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1 Introduction: Bridging Research and Praxis on Both Sides of the 
Atlantic 
 
The average American would likely have a difficult time navigating “the system” – it becomes much 
more difficult for a newcomer who is trying to learn the basics about living in a new country and 
culture. Thus, immigrants become an easy target for policymakers who seek to fix the financial 
problems and budget deficit by cutting services to them, because the possibility of immigrants getting 
heard or uprising (sic) is much lower than any other group.1  
 
Immigrants in the US and the EU face similar challenges in adjusting to a new context and 
setting and learning how to “navigate the new system,” in which they now have to live, 
willingly or not. Integration policies are supposed to ease this learning process. Whether 
immigrants are being heard by local and national authorities or local communities, and how 
integration services for immigrants are managed on both sides of the Atlantic, are crucial 
questions for both integration researchers and practitioners. 
 
1.1 Purpose Statement 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine ways of managing immigrant 
integration and integration policies in the receiving societies, with a special focus on the labor 
market integration of young immigrants.2 The study addresses key interrelated aspects of 
integration policymaking: youth development strategies and the participation of immigrants in 
the local workforce. It also seeks to bridge the gap between the theoretical framework of the 
research on integration and the grounded, local reality of “practicing integration.” 
Indeed, even though the discourse on integration has been evolving rapidly 
throughout the end of the last century and beginning of this one, the focus of research on 
local sites, as the places where the integration of immigrants with the host society actually 
happens or at least should happen, is quite new. The application of a theoretical framework 
for managing integration, developed in this dissertation, is then tested in several different 
local contexts. The hope is that this work will be useful for both theorists and practitioners of 
immigrant integration and youth policies. 
Thus, along with new theoretical insights into the complex research area of immigrant 
integration, the study presents a portrait of integration practices, describing successes and 
shortcomings on both sides of the Atlantic. Simultaneously, the dissertation should foster a 
transatlantic dialog on immigrant integration. By looking at the advanced industrial societies 
                                                     
1
 Delgado M., Jones K., and Rohani M. (2005). Social Work Practice with Refugee and Immigrant 
Youth in the United States. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc., p. 234.     
2
 The term “the receiving society” will be used interchangeably with “the host society.” 
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of the United States, Germany, and Poland, the study seeks to fill a gap in the academic 
field, addressing the need for comparative empirical research and promoting the exchange of 
good and bad practices in providing integration services for young immigrants in America 
and in Europe. 
It is believed that such an exchange is an important step in improving integration. By 
spreading knowledge about local integration practices for immigrant youth, this dissertation 
can and should be a force for social cohesion and defuse local taboos and controversies 
surrounding the issue of immigration, so that “the local” transgresses its borders and 
becomes “the global.” In fact, the globalization of local research on integration can teach, 
warn, and encourage: comparing yourself to others is sometimes the best incentive for 
making improvements and thereby generating innovative ideas, in this case in the field of 
immigrant integration. The showcase of different approaches as a result of the empirical 
study in four city case studies should contribute not only to a critical appreciation of theory 
application and practices, but also stimulate scholars to further transatlantic research on 
managing the integration of immigrant youth. 
 
1.2 Unit of Analysis and Research Questions  
 
The unit of analysis focuses on the supranational, national, state, and local contexts 
for managing the integration of immigrant youth and the work methods of integration service 
providers in the city case studies. The cities in the European case studies are in both old and 
relatively new EU member states, Germany and Poland, which have different bonds and a 
different understanding of what it means to belong to the structure of the Union. They also 
have a different history of immigration. Similarly, on the other side of the Atlantic, the 
American cities are situated in two US states, Arizona and California, which were admitted to 
the United States at different times and have different experiences with immigration. Inside 
these two EU countries and two US states, four cities of a relatively comparable population 
size and distance from each other were selected: San Diego in California, Phoenix in 
Arizona, Munich in Germany, and Warsaw in Poland. The cities are unique in terms of the 
size and diversity of the immigration populations, labor markets, and the roles these cities 
play as immigrant destinations. 
The inconsistencies in definitions of immigrant youth are not conducive to setting 
clear boundaries for empirical comparative research on managing integration of immigrant 
youth in different national and local contexts. Interestingly, no worldwide, universally 
applicable definition of an immigrant3 exists. The study partially follows a rather broad 
                                                     
3
 “Migrant” is a broader category, including immigrants (people coming to a particular country) and 
emigrants (people leaving a given country). However, migrants and immigrants are often used 
interchangeably and the terms are commonly applied to immigrants both in research and practice. 
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definition of the term, proposed by UNESCO. According to this definition, “an immigrant is 
considered any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she 
was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country.”4 Consequently, 
for UNESCO and for this research, tourists who do not intend to stay in a given place for a 
longer period of time are not immigrants. Although UNESCO also does not include refugees, 
displaced persons or others forced to leave their homes among immigrants, these groups of 
people are included here under the single category of “immigrant.” 
Nevertheless, each country seems to have adopted its own interpretation of the term 
in line with its own migration policies and each researcher defines an immigrant in a way that 
best fits into his or her research context. Confusion usually arises about the question of 
whether a refugee is an immigrant and whether second or third generation immigrants should 
still be included in this group. In fact, the term immigrant is widely used without any attempt 
at defining it, and the interpretation of what an immigrant is usually varies from person to 
person and from institution to institution. Similarly, no consensus exists as to what a youth is. 
The age boundaries of this group are quite flexible and have changed throughout human 
history. However, in contemporary America and Europe, the period between 15 and 30 years 
of age may be seen as the crucial period in determining integration into the labor market. 
This thesis is centered around certain key aspects of integration which intersect but 
are rarely put together under one common denominator in research frameworks: immigrant 
youth, the involvement of the receiving society, integration policies, the labor market, and, 
finally, transatlantic comparative research from European and American perspectives in all 
four of these fields. 
The focus on integration places the thesis in the rapidly developing context of 
migration and integration studies in the US and, recently, in the EU – since the 1990s.5 
Furthermore, narrowing down the study to its second crucial aspect, namely to the 
importance of managing immigrant youth integration, is considered of invaluable importance 
for academic and practical purposes. Immigrant youth are perceived as an underprivileged 
group, both in research and integration measures in practice.  
Nevertheless, immigrant youth are not the focal point of the analysis, but the 
integration policies and measures on the part of those who welcome them, namely the 
receiving society. The need for this shift of perspective in integration research from immigrant 
groups to the host society has already been recognized in academia in view of new, 
changing migration flows and the formation of “super diversity” in metropolises. Accordingly, 
immigrants cannot be so easily grouped into single ethnic categories in one location 
                                                     
4
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (n.d.).  
Glossary of Migration Related Terms. 
5
 Penninx, R. (2008). Migration and the City: Local Citizenship and Integration Policies. In M. L. 
Fonseca (Ed.), Cities in Movement: Migrants and Urban Change (pp. 225-240). Lisbon: Centro de 
Estudos Geográficos, University of Lisbon. 
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nowadays.6 Therefore, the study seeks to investigate integration policies and measures for 
all young immigrants, regardless of their ethnic roots. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this research to take into consideration all aspects 
of integration processes targeting immigrant youth. The focus of integration measures is on 
the preliminary stage, when immigrants are making their way to independence: integrating 
into the workforce, which is considered an indispensable step toward self-sufficiency and 
participation in the structure of the society. 
Finally, the research is carried out against the background of the emerging 
comparative transatlantic research in the field of immigrant integration, bridging the gap 
between two continents which are very attractive for immigrants: America and Europe. The 
exchange of integration measures and techniques and their implementation both in research 
and practice in different integration traditions are the fifth aspect of the study. 
The analysis of the interplay of five pieces of the conceptual framework should 
provide the reader with the answers to the following questions:  
 
1)  What factors influence the development of local labor market integration 
initiatives for helping young immigrants enter the labor market? 
2)  How do these factors enable the receiving society to tap into the potential of 
young immigrants?  
3)  Can the exchange of integration policy research and of practical experience 
with integration management between the United States and the European 
Union be of use? 
 
1.3 Organization of the Study 
 
Following the Introduction, chapter 2 familiarizes the reader with the first task of this 
dissertation: the theoretical framework for researching and managing the integration of 
immigrant youth. This framework incorporates the following key aspects: 1) the concept of 
integration; 2) understanding integration through the lens of integration into the labor market; 
3) the role of integration policies and primary stakeholders in immigrant integration on the 
part of the host society; 4) the reason for focusing on integration measures for immigrant 
youth. Finally, the chapter provides the rationale for the study of Affirmative Integration 
Management, as well as the role of good practice exchanges in both integration theory and 
practice. 
Chapter 3 presents the rationale, design, and methods of the transatlantic study 
against the background of existing and newly-developing models of transatlantic cooperation 
                                                     
6
 Vertovec, S. (2006). The Emergence of Superdiversity in Britain. Center on Migration, Policy and 
Society, Working Paper 25. Oxford: COMPAS, University of Oxford.  
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within the field of integration policies. It explains the process of selecting the case studies 
and the research methodology, and introduces the research guidelines. The main points of 
investigation are presented in the criteria catalog of measures for the labor market integration 
of immigrant youth. Finally, the empirical research guidelines for the interview questions are 
summarized. 
In chapters 4 and 5, the focus shifts towards empirical research, examining whether 
and how the theory presented thus far functions in praxis. Chapter 4 focuses on top-down 
contexts for local integration management. Various levels of governance which influence 
local integration policies and integration practices in the case studies are analyzed. For 
Munich and Warsaw, both the EU as well as the German and Polish integration frameworks, 
respectively, are presented. With regard to Phoenix and San Diego, both the US federal and 
the state policies of Arizona and California are examined. 
The analysis of the national and regional contexts for the cities is guided by seven 
points of investigation with reference to the countries and states in focus: historical insights 
into immigration in the post-Second World War period; the scale of immigration accompanied 
by available statistical data; political and public discourse on migration and integration; 
national integration policies; and national immigration policies concerning citizenship, 
education, and the labor market, which have an impact on the integration challenges 
immigrant youth face. 
Chapter 5 presents local integration frameworks and practical efforts toward 
immigrant integration in city case studies focusing on San Diego, Phoenix, Munich, and 
Warsaw. Firstly, the cities are briefly examined from a comparative perspective, with regard 
to their current status and as gateways to integration for both young immigrants, and as 
receiving societies. Secondly, the integration work of local organizations is analyzed 
separately for each local case study in the context of top-down national and state policies 
and the cities’ own modes of integration. The following issues, which focus on the labor 
market integration of immigrant youth, are discussed in each case study in relation to the top-
down integration policies and the local integration context: the perception of immigrant 
integration in the organizations interviewed; local integration challenges for immigrant youth; 
integration programs offered by immigration and youth service providers; the ways the 
organizations reach out to immigrants and the local society; methods of network-building for 
governmental and non-governmental organizations working on immigrant integration in the 
city. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions based on the analysis of local institutions’ 
measures for integrating immigrant youth into the labor market in different contexts and a 
discussion of the research questions. It also elaborates on the limitations of the research, 
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introduces prospects for further study, and finally proposes recommendations for integration 
work for immigrant youth and transatlantic research on immigrant integration.  
 
1.4 Research Context Setting 
 
In empirical research on integration, nothing is more important than understanding the 
local context in which individual immigrants land. The same is true for the research context. 
The time-frame of the field visits, the world economic situation, and the atmosphere around 
the subject of integration heavily impacted the process of scientific inquiry and the writing of 
this dissertation. 
As already noted, and something that will often recur throughout the next pages, the 
subject of immigrant integration became very topical and contentious on both sides of the 
Atlantic as the empirical research was being conducted, in Poland, Germany, and the United 
States, between November 2007 and April 2009. Following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, many countries began to rethink who is welcome and who is not. Moreover, as an 
economic and financial crisis had engulfed the world, this was also a time of rethinking who 
is profitable and who is not. Given these contexts, migration and integration turned out to be 
a very touchy issue both in academia and politics. During my research and the process of 
writing, I had to confront challenges arising from an overwhelming flow of new information. 
Breaking news on integration and immigration, which arrived regularly in my email box from 
migration institutes and organizations I had interviewed in the United States, Germany, and 
Poland, was both intriguing and distracting. In fact, trying to keep up to date with the latest 
developments in the topic of my research on both sides of the Atlantic seems almost as 
challenging as compiling research findings and the analyses of personal experiences 
deriving from my transatlantic field work into a single dissertation project. The hope is that 
this endeavor, which has resulted in the piece of work the reader is now holding in her or his 
hands, will prove useful for both migration researchers and integration practitioners and 
inspiring to anyone who has never thought about the challenges immigrant youth may face in 
dealing with “the new system.” 
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2 Researching and Managing Integration 
 
Immigrant integration research should by no means serve only one purpose: either as 
a sole report on the situation of immigrant integration in a given context or simply as a 
theoretical but abstract debate on the concept of integration, without any reference to 
integration practices. An ambitious aim of integration research is to accomplish both tasks by 
combining practices which are sometimes isolated, bringing together various perspectives 
and constructing new theoretical approaches to integration in order to produce the best 
applicable solutions to the challenges of integration. The fragmentation and lack of a variety 
of perspectives in migration and integration research have already been noted by many 
researchers, for example the Economic and Social Research Council, and will be addressed 
in chapter 3.7 
This chapter will introduce the reader to the first task of this dissertation: the 
theoretical framework for researching and managing the integration of immigrant youth. This 
framework encompasses the following key aspects: 1) the concept of integration; 2) 
understanding integration through the prism of integration into the labor market; 3) the role of 
integration policies and primary stakeholders in immigrant integration on the part of the host 
society; 4) the reason for focusing on integration measures for immigrant youth. Finally, the 
chapter will provide the rationale for the study in the thesis of Affirmative Integration 
Management, and the role of good practice exchanges in both integration theory and 
practice. 
 
2.1 Immigrant Integration as a Concept and Process 
 
Although integration is a very individual, autonomous and complex process, the 
examination and discussions of potential patterns may help to better manage immigrant 
inclusion into the structure of the host society. Generating categories and forming a 
conceptual framework become helpful tools in facing certain immigrant integration 
management challenges, presented in the research questions.8 As Richard D. Alba and 
Victor Nee elaborate on the meaning of any theory: “The test of a theory lies in the power of 
its application to empirical reality, in the reach of its ability to organize and give interpretive 
coherence to otherwise disparate facts.”9 My hope is that the hypothesis and theories 
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discussed here will pass such a test. In fact, the complexity of individual integration 
processes might discourage integration-practitioners from even thinking of the concepts 
behind their work. Nevertheless, it can be argued that organizing scattered thoughts on 
integration research might also prove useful in practical work with immigrants. 
The theoretical framework for integration to be developed and applied here situates 
this dissertation within the rapidly expanding fields within sociology, which conceptualize and 
monitor immigrant integration. This task is difficult, as views of immigrant integration are very 
often distorted, combined with other concepts in the social sciences, often politicized and 
interpreted differently by individual policy-makers. The first step in addressing these 
challenges is to focus on managing immigrant integration in a general framework, taking into 
account though not yet contextualizing the national and the local realm of the receiving 
society, which will be the focus of chapters 3 and 4. 
Despite the complexity of the concept of integration, an attempt must be made at 
defining it. Following Adrian Favell’s optimism in tackling controversial public issues, I fully 
agree that “[d]ilemmas might be a resource of social progress, [and] failure to manage will be 
a loss of moral social order.”10 Indeed, immigrant integration contributes to the sustainability 
of moral social order, which in turn gives the society cohesion and unity.11 
In order to define the concept of immigrant integration, it is important to agree first on 
the meaning of the word “integration.” Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann provide a 
good summary of generally applicable interpretations of integration.12 According to them, 
integration can be generally defined as “the stability of relations among parts within a system 
like a whole.” It refers to one of three general processes, applicable to any area of study: 
- forming a new structure by relating single elements to one another; 
- forming interconnected wholes, including single elements or partial structures into 
an existing structure; 
- maintaining or developing relations within a system or structure. 
Each of them, although different in the interdependent relations of the new elements, 
aims at progress and is process-oriented. 
In a sociological context, integration refers to the stability of relations among actors or 
groups in a given social system. How this stability can be achieved and maintained in the 
context of local and national immigrant integration challenges is of great importance to local 
practitioners and policy makers on integration. 
This stability might be perceived at two levels. According to social system theories, 
there are two crucial concepts: the system and social integration. System integration results 
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from the cooperative functioning of institutions, organizations, and particular mechanisms: 
the state, the legal system, markets, corporate actors, and finance system. Social integration, 
on the other hand, is defined as the inclusion of an individual in a system.13 It could be 
argued that these two processes are interrelated. Effective system integration, which 
provides a society with both rights and constraints, is a prerequisite for social integration. The 
degree of social integration, in turn, promotes the development of new incentives and the 
system’s structural development (e.g. new institutions or new legislation). 
The integration of immigrants into the receiving society is the subject of the second 
type of integration: social integration. This integration is influenced by a number of factors 
dependent on system integration, among others the integration policies as a product of this 
system.14 Moreover, just as immigration flows fluctuate in particular societies throughout their 
histories, the rhetoric of immigrant integration is also constantly undergoing change. The 
evolution of integration is closely connected to the development of migration processes in a 
given time and in a given local context. Therefore, it is crucial that integration research 
focuses not only on a particular group of migrants but first of all on the spatial context of their 
integration.15 This social environment will be the subject of tests in the empirical part of this 
study, which will make a theoretical concept of integration more operational.  
I will now present an overview of the evolution of the key concepts used, compared or 
contrasted in integration research. 
 
2.1.1 The Roots of Integration Theories in American Experience 
 
Contemporary concepts of integration, initially referred to as “assimilation” by 
scholars, stem from the American experience and American process of nation-building 
through the incorporation of immigrants since colonial times. The idea of what a settler 
society should look like has been continuously disputed and evolving, while simultaneously 
new groups of immigrants have been entering the receiving society.16 As Aristide Zolberg 
notes, the process of identity-formation in America followed the usual route of nation-building 
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and national integration, “involving a crystallization of the us and a reinforcement of the 
boundary between ‘us’ and ‘others.’”17 This nation was first based on the common ethnic 
background of Anglo–Saxons but soon, after a number of conflict with Britain and with a lack 
of confidence in the new nation’s future, the “us” was more about a civic nation bounded by 
one political entity, with its own American version of the English language, although it still 
sought to exclude many ethnic groups. In fact, American distinctiveness, although already of 
importance in the late colonial period, fully blossomed in and after the separation of the 
colonies from Great Britain.  
Americanization as a strategy to create one nation evolved over the course of the 
history of immigration to the US and finally culminated in a new trend in American society the 
Americanization movement.18 It dates back to the later period, from about 1900 to the early 
1920s, when an increasing number of new immigrant groups, primarily from eastern and 
southern Europe, started to flood into the Promised Land. It was no longer clear who was still 
alien and who was already “truly American.” 
The first two decades of the 20th century was a time when, after a period of 
welcoming immigrants, a growing number of Americans began to reconsider the importance 
of maintaining their old culture and began emphasizing mutual solidarity and cohesion 
among the homogeneous group of Americans of Anglo-Saxon origin.19 In the most radical 
version it took the form of Anglo-Saxon racism, and in the second half of the 20th century, 
instead of Americanization, the term “WASPification” (from “White Anglo-Saxon Protestant”) 
was coined.20 WASPification signified the process of imposing on immigrants the values of 
the Anglo-Saxon founders, such as the Protestant work ethic, the worship of usefulness, 
civic-mindedness and reverence for the principles of the Declaration of Independence and 
the Constitution. 
Americanization is considered both a sociological and a political movement. As a 
political movement it was “a concerted policy” with an activist role for the federal government 
in molding the newcomers into Americans, which was part of the Progressive Era’s 
centralized effort to construct a modern and cohesive social order.21 Federal agencies such 
as the Bureau of Naturalization in the Department of Labor, the Bureau of Education in the 
Department of Interior, the Committee on Public Information, Council of National Defense 
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were the main actors involved. The measures of those times were as controversial as were 
the various approaches employed in Americanization.  
Some Americans, considering their own national identity as (largely) the heritage of 
their British ancestors, opted for a restrictive policy to curb the influx of immigrants and 
invoked American nationalism. Others supported the process of Americanization by providing 
immigrants with various institutions and help. The purpose, as Isaac Berkson put it, was to 
adapt them to the new reality often by “divesting [them] of old characteristics” rather than 
cultivating their old ways of life.22 Naturally, the process of evolving into a full-fledged citizen 
of the United States was much more difficult than simply meeting the demands of the 1802 
Naturalization Act (“five years of residency, loyalty to the Constitution, and the forsaking of 
foreign allegiance and titles.”)23 What was crucial for developing in the newcomers a sense of 
belonging to a new, large collective group was first familiarizing them with this group’s 
culture. Such was the role among Jewish minorities of the Education Alliance, the largest 
Jewish organization in the country, which offer new immigrants lessons in English, literature, 
civics, and history, as well as industrial classes and recreation. Another noteworthy 
organization was the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), which came into being in 
the US in 1851, offering, among other things, practical educational programs set up for 
immigrants. These and other state and local bodies became the driving force of the 
Americanization campaign. Many of them joined the National Americanization Committee 
(NAC) during the wartime period. Its character, as the director of the organization Frances A. 
Kellor put it, was “half reformer, half nationalist,”24 which resulted in the forced assimilation 
movement both in schools and in education programs. Some strict conditions were imposed 
on schools, such as the admission requirement of American citizenship or restrictions on the 
use of languages other than English.25 Therefore, the very term Americanization has often 
had unfavorable associations with cultural antagonism toward foreign traditions and with a 
violation of freedom, a dear tenet of the American Constitution. 
These associations have prevailed up to the present, although Americanization is 
currently being reinterpreted both by politicians and researchers.26 Zolberg tries to find a 
common ground in many opposing stances, summing up the controversy surrounding the 
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Americanization movement in a mild sort of way: “However painful Americanization might be, 
it nevertheless constituted a genuine invitation, which ultimately held out the promise of 
incorporation and full membership for those who conformed.”27 
In contrast to Americanization understood as the suppression of immigrants and their 
consent to conformity, other approaches to assimilation in the United States began to 
emphasize not only immigrants’ adaptability but also their contribution to the formation of the 
new nation. Such a model of ethnic interaction, described as the “melting pot,” was 
popularized by Israel Zangwill, whose play The Melting Pot attracted large audiences in New 
York in 1909. It was the story of the Russian Jew David settling down in New York. The 
protagonist advocated the fusion of all nationalities to create a new American one. As he 
preached, “America is God’s Crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe 
are melting and reforming.”28 
Much as the idea of the melting pot has turned out to be a utopian vision, its principle 
of universalism and its emphasis on newness in the developing American culture have been 
commented upon in many texts on the ethnic diversification from America and elsewhere. In 
this framework all the immigrants were supposed to become new people, and merge into one 
community together with the first descendents.29 However theoretically, it would lead to 
melting away what made the immigrants unique, which was starting to be associated with 
conformism by melting pot’s critics.30 
Cultural pluralism was the next step in the search for the explanation of the complex 
nature of the transformation of immigrants’ identity and the generation of social cohesion 
between the newcomers and the host society. The roots of cultural pluralism also go back to 
the debates about America as a civic nation. It was a reaction to the utopian version of 
melting pot and to Anglo-Saxon conformity.  
The concept was first used by Horace M. Kallen, a German-born Jewish-American 
philosopher, during a class he was teaching at Harvard around 1906 or 1907.31 It was 
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publicly introduced and popularized much later in Kallen’s publications.32 The concept allows 
for hyphenated identities of immigrants and propagates the celebration of their ethnic roots. 
Kallen questioned America’s own distinctive nationality and advanced the idea of America as 
“a great republic consisting of a federation or commonwealth of nationalities.”33 As he 
argued, an immigrant’s cultural consciousness was even strengthened by the attempts of 
Americanization, which resulted in their dissimilation.34 In Kallen’s view, the harmony of 
different ethnic societies in one nation can only be achieved in accordance with the principles 
of democratic society: respect for self-realization in accordance with one’s own ethnic roots, 
which are seen as an immigrant’s spiritual assets. The development of these assets should 
be guaranteed by the government: “There are human capacities which it is the function of the 
state to liberate and to protect.” Such a function on the part of the state would result in “a 
multiplicity in a unity.”35 According to Kallen, this form of unity is only possible in a democratic 
society “whose institutions encourage individuality in groups, in persons, in temperaments, 
whose program liberates these individualities and guides them into a fellowship of freedom 
and cooperation.”36 However, the real role of the government in this process was not clear. 
Kallen envisioned America as an ideal “orchestration of mankind” based on an idealistic tenet 
of Americanism: democracy. The unresolved challenge for such a vision is the question who 
would be the conductor of such an orchestra of many different tunes and where is the 
unifying force of its members. 
Inspired by Kallen’s cultural pluralism, his contemporary Randolph Bourne tried to 
answer this question and further developed the idea of the merging of cultures into a “Trans-
National America.” Within such an America many heterogeneous national groups would be 
unified in “a democratic cooperation in determining the ideals and purposes and industrial 
and social institutions of a country.” Bourne called for a national effort to cherish the 
distinctiveness of transnationality, rejecting the ideals of the melting pot or homogenous 
Americanism. According to Bourne America should be a “cosmopolitan enterprise” of “distinct 
but cooperating foreign cultures.” Kallen’s focus on the individual’s freedom to cultivate his or 
her own ethnic identity was shifted in Bourne’s vision towards the principles of common 
freedom in a democratic “Beloved Community.” Their cosmopolitan members were to be 
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united by a national acceptance of the ideal of mutual respect and understanding.37 This 
would be a unifying force for Kallen’s orchestration of mankind.  
Indeed, cultural pluralism has undergone changes and even in Kallen’s later work 
was associated with the liberal strain of Americanization, defined as “Americanization, 
supporting, cultivating a cultural pluralism.”38  
Today, Kallen's and Bourne’s ideas are rejected by the advocates of multicultural 
society who are constantly searching for an ideal frame for maintaining cultural diversity.39 In 
the end cultural pluralism has expanded beyond the American context and established itself 
as an “intellectual ancestor of contemporary multiculturalism.”40 It gave rise to 
multiculturalism and its “politics of recognition,” which have been adopted as official policy in 
many western nations since 1970.41 The latter emphasizes the recognition of the cultural 
diversity contributed by the minority.42 Much as the idea of multiculturalism has been 
extensively discussed both in politics and research, of the many controversies there is one 
important unresolved challenge in the multiculturalists’ framework for immigrant integration 
into the host society. As Alba correctly notes, the assumed parity of cultures is difficult to 
achieve in the mainstream society, as there are asymmetrical expectations: members of a 
majority culture impose many requirements upon the minority (e.g. to be successful they 
must be bicultural) whereas no expectations are put on the majority.43  
Although cultural pluralism is seen as an early-twentieth-century version of a 
multicultural United States,44 the concepts of dual identities and hyphenated nature of 
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immigrants have a strong influence on the integration theories which are applicable to a 
context outside the US as well. Similarly, the aforementioned Americanization movement and 
the melting pot ideal are fundaments for integration research examining other democratic 
states, even though they appear in throughout the literature on the US rather than on other 
countries. Consequently, the contemporary reinterpretations of these four core ideas: 
Americanization, the melting pot, cultural pluralism, and multiculturalism, such as David A. 
Hollinger’s ”post-ethnicity” or Noah Pickus’ “new civic nationalism” might be more universal 
for research on regions outside the US than expected.45 Roger Waldinger points out the 
relevance of American concepts for international research as follows: “As international 
migration is an exception to the system by which states bind mutually exclusively 
populations, the fundamental dilemmas it produces are experienced by the residents of all 
the rich democracies, not just by Americans.”46 By the same token, American assimilation 
theories, as scientific interpretations of the aforementioned four concepts which are crucial 
for American nation-building, may be considered first drafts of contemporary integration 
theories. 
 
2.1.2 Assimilation Theory 
 
The first scientifically-oriented assimilation theory can be traced to the 1920s, in the 
Chicago School of Sociology, with Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. They based their 
concepts on the close observation of the urban environment around them.47 Their early 
definition of assimilation referred to “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which 
persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and 
groups and by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them into a 
common cultural life.”48 Soon, Park became a pioneer of “race relations cycle theory,” which 
claims that relations between migrants and non-migrants go through the sequence of 
contact, competition, accommodation and eventually assimilation.49 In contrast to what is 
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often believed, these first concepts of assimilation theory should be understood as a two-way 
process of interaction between newcomers and the residing inhabitants, living in “cultural 
solidarity”50 without eradication of immigrant ethnic culture.  
William L. Warner and Leo Srole introduced the familiar concept of assimilation as a 
one-sided process, as a “straight-line assimilation theory,” according to which all immigrant 
groups would inevitably evolve toward the American way of life at their own pace.51  
Furthermore, a multitude of concepts and theories about assimilation were 
synthesized by Milton Gordon in Assimilation in American Life, in which he introduced a 
multidimensional index of assimilation variables: cultural, structural, marital, identificational, 
attitude receptional, behavior receptional, and civic. Acculturation, a one-way process of 
adopting the unchanged core culture, was supposed to be a prerequisite for further structural 
assimilation, that is for an entry into the socio-economic mainstream. In Gordon’s framework 
only the latter would lead to other dimensions of assimilation.52 
A radical version of a one-sided assimilation model triggered many hostile reactions. 
Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan argued that the success of structural assimilation is 
largely influenced by categorization of human beings, which results in the creation of social 
distance. Referring to the Chicago School of Sociology, they claimed that the boundary 
between ethnic groups mostly stems from competition for resources and symbolic 
domination.53  
Another skeptical reaction to straight-line assimilation was raised by Herbert Gans in 
his bumpy line theory. According to Gans, assimilation may not turn out to be such a smooth 
process and may result in either upward or downward mobility.54 Similar doubts can be found 
in the notion of ”segmented assimilation,” introduced by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, who 
argue that immigrants are incorporated in different strata of the host society, either moving 
into the middle class or into a disadvantaged social strata.55 
Currently, there is a tendency among scholars towards recovering the original 
concept of assimilation. Relating to the significance of social boundaries, Alba and Nee 
remake the concept of assimilation through the notion of an “assimilatory boundary 
change.”56 The latter implies narrowing social distances between immigrants and the 
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receiving society, described as the “attenuation of distinctions based on ethnic origin.”57 
Assimilation is reinterpreted as a two-sided process, as “members of the minority must seek 
entry into social contexts occupied by majority group: and members of the majority must find 
their entrance acceptable.”58 This marks a return to the first two-way concept of the 
assimilation theory, developed by Park and Burgess, with some innovations. The new 
assimilation theory allows for alternative patterns of incorporation: assimilation is not 
inevitable nor is it irreversible. Assimilation depends on many factors such as individual 
choices, the collective actions of ethnic groups, and institutional mechanisms for monitoring 
and enforcement of assimilation. Therefore, in this “remade” assimilation theory great 
emphasis is placed on interdependencies among the individual, social groups and the 
system. 
The rhetoric of integration and assimilation is influenced to a great extent by the 
historical context of migration movements in a given time and place. Accordingly, a European 
perspective must be different from an American one.59 
With the rise of the importance of the nation state and citizenship in the late-
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe, policies of assimilation were associated with 
cultural suppression, forcing minorities to adapt to the mainstream. Assimilation became a 
taboo concept after World War II, as a reaction to the extremist nationalism and the 
expulsion of minorities.60 Many researchers and policy-makers nowadays seem to stick to the 
concept of integration rather than assimilation. The word “integration” is more politically 
correct and does not have bad connotations. In the US on the other hand, the society is more 
used to the idea of building one nation out of many cultures, due to “a progressive shrinking 
of socially relevant differences between groups.”61 Therefore, the concept of assimilation is 
not as loaded as it is in Europe, where it is highly politicized and associated with the 
enforcement of constraints and limitations on immigrants.62 
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However, a new interpretation of assimilation theories has also been traced in 
Europe, though perhaps to a lesser extent than in the US. More researchers refer to 
integration as assimilation nowadays, signaling the need for reconceptualizing the 
implications of assimilation in light of a new trend towards transnationalism.63 These two 
processes of assimilation and transnationalism can in fact be viewed as complimentary. In 
face of growing transnational connections Michael Bommes provides an interesting 
interpretation of assimilation as a unifying process for all individuals, irrespective of their 
ethnic background. According to Bommes, assimilation is a general necessity for all 
individuals who want to succeed in modern society, not merely immigrants. By the same 
token, transnationalism with cultural plurality and assimilation is not contradictory. Whoever 
wants to gain access to society has to fulfill “the bundles of social expectations” about the 
given roles they take in the society. Therefore, the issue of immigrant assimilation 
corresponds to more or less favorable conditions of participation in social systems.64 
Assimilation is still perceived as a change process both for immigrants, assimilating to the 
expectations linked to their new roles, and the social systems, transformed by the immigrants 
themselves. “They [immigrants] not only do conform to these expectations, but they develop 
corresponding expectations' expectations.”65 Again, the commonly accepted perception 
would be that the host society should be willing to undergo change in order to guarantee 
social cohesion. Such an approach corresponds to Alba’s vision of assimilation as 
“assimilatory boundary change.”66 
There are some more points of convergence in theories and trends in research on 
assimilation in America and in Europe. As Nee and Alba rightly point out: 
 
The theoretical framework [of American concepts of assimilation] can be extended to global 
cities elsewhere by taking into account the differing institutional contexts, especially with 
respect to cultural beliefs and the informal and formal rules governing citizenship. The theory 
of assimilation turns on distal causes stemming from the institutional mechanisms of 
monitoring and enforcement that structure incentives in the institutional environment.67 
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With regard to possible synergies among transatlantic perspectives on assimilation, 
one should take into account national and local differences, although the theoretical 
frameworks seem to have very much in common on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
2.1.3 From Assimilation to Integration 
 
In a number of interpretations of assimilation throughout the rather short history of its 
rapid development presented above, there seem to be a number of overlaps with the concept 
of integration.68 Although it seems quite impossible to set the boundaries between 
contemporary concepts of assimilation and integration, the conceptual framework for the 
process of integration proposed here attempts to clarify the relation of assimilation to 
integration. 
First, it should be stressed that there are some problems and ongoing debates in 
theories of immigrant integration among past and contemporary scholars. One of issue is a 
constant imprecision in the use of different terms for integration. Although the concept of 
integration is relatively new, there have been other widely-used alternatives, such as 
assimilation, acculturation, or inclusion. They have paved the way for current integration 
research. Nevertheless, they have often been used interchangeably or confused with 
integration. In researchers’ dialogues with practitioners, such scientific concepts might 
acquire normative connotations, making it difficult for scientists to use them in 
communication with a broader audience.69 Some of these terms, like “assimilation” in Europe, 
have negative associations, so they are quickly replaced by terms which are less 
ideologically loaded.70 
The strategy among scholars and/or policy-makers for using terms associated with 
immigrants entering the receiving society seems to be rather unclear and is apparently 
influenced by the local political climate and debates on the subject of immigration. As a 
result, if one term is not politically correct, an alternative is used, putting many concepts 
under one umbrella, and letting others decide where the boundaries between the concepts 
are located. Such an approach complicates the task of drawing the lines between theories of 
assimilation and integration. 
I will here draw on the concept of integration developed by German scholars Friedrich 
Heckmann and Hertmut Esser, who categorize the dimensions and stages of immigrant 
integration in a structured and comprehensible way. Comparing the frameworks of the two 
illustrates how closely related the concepts of assimilation and integration remain. 
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As mentioned previously, following Lockwood’s framework, immigrant integration 
pertains to social integration, meaning the inclusion of immigrants as individual actors in 
existing social structures of the host country.71 According to Esser, the latter involves both 
the host society and ethnic communities.72 Immigrant integration is considered “a multilevel 
and multidimensional process” with different dimensions.73 Reinterpreting Gordon’s 
assimilation theory, Esser proposes four basic forms of social interaction and integration into 
the existing social structure across four dimensions: acculturation, placement, interaction, 
and identification.74 Heckmann, alternatively, labels them cultural, structural, interactive, and 
identificational integration.75 
 
These four categories are discussed here in more detail:  
 
a) Acculturation (cultural integration) is the process by which an individual acquires 
the knowledge, cultural standards, and competencies needed to interact 
successfully in a society. This stage is a prerequisite for any other form of 
integration. Language acquisition plays a key role in this process. Acculturation 
does not require that the immigrant abandon cultural practices. In contrast, 
immigrants may profit, ideally, from their ethnic cultures, using their biculturalism 
as an asset in the host society. 
 
b) Placement (structural integration) relates to obtaining a position in society by 
acquiring an access to full legal rights, education, the labor market, and public 
institutions. One may also call it socio-economic integration in the educational or 
economic systems.76 Placement also implies the acquisition of rights associated 
with particular positions and the opportunity to establish social relations. 
Integration into the labor market is a crucial part of this process. 
 
c) Interaction (interactive integration) is the formation of relationships and 
communication networks by individuals who share a common orientation, 
resulting in membership in social groups within the host society. This integration 
can be in the form of friendships, relationships, marriages, voluntary activities, 
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or more generally in memberships within social groups. This process of 
integration may of course be extended to other locations and, unlike 
acculturation and placement, is not bounded by the local context of the 
immigrant’s residence. 
 
d) Identification (identificational integration) refers to the development of an 
individual’s emotional bonds and sense of belonging to a local community or 
country and involves immigrants forming their own perceptions of how they see 
themselves as part of the receiving society. This form of integration takes place 
at a very subjective level of the immigrant’s self-identification and is not 
considered a condition for other dimensions of integration. Accordingly, one 
may participate in a core social structure without identifying oneself with the 
host society. 
 
It should be noted that Heckmann’s dimensions of integration – cultural, structural, 
interactive, and identificational – have a narrower focus and refer to integration into the host 
society. Esser´s terminology, on the other hand, encompasses integration both into the host 
society and ethnic/immigrant communities. Esser places the concept of assimilation in the 
framework of social integration. Within this framework, he distinguishes “individual 
assimilation” putting it on a par with individual integration into the host society but not with the 
ethnic community. Individual assimilation can occur within the aforementioned four 
dimensions: acculturation, placement, interaction, and identification.77 However, the following 
alternatives to such complete assimilation are possible (see table 1): 
 
Table 1 Assimilation in Esser’s Framework for Social Integration into the Host Society and into an 
Ethnic Group78 
 
 Social integration into the host society 
 YES NO 
YES multiple inclusion individual 
segmentation Social integration into 
ethnic group 
NO 
 
individual assimilation 
 
marginality 
 
a) marginality as the failure of integrating either within the host society or the 
ethnic community, 
b) individual segmentation as integration only with ethnic community, or 
c) multiple inclusion as integration in both social systems (e.g. bilingualism). 
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It might be assumed that complete social integration into the host society takes place only in 
the form of individual assimilation. 
These detailed differentiations between levels of integration into ethnic communities 
and the host society are considered a bit too confusing for the purposes of this thesis. Since 
the scope of the empirical research in this work is more oriented toward the host-society, 
throughout the dissertation the concept of immigrant integration will be used with reference to 
a given host society only, without reference to existing ethnic communities. Moreover, it is 
crucial to keep in mind that Heckmann’s understanding of social integration into the host 
society adopted in this research corresponds to Esser’s individual assimilation. 
Esser’s and Heckmann’s frameworks address integration in a very structured way 
and seem to be the most transparent ones for application in research. 79 However, in using 
any framework, one runs the risk of oversimplifying individuals’ integration process in 
different contexts. It is important to be aware of these limitations during any empirical study. 
In fact, the confusion over integration extends beyond theoretical concepts and terminology 
to application of the theories in practice at the national and local level, which will be explored 
in later chapters. 
There is an ongoing debate on whether integration should be viewed as a one-way or 
two-way process, in other words whether a prerequisite for successful integration involves 
adaptability on the part of immigrants only or of the host community as well. The need for a 
contribution on the part of the local community toward the process of immigrant integration 
remains a very thorny issue. Opinions vary according to different political agendas and the 
pro- or anti-immigration moods in different local contexts. 
I consider integration an interactive, two-way process between immigrants and the 
host society. Therefore, not only are immigrants expected to change, but the receiving 
society also has to be willing to absorb some new trends and to transform itself as well. At 
the institutional level it means being open to dealing with the challenges of immigrant 
integration and granting immigrants the same opportunities as other residents. 
Integration should be also seen as a long-term process. The question arises then 
whether reaching the end-stage is feasible. Theoretically, it is possible to reach the goal of 
complete integration within Heckmann’s four dimensions of integration. Practically, however, 
it would be hard to measure the success of integration for a couple of reasons. 
First, it is difficult to measure and monitor the integration process: the easiest and the 
most widely-used measurement methods among policy makers and researchers exist for 
structural and cultural integration (with such indicators as intermarriages, citizenship, level of 
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proficiency with the host society’s language) while other process: interactive and 
identificational ones are much harder to calculate. 
Secondly, some factors which influence the extent of immigrants’ integration vary. As 
Wayne Cornelius notes, these include: 
 
a) the differing vulnerabilities and coping resources; 
b) different patterns of exposure to racial discrimination; 
c) proximity to educationally dysfunctional inner-city subcultures; 
d) changing economic conditions (e.g. the disappearance of traditional 
occupational mobility ladders triggered by economic restructuring); 
e) the legal and political context affecting documented and undocumented 
immigrants.80 
 
Thus individual immigrants’ attributes and willingness to integrate are not solely 
responsible for their integration, but a network of interdependent factors also determines the 
outcome of integration. 
Finally, what is the mainstream to which immigrants are supposed to integrate? 
However absurd it may sound, defining the mainstream as an unchanging and stable strata 
of society is quite difficult. The host society is constantly evolving and is being challenged by 
ever-changing trends: globalization with exposure to new ethnic influences and increased 
access to distant contacts, the current political and economic situation, new transnational 
networks, and changing concepts of race in a particular society.81 Accordingly, new pluralistic 
patterns of coexistence are emerging in the host society and for the immigrants: e.g. 
immigrants establishing ethnic enclaves or maintaining ethnic affiliations, while 
simultaneously participating in the core institutions of the host society.82 This form of 
transnationalism need not hamper integration and may even facilitate the building of 
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international relations in the host society.83 In this way, the host society is never 
homogenous. By the same token immigrants’ biculturalism in no way prevents them from 
joining the ”mainstream,” as vividly illustrated in the case of the US. As Philip Kasinitz and 
others argue, children of immigrants have a unique opportunity to blend their traditional and 
“Americanized” ways, “keeping some elements and discarding others as they go along.”84 
Although some destination countries refuse to acknowledge the fact that they are countries 
of immigrants, the influence of new immigrant groups and the consequent changes to the 
mainstream are undeniable. 
Since the host society is never a uniform and coherent system, integration happens to 
different segments of society (with immigrants’ upward or downward mobility). The 
phenomenon of immigrant admission into different segments of the host society refers to the 
aforementioned concept of “segmented assimilation.”85 However, in the interest of employing 
coherent terminology the concept of segmented integration will be used here instead.86 
Suarez-Orozco provides the following explanation of this phenomenon in the US:  
 
Given their diverse origins, financial resources, and social network, immigrants gravitate to 
very different sectors of American society. While some are able to join integrated well-to-do 
neighborhoods, the majority of today’s immigrants come to experience American culture from 
the vantage point of poor urban neighborhoods.87 
 
The mainstream can be understood as that part of society which takes advantage of 
full participation in the structures and core institutions of a society and guarantees its new 
members advancement and upward mobility. Therefore, the idea of joining the mainstream 
as a successful integration strategy does not mean joining one homogenous culture and 
values but this segment of society which provides opportunities for immigrants’ development 
and their upward integration. Ideally, immigrants should gain access to these opportunities, 
join the mainstream, and by the same token transform it as well. Thus neither the 
mainstream nor integration to the mainstream are static.  
In fact, as previously discussed, social integration is dependent both on the new 
members as well as those receiving the immigrants, dependent on the so-called “glue of the 
society.”88 Therefore, it is impossible to operationalize the concept of immigrant integration 
without making reference to a particular society. Although the theories of immigrant 
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integration presented here might seem to be abstract now, without reference to particular 
conditions, they will be contextualized in later chapters with case studies on managing of 
immigrant youth integration. Of the multitude of complex fields of integration processes, the 
focus for this dissertation will be on the management of integration into the labor market as 
the most crucial dimension for immigrant youth integration. 
 
2.2 Labor Market Integration 
 
“If there was enough work and money to live normally, it would be very good. Now 
there is nothing as you can see: no work, nothing. We would like to work normally.”89 This 
comment from a refugee in Poland illustrates the underlying motives for migration and the 
decision to stay or leave a host country: to get a job and live a decent life. Indeed, people 
usually migrate in search of new opportunities, except in cases of forced migration by those 
who are victims of persecution, violence, and wars and seek asylum. The motivation for 
migration is frequently economic opportunity, faith and optimism in a better future, or strong 
family bonds.90 As James Hollifield puts it: “immigrants are highly motivated individuals, 
whose primary objective in moving from one country to another is to find employment and 
improve their and their families’ standard of living and quality of life.”91 Such an optimistic 
approach to immigrants in the host country might be both inspiring and threatening to the 
local population. Therefore, immigrant integration into the labor market is of particular interest 
for those who wish to foster the coexistence of newcomers and the host society.  
Migration itself represents an attempt at accessing social systems.92 In order to 
achieve this, immigrants have to gain an appropriate social status, adequate for their 
aspirations. A person’s socioeconomic position plays a significant role in status formation in a 
society, which can further pave the way to new opportunities. 
Among other complex dimensions of the integration process, socioeconomic 
integration with integration into the labor market is considered the first crucial step to 
establishing one’s position in a society. If members of an immigrant minority and others 
similarly positioned have the same life chances in the pursuit of contested goods, such as 
desirable occupations, one can talk about the success of socio-economic integration in 
society.93 To what extent this competition (referring to Park’s race relation cycle)94 is 
successful is determined by four issues key to understanding integration processes: 
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a) the characteristics of immigrants; 
b) the nature of transnational networks and communities; 
c) the structure of the labor market; 
d) the opportunity structure of the receiving society.95 
 
Whereas the first two are not so dependent on the host society, the last two are 
determined by the host society’s structure. Social and political institutions and organizations, 
which not only create legislation but lobby and are a driving force for bottom-up integration 
initiatives, in turn represent access to opportunities and available resources.96 
Each of the four above-mentioned determinants of socioeconomic immigrant status 
are conditions for structural integration outlined in chapter 1. Structural integration should 
open the gate for “a better life”: gaining rights and status in the core institutions of the host 
society – in the economy and labor market, education and qualification systems, the housing 
system, state welfare institutions, and full political citizenship.97 These core areas are 
decisive for the socioeconomic position of any immigrant in a new society. Therefore, it is 
necessary to devote some attention to their functioning in the field of immigrant integration. 
This dissertation focuses on those responsible for integrating immigrants into the local 
workforce. 
In fact, integration research has made many attempts to rank the most important 
subfields of integration, summarized in the previous section of this chapter. Gordon, for 
instance, still using the rhetoric of assimilation with reference to our today’s understanding of 
integration, claimed that structural assimilation would stimulate all other types of assimilation, 
so that once structural assimilation had taken place, all other forms of assimilation would 
follow.98 However, this does not always seem to be the case. Gordon assumed that structural 
integration is the key to further processes of integration, but it does not automatically trigger 
other integration processes in different spheres of immigrants’ lives. For example, immigrants 
can easily be integrated into an educational system yet still identify with citizens of their 
native land. In fact, structural integration is indispensable for helping immigrants to reach a 
better socio-economic status and to fulfill their immigration goals: getting new life chances, 
which immigrants feel they cannot achieve “at home.”99 
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Moreover, one should not overemphasize the importance of the economy for social 
cohesion in society. Although one can agree with Esser’s claim that structural assimilation is 
an irreplaceable core of all social integration processes, it seems less probable that for the 
receiving society it is the only central and important dimension of immigrant inclusion. It is 
difficult to entirely agree with Esser, who claims that nowadays there is only one social goal 
worldwide: economic profit and knowledge about technological efficiency, which pertains to 
immigrant integration into the labor market.100 On the contrary, culture and identity of 
immigrants do matter to certain strata of the host society. Simply looking at Samuel 
Huntington’s fears of the cultural clash in civilization and the alleged “Hispanic invasion of the 
American Nation”101 or the recent rise of racist anti-immigrant movements on both sides of 
the Atlantic to talk about important factors beyond the economy which demonstrate host 
societies responses to immigration. 
Indeed, focusing my research on the management of structural integration on the part 
of the host society, I prefer not to downplay the significance of the other three fields of 
integration (the cultural, interactive and identificational). As Kasinitz and others emphasize in 
Inheriting the City, culture does play a very important role in immigrant integration: 
 
Whereas traditional sociological accounts of racial and ethnic inequality tend to emphasize 
structural factors such as residential segregation, neighborhood isolation, low-quality schools 
and discrimination in the labor market, the authors break new ground by concluding that 
culture also matters in explaining divergent outcomes across groups.102 
 
Drawing conclusions from the above “ranking attempts,” all dimensions of integration 
are interdependent and interconnected. The focus of research on structural integration of 
immigrants into the labor market, however, is not arbitrary and can be quickly explained. 
First, when examining integration measures for immigrants, focusing on the primary 
steps of immigrant inclusion in the host society is logical. These are the interactions of 
institutions and organizations with immigrants in the fields relevant to their structural 
integration, like labor market, the education system, and social welfare. In fact, it is easier to 
conduct research on the formal points of contact of the host society with immigrants within 
the key institutional structures than on the cultural distance between individual members of 
the host society and immigrants. 
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Second, labor market integration as a subfield of structural integration is particularly 
interesting and emotional for both immigrants and the receiving society. Immigrants see their 
access to the labor market as key to the fulfillment of their immigration inspirations, whereas 
members of the receiving society feel endangered and challenged by immigrants in the battle 
for better wages, career and social status. This area constitutes the first step in Park’s race-
relation cycle in the competitive encounter with the host population. 
Finally, in the face of global development and the economic crisis, immigrants have 
now become a major area of interest in economics. As the freedom of movement and 
demographic gaps between regions increases, two parallel trends in the world labor market 
dynamics are emerging: the decline in the demand for unskilled labor and the rising 
importance of human capital in the production of goods and services. Accordingly, there are 
two causes of migratory moves from two adverse situations: 
 
a) high-skilled immigrant workers have to work more flexibly across the countries; 
b) low-skilled immigrant workers are increasingly forced to move to find a safe 
place in their struggle to earn their living.103 
 
These two migratory labor forces support a dual labor market system, which divides 
the economy into “primary” and “secondary” sectors.104 Primary jobs guarantee high salaries, 
good working conditions, stable employment, opportunities for advancement and equity. 
Jobs in the secondary market, in contrast, offer low wages, unsatisfactory working 
conditions, little chance of advancement and bad supervision. This dual market leads to a 
devaluation of the human capital which immigrants represent but which is not always 
recognized in the host country.105 
With the exception of a special group of highly-skilled immigrants, “imported” by the 
host countries to fill the needs of their high value-added sectors, there is no doubt that most 
immigrants usually find it harder to make themselves marketable. They usually end up in the 
secondary sector. They often lack mastery of the language of the host society, to say nothing 
of the human capital resources necessary for their employment. Even if immigrants possess 
high skills and credentials, these skills may not always be recognized or relevant to the local 
needs of their new residence. These workers are initially employed below their educational 
potential and often adjust to have to go down the career ladder, taking more and more 
undesirable work. In the hourglass economy with many good jobs at the top, many bad jobs 
at the bottom and few options in between, immigrants find it even more difficult to escape the 
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degrading job positions and hope for upward mobility. The situation used to be different. As 
Carola Suárez-Orozco and Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco note, 
 
At the turn of the century low skilled immigrants workers with very little formal schooling could, 
through floor-shop mobility, attain living wages and a comfortable lifestyle. Today’ s global 
economy is unforgiving of those without skills and credentials.106 
 
It seems that the American socioeconomic model of advancement has become more 
difficult. It is hardly possible for anybody to move from the bottom of the hourglass to the top 
without much formal education. It is even more difficult for immigrants, who face more 
challenges than natives in the education systems of the host countries. 
According to economic liberalism, markets should not be regulated and labor is a 
commodity to be bought and sold. According to these principles, immigrants are easily 
treated as expendable commodities that can be used according to the needs of the market. 
They are easier to hire and fire than citizen workers, which is also observable in the current 
economic crisis.107 On the other hand, according to the principles of political liberalism, 
immigrants should be granted the same civil, political and social rights as every member of a 
society. 
This conflict points at the so-called “liberal paradox” of rights versus markets in the 
host countries. In opposition to the needs of the market, nation states protect their citizens 
against the potential competitive working migrants, setting up restrictive immigration policies 
and turning their countries into “fortresses” and foreign workers into “the objects of political 
conflict.”108 Unlike goods or capital, immigrants should acquire rights under the protection of 
the laws and constitutions of the liberal host states. 
The liberal paradox has not been resolved, but it can be assumed that it will gradually 
wane with the growth of a labor international market and the expansion of civil rights for 
immigrants. Practically within the labor market organizations of the host societies it is 
necessary to recognize the reality of an unjust dual labor market. Immigrants are often 
doomed to failure, because of “the lack of knowledge of the ropes in their new society.”109 
These can be provided through appropriate integration policies and services, such as 
remedial educational opportunities, job training programs, and apprenticeships at the local 
level. These measures will be discussed in the empirical part of this study. It is worth 
reflecting here, however, that the opportunity structure for immigrants is influenced not only 
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by the economy but also by the institutions in the host society. This explains why the same 
minority groups fare differently in different locations. 
The need for institutional involvement underscores the concept of integration as a 
two-way process, which necessitates change on the part of the receiving society and the 
immigrants. Logically, such an involvement on the part of the state should also bring mutual 
benefits of integration into the labor market to these two parties involved. The question then 
arises whether it pays off to accept immigrants and further invest in their training and 
development? 
The first part of the question refers to selective immigration policies of countries, 
policies which aim at attracting those who are clear economic assets to the receiving 
society.110 Although immigration has proven to be economically beneficial, there is still a 
strong desire among the public and politicians in the industrial democracies to control 
immigration: border control symbolizes the essence of state sovereignty and protection of 
their citizens.111 In the US and the EU countries, a broad categorization system enables 
better management of the admission into or exclusion from labor markets (e.g. the developed 
system of categories of immigrants: workers, seasonals, family members, frontier workers, or 
refugees assigned to an individual as the basis of the motivation for their arrival).112 It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to estimate the degree of usefulness of immigration 
policies. Suffice it to say that immigration policies both stipulate selection of immigrants with 
respect to human capital and determine whether and how this capital is to be utilized.113 
The question arises whether it pays off to invest in those already within the 
boundaries of a country and a local community. Once immigrants are deliberately selected 
for low-skilled jobs and no permanent settlement is envisaged, they are consigned to the 
secondary labor market and have little chance of escaping their outsider status. As Hollifield 
points out, in the long run immigration makes the most positive contribution to a host society 
when immigrants have been offered the most favorable economic prospects under the 
formula of “higher is better.” This is for three main reasons: immigrants who earn more pay 
higher taxes and in this way are less dependent on social service or unemployment 
compensations. Moreover, stronger and better established immigrants boost the labor 
market, creating more jobs. Though cheap immigrant labor can be viewed as lucrative, the 
benefits of keeping them in the low paid sector are short term. Within a few years they might 
prove to be a burden for society in terms of economic independence as well as social and 
political outcasts, downgraded to the social underclass.114 
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Assigning immigrants to specific sectors of the labor market determines immigrants’ 
future status in the society. This stigmatization will be seen, in the empirical part of the 
research, in case studies on managing immigrant integration (e.g. like creating specific job 
training programs aimed only at specific categories of immigrants, for example refugees). 
The host society’s institutions and integration policies determine whether and how 
immigrants are given support in the face of increasing labor market inequality. These 
societies are capable of providing immigrants with help, training and networks to make it into 
the upper half of the hourglass economy. 
 
2.3 The Role of the Host Society and Integration Policies 
 
Although nowadays it is often taken for granted that integration should be seen as a 
two-way process involving both immigrants and the host society, this does not mean that 
both partners are equally powerful. In fact, the outcome of the integration process cannot be 
expected to be uniform, since this process necessitates the interaction of two parties at 
different levels.115 The relations between these two parties vary according to different 
dimensions of integration. Focusing on structural integration, especially into the labor market, 
the integration process is influenced to a large extent by both the governmental and non-
governmental frame of welcoming and supporting newcomers in a local environment. The 
development of this frame is, of course, determined by supranational, national, and local 
structures of rules and legal boundaries. 
Considering how great the dependency of an individual immigrant is on these factors, 
the focus of the research shifts towards the more powerful partner: the host society with its 
institutions and integration policies. The shift in the perspective, which is usually focused on 
immigrants, towards the host society supports a new trend in the research emphasizing the 
responsibilities of the host society for immigrant integration.116 This approach also goes in 
line with IMISCOE recommendations to focus migration and integration research on 
multilevel governance of integration, looking at the formal distribution of competencies in the 
host society.117 
The host society is a very broad category, ranging from the organized forms of a 
formal apparatus of governance in a host country to individual neighbors in the vicinity of 
immigrants’ new surroundings. For the purpose of this research, the scope of the host 
society will be narrowed down to the representatives of its national and local governments 
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and other important institutions, which are stakeholders in education and labor market 
systems. In fact, these are the sectors of the host society with the greatest capacity for 
creating a welcoming or unwelcoming atmosphere for immigrant reception. 
Indeed, the impact of immigration (as well as integration) is a social product shaped 
by institutional structures.118 By the same token, institutions influence the process of 
immigrant integration into the local labor market, providing or hindering their advancement. 
As Alba and Nee note, institutions “create the structure of opportunities and limitations for 
individuals.” As a web of interrelated norms, formal and informal, institutions represent both 
constraints and resources.119 
Apart from the host society’s institutions, immigrant groups form their own religious or 
cultural institutions, which definitely influence the management of integration processes at 
the local level, although they are not the main focus of this research, which centers on the 
host society’s organizations.120 It is not my intention to downplay either the individual 
immigrant’s stake in the integration process or the impact of immigrant institutions. Two 
institutional levels of immigration reception both on the part of the host society and 
immigration groups shape individuals’ perception of the immigrants in the receiving society. 
As Alba and Nee point out, “institutions structure incentives and specify the rules of 
legitimate social action within which individuals and organizations compete for control over 
resources.”121 On the other hand, institutions can also be influenced by the actions of 
individuals, thus contributing to institutional changes. All these bottom-up and top-down 
trends in the interaction between the receiving society and immigrants determine whether or 
not “developmentally attentive communities”122 and safety nets for immigrants are 
established in a host country’s labor market. 
In fact, “a patchwork of institutions and policies” influences the outcome of integration 
processes.123 There are formal rules which govern these relations in the form of immigration 
policies or immigrant policies (integration policies).124 The first policies deal with those who 
want to enter the host country, whereas the second policies focus on immigrants already in 
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the country. The question arises as to which actors and factors influence the development of 
these rules. 
In traditional political science, policy making is narrowed down to the decision of the 
parliament and political administration.125 However, since 1970s there has been a new trend 
in practical policy-making toward focusing on the dialogue between various actors influencing 
policy processes.126 As Ulrich Beck notes, the hierarchical model of policy making 
 
[…] is being displaced by theories that emphasize consultation, interaction, negotiation, 
network: in short, the interdependency and process character in the context of the responsible, 
affected and interested agencies and actors from the formulation of programs through the 
choice of measures to the forms of their enforcement. While the traditional understanding of 
politics proceeded with a certain naiveté from the assumption that the goals set can be 
reached by politics, provided the proper means are taken, politics in newer approaches is now 
viewed as the collaboration of different agents even contrary to formal hierarchies and across 
fixed responsibilities.127 
 
These agents involve both the private sector and the so-called “third sector,” often 
attributed to the concept of civil society. The latter is still elusive and indefinite, although 
currently widely-used with reference to this segment of society which can be differentiated 
from the government and business. 
 
2.3.1 Civil Society 
 
What is meant by the notion of civil society depends on the historical, political and 
geographical context. Michael Walzer points to local distinctions in conceptuals of civil 
society as follows: 
 
Central and East European dissidence flourished within highly restricted versions of civil 
society and the first task of the new democracies created by the dissidents, so we are told, is 
to rebuild the networks […] In the West by contrast, we have lived in civil society for many 
years without knowing it.128 
 
Indeed, the concept of civil society received special attention during struggles against 
communist and military dictatorships in Europe of the last century.129 In communist countries, 
                                                     
125
 Boswell, Ch. (2005). Knowledge Transfer and Migration Policy Making. Geneva: International 
Institute for Labor Studies. 
126
 Richardson, J. (1996). Actor Based Models of National and EU Policy-Making. Discussion 
Paper 103. Essex: University of Essex, Dept of Government, quoted in ibid.   
127
 Beck, U. (1996). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: SAGE, p. 199. 
128
 Walzer, M. (Ed.) (1998). Toward a Global Civil Society. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, p. 7. 
129
 Khilnani S. (2001). The Development of Civil Society. In S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani (Eds.) Civil 
Society, History and Possibilities (pp. 11-32). Cambridge: University Press, p. 15. 
  
44 
like Poland, the predominance of most vertical social bonds were relinquished during the 
transition period in the nineties whereas new social groups, built on horizontal relationships, 
started to emerge and change the realm of social society which had been restricted up to 
then.130 
There are two important contexts where the idea of civil society flourishes nowadays. 
One is the danger of “capitalist atomization” in society, which can be counterbalanced with 
the revival of the associative initiatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in civil 
society. The other context concerns the emergence of new social movements and the 
simultaneous decline of old interest-based groupings. In fact, we have seen a constant 
increase in feminists, environmentalists, and other social activists holding strong positions on 
special issues, e.g. abortion, capital punishment, as well as immigration, in contrast to a 
decreasing popularity of old political parties, trade unions, and professional associations.131 
The recent rediscovery of civil society should not obscure the historical roots of the 
term, which is not new and has undergone many conceptual changes in different times and 
in different spaces. The term civil society can be traced back to the classical era and is a 
direct translation of Aristotle’s koinonia politike and Cicero’s societas civilis, which meant “a 
community, a collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order.”132 The 
concept was widely used during the Enlightenment, when the absolutist nature of the state 
was disputed by thinkers such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. In their quite different 
social contract theories, both emphasized the co-existence of the state and civil society.133 In 
their views, civil society consisted of a cluster of institutions of law-making, law-enforcing and 
law-abiding state.134 The terms civil society and political society were then used 
interchangeably. 
Civil society was considered indistinguishable from the state until the late 18th century. 
Hegel, who first introduced the distinction between the state and civil society, is a pivotal 
figure in contemporary understandings of the idea of civil society. This last emerged in 
capitalism, incorporating liberal individual freedoms and needs for recognition and 
identification between people.135 Hegelian civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) was a realm 
of conflict and fragmentation, where economic interests, religious views, and affiliations were 
organized, expressed, and confronted. It also encompassed voluntary organizations, 
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described in Hegel’s The Philosophy of Right as “the ethical root of the state.”136 Of course in 
this realm the possibility of conflicts and inequalities was much greater. Hegel considered the 
state the highest unity whose constant surveillance was indispensable for keeping moral 
order in society and at the same time guaranteeing democratic union.137 
Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America extended Hegel’s differentiation 
between state and civil society, further dividing society into three realms. First, there is the 
state with its parliamentary assemblies, courts, bureaucracies, police, and army. Then, there 
is civil society, which represents private and economic interests. Finally, there is political 
society with its political associations such as local government, juries, political parties and its 
civil associations such as churches, schools, scientific societies, and commercial 
organizations. Political society serves as “the independent eye of society,” exercising 
surveillance over the state. In this way Tocqueville emphasized the importance of civilian and 
political associations, calling for active participation on the part of citizens in the institutions 
as a key to democracy.138 
These thoughts were continued and extended in Antonio Gramsci’s idea of three-fold 
society. He differentiates among state, the economy and civil society, rejecting the Hegelian 
inclusion of principles of capitalist economy in the same realm as civil society.139 This division 
has led further to the contemporary interpretation of civil society by Jean L. Cohen and 
Andrew Arato, adopted for this research. 
According to Cohen and Arato, civil society is understood as a sphere of social 
interaction between economy and state, in which political and economic societies are to be 
distinguished. Political society includes such actors as political parties, political organizations, 
and parliaments, whereas economic society consists of the organization of production and 
distribution into companies, cooperatives, consortia, and so on.140 Both parts of societies 
arise from the structure of civil society, but they are directly involved in the decision-making 
processes of the state and economy, so their channels of communication are generally 
restricted. In consultation with other civil society organizations, public discussions between 
representatives of the outside structure of the formal apparatus of politics and economy are 
possible. In this way, the borders between Gramsci’s sectors are not sealed off and both 
political and economic societies are mediators in these cross-sector relations.141 
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Civil society does not refer to all members of a society who are not directly connected 
to the state or the economy. In fact, civil society is only one dimension of the “sociological 
world” organized around given norms, competencies, and roles. This dimension should be 
understood as the institutionalized and organized structures of active socialization, 
associations, and communication in society. These would include, for example, NGOs, 
academia, and church groups, as distinct from but not in opposition to those involved in the 
formal apparatus of governance in the political and economic sphere. Moreover, civil society 
also encompasses independent but organized initiatives from below, based on self-
constitution and self-mobilization, including aforementioned new social movements such as 
pro- or anti-immigration organizations. 
The role of civil society is open-ended communication with their actors in a formalized 
political and economic society of state and economy sectors. This dialog is a tool for 
controlling and protecting civil society from false and destructive resolutions in these 
spheres. According to Tocqueville, without the active participation of civil society in 
egalitarian institutions, the democratic character of the latter would be threatened.142 The 
maintenance of democracy is considered the prime function of civil society, which legitimizes 
its activities.143 
The engagement of civil society actors in lobbyism, demonstrations, and open public 
debates pushes policy making into a more liberal direction, where the decision-making 
process is influenced by those functional and institutional structures out of apparatus. The 
question is what kind of channels and receptors of influence are practically possible in the 
field of managing immigrant integration and integration policies at a local level. Civil society 
organizations usually act locally, and therefore this sector of society is of particular 
importance for the empirical focus of this research. 
 
2.3.2 Integration Policies 
 
Until recently there had been some imbalance between the scopes of public debates 
and research about immigration versus immigrant policies in the EU and in the US. The 
focus on “fortress” rules: protection of borders and reining in uncontrolled migration flows had 
been of greater importance than the focus on contending with those who had already entered 
and were living in the host society. However, current trends in research are changing. 
Research has increasingly taken up the importance of both immigration and integration 
policies and their interconnectedness in the attempt to manage international migration.144 As 
                                                     
142
 Ibid., p. 19. 
143
 Sałustowicz, P. (Ed.). (2001). Civil Society and Social Development. Bern: Peter Lang, p. 14. 
144
 These trends are to be seen both in research in the US and in the EU e.g. in the establishment of 
The National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, 
  
47 
Rinus Penninx points out, “the lack of a consistent and transparent immigration policy is an 
impediment to effective integration policies. In many cases, poor integration policy has 
contributed to negative perceptions of immigrants, which in turn has led to the reinforcement 
of defensive immigration policies.”145 The conflict between these policies might be due to 
their varying importance at the national level of governance in the host countries.146 
The gap between immigration and integration policies in practice can be traced back 
to European disillusionment with guest workers programs in the early 1970s. Swiss novelist 
Max Frisch’s famous expression from those times – “we asked for workers but instead 
human beings came” – has become a famous citation among integration researchers and 
practitioners.147 This remark points to the short-sightedness of immigration policies 
unaccompanied by any integration measures. In fact, as Irena Kogan notes, once immigrants 
are recruited for low-skilled jobs by special programs of immigration policies, “they are 
segmented in the secondary labor market with hardly any chance to escape their outsider 
status.”148 Integration policy is crucial to remove this imbalance and transform immigrants 
from workers to full-fledged members of the host society. There should be a cause and effect 
relation between the immigration policies and integration measures for those who enter a 
country. The question about immigration policies, “whom we shall welcome” simultaneously 
triggers the question about integration policies, “how we shall welcome them.”149 
Although this research focuses primarily on the management of immigrant integration 
and integration policies, it recognizes the importance of immigration policies for integration 
measures in the host country. Therefore, national immigration policies in reference to the 
labor market will be briefly outlined in the empirical chapters about particular case studies. 
How is integration policy to be understood? The Urban Institute, Washington DC 
provides a short and compact definition, easily applicable to different national and local 
contexts of immigrant reception: 
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Integration policy encompasses the laws, regulations, and programs that influence the 
integration of immigrants once they are in this country. Its range is broad, including laws and 
regulations that determine non-citizens’ eligibility for public benefits as well as spending on 
programs that are targeted to immigrants.150 
 
General and special integration policies have to be distinguished. The first, also called 
indirect policies, are aimed at the entire population without distinguishing between.151 This 
indirect way of approaching immigrants, often called mainstreaming, is meant in part to avoid 
stigmatizing immigrants and to prevent negative feelings which might arise among the host 
population.152 Immigrants are therefore included in the same integration actions as anyone 
else eligible for such a service, for example unemployment benefits. Special integration 
policies, on the other hand, refer to measures explicitly and directly designed for immigrants. 
They often imply creation of new institutions or the expansion of the existing ones for the 
purpose of immigrant services, such as native language courses.153 
Explicit integration policies are still typically absent in most domains of integration. 
According to Gary Freeman’s multicultural framework for understanding processes of 
immigrant incorporation, there are four key sets of regulatory institutions: the state, the 
market, welfare, and the cultural sector. Of them, usually the state and the cultural sectors 
have specific policies for immigrants. However, as Freeman claims, the state generally 
creates the same incentives for both immigrants and natives.154 Whether such a statement is 
justifiable in reference to incentives for immigrant integration into a local labor market will be 
explored in the empirical part of the study with reference to several cities in different 
countries. 
The extent to which immigrant policies are developed derives from many national 
specific factors. Both direct and indirect integration policies of a given country form the so-
called “national mode of integration,” which is determined by a specific immigration situation, 
a sense of nationhood, and the professed principles of social order in the countries, such as 
Germany’s soziale Marktwirtschaft or France’s republicanism. Quite purposefully, the 
inventor of the concept, Friedrich Heckmann, seeks to avoid the usage of a popular term like 
“national integration strategy,” which is much too narrow for cross-country comparative 
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research.155 In fact, integration strategy is always specific, planned, and goal oriented, as in 
the National Integration Plan in Germany. However, the term “strategy” cannot be universally 
applied to integration measures in such countries as Poland and the US, where integration 
management is still in a formative phase on the political national agenda. However, it can be 
assumed that each country has a specific national mode of integration, regardless of the 
stage of its development. National modes of integration reflect similarities or differences in 
the status of immigrant integration in various countries, which by the same token determines 
the platform of comparison for specific case studies.156 
It should be stressed that immigrant policy-making is by no means without difficulties 
in the management and assessment of outcomes. The question then arises regarding the 
real role of integration policies and the measurement of their success. In fact, one should not 
overestimate the significance of integration policies for the whole process of integrating 
immigrants into the receiving society. According to Christian Joppke, “it is misleading to 
assume that something as multidimensional and complex as immigrant integration could ever 
be the result of a single policy […]”157 Ideally immigrant policies should promote immigrant 
participation in the major institutions and public services of a host society. However, in the 
liberal countries “it is impossible for the authorities to steer integration completely.”158 
Integration policies do not guarantee social cohesion between immigrants and the host 
society. They are only an attempt at or a tool for integration but not a guarantee that 
integration will be achieved.159 
Moreover, there are some controversies with regard to the rationale behind the 
development of integration policies. There is a risk that immigrant policies might turn into 
measures for control of immigrants, restricting rather than providing them with a wide range 
of opportunities. Obligatory language courses and other requirements for gaining citizenship 
might be examples of exercising such a power over immigrants, imposing on them conditions 
they are obliged to fulfill in order to get a free access to services available to the natives.160 
Integration and integration policies might also easily become a tool of political 
campaigns and political symbolism. As Favell notes, the issue can be easily directed away 
from technical and heavily loaded questions of political economy and welfare management, 
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towards more fundamental, symbolic public issues. In the rhetoric of integration, both left-
wing and right-wing social movements can voice their concerns about social order and 
national identity so that integration can become “a good vehicle” for giving a voice to 
marginalized, non-elite political groups within the host society.161 There might be also a 
tendency to stigmatize immigrants by emphasizing their failure to adjust to an established 
social order and the need for a remedy: integration policies. This often occurs when an 
individual immigrant happens to be the perpetrator of a widely-publicized crime or incident 
(like the murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004) and the blame is 
simultaneously shifted towards immigrant groups in general.162 
In sum, constructing integration policies is a complex process for a number of 
reasons. First, integration policies have to contend with complex domains of integration 
(structural, interactive, identificational, and cultural) and their interrelationship. Then, the 
goals of integration policies are largely dependent on the national mode of integration. 
Furthermore, the goal of integration policies might not be always clear for policy makers, who 
may try to use policies as measures for restricting immigrants rather than aiding in their 
integration. Finally, there is a complex network of factors and actors influencing the 
development of integration policies. As Penninx notes: 
 
[F]ormulating the appropriate policy depends greatly on conditions at all levels, from town halls 
to national capitals. A long-term framework that balances the concerns of both sides may 
succeed; a short-sighted policy that puts politics before realities can lead to losses on all 
sides.163 
 
Indeed, one needs to refer to supranational, national, as well as local integration measures to 
generate a comprehensive depiction of integration policies in a single locality. 
In order to find a solution to these challenges and controversies, there is a strong 
need to develop methods of measuring the goals and the level of success of integration 
policies, based on the perception of two main actors in integration: the host society and the 
immigrants themselves.164 Much as this demand is crucial for the future development of 
comprehensive integration policy research, it is beyond the scope of this project on the 
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integration policies’ outcomes on both sides of the Atlantic. However, it is taken for granted 
that integration policies promoting and facilitating at least the structural integration of 
immigrants into the host society will ease the transition of immigrant youth from childhood to 
adulthood. The smoother the process is, the more benefits are available for both the young 
immigrants who are the contributors to the receiving society and its members. Immigrant 
policies represent a formal and institutionalized approach to connecting these two groups. 
The ultimate goal for those responsible for integration policy-making should be governments 
and public and civil society institutions working together to create this win-win situation. 
 
2.4 Immigrant Youth as Entrepreneurs in a New Local Context 
 
The young seem to bring new ideas and new promise for progress. As Julio 
Cammarota notes, “The true blessings that all young people can bring to us are their critical 
perspectives and their willingness to create a world better than what the adults have given 
them.”165 However, youth energy can be wasted unless it finds a good breeding ground for its 
development. 
Numerous factors influence the transition from childhood to adulthood. One factor is 
community involvement and support, which can either facilitate or hinder the process. Just as 
youths are challenged in their adolescence to prove their value and to get recognition, social 
workers, educators, and employers are faced with the challenged of not overlooking the 
hidden skills and potentials of youth.166 It is both intriguing and challenging to work with youth 
and try to take part in their development. This development can be compared to the process 
of building a “pipeline” for youths, which leads to the successful realization of their potential. 
Indeed, for many young adults the attempt at discovering and cultivating their strengths or 
talents comes too late. 
The first years after school are very crucial for the directions the lives of young 
immigrant adults take: who they become, how they live, and how they can contribute to the 
host society. These are the years when they should be establishing themselves in the local 
labor market. However, the crucial period starts even earlier, at school, when they make the 
educational decisions which will determine their life and career paths. If something goes 
wrong in this time it might have dramatic consequences for their future. Drop-outs will not 
find it easy to complete their educations, which closes the doors to many job opportunities. 
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Who is actually considered a youth and what are young adults? The United Nations 
defines youths as people between the age of 15 and 24 years old.167 The youth turns into an 
adult at some point, but it is often far above the official legal boundaries, which are usually 18 
in most countries. In fact, youth overlaps with the initial stages of adulthood, so-called “adults 
in waiting.”168 Quoting other sources, even people up to 35 years old might be considered 
young adults, caught in the time of “betwixt and between”169 or “adultolescence.”170 The latter 
describes the prolonged period of acquiring independence, starting from adolescence even 
up to the age of 30, when people are still considered on the threshold to adulthood. They are 
still too inexperienced to achieve the milestones of adulthood: finishing school, working full 
time, being able to support a family, or becoming financially independent.171 Of course, these 
boundaries are quite flexible and have been changing throughout human history, but in 
contemporary America and Europe the time between 15 and 30 may be seen as the crucial 
period determining integration into the labor market. 
Immigrant youth, both first and second generation, comprise a unique group among 
young people, interesting to researchers for a number of reasons. First, they bring with them 
stocks of risks, potential, and innovation both to research and the receiving society. 
Secondly, they are the most flexible and mobile group among other immigrants, more eager 
to move to new surroundings and to adapt to the new environment quickly. Finally, because 
of the wealth of immigration experience, they might often be marginalized and left outside the 
mainstream. In fact, they are often forced much earlier than others to lead lives with adult 
responsibilities, which creates a huge gap between them and the local youth. 
Two approaches to talking about immigrant youth are possible. The first one focuses 
on risks associated with them, whereas the second examines their potential. Unfortunately, 
these two approaches do not always overlap, being either too pessimistic or too optimistic. I 
attempt to bring the two extremes together under one umbrella. 
According to the first approach, immigrant youth face challenges of a two-fold nature, 
or they are “doubly underprivileged” on the path to self-realization. Their often complex 
transition periods from adolescence to adult life is additionally affected by their migration 
background and integration problems. Learning a new language, living up to the expectations 
of two cultures, and juggling the contrasting worlds of their family and the host society are 
                                                     
167
 United Nations, General Assembly. (1981). International Youth Year: Participation, Development, 
Peace. Resolution A/RES/36/28. 
168
 Delgado, M., Jones, K., Rohani, M., op. cit., p. 167.  
169
 Draut, T. (2007). Strapped: why America's 20- and 30-somethings Can't Get ahead . New York, NY: 
Doubleday, p. 22. 
170
 The term coined in the Newsweek magazine by Tyre, P., Springer, K., and Scelfo, J. (2002. March 
25). Bringing up Adultolescents. Newsweek, 34. 
171
 Settersten, Jr., R. A., Furstenberg Jr., F. F., and Rumbaut, R. G. (2005). On the Frontier of 
Adulthood: Theory, Research, and Public Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
  
53 
only some of their challenges they face in negotiating their transcultural lives.172 The crucial 
question is whether the immigrant youth are able to realize themselves or whether they are 
forced to lower their sights and adjust in any way they can to local realities.173 
The second approach to immigrant youth shifts from a less risk-driven approach to a 
more potential-rich one: immigrant youth are not necessarily only a challenge but also a 
source of power, talents, and new energy for the receiving society. In fact, such assets stem 
from their various migration experience. Doing research on different young immigrants, 
Rubén Rumbaut notes: “Although these students, primarily from Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, display wide variations by national origin in terms of their vulnerabilities and 
resources, broad trends have emerged, some of which challenge popular beliefs.” Rumbaut 
points to the noteworthy achievements of immigrants, like greater school retention, greater 
levels of fluency in English than in the parental language, the perception of education as an 
enduring value, and higher education aspirations and expectations.174 This set of 
commonalities among different ethnic groups challenges popular perception that ethnicity 
shapes the integration capacity of young immigrants and that different approaches should be 
adopted for different nationalities. 
Another interesting summary of common potentials for immigrant youth is provided by 
the Act For Youth Upstate Center of Excellence.175 Its report elaborates on four assets of 
immigrant youth, which should be taken into account by organizations working with the 
youth: 
 
a) Values of the family’s culture of origin, such as the importance of the extended 
family, the placing of the needs of the community above individual needs, and 
collective decision-making; 
b) Bilingualism as an asset in an increasingly global world;176 
c) Migration-related challenges, which make the youth mature faster and develop 
confidence and leadership skills; 
d) Balancing two cultures, which develops resiliency, flexibility, and the ability to 
live in multicultural communities. 
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Such an approach to immigrants leads to the Positive Youth Development (PYD) 
theory which emphasizes talents to be encouraged and developed in young people. This 
approach does not exclude risk-behaviors, but supposes prevention and treatment of these 
problems through working on youth strengths. 
The field of Positive Youth Development has been developing over the last several 
decades resulting in various models.177 The following three assumptions may be considered 
common to the various PYD frameworks: 
 
a) Focus on strengths and assets, emphasizing the skills and competencies that 
are needed in the transition to adulthood, rather than deficits and problems. 
b) Strengths and assets are usually acquired through positive relationships, 
especially with pro-social and caring adults, such as parents and family, 
teachers, neighbors, business owners, and mentors. 
c) The development and acquisition of youth assets occurs in multiple contexts 
and environments. For example, schools, workplaces, community organizations, 
and social programs all offer opportunities to acquire developmental 
resources.178 
 
The PYD model has developed as a response to the risk-focused approach. The 
latter has been criticized for emphasizing only what goes wrong in youth. According to its 
critics, such an approach aims at reducing at-risk behavior in youth, but does not guarantee 
the development of youth potentials and aspirations. In fact, these two approaches should be 
complimentary, as neither of them can fully address all the needs of youth. It is noteworthy 
that developing assets by no means entails ignoring the adversity youth face. The best 
approach to working with immigrant youth should be balanced between these two 
perspectives. As Peter L. Benson notes “the health and well-being of children and 
adolescents require as much attention to promoting developmental strengths as to directly 
combating risks, environmental threats, and social dysfunctions that obstruct human 
                                                     
177
 The best known PYD model is Peter L. Benson’s, promoted by the Search Institute in Minneapolis, 
built around forty developmental assets, i.e. individual and contextual factors which encourage youth 
to avoid harmful behavior and which engage them in activities that promote positive development. 
Benson, P. L. (2006). All Kids Are Our Kids: What Communities Must Do to Raise Caring and 
Responsible Children and Adolescents. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
The other widely known PYD framework is Richard Lerner et al’s concept of the ‘five Cs’: competence, 
character, connection, confidence, and caring, to be extended in adulthood by the sixth C: 
contribution. All these assets are developed through interaction with individuals in varying contexts, 
such as the family, school, and the community.  
Lerner, R. M., Fisher, C. B., and Weinberg, R. A. (2000). Toward a Science for and of the People: 
Promoting Civil Society through the Application of Developmental Science. Child Development, 71, 
11-20. 
178
 Butts, J., Mayer, S., and Ruth, G. (2005). Focusing Juvenile Justice on Positive Youth 
Development. Issue Brief 105. Chicago, IL: Chapin Hall, p.5. 
  
55 
development.”179 Balancing these two foci of attention for immigrant youth should guarantee 
success in creating an avenue for their strengths while simultaneously trying to solve the 
problems and deal with the risks they are exposed to. 
Such an awareness is especially important for community organizations. Any service 
which works with immigrant youth should consider these PYD and risk-driven approaches, in 
order to identify positive aspects of the skills of immigrant youth as well as their ability to 
juggle many worlds, developed throughout their lives as immigrants. It is crucial to apply this 
PYD approach to young immigrants, so as to prevent, as Cornelius puts it, “the 
underdevelopment of the human capital that is being received through international 
migration.”180 According to PYD theory, immigrant youth may be seen as a useful resource 
for researchers, the community, and the receiving country. What are the benefits for each of 
these groups? 
For researchers, immigrant youth constitute an interesting source of knowledge on 
cultural negotiation and culture transfer processes. Generally, the importance of research on 
the culture of the youth had been neglected until 1990s.181 Moreover, it seems that immigrant 
youth have thus far received insufficient attention in integration research.182 Distinct features 
of the first, 1.5, and second generations of immigrants have been the focus of some research 
studies.183 However, community based organizations do not typically distinguish among 
these groups and adjust their services based on their differences. Accordingly, these 
discrepancies do not fall within the scope of this research. 
Little research has been done on the youth development in connection with immigrant 
youth.184 Up to the 1970s, immigrant youth were considered “in between cultures” or “in 
limbo.” Now, they are a newly-emerging and promising field of research. Youth development 
theories can be tested in the context of the transcultural lives immigrant youth lead and their 
intercultural communication abilities. Moreover, the findings of PYD research on immigrant 
youth can appease some anti-immigrants sentiment in the host society and serve as a 
healthy base for consulting with community organizations attempting to create a bridge 
between researchers and practitioners. This brings community residents and scholars 
together “in the pursuit and production of knowledge” about youth development.185 
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Researchers should examine how immigrant youth have been embraced by the receiving 
society and whether they have been neglected not only by migration researchers but first and 
foremost by practitioners. 
For the community, immigrant youth must be seen as a new resource of intercultural 
skills to tap into. “It is the young immigrant generation who cross cultural and linguistic 
barriers, breaking them down while absorbing the best of both worlds.”186 Therefore, it is in 
the interest of local communities and also the receiving country to take advantage of these 
enormous, often hidden assets. They should facilitate the transformation of immigrant youth 
from their traditional roles as being social outcasts to major contributors, cultural mediators, 
and help-providers within their respective environments.187  
For the nation, especially in the current period of economic crisis, the question is what 
immigrant youth can contribute to the society and how the receiving country can best tap into 
this resource. Considering the demographic downturn in western countries, native and 
immigrant youth will be key stakeholders for future economic and demographic development. 
Cheap, illegal labor recruited from among young flexible immigrants has long been alluring to 
employers in the receiving countries. However, the time has come at last to examine longer 
term perspectives and think about benefits in investing in the immigrant youth rather than 
overlooking their assets and forcing them to take on degrading work. Indeed they are part 
and parcel of the entire population of youth in the receiving country. As Melvin Delgado and 
Lee Staples suggest: 
 
A nation that systematically neglects its youth must be prepared to invest considerable sums 
of money in remedial services and correctional supervision, both now and in the future. These 
resources, in turn, can better be spent as social capital investment, helping to prepare youth to 
assume contributing roles in society.188 
 
There is also a special niche for researchers, the local community, and the receiving 
country: a demand for research on and knowledge about undocumented youth, which is still 
a taboo and often politically incorrect on both sides of the Atlantic.189 Drawing on German 
experience, the researcher Philip Anderson points out: 
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The question which should be addressed is that of the actual life situation of migrants without 
valid papers in the large German cities and whether a more inclusive, resources-oriented 
policy would not be more appropriate than the defensive “fortress mentality“ which all too often 
dictates policy constraints.190 
 
In fact, the undocumented are part and parcel of the host society, which is often 
denied or overlooked both in the research on immigrants and in programs for immigrants. 
Undocumented immigrant youth are normally considered unintentional criminals, when the 
blame for their illegal status is shifted onto their undocumented parents. Sometimes, quite 
obviously, they are seen as part of the most vulnerable group of “the poor,” drop-outs, and 
socially excluded. They are not able to follow the usual path of finishing school and then 
finding work. Perhaps they are excluded from research on integration because of the 
assumption that it is not even appropriate to think about their integration.191  
However, network-building for undocumented immigrant youth deserves particular 
attention. Of the many challenges in managing integration of immigrant youth network-
building is the most controversial and sensitive issue among integration practitioners. This 
study offers a different perspective, incorporating the undocumented into the scope of 
research on integration. As American researchers rightly note, “undocumented populations 
are [not only] part of our nation economically, socially and culturally but [also] politically.”192 
The extent to which both documented and undocumented immigrant youth are a target of 
integration measures of local administration and civil society organizations is the focus of the 
empirical research presented in the forthcoming chapters. 
As noted above, it is important to combine positive PYD models with the prevention of 
problem behaviors early enough to not let the assets of immigrants go to waste. Indeed, 
settling and growing up in a receiving country and its local community represents a sort of 
investment for both sides. 
Young immigrants on the brink of adulthood might be considered entrepreneurs who 
wish to invest their assets in their society to ensure future success. This might be the dream 
of any young person. However, for immigrants the system of social networks and official 
bureaucracy they have to navigate to make “their investment” is often strange and unfamiliar 
to immigrants. In order to make their dreams come true, they need lots of stamina and 
perseverance to cope with language challenges, social stigma, and anti-immigrant tensions 
in local communities. The local community and national politics can greatly influence the 
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process of transition from adolescence to adulthood or, put differently, from dreamers to 
entrepreneurs, building the pipeline for their assets and working together towards their 
successful development. Quite intentionally, I draw here on the rhetoric of entrepreneurship, 
pointing out the correlation between a successful life and successful labor market 
incorporation, which along with a satisfactory education constitute first steps to social 
inclusion and integration. 
It is important that the transition from dreamers to entrepreneurs be available to both 
legal and undocumented young immigrants. The latter do not differ much from the former in 
their skills, assets, and aspirations. One of the undocumented students in Arizona, 
commenting on her aspirations and the hurdles to getting financial support to attend the 
college, noted: “Still, I hold on to my dreams. My dream is to overcome these obstacles, to 
finish high school, college and one day to become a nursing assistant.”193 Whether legal or 
undocumented, these immigrants and their future are dependent on what the host society 
can offer them. In fact, it is within the capacity of the receiving society, its practitioners, 
policy-makers, and its researchers to shed some light on the dreams of immigrant youth and 
to help them to develop their dreams into economically viable concepts. In other words, such 
a task pertains to developing the system of supportive measures on integration into the labor 
market. 
 
2.5 Affirmative Integration Management as a Multi-Level Process 
 
The responsibility for immigrant integration lies on the shoulders of local authorities 
and other organizations where the immigrants reside. In fact, the claim that real integration 
always happens “at the local level” is nothing new.194 The process of local integration into the 
mainstream might be facilitated or hindered, either by institutionalized large-scale actions or 
the less formal measures of grassroots groups and civil society organizations. In an attempt 
to balance the concerns and interests on the subject of integration in the receiving society 
and on the part of immigrants, cooperation among the supranational, national, and local 
levels towards one common goal – Affirmative Integration Management (AIM) – is vital. 
Following my thesis about AIM proposed here, immigrant integration is not only seen 
as a two-way process (involving the receiving society and immigrants) but also as a multi-
dimensional one, dependent on mutual relations between institutions in society (either 
obstructive or cooperative). In order to provide immigrants with good preparation for a future 
on the local labor market, one needs to aim toward a comprehensive policy, removing 
barriers between the sectors and key stakeholders. Educators, administrators, and 
employers should be involved in the integration strategy for immigrants, evaluating their 
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assets and potential. Such a positive approach towards integration emphasizes a true 
commitment to its success. AIM recognizes and addresses integration problems while at the 
same time focusing on the benefits immigration brings to the receiving society. 
Special attention should be devoted to network-building for the integration of 
immigrant youth into the labor market using PYD strategies. Both direct and indirect 
integration policy measures should aim at ensuring equal educational opportunities for 
immigrant youth and development of such immigrant services as language and vocational 
training, job counseling, recognition of qualifications, promotion of entrepreneurship, and 
workplace discrimination prevention. We assume that the success of these measures will be 
facilitated by the national or even supranational coordination and monitoring. In fact, AIM 
consists of a combination of top-down and bottom-up measures, which influence social 
cohesion in society and should be of interest to both immigrants and the host society. 
Tremendous variation exists, of course, across the US and the EU in the 
development of the way national and local governments network, share power, and deliver 
integration services.195 However, the exchange of transatlantic national and local good 
practices might prove to be useful in generating new approaches to dealing with integration. 
 
2.6 Good Practice Exchange and its Role for Research and Practice  
 
The multilevel governance of integration and the local context of integration have 
been increasingly emphasized in research on integration recently, shifting the focus from the 
national to local and city level of integration management.196 Cities in particular, both in 
America and in Europe, have gained much attention recently as the context for immigrant 
incorporation and a main unit of analysis in migration research and networks. The city usually 
attracts immigrants and, using the demographer Audrey Singer‘s terminology, is the first 
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“gateway” to immigrants’ opportunities in a new host country. Municipalities in turn, can open 
the gates for immigrants and turn into real “moderators of integration.”197 
As suggested earlier, the focus on the local perspective should not be detached from 
national and global trends in integration policies. Although some researchers postulate a 
diminishing role for national decisions regarding migration management at the local level as 
an outcome of globalization, multilevel governance involving national migration and 
integration policies should not be neglected.198 However, it is at the local level that best or 
worst practices of immigrant integration management reflect the impact of the lack of top-
down supranational or national measures. As Demetrios G. Papademetriou points out: 
“Ultimately, it is at the local level that practical ideas are tested, adapted, and re-tested.”199 
Looking at cities’ institutional design of integration management, one can gather more 
insights into the applicability and reasons for national integration frameworks, which is one 
argument for the importance of gathering knowledge and doing research on integration best 
practices. Two other arguments are also worth mentioning here. 
One is the need to raise interest in the subject of integration among the local host 
society and policymakers, even if the subject remains taboo or is rarely discussed. 
Accordingly, collecting data on one city and then comparing it with that from another will lead 
to further monitoring, evaluation, and healthy competition. In fact, the platform of comparison 
may motivate municipalities to focus more on forming “developmentally attentive 
communities” for immigrants.200 Finally, research on good practices for integration 
management produces dialogues and encourages partnership between scholars and 
practitioners on integration. As Delgado rightly indicates, out of such cooperation there are 
“two-sided benefits: practitioners need the proof of their effectiveness, and academics must 
be able to join practitioners to increase their relevance in helping to shape practice and social 
policy.”201 In fact, social science seems to lag behind in applying its results in practice, and a 
cooperation between researchers and integration practitioners might be a good way to 
change that. 
It should be noted, however that best practice research is generally a never ending 
process, like “a journey without a final destination.”202 It is quite obvious that there will always 
be something that could be done better in the local approach to immigrants and possibly 
adapted from other promising practices. Researching “what works and how or what does not 
                                                     
197
 Bommes, M. (2008), op. cit., p. 187. 
198
 For the state of the art of the researchers’ and public debates on the integration policies in local 
communities see ibid., p. 160. 
199
 Papademetriou, D. G. (2003, October). Policy Considerations for Immigrant Integration. Migration 
Information Source.  
200
 Benson, J. (2007), op. cit., p. 53, (see subchapter 2.3.) 
201
 Delgado, M., Jones K., and Rohani M., op. cit., p. 16. 
202
 Ibid., p. 100. 
  
61 
work and why” stimulates mutual learning from others’ experience and its adaptation to other 
contexts.  
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3 Transatlantic Research: Framework, Scope and Methodology  
 
Taking into account the current economic crisis and subsequent changes in the global 
division of labor, it is controversial to what extent Europe and North America will remain 
attractive to immigrants in the near future. However, according to the UN statistics these two 
regions have had the fastest growing share of migrants in total population since 1990 (with 
the estimates for North America 14.2%, and Europe 9.5% of the population in 2010).203 Two 
significant immigrant destinations are located in these two regions: the European Union (the 
union of 27 member states) and the United States of America. While they may have different 
migration experiences and migration histories with heterogeneous immigrant groups, they 
share similar domestic policy concerns with regard to migration. As transatlantic researchers 
point out, on the issue of immigration in the EU and the US there is a similar split between 
public opinion on the one hand and academics on the other. The public fears are directed at 
massive inflows of immigrants and their allegedly negative impact on social cohesion, 
security and the labor market. According to some public opinion polls, a general belief exists 
that immigrants lower wages, raise competitiveness, and overburden the welfare system. On 
the other hand, some economists and demographers emphasize the long range positive 
effects of immigration. Immigrants, they argue, sustain population growth in the aging 
Western Democracies, counterbalance the increasing brain drain, and stimulate the 
economy.204  
Although North America and Europe are still the main immigrant destination targets, 
this preference might soon change for certain groups of migrants. The global economy now 
makes alternative career paths possible in many parts of the world for the most talented 
people. In the increasing competition for “global talent the EU and the US have started 
thinking about how to attract highly qualified immigrants to their countries.”205 Additionally, 
they have to start considering how to encourage the educated migrants to stay and how to 
make use of the potential of many immigrants overrepresented in the low skilled sector. 
Immigrant integration policies on both sides of the Atlantic represent an appropriate tool to 
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address all of the abovementioned concerns: public fears as well as demographic and 
economic needs. As transatlantic researchers point out: “the public is unlikely to be 
convinced by the economic benefits of immigration unless people see immigration working at 
the local level.”206 The exchange of experience and forming comparative transatlantic 
frameworks between the US and the EU can assist in finding solutions to common 
challenges. Apart from the research aims highlighted in the last chapter, this study seeks to 
contribute to this transatlantic dialogue and transatlantic research methods.  
This chapter introduces the reader to the rationale, design, and methods of the 
transatlantic study against the background of existing and newly developing models of 
transatlantic cooperation within the field of integration policies. It explains the selection 
process of case studies and research methodology. Furthermore, it presents research 
guidelines. Then, the main points of investigation are presented in the criteria catalog of 
measures for labor market integration of immigrant youth. Finally, the empirical research 
guidelines for interview questions are summarized.  
 
3.1 Transatlantic Research Projects  
 
The comparison of European and North American perspectives is both challenging 
and promising, for practical cooperation as well as for research projects within the field of 
immigrant integration. Accordingly, the study presented here pursues a recently increasing 
interest among researchers and policy-makers in the transatlantic exchange of information, 
data, and experience in migration management.  
There has been a recent boom in new initiatives, buttressed by conferences and top-
level meetings at local and more global levels of collaboration between the US and the EU 
countries within the broad field of world migration.207 One of the first of such movements in 
integration policies was established by the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research in 
cooperation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, who gathered researchers 
from within the Transatlantic Learning Community. In their paper Migration in the New 
Millennium the researchers strongly emphasize the need for an exchange of best integration 
practices across the Atlantic: “[T]here is no mechanism for regular transatlantic sharing of 
information on best practices. Both governments and the private sector need information on 
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programs that work to foster immigrant integration.”208 Sparked by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
the US and later the Madrid and London bombings in Europe, the focus of transatlantic 
discussions on immigration policies has shifted towards the issue of security. 
One of the most significant recent resolutions for transatlantic political collaboration 
on the issues of migration and security was presented in the EU-US Joint Statement on 
Enhancing Transatlantic Cooperation in the Areas of Justice, Freedom and Security made in 
October 2009. The authors, a group of US and EU officials and experts, known as the US-
EU High Level Contact Group (HLCG), have set up a framework for cooperation and the 
sharing of information relating to human mobility for the common purpose of fighting against 
terrorism.209 Interestingly enough, this non-binding statement does not include any 
consideration of the significance of integration policies for establishing security in the EU and 
the US.  
There are, however, recent new transatlantic initiatives among scholars and think-
tanks, which initiate dialogue between the EU and the US on the implications of integration 
policies. The contributors to the volume: Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and 
Europe in Comparative Perspective analyze the common current public and policy-makers’ 
concerns on both sides of the Atlantic: perceiving immigrant populations as a potential 
security threat, and focusing on stricter border patrol rather than on social policies for 
immigrants. These trends divert attention from the needs for integration management of the 
existing immigrant groups.210 According to the book, the failure of immigrant integration, both 
in the EU and in the US, is considered “a major source of insecurity.” Therefore, the 
collaboration between national and local governments is needed to adopt a more 
comprehensive approach towards integration across social, educational, and urban policies. 
As the authors argue, “it is crucial [therefore] that alternative means for managing the 
immigrant-host society interaction be negotiated and elaborated in broader forums.” 211 
There was an attempt to address this need at the political level in June 2004 during a 
joint seminar by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion (DG 
EMPL) of the European Commission and the United States Department of Labor (DOL). 
Together with participating officials from other US agencies, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Canadian Government, and EU representatives, 
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the organizers discussed, among other migration issues, the common challenges for 
designing and implementing effective immigration and integration policy with a special focus 
on the integration of immigrants into the labor market.212 Among many postulates on 
managing integration policy, a greater “horizontal” coordination on policy matters was 
advocated. This call for cooperation across many governmental sectors also supports my 
interpretation of integration policy as a multi-dimensional process, presented in subchapter 
2.5. 
The OECD’s International Migration Division is currently continuing its research on 
integration with a special focus on cross-country comparative analysis of integration of 
immigrants into the labor market and integration policies in 15 European and non-European 
OECD countries.213 The key findings of their study resulted in “Recommendations for an 
effective integration policy and examples of good practices from the countries under 
review.”214 The OECD research has been extended to a deeper analysis of the fate of 
children of immigrants and their integration on the labor market. Its key findings were 
presented at the international seminar, jointly organized by the EU Commission and the 
OECD Secretariat in Brussels in October 2009 and recently published in the book Equal 
Opportunities? The Labor Market Integration of the Children of Immigrants.215 The publication 
also includes insights into the US experience with immigrant integration, adding new 
perspectives for comparative transatlantic integration research.216  
The interest in the exchange of the US and EU experiences in migration and 
integration has won the attention of some American migration policy think–tanks and some 
German foundations. One of the most prominent examples is the Migration Policy Institute 
which, together with German Bertelsmann Foundation, launched the Transatlantic Task 
Force on Immigration and Integration in 2006. During the two years of its existence, the Task 
Force addressed its recommendations about migration and integration policies to the 
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governments of the United States and Canada, state and local governments and civil society, 
European Union institutions and EU member state governments. In 2008, it expanded 
internationally and was transformed into the Transatlantic Council on Migration. Since then 
the Council has convened several meetings on both sides of the Atlantic to discuss and 
analyze the transatlantic immigration and integration agenda for policy issues. The Council’s 
transatlantic members and guests come from the academic, policymaking, business, and 
media worlds. Their aim is to serve as a resource for international governments on the issues 
of both migration and integration.217  
The German Marshall Fund of the Unites States (GMF) pursues similar aims in their 
projects within transatlantic cooperation for migration issues. After their aforementioned 
milestone publication for transatlantic cooperation in 2000 together with other foundations 
they extended their scope of programs and projects into three basic areas, beginning in 
2008. One of these programs, the Transatlantic Forum on Migration and Integration, like the 
Transatlantic Council on Migration serves as an international forum for exchange for 
governments, the media, academia, and the non-profit sector. Secondly, the Transatlantic 
Academy is a scholarly forum, whose first group of fellows has concentrated on transatlantic 
integration research and produced a significant collection of comparative projects. Finally, 
the third project “Transatlantic Trends: Immigration” is a public opinion survey (of the US, 
Canada, and six EU countries), which addresses immigration and integration issues (for 
example, the effect of the economic crisis on attitudes toward immigration and the impact of 
the immigrants labor market on wages).218 
Other smaller scale research projects and programs at the university level have also 
emerged in the last few years. They aim at establishing learning communities and exchange 
platforms for research findings among individual European and American scholars of 
transatlantic comparative studies on migration and integration.219 Looking at the existing 
programs it may appear that in recent years Germany has become a key player in fostering 
the transatlantic exchange on migration. However, there are some other global international 
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migration and integration forums, whose focus is not solely transatlantic but whose work 
intersects with abovementioned transatlantic initiatives.220 
The brief overview of current transatlantic project presented above demonstrates that 
the scope of my research does not diverge from recent common trends and is part and 
parcel of the rapidly developing interest in sharing European experiences in migration and 
integration issues with American scholars. However fashionable and common it is now to 
compare EU cities to those in the US, it is crucial that reductionism be avoided and the 
challenges transatlantic comparative research involves be realized. The selection process of 
case studies for my empirical research has been one of them. 
 
3.2 The Selection Process 
 
The process of selecting case studies for my research project turned out to be both 
intriguing and challenging. The question I faced was how to demonstrate that the cities on 
both sides of the Atlantic, which are difficult to compare, can be placed into one research 
framework. In order to be successful, the plan of comparing cities in Poland, Germany and 
the United States, which to the best of my knowledge had never before been put into a 
similar constellation of comparative migration research, required some fundamental criteria. 
First, the idea behind such a choice was to conduct research on both old and relatively new 
EU member states, which have different bonds and a different sense of belonging to the 
structure of the Union as well as a different history of immigration. Similarly, on the other side 
of the Atlantic the plan was to choose those US states, which differ in the time of their 
admissions to the United States and in their experience with immigration. The number of 
case studies could not exceed my research capacities, so I decided to choose two cities of 
two neighboring EU countries, Poland and Germany, and two cities of two neighboring US 
states, California and Arizona. These two countries and two states represent a wide range of 
experiences with immigration. Moreover, the periods of Poland’s and Germany’s 
memberships in the EU and Arizona’s and California’s belonging to the US differ by more 
than half a century.221 It is assumed that this difference between the countries and states can 
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lead to a different sense of belonging to “their unions” and model certain patterns of local 
governance.222 In fact, both Arizona and Poland seem more defiant than their western 
neighbors towards top down recommendations from Washington and Brussels 
respectively.223 A desire for a certain degree of sovereignty may influence local patterns of 
governance in migration and integration policies.224 
Within these two EU countries and two US states I chose four cities of a relatively 
comparable population size and distance from each other: Phoenix in Arizona, San Diego in 
California, Munich in Germany, and Warsaw in Poland.225 Of course, the cities are unique in 
terms of the size and diversification of immigration populations and labor markets. 
Accordingly, the choice of the cities was also determined by their different immigration 
patterns and the role these cities play as destination for immigrants. According to Singers’ 
classification of certain American cities as immigrant gateways, San Diego is considered a 
post-World War II gateway, which began attracting immigrants in large numbers only in the 
past fifty years or so. Long-established destinations for immigrants which continue to receive 
large numbers of foreign-born, such as the city of Munich, are termed “continuous gateways.” 
Phoenix, in turn, is considered an “emerging gateway,” with rapidly growing immigrant 
populations which have settled there during the past twenty-five years. Warsaw might one 
day be one of Singer’s “pre-emerging gateways,” which is used to describe places where 
immigrant populations have grown very rapidly and are likely to continue to expand as 
immigrant destinations.226 
The case studies have proven to be an interesting testing ground for the effects of 
local institutional conditions on the integration management for immigrant youth, which will 
be further developed in the analysis of the empirical research in chapter 5. The following 
methodological approach has been instrumental for this transatlantic cross-city research 
design.  
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3.3 A Methodological Framework for Transatlantic Research 
 
The methodological framework for this research is founded on a mixed 
methodological design,227 which employs both qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
The research is based on triangulation, using many sources of information and research 
methods to increase the credibility and validity of the results. Analyses of statistical data, 
research literature, press articles, and field work in the four cities are assembled. The 
empirical methods consist of observations, field visits, as well as informal discussions with 
immigrants and migration researchers. These various sources serve to add depth to the 
evidence at the core of the empirical research: expert interviews. Exploring and 
systematizing expert interviews provides orientation for the analysis of integration measures 
in case studies and aids in organizing the information gathered.228  
Following the typology of expert interviews by Michael Meuser and Ulrike Nagel, the 
word “expert” refers to either a person who is responsible for the development, 
implementation, or monitoring of solutions under examination or a person who has a 
privileged access to information about groups of persons or decision processes.229 In the 
context of this research, the interviews were conducted with “potential experts in immigrant 
youth integration in a given city.” The latter describes representatives in the governmental 
and non-governmental sectors who were either thought to be knowledgeable about or 
responsible for or directly involved in integration work for urban immigrants. I use the 
expression “potential” to emphasize the challenges faced in the process of sampling 
interviewees.  
Two basic methods were used in the selection of interviewees: a pre-selection and in-
process selection method. Pre-selection took place during the preparatory research on 
possible key integration stakeholders and umbrella integration organizations across all four 
case studies. Next, snowball sampling was used during the study visits as a strategy to get to 
the most important organizations within the fields of labor market integration of immigrant 
youth.230 In fact, this field of integration work lies within the capacities of school 
representatives, job agencies, and immigrant organizations, whose fields of work are not 
restricted merely to the subject under investigation (for example, job counselors serve all 
                                                     
227
 Creswell, John W. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
228
 According to the differentiation of expert interviews three types are distinguished: explorative-, 
systematizing-, and theory-generating expert interviews.  
Bogner, A. and Menz, W. (2002). Das theoriegenerierende Experteninterview. Erkenntnisinteresse, 
Wissensformen, Interaktion. In A., Bogner, B. Littig, B., and W. Menz (Eds.), Das Experteninterview. 
Theorie, Methoden, Anwendungen (pp. 36-38). Opladen: Leske & Budrich. 
229
 Meuser, M. and Nagel, U. (2005). ExpertInneninterviews – vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht. Ein 
Beitrag zur qualitativen Methodendiskussion. In A., Bogner, B. Littig, B., and W. Menz (Eds.), Das 
Experteninterview. Theorie, Methoden, Anwendungen (pp. 71-99). Opladen: Leske & Budrich. 
230
 The fields of integration work for immigrant youth are presented in the form of a criteria catalog in 
subchapter 3.5. 
  
71 
citizens of a given city, not only immigrant youth). Therefore, the interviewees, first 
considered as experts sometimes turned out to be only partially involved in the field of 
integration. In such cases, they referred me to colleagues thought to be more competent. In 
fact, there were only few cases where I could get to the institutions which dealt solely with 
immigrant youth. However, all interviews analyzed were equally important for the empirical 
study and its findings on social networking for labor market integration in each city.  
I conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews: 16 interviews in each of the cities 
in the countries’ native languages (English, German, and Polish).231 Most of the interviews 
were recorded, with only a few exceptions, when the interviewees were opposed to the 
recording of some confidential information or to the conversation as a whole. The interviews 
were intended to be semi-structured and organized around key question group categories 
and points of investigation of the research.232 The time span planned for an interview was up 
to one hour.  
Each of the interviews conducted was followed by an analysis of the additional 
documentation and information materials provided by the interviewees and their online 
resources. Follow-up questions were clarified by email or per telephone. Upon the request of 
some interviewees, their names and the names of their organizations have been omitted.  
The empirical research and data collection took just over two years, between October 
2007 and December 2009. Different factors determined the time I was able to spend doing 
field research on each case study. Since I was not able to afford a longer stay in the US, the 
empirical research in the cities of Phoenix and San Diego had to be completed within one 
month in each of the cities (May 2008 and June 2008 respectively). The field visits were 
preceded by a one-month stay at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington DC, where I 
consulted with American migration and integration experts, conducted interviews with the 
stakeholders in federal integration policies, and prepared for my field work in Phoenix and 
San Diego. My empirical research in Poland was also restricted to a one month stay in 
Warsaw (March 2009), whereas the field work in the city of Munich, which was then my place 
of residence, was conducted throughout the whole time frame of the research.  
I used some empirical methods applied in the Grounded Theory (GT) developed by 
Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss (1967). In their work they reject formulating any 
theories before the field work is done and are strongly committed to empirical evidence 
rather than pre-formulated theoretical arguments.233 Based on these principles, my study 
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methodology evolved over the course of the collection of both qualitative and quantitative 
data. The research guidelines were being continually revised according to the contextual 
needs and new emerging areas of investigation discovered during the research process. 
It should be noted here that during the course of the interviews there were some 
alterations in length and thematic area. Some interviews were more narrative in structure and 
more extensive, while others were rather short and sometimes did not cover all questions as 
planned.234 The way of conducting interviews and their lengths depended on the rapport and 
level of trust while developed between me and the interviewees, their fields of work, and their 
eagerness to share additional information, which sometimes diverged from the scope of my 
interview questions.  
Another change to the planned procedure of the study concerns the subject of 
undocumented immigration in three of the countries included in the case studies. In fact, this 
issue was not included in the first draft of the research questions. Upon initial consultation 
with American migration researchers and immersion in the US integration debate on illegal 
immigration, I became aware of the scale of the problem and of the challenges for the focus 
of my research but decided not to exclude them from my study. Such an exclusion would 
have contradicted my commitment to the subject of immigrant integration.235 As a 
consequence of extending the focus of my field work, I had to restructure my initial interview 
questions (adding two more questions) and sometimes break taboos about services provided 
to the undocumented during the interviews. In fact, the inclusion of the issue of 
undocumented youth in the interviews was very helpful in obtaining better insight into the real 
challenges for integration work among interviewees and into their organizations’ 
backgrounds. The willingness or refusal to talk about the undocumented on the part of 
interviewees was determined by the profile of the organizations (governmental or non-
governmental) they represented and other contextual factors of a given city in a given 
country. 
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The data collected during the time frame of my research resulted in the formation of 
my theory of Affirmative Integration Management,236 which was developed in the process of 
analyzing the findings in my four case studies. The results and conclusions were examined 
from a comparative perspective in order to specify the conditions for the application of this 
theory in the US, Germany, and Poland and its relation to the research questions.  
The analysis of the transatlantic case studies required a special comparative 
framework, so that the research would not turn into disparate, incoherent elements of 
empirical field work. The groundwork for this frame was laid by the research guidelines 
presented in subchapters 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.  
The study employs various types of comparisons, which, according to the theorists 
Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, often happens when “[o]ne case may be most 
similar to another and both may be least similar to a third case.”237 As one can see in the 
analysis of the selection process in subchapter 3.2 and in the discussion of the case studies 
in chapter 5, there are many areas of comparison. However, it is quite difficult to use all of 
them for all of the cases. For example, the situation of immigrants in the city of Warsaw may 
be comparable to that in Phoenix, as both cities have less experience in dealing with 
immigrants than the other two, Munich and San Diego. On the other hand, the latter two 
cities vary in the number of immigrants and immigration groups they host. The question 
therefore arises, how can the comparison of cases with some similarities but many 
differences be justified?238 
In fact, the comparison of seemingly disparate case studies lies at the very core of 
this research design. The assumed difference of the antecedent conditions for integration 
processes (e.g. the different scale of immigration, ethnic immigration groups, and 
geographical location) determined the choice of the case studies.239 These different 
antecedent conditions pose challenges for transatlantic research. However, they do not rule 
out the existence of the same independent variables: case studies’ synergies, which will be 
presented in chapter 6. Consequently, this collective case-study research should increase 
the applicability of the results, exploring new dimensions of measures necessary for the 
successful implementation of the Affirmative Integration Management Theory (AIM) in 
different localities under different circumstances.240 Such a research approach draws on a 
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method that Kenneth Burke developed, called perspective by incongruity.241 Following his 
method, the argument is that by juxtaposing seemingly contrasting case studies of countries 
with such different histories of migration (as discussed in chapter 4) their similarities will 
emerge. The incongruity of the cities should bring into focus new perspectives on integration 
management and encourage the exchange of good or bad practices within the field of the 
integration of immigrant youth.  
The process of discovering which factors hinder or facilitate the AIM for immigrant 
youth has been guided by George’s and Bennet’s “Building block procedure.” Using this 
procedure, the research guidelines, which form the subtypes – “blocks” of one phenomenon: 
integration management for immigrants on the labor market – have been identified. 
According to the building block procedure, “each subtype can be regarded as a candidate for 
separate study and each study will investigate instances of that subtype.”242 Similarly, each 
of the points of the guidelines have been investigated in each of the cities and analyzed with 
regard to the development of other integration measures and contextual settings. The 
research guidelines build the blocks of 1) the list of main points of investigation for 
transatlantic research; 2) the list of key labor market integration measures for immigrant 
youth; 3) groups of interview questions. These blocks will all be discussed in detail in the 
following subchapters. 
 
3.4 Points of Investigations for Transatlantic Cases 
 
Seven major points of investigation have been chosen for the analysis of the pre-
existing conditions in the case studies. The following list constitutes the first set of research 
guidelines:  
 
1) Historical context of immigration;  
2) Immigration scale;  
3) Public and political discourse (the government’s “body language” and society’s 
“body language”);243  
                                                                                                                                                                     
- collective study (as in this research, different case studies broaden the perspective and all are 
instrumental to understanding the patterns of a phenomenon, here: management of immigrant 
integration).  
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4) National and local modes of integration;  
5) Citizenship policies244 and the role of legal status for integration;  
6) The education system and its policies;  
7) The labor market and it policies. 
 
The pre-existing conditions of international, national, state and local contexts of the 
cities are considered of equal importance to the research findings, and many of these points 
of investigation cut across these dimensions. In fact, conducting transatlantic research in EU 
and US cities without a deeper analysis of their national contexts seems wrong-headed. The 
points of investigations will be discussed in detail in the analysis of the top-down context for 
each of the city case studies in chapter 4245 and will be raised again in the discussions of 
local integration management in the cities in chapter 5.  
The analysis of these points should result in generating a list of significant factors in 
the research which have been found to influence local management of immigrant labor 
market integration: the catalog of differences and similarities among the EU and US case 
studies for the comparative transatlantic research framework. 
 
3.5 Catalog of Criteria of Labor Market Integration Measures 
 
A list of key labor market integration measures for immigrant youth comprises the 
second set of research guidelines. These measures are factors which have a significant 
impact on the degree of labor market integration “with” immigrants on the part of the host 
society. In other words, they determine the options available to the local host society for 
facilitating labor market integration, specifically for immigrant youth. 
The key labor market integration measures for immigrant youth have been chosen in 
eight fields for case study research. They are ordered according to the sequence of 
measures a young immigrant may need at different stages during the process of their 
transition from school to work. These measures are presented in the following criteria 
catalog: 
 
1) offer language training; 
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2) provide access to education; 
3) provide vocational training; 
4) recognize qualifications; 
5) offer job counseling; 
6) provide access to labor market information;  
7) promote entrepreneurship;  
8) eliminate discrimination in the workplace. 
 
These fields are merely a part of a larger picture of local measures for the integration 
management for immigrants which are crucial for implementation of the AIM within the field 
of labor market integration. The selection of only the eight aforementioned fields was made 
intentionally to narrow the focus of the research to “a more circumscribed scope conditions” 
and “avoid less precise generalizations.”246 In fact, other fields of policies and integration 
measures also determine labor market integration, for example an immigrant’s access to 
citizenship rights, the welfare and healthcare systems, transportation or housing.247 
It is important to note that determinants of “individual” integration of immigrants are 
not included in the criteria catalog, since individual immigrants themselves are not the 
subject of the study. The labor market integration factors which vary depending on the 
immigrants refer to their: 
 
1) age at arrival;  
2) household composition; 
3) entry class;248  
4) legal status; 
5) country of origin and networks.249 
 
These background characteristics of immigrants were also the subject of the expert 
interviews, in which the interviewees always emphasized the role of immigrants in the 
success of the integration measures undertaken by the institutions. Although I am not going 
to discuss these factors in detail in the case studies, I acknowledge their indisputable 
importance for the immigrant integration process.250 
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The criteria catalog was developed on the basis of hypothetical guesses supported by 
my study of integration literature and consultations with migration scholars. The following 
background assumptions will explain the reasons for the choice of the eight points of 
investigation.  
Language training for immigrant youth as a tool for facilitating the improvement of 
language skills acquired thus far is considered the most fundamental integration measure 
which the host society can offer. Both mentoring and motivation to learn are extremely 
important, especially for those who lack such support from their families or schools. Mastery 
of the language of a given country is “a must” in order to function in the receiving society. As 
Tamar Jacoby notes, referring to the US context, learning language (along with respect for 
law, habits and principles of democracy in the receiving society) was and still is considered 
the fairly “minimalist rules of the game.”251 This also applies to the EU countries with their 
language policies and, in some cases, obligatory language courses. Obviously, unless a 
young immigrant plans to engage in ethnic economies, there are hardly any prospects of 
integration into the labor market without language competence in the host country. On the 
other hand, the process of integration should not discourage immigrant youth from using their 
native languages, which should ideally be an asset on the labor market.252 Language training 
is sometimes but not always part of the curricula in the fields of education and vocational 
training, which are the next points of investigation.  
The educational system plays an important role not only in the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills but also in the healthy psychosocial functioning of immigrants both in 
the US and in the EU.253 This functioning is a prerequisite for an immigrant’s success on the 
labor market. Access to education and an “immigrant friendly” education system is therefore 
another measure to be investigated in these case studies. As Han Entzinger and Renske 
Biezeveld rightly point out, “[t]he educational system is not always sufficiently geared towards 
the specific needs of migrant children[,] and quite often suffers from segregation and ‘white 
flight.’”254 Improving access to education would require all measures which encourage 
immigrant youth to make progress, for example by lowering dropout rates and reducing 
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segregation, offering second-chance education opportunities for early school dropouts and 
providing higher education opportunities for young immigrants who aspire to academic 
careers. Since the choice of educational path is quite often made by parents, integration 
measures should also focus on educating migrant parents about local educational systems. 
Accordingly, training programs for parents are here considered indirect measures for the 
development of a future workforce among immigrant youth. 
The following points of investigation refer directly to the integration measures 
attending the first steps of immigrant youth on the labor market. The aim of these measures 
is to bring about a good mutual “orientation” for immigrants and for their prospective 
employers.255 Therefore, these who provide labor market services in these fields should be 
part of a good network system among immigrant communities and employers. 
Vocational training and apprenticeships are considered the first job experiences 
available to youth, which very often determine their future career opportunities. It might be 
difficult for immigrant youth to find suitable placements, especially when their language 
competencies or self-esteem are too low to make them standout from among other 
candidates. Usually mediating institutions like vocational schools or job counselors 
(depending on the vocational education system of a given country) take the responsibility for 
showing underprivileged youth the paths to a first job training. It is also crucial that those 
attending vocational education be presented opportunities to further develop their 
qualifications, for instance by transitioning to or returning to mainstream education.  
Vocational and job training are also a remedial qualification opportunity for those 
immigrants whose foreign credentials are not documented, accredited, or otherwise 
recognized in the host society. Such training might be the fastest way for immigrants to 
obtain a job certificate in the host country, although their real qualifications and skills may 
well exceed the job they would be allowed to perform afterwards. Many studies have shown 
that the lack of an efficient system for validating foreign credentials leads to downgrading 
jobs among immigrants.256 Moreover, a complicated system of credential recognition might 
be discouraging for potential employers of immigrant youth. Similarly Peter Creticos and 
others assert that “the apparent difficulty in validating the credentials of those educated or 
trained outside of the US [and other host countries] coupled with general confusion on 
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immigration law contribute to the view that hiring immigrants brings added risk.”257 Therefore, 
assessment and qualification recognition services should work in close collaboration with job 
counseling services.  
Individual job counseling and job placement services are of special importance to 
those who are recognized as disadvantaged for a number of reasons, for example social 
status, lack of self-confidence or interpersonal competence. Young people with migration 
backgrounds might feel stigmatized and disoriented in the competition on the labor market. 
Therefore, together with the intercultural training, assessment centers and job application 
courses are crucial for immigrant youth. These services may help immigrants to find out 
about their own potential, boost their self esteem, and learn the rules of the local labor 
market.  
Apart from job counselors, other channels of information about the needs of local 
labor market, such as formal and informal networks for job placement, might also be 
available. Indeed, young immigrants might even be unaware that there are job vacancies for 
which they are eligible, if they do not have access to these networks. Hence, finding out 
whether methods other than job counseling agencies exist and which of these are used to 
inform young immigrants about the needs of the labor market and available job openings 
constitutes a separate point of investigation.  
Another crucial aspect of supporting labor market integration for immigrant youth is 
the promotion of their entrepreneurship. Quite often the phenomenon of entrepreneurship 
among immigrants is usually understood in terms of creating ethnic economies and 
consequently ethnic enclaves. Since the workforce in ethnic businesses usually stems from 
those same ethnic communities, whether ethnic economies support or prevent immigrant 
integration into the host society is debatable. On the other hand, evidence does exist that 
ethnic enterprises encourage immigrants to acquire new skills and start their own 
businesses, which is also beneficial for the local economy. According to Malcolm Cross and 
Waldinger, “a growing ethnic economy creates a virtuous circle: business success gives rise 
to distinctive motivational structure, breeding a community-wide orientation towards small 
business and encouraging the acquisition of skills within a stable, commonly accepted 
framework.”258 Moreover, ethnic enterprises do not necessarily cooperate only with immigrant 
groups of the same ethnic origins. Young immigrant entrepreneurs may well become the 
future employers of local community members outside the ethnic enclaves, which supports 
the process of integration with the host society. Consequently, making young immigrants 
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realize that starting their own businesses can be a rewarding, albeit challenging endeavor is 
important. Offering special training for developing business plans, counseling on how to 
overcome bureaucratic obstacles, or showing examples of best practices from local success 
stories among immigrants might be encouraging. The question for empirical investigation is 
how immigrant entrepreneurial activity among the young start ups in the city is supported by 
the local institutions.  
For immigrants, starting their own businesses can also be a way of avoiding labor 
market discrimination.259 Indeed, young immigrants may experience discrimination at the final 
stage of their transition from school to work, trying to obtain a first interview or a job. It might 
be much harder for a person with very little or only limited work experience to win when 
competing with a more experienced adult on the labor market. A migration background may 
even raise more concerns among employers. According to an OECD report, “[e]mployers 
may perceive the children of immigrants as less productive than other job seekers or they are 
more uncertain about their potential productivity.”260 The question arises whether and how 
the host society helps to combat discrimination both during recruitment and in the 
workplace.261 The level of discrimination on the local labor market, it is worth noting, is 
difficult to measure and necessitates a focus on employers, which is beyond the scope of this 
study. My points of investigation concern, first, anti-discriminatory actions of those institutions 
outside the business sector and, second, recruitment agencies which would monitor and 
offer counseling to young immigrants in cases of discrimination. Such pro-integration 
activities constitute the last point of the criteria catalog for my field work. 
 
3.6 Interview Question Groups 
 
The third pillar of the research guidelines are the interview question groups. They are 
based both on the criteria catalog presented above and some additional points of 
investigation from the research questions.  
The interview questions were organized along the following thematic lines with 
reference to integration work and the working environment of a given organization: 
  
a) understanding by the organization of labor market integration processes for 
immigrant youth;  
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b) challenges for immigrant youth on the local labor market; 
c) actions taken for immigrant youth and their labor market integration (with a 
follow-up on eight integration measures from the criteria catalog);  
d) integration measures for undocumented youth; 
e) ways of reaching out to immigrants and the host society; 
f) source of funding of the organization and its challenges; 
g) network building for immigrant youth and cross-sector cooperation with other 
organizations (county, province, country, international community); 
h) the influence of top- down integration policies for the organization’s practical 
integration work; 
i) prospects for the future: challenges and plans for integration work of a given 
organization. 
 
The list of sixteen interview questions, which were developed around the above points, are 
presented in appendix 1. As mentioned earlier, the questions were sometimes modified, 
shortened or extended over the course of the research as well during an interview itself to 
adjust their scope to a given interviewee and the type of organization.262  
Additional points of investigation, which arose unexpectedly during the field work, and 
which was not planned before the research guidelines were developed, will be discussed in 
the analysis of the case studies in the following chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
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4 Top-Down Contexts for Local Integration Management 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on theoretical aspects of and speculation about the 
successful management of integration policies to assist immigrant youth in gaining access to 
local labor markets. In chapters 4 and 5, the focus now shifts towards empirical research, 
which examines whether and how the theory, presented thus far, functions in practice. 
As previously mentioned, integration takes place first and foremost at the local 
level.263 At the same time it is obvious that local integration management is determined by 
both national and regional integration measures. Together they set general policy 
frameworks and can be used to establish integration instruments that either facilitate or 
hinder local attempts at integration.264 Various levels of governance, which influence local 
integration policies and integration practices in the case studies, are discussed in this 
chapter. In the cases of Phoenix and San Diego, both the US federal and state policies of 
Arizona and California are examined. For Munich and Warsaw, both the EU as well as 
German and Polish integration frameworks, respectively, are presented. 
The following seven points will be highlighted with reference to the countries and 
states in focus: historical insights into immigration in the post-Second World War period; the 
scale of immigration accompanied by available statistical data; political and public discourse 
on migration and integration; national modes of integration; and national immigration policies 
concerning citizenship, education, and the labor market, which have an impact on integration 
challenges immigrant youth face.  
From the outset it should be noted, however, that not all seven points will be 
discussed in all six contexts: the US, California and Arizona; and the EU, Germany and 
Poland. Different levels of governance and various interrelations among these political 
entities make it impossible to present the top-down contexts in the case studies in the same 
way. The EU obviously has much less authority over its member states than is the case with 
the US federal government and the individual states. Moreover, Poland and Germany have 
distinct integration modes and citizenship, education and labor market policies, whereas 
Arizona and California are under the single umbrella of US federal legislation. Accordingly, 
the description of the US context for integration management will be more extensive than 
that of the EU. Sections on the national mode of integration, legal status, and a more 
extensive consideration of the integration framework for education and the labor market will 
be included in subchapter 4.1 on the US. Subchapter 4.3 on the EU will be much shorter and 
will not cover the EU mode of integration and legal issues on migration, which will be 
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analyzed separately for Germany and Poland. All of the data collected on top-down contexts 
has been updated, where available, to the end of 2010.265 
 
4.1 The United States 
 
4.1.1 US Scale of Diversity 
 
The US scale of diversity will not be discussed solely through the prism of statistical 
data, reminiscent of the case of the European Union.266 As Peter Schuck points out, two 
levels of thinking about diversity in reference to diversity in America must be distinguished: 
“diversity as fact” and “diversity as ideal.” Accordingly, American diversity as fact is 
interpreted as the demographic reality of ethnic diversification, which has shaped the US 
since its earliest years. Diversity as ideal, in contrast, is quite a new phenomenon, which 
emerged in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, emphasizing American “notions of 
fairness, equal opportunity, and growing global responsibility” for world migration 
movements.267 
The ideology of the past and present American ideal of diversity, which needs to be 
included in any discussion of the US as a typical immigration country, will be considered first. 
In fact, three commonly-used associations with America could be employed to briefly 
characterize the landscape of US immigration: diversified, unified, and hyphenated. These 
opposing expressions already indicate the great complexity of the US scale of diversity. 
First, Hollinger’s metaphor of “diversification of diversity,” used in reference to the US, 
points to a multitude of different ethno-racial affiliations present in the country. This ethnic 
diversification has led America to be commonly associated with the notion of the melting pot 
as well as the birthplace of assimilation and multicultural thought.268 The United States has 
definitely become one of the most popular destinations for world immigration, with the 
renowned Statue of Liberty, a symbol of a welcoming mother greeting new immigrants, the 
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“huddled masses yearning to breathe free,” and offering them hope for a better life “beside 
the golden door!”269 
Secondly, people of different cultures who found themselves together in one country, 
started to create a sense of unity. However, neither a common history nor the same blood 
could bind immigrants in the US together, but only a shared set of ideals. As Seymour Martin 
Lipset confirms, “[b]eing an American is an ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. 
Those who reject American values are un-American.”270 Indeed, a set of American values, 
the American Creed, first coined by Gunnar Myrdal,271 is considered one of the building 
blocks unifying people of many traditions and various cultural backgrounds. Historically, the 
Founding Fathers expressed the American Creed, laying the foundation for the United States 
in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution. As Henry Bischoff points out, 
“[f]rom such ideas a civic culture emerged that valued liberty, established an increasingly 
participatory democracy, included a bill of rights, and fostered open economic opportunity.”272 
As a result, the national unity in diversity of many ethno-racial groups has emerged. The 
motto E Pluribus Unum, out of many one, first used as a symbol for the political unity of the 
thirteen-state-country in the first Great Seal of the United States, has become a symbol of 
the American ideal.273 Certainly, the bonds among members of this American unity are much 
stronger than those among the countries in the European Union. The old and still common 
celebration of the American ideal of diversity has made the United States appear to be an 
immigration country in a way which no European immigration country ever has. 
Although different cultural influences have been incorporated into the values of the 
American Creed, tolerance towards “otherness” is not unlimited. In fact, the American 
immigration and integration system works through the binary opposition of inclusion and 
exclusion: American versus “alien.” The challenge of striking a balance between the two 
American ideals, creating unity while respecting diversity, are part and parcel of American 
politics and culture. As a result, the third important symbol of the US as a nation of 
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immigrants emerged with the hyphen. Hyphenated America has become “an emblem of the 
immigrant bargain,” which is a consequence of the failed Americanization movement.274 
Endless discussions exist among researchers about the question of which expression 
– diversified, unified or hyphenated – best describes the American nation of immigrants. 
Judging which concept is more appropriate or adding new perspectives to this debate is 
beyond the scope of this paper.275 Nevertheless, it can be argued that being American will 
always be an issue in the US national mode of integration as will be discussed in a later 
section of this chapter. As Jacoby rightly points out, referring to American political principles, 
“much as we celebrate the hyphen, one side of it is more important than the other.”276 The 
same principle also applies to American integration policies. 
The second dimension of the US scale of diversity – diversity as fact – is much easier 
to measure owing to a wide range of available statistics and demographic reports on 
immigrants in the US.277 Based solely on the quantity and quality of available sources on US 
immigration, it might be assumed that monitoring ethnic diversification is a top priority at both 
state and national levels. In fact, the US government started publishing statistical data on 
immigration as early as the 1890s,278 whereas the first data on the birthplaces of the US 
population stem from the 1850 decennial census. Such a long-established system of regular 
data collection makes historical and comparative research on migration trends across the 
whole nation, particular states and at the local level much easier than on the other side of the 
Atlantic.279 
The diversity of immigration in the US can be perceived through the prism of various 
categories of immigrants in the US statistics, which differ significantly from European ones. 
According to the Census Bureau, the term “foreign born” refers to a person with no US 
citizenship at birth, and includes naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees 
and asylees, people on certain temporary visas, and the unauthorized. On the other hand, 
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the term “immigrant” in US statistics refers only to people granted legal permanent residence 
in the United States, also known as LPRs.280 However, for the purpose of this dissertation the 
term “immigrant” will be used interchangeably with foreign born people, following the 
standards set out in the introduction and also a common practice in US migration reports.281  
With reference to statistics on immigration youth, two types of immigrant children 
have to be distinguished: second-generation immigrant children, who are US-born children 
with at least one foreign-born parent; and first-generation immigrant children, which include 
any foreign-born children with foreign-born parents, collectively called children with immigrant 
parents (hereafter immigrant children). Nationwide research on this group of children is quite 
difficult to interpret due to certain shortcomings of existing data.282 The available data on 
immigrant children comes from the decennial census and American Community Surveys, 
which did not ask respondents for their parents' country of birth if they did not live together in 
the same household. Consequently, the statistics collected on immigrant children reflect only 
those who reside with at least one parent. The majority of this population is under the age of 
18. By the same token, research on the educational performance of second generation 
immigrant children is limited to local surveys and longitudinal studies.283  
Despite variations in the intensity of incoming flows of immigrants into the United 
States in the two last centuries, the average number of all immigrants across the 50 states 
makes the US the top immigration host country in the world.284.  The overall percentage of 
immigrants in the US population has been constantly increasing since its record low in 1970 
(4.7%). According to the Census Bureau's 2009 American Community Survey, the current 
US immigrant population, estimated at 38,517,234, stood at 12.5% of the total US population 
in 2009.285 Immigrant children and youth (aged 5 to 24) accounted for almost 15% of all 
foreign born.286 The predominance of immigrants from Central America and Asia among all 
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foreign born marks an important shift in recent immigration patterns.287 Of the entire foreign 
born population in 2009, the most numerous group according to the country of birth came 
from Mexico, which comprised almost 30% of the foreign born residing in the US. Mexico 
was followed by the Philippines, India and China, excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan (see 
graph 1). 
 
Graph 1 Ten Source Countries with the Largest Populations in the US as Percentages of the Total 
Foreign-Born Population in 2009.  
 
 
Source: The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009 
 
A distinct part of the US immigration landscape is shaped by refugees and asylees.288 
For more than two decades refugees in the US have constituted one-tenth of the annual 
immigration into the country. They are beneficiaries of the well-known US Refugee Program 
(USRP), which in cooperation with the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR has resettled more 
refugees than all of the other 24 current resettlement countries combined. Among new 
arrivals in 2009 74,602 refugees were reported, half of them under 25 years of age.289 The 
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number of resettled immigrants in 2009 was almost three times higher than during the 
steepest fall-off in resettlements in 2002 (when 26,765 refugees were accepted), though this 
figure is still far from the peak in 1980, when more than 200,000 refugees were admitted. 
Iraq, Burma, and Bhutan were the three top countries of origin in 2009.290  
The number of foreign born who have successfully applied for asylum has been 
constantly decreasing since 2001 (with the exception of a small increase from 2005 to 2006), 
when almost 40,000 people were granted the status of asylees. Today the number of new 
asylees has decreased by almost 50% (to 22,119 in 2009). Nearly half of all asylees came 
from China (28%), Ethiopia (5%), Haiti (4.5%), Colombia (4.5%) and Iraq (4.1%). 
It should be noted here that the average level of immigration presented for the whole 
US does reflect existing differences between US states. Graph 2 provides an overview of the 
geographical distribution of immigrants in the US. States also differ in terms of the main 
countries of birth of immigrants, which will be discussed in more detail in the subchapters on 
California and Arizona. However, certain general new trends in immigration patterns are 
worth mentioning here. 
Although the long-established immigrant destinations, such as California (9,947,000), 
New York (4,178,00), Texas (3,985,000), Florida (3,484,000), and New Jersey (1,759,000), 
were still on top in 2009, other immigration destinations have been rapidly growing in 
popularity over the last decade, primarily in the Southeast and Midwest.291 
The states with the largest percent growth of the immigrant population between 2000 
and 2009 include South Carolina (76.9%), Alabama (67.5%), Tennessee (67.1%), Delaware 
(64.9%), and Arkansas (63.2%) (see graph 3). Geographical resettlement patterns, in turn, 
are usually determined by the location of family members or pre-existing ethnic communities 
of incoming refugees. Almost one-half of all refugees were resettled in one of six states: 
California (15%), Texas (11%), New York (5.9%), Arizona (5.8%), Florida (5.6%) and 
Michigan (4.7%). 
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Graph 2 US States Ranked by Percent of Foreign Born in 2009 
 
 
Source: The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009 
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No demographic picture of immigration situation in the US would be complete without 
mentioning the magnitude of undocumented immigration. For years the issue of the 
unauthorized population has been the most contentious subject in political and social 
debates on immigration.292 Consequently, there are many surveys monitoring unauthorized 
immigrants. As of January 2009 the Department of Homeland Security estimated 10.8 million 
unauthorized resident immigrants, of whom 63% entered before 2000 and 62% were from 
Mexico.293 These figures are corroborated by the estimates presented in the most recent 
report by the Pew Hispanic Center, from February 2011, which reported 11.2 million 
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States as of March 2010 (up to 3.7% of the 
nation’s entire population), almost three times more than in 1990, but 8% less than in March 
2007. Besides Mexico, the majority of undocumented immigrants are reported to come from 
Central America (12%), Asia (11%), South America (5%), and the Caribbean (3%). However, 
the recent years have seen a decrease in the size and annual inflows of unauthorized 
immigrants, predominantly among those who come from Latin American countries other than 
Mexico.294 Similarly, a decline in the population of undocumented foreign born children 
(immigrants under the age of 18) was noted: from 1.5 million in 2000 to 1.1 million in 2009. 
However, during the same period, the number of US-born children with at least one 
unauthorized parent increased by 42% from 2000 to 2009, when they numbered 5.1 million. 
As a result, the percentage of children living in the households facing possible 
deportation of one or both parents must have grown significantly. Living in fear and with no 
access to public services for their family members integrating this group of US immigrant 
youth is much more challenging.295 
Despite slight decreases, recent trends in the number of unauthorized people living in 
the US, the fact that 28.5%296 of all foreign born people in the country have an unregulated 
status, concerns both pro- and anti-amnesty activists and policymakers. In fact, the fierce 
discussions about unauthorized immigrants quite often seems to eclipse American pride in 
the “diversity ideal,” which acknowledges the potential of immigrants and recognizes their 
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valuable contribution to a multicultural society. In fact, the issue of irregular immigration 
appears omnipresent in any discussions of immigrant integration.297 
 
Graph 3 US States Ranked by Percent Change in the Foreign-Born Population, 2000 to 2009 
 
 
Source: MPI Data Hub (Migration Policy Institute) 
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4.1.2 US Mode of Integration  
 
Both US history as a nation of settlers and contemporary responses to large–scale 
immigration, presented above, have tended to create an inaccurate image of the United 
States as a country where integration processes run smoothly. In fact, integration has been 
and continues to be a very painful and even violent process. The constant struggles of 
certain ethnic groups past and present to gain acceptance as equal members of American 
society serve as historical evidence of the ongoing challenges of immigrant integration.298 In 
fact, the success of newcomers’ efforts toward integration and that of the second generations 
has not been determined so much by their migration backgrounds as by their race. Despite 
the great achievements of the Civil Rights Movement, exclusion from or inclusion in 
American society was and unfortunately still is determined by the skin color of the US 
residents. Current debates about integration in the US more often focus on the Latino 
population than on any other ethnic group. In fact, since most of the unauthorized immigrants 
are Hispanic, in some cases American citizens with brown skin are already potential 
suspects or integration outcasts. As my empirical research on the US case studies indicates, 
“the whites” sometimes have misgivings about the integration achievements of “the browns,” 
regardless of whether an individual was born in the country or had just crossed the US 
border.299 The current situation may be reminiscent of the stigmatization of the black 
population or Native Americans in previous centuries. Paradoxically, those who were not in 
fact immigrants were expected to adapt to the culture of the white mainstream population of 
immigrants. Consequently, “a partial decoupling of migration and integration issues” in the 
US policies is nothing new.300 
According to the principles outlined in the US Civil Rights Act, equal access to 
American opportunities for all people can be understood as integration into American 
society.301 In fact, the US national mode of integration has its roots in the notion of the 
equality of all ethnic groups, without a special focus on immigrants. As Donald Kervin notes, 
the interplay between the rights and “integration” of immigrants is unique to the American 
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experience: “The application of these core protections to non-citizens (i.e. civil rights) 
represent a fundamental form of ‘integration’ in our constitutional system.”302  
Supporting the integration of immigrants was not part of any official American policy in 
the post-Second World War period. Integration measures for people under international 
protection, which have been administered by the Federal Refugee Resettlement Program 
since 1980, are merely a notable exception.303 Despite the ostensible guarantee of equal 
constitutional rights for all in the Civil Rights Act, certain federal policies restricting public 
benefits for non-citizens, introduced in 1996, started to delay the potential integration of 
some immigrants.304 As a result of legislative changes and the intensified surveillance of 
newcomers after 9/11 policy makers and migration think-tanks in the US began to debate 
integration with reference to migration. Only recently did the Federal Government 
demonstrate greater interest in managing immigrant integration. In fact, integration policies at 
local levels still remain ad hoc, under-funded, and lacking in any federal coordination 
strategy.  
A growing consensus among American migration experts and local community-based 
organizations is arguing that federal immigrant integration tools, such as funding and a 
national plan for integration, are essential. Advocates for this position argue that the issue of 
immigrant integration should be more central to the nationwide calls for “comprehensive 
immigration reform,” a long desired reform that is supposed to overhaul the current 
immigration system which is unable to manage demographic, economic and social 
challenges arising from current immigration trends.305 As MPI experts claim, the laissez-fair 
approach to integration fails to address new challenges, such as increasing immigration 
flows since the 1990s, new immigrant destinations in the US, the rapid expansion of the 
number of unauthorized immigrants, the increasing number of low-income children of 
immigrants, and limited English proficiency among the student population.306  
Just as there is no formal US integration policy, no official definition of integration 
exists either. Although extensive secondary literature on the concept of integration does 
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exist, only a few US federal agencies have made any attempt at defining integration.307 A 
more intense discussion was initiated in 2004 with the three-year project Building the New 
American Community (BNAC), funded primarily by the Office for Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR).308 The project was considered an “experiment,” faced with the absence of a national 
integration policy and federal integration initiatives. It focused on integration strategies 
among various stakeholders in refugee and immigrant assistance in three cities, Lowell (MA), 
Nashville (TN), and Portland (OR). The findings identified social and economic conditions 
and provided an incentive for the 2006 creation of the Integration Working Group (IWG) by 
the ORR. The goal of the group was to review and analyze the process of refugee integration 
into local communities in the United States. One of the first tasks was to develop a working 
definition of integration 309 After a round of consultations and modifications, the group 
members agreed upon a definition. According to their definition: 
 
Integration is a dynamic, multidirectional process in which newcomers and the receiving 
communities intentionally work together, based on a shared commitment to acceptance and 
justice, to create a secure, welcoming, vibrant, and cohesive society.310 
 
As the IWG rightly points out, this definition focuses more on the integration process than 
expected integration outcomes, which became central to another federal integration project, 
the Task Force on New Americans. The Task Force, which operated for more than two 
years, was a federal interagency initiative launched by President George W. Bush at the time 
of the establishment of IWG (June 2006) whose target was to “help legal immigrants 
embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common language, and fully 
become Americans.”311 The Task Force, as its final report states, was established “to 
highlight the importance of successful immigrant integration to the nation” and inspire the 
development of a national strategy for integration efforts. The report, however, was very 
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ambiguous regarding a consistent definition of integration, combining it with the common and 
overdetermined concepts of adaptation and incorporation into the American nation. As one 
can read: 
 
The integration efforts described in this report are a federal call to action that defines a 
modern-day Americanization movement […] Americanization is the process of integration by 
which immigrants become part of our communities and by which our communities and the 
nation learn from and adapt to their presence. Americanization means the civic incorporation 
of immigrants; this is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of liberty, 
democracy and equal opportunity.312  
 
In fact, the Task Force focused on promoting the ideology of the old Americanization 
movement in the form of a new so-called Americanization Movement for the Twenty-first 
Century, in which integration is employed as a better-sounding alternative to assimilation.  
The rhetoric of this new Americanization Movement is reflected in the officially 
declared concept of integration measures which are now defined by the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in terms of civic integration. Accordingly, the 
federal strategy for civic integration activities targets only those who aspire to American 
citizenship and provides “instruction and training on citizenship rights and responsibilities 
[and] information and tools necessary to successfully integrate into American civic culture.”313 
Neither the Task Force’s groundwork nor the above understanding of civic integration as a 
final, completed stage in becoming an American citizen is consistent with the aforementioned 
process-oriented concept of integration, proposed by IWG. Consequently, much still has to 
be done to conceptualize integration in terms of one coherent and generally accepted formal 
definition for US integration policy. 
As no formal definition of integration has yet been developed, federal integration 
policy is still fragmented. No single federal agency is solely dedicated to developing and 
monitoring integration policies. Nevertheless, a number of agencies from various US 
departments, which oversee state legislation and funding programs that touch on various 
parts of immigrant lives, do have an impact on the process of immigrant integration at the 
state and local levels. 
The only comprehensive federal integration program is run by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) through the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). 
The program is aimed at refugees and asylees, victims of severe forms of human trafficking, 
certain Amerasians from Vietnam, Cuban and Haitian entrants, and unaccompanied alien 
children (henceforth referred to collectively by the ORR as “refugees”). Since its 
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establishment by the 1980 Refugee Act, the ORR has been offering programs and grants, as 
well as supporting and cooperating with State Refugee Coordinators and local partners, to 
provide target groups with assistance upon their arrival and over the longer term. The goal of 
the assistance is to help refugees and asylees achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly 
as possible in the first six to eight months after their arrival.314 The traditional resettlement 
programs, as administered by the states, initially provide refugees with funding for food, 
shelter and clothing, medical care for up to eight months315 and social services (like 
education, health care, and mental health services) for up to five years. The state agencies 
coordinate with local branches of 11 National Voluntary Resettlement Agencies (so-called 
VOLAGs),316 which in turn partner with other local resettlement organizations (affiliates), in 
some states forming a well-organized refugee assistance network.317  
Some alternatives to state-managed programs include funding opportunities for 
resettlement agencies which can apply directly to the ORR for assistance. Examples of such 
programs are the Matching Grant (MG) Program for VOLAGs offering refugee assistance 
projects which provide employment for periods of four to six months, or the Wilson Fish 
Program, which also focuses on the economic self-sufficiency of refugees (while providing 
assistance for a longer period of time) and network-building in local communities where 
immigrants are resettled. Moreover, many ORR discretionary programs are awarded 
competitively to public and private non-profit organizations which engage in different fields of 
refugee integration, for example School Impact Education grants to assist schools receiving 
large numbers of refugee children or the Microenterprise Development Program, offering 
training and technical assistance in business plan development and other skills refugees 
need in order to become successful entrepreneurs.318 Despite a wide range of funding 
opportunities for refugee integration, many recent reports on the refugee situation have 
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drawn attention to the dire need for increasing available funds.319 Similarly, federal funding 
for resettlement assistance is too little and provided for too short a time to enable refugees to 
achieve self-sufficiency and integration, which poses a big challenge for the ORR 
administration and for efficient labor market integration in the US in the US Resettlement 
Program.  
Other agencies which are responsible for immigration policy, apart from the US 
Resettlement Program, were restructured by the Homeland Security Act, signed by President 
George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 in November 2002. Accordingly, the functions of the 
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was abolished in March 2003, 
were transferred from the Department of Justice and divided among three offices of the 
newly-created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As Berndt Ostendorf points out, this 
relocation marked a significant change in the perception of immigration and integration, 
which are not only a focus of consideration for the economic stability of the US labor market, 
as in the past, but simultaneously became first and foremost a subject of national security 
policy.320  
Of the three new offices of the DHS, the USCIS is the federal stakeholder in the 
program for civic integration mentioned earlier.321 As a spearhead of the Task Force on New 
Americans, the USCIS concentrated on promoting the ideology of the new Americanization 
Movement. At the end of 2008 the Task Force launched the US Government’s official web 
portal for new immigrants and immigrant-receiving communities, WelcometoUSA.gov,322 
which provides immigrants with basic information on life in the US and the government. One 
of the civic integration tools Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New Immigrants and 
Communities offers educational materials and training methods on the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship (e.g. a Civics and Citizenship Toolkit).323 
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Since naturalization still remains one of the ultimate goals of federal integration 
measures, the focus on citizenship courses, which are supposed to prepare immigrants for 
US citizenship, comprise the core of the development of USCIS integration measures. Their 
purpose is to make immigrants perform competently at naturalization interviews and to pass 
tests.324 For example, the Citizenship Resource Web-based portal, launched in September 
2010, offers user-friendly access to information specifically divided into sections for learners, 
teachers, and community-based organizations. Although the portal primarily focuses on 
promoting citizenship courses, it also presents examples of promising local practices, which 
not only increases access to citizenship services but also engages “the general public in the 
successful integration of newcomers” (e.g. recruiting volunteer English language assistors or 
initiating an information campaign on immigrant cultures).325 The exchange of best practices 
on topics other than naturalization might one day lead to a shift away from the USCIS’s focus 
on civic education towards a more comprehensive vision of integration. 
Just recently, the USCIS started offering funds for integration, supplementing the 
Department of Education’s existing civic education grant program, which will be described in 
the next section. USCIS Citizenship Grants aim to expand the number of citizenship 
preparation programs for selected community-based organizations. Since its first year of 
operation, in 2009, the program has expanded in budget, categories of possible applicants, 
numbers of beneficiaries, and scope. In fiscal Year 2011, the USCIS is offering three 
competitive grant funding opportunities, with a total budget of $8.5 million, designed “to help 
prepare permanent residents for citizenship and promote immigrant integration.”326 More 
specifically, only those organizations can apply for grants which aim to provide permanent 
residents with citizenship instruction in civics and English (in Citizenship and Integration 
Direct Services Grant Programs) or with other sub-applicants create comprehensive long-
term capacity programs for citizenship courses and naturalization services (in the National 
Capacity Grant Program). Although the USCIS grant programs do not directly support 
integration measures for the labor market integration of immigrant youth, naturalization is a 
very important step toward guaranteeing each young immigrant security and social benefits. 
Besides recently allotted integration funds, the USCIS reaches out states and local 
communities through the Office of Public Engagement, which cooperates with other USCIS 
                                                                                                                                                                     
free of charge. The enthusiasm and pride in spreading the news about their “integration work” was 
remarkable.  
324
 For more on naturalization tests, see subchapter 4.1.3. 
325
 Citizenship Resource Website: http://www.uscis.gov/citizenship 
326
 The Office of Citizenship offered it first grant program in 2008. Under the 2008 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act, the Office of Citizenship was able to provide a total of $450,000 in grants to 
support citizenship preparation programs. The FY 2008 funding opportunity was restricted to two 
organizations in New York City: the Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights. and the 
Citizens Advice Bureau (now called Bronx Works). The past two years has seen a significant increase 
in funding over previous years. In 2009, the USCIS awarded 13 community-based organizations a 
total of $1.2 million to expand citizenship preparation programs, followed in 2010 by $7.8 million 
granted to 75 organizations. 
  
100
field offices across the states in order establish good communications between the USCIS 
agency and local stakeholders (such as governors, legislatures, mayor’s offices, employers, 
and community-based organizations). A national network of Community Relations Officers 
(CROs) across the US, which is managed by the USCIS Community Relations and 
Engagement Division, is seeking to establish a dialog between the Federal Government and 
immigrants and immigrants and the receiving communities. The Officers monitor local 
partnerships and give feedback to the USCIS Agency on local programs and integration 
initiatives for immigrants in the regions for which they are responsible.327 
Both the USCIS and the ORR could be considered the forerunners of still skeletal 
federal integration policies. Other integration measures in other federal agencies, which will 
be highlighted in the next sections of this chapter, contribute to the patchwork of integration 
programs, which can facilitate the transition of immigrant youth into the labor market. 
Moreover, the emerging bottom-up network of local non-governmental organizations and 
governmental integration stakeholders plays a crucial role in the lobby work seeking the 
development of a US mode of integration. It is worth noting that the current language on 
integration, which is quite new at the federal level, describes many processes which were 
taking place at the local level for generations without much federal attention. In fact, much of 
the integration work of these local organizations had simply gone unnoticed for a long time. 
Only recently have these organizations started to unite through new nationwide integration 
initiatives such as the annual National Immigrant Integration Conference (which met for the 
first time in 2009)328 or the US Immigrant Integration Network (which first met in 2010).329  
Indeed, any plans for comprehensive immigration reform must take into consideration 
the experience of bottom-up initiatives, whose integration work for immigrant youth will be 
discussed in the US case studies in chapter 5. As Doris Meissner rightly points out: “the 
admonition against fixing what isn’t broken should be a guiding principle in examining the 
issues underlying immigrant integration.”330 Moreover, only by analyzing the importance of 
legal status for integration processes in the US can one really begin to understand why most 
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federal immigrant integration measures target civic education and transforming immigrants 
into New Americans.  
 
4.1.3 Legal Status 
 
The US is not only known worldwide as a nation of immigrants but also as a nation of 
laws. Indeed, the country boasts a complicated set of categories of potential legal ways of 
entering and remaining in the country, categories which entail different constraints or benefits 
for immigrants. Thus, structural integration of the youth residing in the US depends to a great 
extent on a “continuum of consent,” i.e. the degree to which the government has consented 
to their stay in the country.331 Whether immigrant youth have the status of temporary visitors, 
legal permanent residents, US citizens or belong to the undocumented population 
determines their welfare situation and consequently their path toward successful integration 
into the labor market. 
 
Graph 4 Legal Status of the US Foreign-Born Population, 2010 
 
 
 
Source: Pew Hispanic Center, 2011 
 
Foreigners residing in the US temporarily on a particular type of visa are formally 
called temporary admissions or non-immigrants.332 They constituted the smallest group of all 
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foreign-born people in the US in 2010 (see graph 4). Since they have been allowed to enter 
the US only for a specific purpose, they are restricted to engaging temporarily in the 
particular array of activities specified by their visa, and they are eligible for few benefits and 
services. Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs), who, as previously mentioned, are the only 
group of foreigners officially called immigrants,333 also known as Green Card Holders, have a 
permanent right to live and work in the United States. However, their eligibility for federal and 
state benefits and grants also varies. Refugees, asylees, and those LPRs who have worked 
for a longer period of time in the US, or have served in the military, have access to a wide 
range of social assistance. Other LPRs face different eligibility requirements, dependent on 
the type of benefits and state regulations. Since the enactment of the controversial Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, many 
restrictions have been imposed on the eligibility of many legal immigrants who have been in 
the Unites States for less than five years. As a result, their lack of access to core social 
federal benefits may negatively impact the welfare situation of immigrant youth from low-
income families.334 Although LPRs vary in their access to federal and state benefits, they can 
be still regarded on the whole as the most privileged group of non citizens in the US, together 
with refugees, who enjoy nearly the same privileges as US citizens.  
People seeking legal permanent residence in the United States can apply either from 
outside the United States or by obtaining LPR status once inside the United States. They can 
qualify for LPR status through three main immigration streams, guaranteed by US 
immigration law: family reunification, employment sponsorship, or humanitarian protection 
(refugee and asylum adjustments one year after admittance as a refugee or asylee). In 
certain cases an applicant may be granted Conditional Permanent Residence for two years 
(e.g. as a family member of a US citizen; or an immigrant entrepreneur), which requires a 
petition for the removal of a set conditions 90 days before their green card expires. Over the 
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last few years many backlogs have been reported in processing applications for LPRs, which 
prolong the waiting period of immigrant youth seeking LPR status. There have been 
improvements in recent years, especially in reference to family reunification processing for 
minor children of LPRs.335 
Another option for people from overseas to settle in the US as LPRs is to take part in 
a diversity lottery. The Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, which was created in 1990, 
randomly selects winners of Green Cards. The number is set at an annual quota of 55,000 
visas. Applicants for the status of diversity immigrant have to meet certain eligibility 
requirements: they have to come from countries with low rates of immigration to the United 
States and possess an adequate level of education or work experience.336  
Due to restrictions in the 1996 welfare reform law, citizenship is the only gateway to 
full structural integration for a young person, the only option for developing their potential with 
social and legal protection. Besides eligibility for federal grants and scholarships, US citizens 
possess other additional rights which are often not available to LPRs. These include the right 
to vote in federal, state and local elections, to serve on a jury, perform certain federal jobs, 
and run for elected federal office. Probably the most important right for immigrants is the right 
to residential security, i.e. protection against deportation.337 Consequently, citizenship is 
probably the most valued status, primarily for practical rather than patriotic reasons, a sense 
of loyalty and commitment to the US as advanced by the federal government. Moreover, 
another encouraging factor for applying for US citizenship is the fact that people naturalized 
as US citizens usually need not give up citizenship in their country of birth. 
US citizenship is granted according to either the jus soli-principle, based on birth in 
US in line with 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, or the jus sanguinis-principle, which 
means that at least one parent was born in the US. Recent state proposals and anti-
immigration coalitions across the US have been trying to strip jus soli rights from children of 
unauthorized immigrants, a topic that will be discussed in later sections of this chapter. 
Securing US citizenship after birth is relatively easy for LPRs. They need only live in the US 
as a permanent resident for at least five years, or three years if married to and living with a 
US citizen. LPRs are granted immediate citizenship upon joining the military.338 As required 
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by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), each candidate, in addition, has to pass a 
naturalization test in civics and English.339  
The last decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of 
naturalizations. On average about 140,000 lawful permanent residents were naturalized each 
year in the 1970s, almost 500,000 in the 1990s, and more than 600,000 in the 2000-2008 
period.340 Data from 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics reports 743,715 naturalizations 
in 2009, of which nearly 20% were young immigrant adults between the ages of 18 and 29 
(see table 2). 
For nearly 4% of the entire population, the percentage who were estimated to be 
residing in the US illegally in 2010, the path to American citizenship is currently blocked. In 
fact, their future in the US is in question due to a number of recent, controversial laws at the 
federal and state levels, directed against “illegals,” and the continuing lack of a 
comprehensive immigration reform program which might pave the way to legalization. The 
last amnesty program, passed by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), dates 
back to 1986,341 when the scale of unauthorized immigration was still insignificant compared 
to the current figures. In addition, some unauthorized immigrants might be able to obtain 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS), initially for a period of between 6 and 18 months, under a 
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 but then possibly face returning to 
unauthorized status.342  
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Table 2 People who obtained Legal Permanent Resident, Refugee, Asylee and Citizen Status in the 
US, 2009 
 
  
Total Youth (15-29 years of age)* 
Youth percentage 
share of the total 
LPRs 1,130,818 346,489 30.6 
Refugees 74,602 25,217 33.8 
Asylees 22,119 4,752 21.5 
Naturalized 743,715 148,187 19.9 
       * In the case of naturalized youth, 18- 29 years of age  
 
Source:  My own calculations based on 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
 
Immigrants, seeking better employment opportunities than those available in their 
home countries, are attracted by the steady demand for low-skilled workers in the US and 
strive to find ways to start their lives “in the promised land.” The sources of unauthorized 
immigrants are various. According to available sources, “illegal” immigrants have entered the 
United States without valid documents, overstayed the terms of their temporary visas or 
otherwise violated the terms of their entry. Passing through border control with fake 
documents or making dangerous border crossings and escaping official inspection have 
been the most commonly reported practices. The decisions of many undocumented labor 
immigrants to bring children and families and settle down have resulted in a significant 
number of undocumented immigrant youth. Like their parents, they are barred from obtaining 
federal benefits except for emergency and Medicaid. Moreover, they face legal 
apprehensions and obviously hardship in their school-to-work transition.343 Their situation is 
becoming even more uncertain faced with the development of the federal “enforcement-first,” 
otherwise known as the “enforcement only,” approach in federal immigration policies in the 
last two decades. Firstly, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) of 1996 strengthened enforcement rules, making any immigrant at risk of immediate 
deportation for minor offences and barred from legal reentry for up to ten years.344 Secondly, 
legislation in the aftermath of 9/11 imposed further restrictions on the undocumented. Among 
other border enforcement provisions, The Real ID Act of 2005 barred immigrants unable to 
document their legal status from obtaining driver's licenses.345  
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The US enforcement-only immigration policies have gained nationwide attention since 
2006, following massive, peaceful immigration protest marches organized in cities across the 
US. The protest marches were a reaction to the extreme anti-immigration proposal of the 
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which would 
have made not only the presence of the unauthorized a felony offence but also providing 
these immigrants with service and assistance.346 Although the proposal to criminalize 
undocumented and those who provide them with aid has not yet passed, further plans on the 
part of the federal government and state legislatures to restrict unauthorized immigration 
have been introduced. The campaign for a Comprehensive Immigration Reform and the still 
unsuccessful fight to pass the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) 
Act, which would allow for the legalization of an educated group of undocumented immigrant 
youth, are still contentious and both continue to gain opponents and proponents among 
Republicans and Democrats.347 For example, the recent attempts to repeal birthright 
citizenship for the US-born children of unauthorized immigrants, proposed by so-called 
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, represents an ongoing debate about the legal rights of 
immigrants and their US-born “anchor babies,” to use the language of anti-immigration 
movements, who obtain US citizenship rights in this way under current legislation.348  
In conclusion, the legal framework for immigrants’ presence in the US does not 
appear to facilitate the integration of immigrant youth, unless they aspire for naturalization 
once they turn 18. Indeed, young immigrants need to become US citizens to be able to 
receive full rights and access to benefits necessary for their transition from adolescence into 
secure adult life. Moreover, the process of integration for a significant percentage of young 
US citizens who live in mixed status households may be impaired by an atmosphere of fear 
that their family members may be deported at any time.349 It is worth mentioning that federal 
legal constraints can either be strengthened or eased by state legislatures and public 
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 For an analysis of the development of the “enforcement first” approach, see:  
- Magner, T. (2007). Immigration Reform: Failure and Prospects. Cambridge: Center for International 
Studies; 
-  Wasem, R. E. (2007). Immigration Reform: Brief Synthesis of Issue. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
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 For more on the DREAM Act, see the later sections of this chapter. Highly politicized public 
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Birthright Citizenship Act would likely expand it. For more on the fallacies of the Birthright Citizenship 
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of Repealing Birthright Citizenship. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 
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immigrants and their US citizen children, numbered 8.8 million people. See Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. 
V. (2009), op. cit. 
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discourse, which will be discussed in reference to California and Arizona in the next 
subchapters. 
Obtaining citizenship is by far the best path to immigrant integration. Nevertheless, 
the barriers and provisions for integration which exist for immigrant youth in the US states 
are also determined by federal policies in the field of education and the labor market. 
 
4.1.4 US Integration Frameworks for Education and Labor Market  
  
The self-sufficiency and independence expected of individuals in achieving their 
goals, the values promoted in daily life, are visible in the laissez-faire attitude toward 
immigrant education and the immigrant youth transition from school to work on the part of the 
US federal government. The expression “sink or swim” has often been used in migration 
research to describe a general American attitude toward the educational needs of immigrants 
and their advancement on the local labor market.350 However, a few federal immigrant 
programs and some legislation, which will be examined in this section, may provide 
assistance to some young immigrant “swimmers.” This section will outline the situation of 
immigrant youth across the nation and the federal response to their integration into the 
educational, vocational training, and labor market systems, which have an impact on state 
and local policies to a certain extent.  
Only in the late 1960s (with the Bilingual Education Act of 1969) did the federal 
government start recognizing the inequalities of the educational opportunities for an 
immigrant population with a limited ability to speak English.351 Today, the support of the 
federal government is still dependent upon the decisions of state and local governments and 
their education policies. Federal contributions to what are generally ad hoc US immigrant 
integration policies mark a gradual yet important change in the federal involvement in 
immigrant integration management in the traditionally highly-decentralized American 
education system. 
The responsibilities and funding for the US education system are divided among 
many actors: the federal government, the states, local authorities, individual schools, and 
institutions of higher education. The federal government generally plays the role of an 
"‘emergency response system,’ a means of filling gaps in state and local support for 
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education when critical national needs arise.”352 In fact, there is no national Ministry of 
Education. The nationwide leadership role of the federal Department of Education (ED) in US 
education is focused on raising national and local awareness of the educational challenges 
and best practices across the states in teaching and learning. 
 
Graph 5 Education System in the US 
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The states administer most aspects of education at K-12 (which includes elementary 
and secondary levels) and postsecondary levels (see graph 5). Among other duties, the 
states are responsible for providing funding for public education, setting policies for learning 
and teaching standards, and assessments, except for higher education. They also exercise 
oversight over educational services for special needs populations, including English 
Language Learners (ELLs).353 Local communities operate schools, implement state laws and 
policies, develop curricula, supervise professional teaching staffs, and sometimes develop 
their own educational policies. Consequently, most policies and programs for immigrant 
students are developed and implemented either at the school district level, governed by 
school boards (in public schools at the elementary and secondary levels), or individual 
school level (in private schools or institutions of higher education). 
Similarly, the greater part of nationwide spending on education at all levels comes 
from state, local (usually through property taxes) and private sources. According to a recent 
federal report, the federal contribution to elementary and secondary education for school 
year 2010-2011 is about 10.8 percent, which includes funds not only from ED but also from 
programs at other federal agencies, directly or indirectly supporting immigrant population at 
all ages.354 The federal contributions still seem insufficient in view of the resulting problems 
that American education and vocational systems currently face.  
The ELL performance gap is considered one of the most challenging issues 
confronting the US education system at present. The demands for programs and the 
implementation of legislation targeting ELL immigrant youth has been growing along with the 
massive increase in immigrants over the last few years.355 According to the results of the US 
Census Bureau's American Community Survey, more than half of the whole foreign 
population five years of age and older were reported to be non-proficient users of the English 
language. Of more than 5.3 million students enrolled in the 2007-2008 school year, almost 
half million children were ELL students,356 an increase of more than 50% over the last 10 
years. In addition, some worrisome trends were present in the results of the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the only on-going and nationally 
representative assessment of K-12 students in the US. According to the 2010 NAEP report 
the average reading score for twelfth-grade ELLs was lower and their reading performance 
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 In national statistics, either ELL or Limited English Proficient (LEP) is used to refer to people who 
are still in the process of learning English. In the dissertation the term ELL is used.  
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 US Department of Education (n.d.), op. cit.  
355
 For more information on educational statistics, see later parts of this subchapter. 
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 ELLs may also include cases of US non-immigrant students of low literacy. However, it is 
commonly accepted that the increasing number of immigrants is generally responsible for the 
increasing number of ELL students in US public schools. It should be noted that the exact definition of 
ELL may vary between states. On the need to standardize  ELL testing, see  
Wolf, M. K., Herman, and J. L., Diete, R. (2010). Improving the Validity of English Language Learner 
Assessment Systems. CRESST Policy Brief 10. Los Angeles, CA: University of California, National 
Center for Research on Evaluation, Standards, and Student Testing (CRESST). 
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more often below basic level in 2009 when compared to 2005.357 The number of non-
proficient English speakers differs significantly from state to state but generally more than 
55% of all schools across the US deal with ELL students.358  
Graduation rates and attendance at postsecondary education institutions by 
immigrant youth are other challenges for immigrant integration into the US education system. 
Although the number of foreign-born youth (aged 16 to 19) in 2009 who were not enrolled in 
school and who had not obtained a high school diploma or equivalent359 decreased by 11% 
in 2009 compared to 2000, it still stood at more than double the rate of native speakers. The 
drop-out rate of foreign born students in secondary schools stood at 12.4 compared with 4.8 
for native born in 2009.360 Inequalities were also reported in 2009 for college enrollment 
between the foreign born and native born populations between 18 and 24 years of age: 
32.8% and 42.8% respectively. Striking differences are also to be seen in the general 
education level of the population 25 years of age and above: 20% of foreign born people had 
only a 9th grade education or less compared to 3.5% of the native born population. However, 
it is significant that, according to longitudinal studies of immigrants, in some US states 
members of the second generation perform better academically than first generation 
immigrants.361 
Finally, the situation of unauthorized students who aspire to higher education remains 
an unresolved issue for the federal government. While states and localities are obliged to 
respect the right of every child, regardless of immigration status, to attend public K-12 
education, access to postsecondary education is not always equal for all immigrant youth 
and depends on state laws.362 Foreign students have to pay out-of-state tuition, since they do 
not have state residency. In most states, unauthorized students are treated like foreign 
students, although they might have been residing in a given state since early childhood. 
Because they are unauthorized, they cannot apply for federal and state student loans and 
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 United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2010). The 
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Washington, DC: US Department of Education. 
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 United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, (2009). Schools 
and Staffing Survey (SASS), Public School, BIE School, and Private School Data Files, 2007–08. 
Washington, DC: US Department of Education. 
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 An equivalent such as the General Education Development (GED) is obtained by those who did not 
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scholarships.363 Consequently, they can rarely afford the costly undergraduate programs at 
universities which lead to bachelor and master degrees.364 A more feasible option for them is 
to earn an associate degree at a community college, which may have lower prestige but at 
the same time lower tuition fees. Nevertheless, even this option is still inaccessible to many 
undocumented in most of the states, Moreover, even at the secondary level chances are not 
equal for all immigrants. In so-called transition programs of middle and early college high 
schools students can usually gain a college education by taking college level introductory 
courses in selected subjects and thereby earning some credits while still enrolled in free 
secondary education public schools. This option is ruled for undocumented high school 
students, unless they pay out-of state tuition for college classes.365 
In recent years the US Federal Government has intensified efforts to tackle some of 
the challenges mentioned above by developing programs, drawing up legislation and drafting 
reform plans to improve immigrant integration. Federal attention has been directed for the 
most part towards the needs of ELL immigrant youth. In fact, federal law requires that 
schools address the needs of English language learners by providing them with adequate 
programs and effective staff so that they can overcome language barriers and participate 
meaningfully in mainstream educational programs.366 At the same time there is no national 
language policy and the states and school districts are free to choose their own educational 
approaches for teaching ELL students. The following instructional methods are common: 
bilingual education, dual language instruction, English as a second language (ESL), and 
immersion. The choice often depends on state legislations. The recent tendency to move 
away from bilingual classes has resulted from some restrictive language policies in some 
states.367  
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 For example federal Pell Grants, as defined by the Higher Education Opportunity Act 2008.  
Very often immigrant children were brought to the US at a very early age by their undocumented 
parents. Under current law, they are considered illegal, there is no process for legalizing their status, 
and they live in constant danger of being discovered as illegal aliens, detained, incarcerated and 
deported. For more on the situation of unauthorized immigrants, see subchapter 4.1.3. 
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through US-Mexican teacher exchange programs, see Terrazas, A. and Fix, M., op. cit. 
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In addition to the requirement that the rights of ELLs be respected, federal legislation 
has established a central accountability mechanism for students’ results, including those of 
ELL students across the United States. The accountability system is monitored by the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), reauthorized in 2001 as the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB). The goal of NCLB is for all students, including immigrants, to improve 
their education results, achieving 100% academic proficiency by 2014, as measured by 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) standardized state tests. The Title III State Formula Grant 
Program, administered by the ED’s Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE), 
offers federal monies to states for the education of ELL students. These monies are to go for 
such things as English language instruction, services for ELL students (including immigrant 
students), family literacy and parent outreach programs, and professional training for staff. 
The money is allocated to school districts with a certain number of ELL students. If the 
schools fail to guarantee ELL students achieve adequate progress, as tested against annual 
measurable achievement objectives set by each state, they may face funding cuts and be 
forced to reorganize curricula, change teaching methods, replace staff or even close. NCLB 
also requires that schools and districts expand immigrant parents’ involvement in the 
education of their children, which is especially challenging for schools which have yet to 
establish a good partnership with community-based organizations for outreach to immigrant 
populations. School districts and critics of NCLB have hotly disputed whether the demands of 
the NCLB are workable in practice. Despite the addition of amendments in 2008, the Act is 
still considered outdated by many practitioners and policymakers and yet still planned for 
reauthorization by the Obama Administration in 2011. Nevertheless, NCLB is still considered 
the most important piece of legislation for the education and integration of immigrant youth at 
the elementary and secondary school levels.368  
The Office of Migrant Education within the ED offers another method of assisting 
immigrant youth in learning English in Migrant Education Programs. The programs provide 
financial support to state educational agencies, institutions of higher education or other 
institutions serving migrant children and their families to improve the educational and 
academic opportunities at different levels of schooling.369 Since the migrant workforce has 
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largely been dominated by foreign-born migrants in recent years, immigrant youth comprise 
the largest group of the beneficiaries.370 Basically, two programs target immigrant youth in 
their school-to-work transition: The High School Equivalency Program (HEP), for those 16 
years of age or older who have left school; and the College Assistance Migrant Program 
(CAMP), for the first years of migrant students’ college education.  
Additionally, the ED’s Office of Vocational and Adult Education offers yet another 
venue for enhancing the language and education performance of immigrant youths by 
granting funds to states through Adult Education Programs. These programs, among others, 
finance literacy programs (Adult Basic Education), GED preparation (Adult Secondary 
Education) and English Language Acquisition for adults and school-leavers over 16 years of 
age who are not enrolled or not required to be enrolled in secondary school under state 
law.371 
Finally, educational assistance to immigrant youth is partially supported by the 
Department of Health and Human Services through the ORR’s Refugee School Impact 
Program for services which target school-age refugees (between 5-18 years of age). These 
programs may include “English as a Second Language instruction, after-school tutorials, 
programs that encourage high school completion and full participation in school activities.”372  
Much as the federal government might support the education of immigrant youth 
residing legally, no federal money can be spent on the unauthorized population, whose 
access to higher education is frequently restricted. One of the solutions advocated by 
immigrant-rights groups would be passing the aforementioned DREAM Act. It is a federal 
proposal which has been discussed every year in Congress since 2001 but never 
successfully brought up for a vote.373 This bill would provide certain undocumented immigrant 
students the opportunity to earn conditional residency and, upon completion of certain 
requirements, put them on the path to citizenship. They would have to be US high school 
graduates, have good moral character, have arrived in the US as minors (16 years or 
younger), and would have to have been in the country continuously for at least five years 
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prior to the bill's enactment. The students would obtain temporary residency for a period of 
six years. Within the six year period, a qualified student would have to attend 2 years of 
postsecondary education, or serve in the military for two years, in order to earn permanent 
residency and the opportunity for citizenship. If a student did not comply with either the 
college requirement or the military service requirement, temporary residency would be 
withdrawn and the student would be subject to deportation. The DREAM Act is believed to be 
a golden opportunity for many undocumented youth who at the moment seem to have no 
future. Therefore, the legislation remains on the political agendas of many pro-immigration 
community agencies across the US.374  
Although academic education and high-skill qualifications are highly valued on the 
American labor market, the newest prognoses and research on the demands of 21st century 
US labor trends emphasizes an impending need for modernizing the US vocational training 
system. Consequently, current nationwide debates about the necessary reforms of the whole 
system for all does not broach the issue of individual target groups, like immigrants. Similarly, 
to the best of my knowledge little research has been conducted on foreign-born students in 
vocational training in the US. In order to understand the challenges of the transition of 
immigrants into the US labor market, a closer look at how vocational education functions is 
required.  
Recent statistics show a worrying gap between enrollment and graduation from 
postsecondary education. According to projections by the Center on Education and the 
Workforce at Georgetown University, by 2018 the US economy will have created some 47 
million job openings, of which one third will require that workers have a bachelor’s degree or 
higher and another third will call for postsecondary occupational credentials or an associate’s 
degree. Consequently, in order to help young people make the transition from secondary 
education to well-paying jobs, stronger focus needs to be put on high-quality career 
education, with career-oriented programs.375 The vocational education system in the US, 
which the Department of Education recently renamed Career and Technical Education 
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(CTE),376 is deemed outdated, under-funded and lacking the support of the federal 
government and the political elite across the US. However, federal efforts to reform “the 
neglected stepchild of education reform” are currently under way.377 
The general lack of interest in the development of vocational education has its roots 
in the past. At the beginning of the twentieth century, vocational courses were offered only by 
high schools and mainly attended by students from low-income families. The fact that the 
majority of the students came from ethnic groups resulted in vocational education being 
viewed as “a dumping ground for students of color.”378 Consequently, cultural biases and 
prejudices stopped political elites from investing in occupational courses. Unfortunately, as 
recent research on the American education system shows, the beginning of the twenty-first 
century has witnessed similar trends.379 
Over time, however, the vocational education system has been extended to 
postsecondary and adult education levels. Current CTE courses are offered at secondary 
levels, by middle schools and high schools, and at the postsecondary level, by vocational 
and technical institutions as well as community and technical colleges, which also offer 
academic degrees.380 Additionally, short programs lasting less than one year offer training or 
refresher courses in specific occupational subjects.381 The majority of the institutions which 
provide career and technical courses are private (except for the middle schools, high 
schools, and some colleges) and are often operated on a for-profit basis. They are, however, 
approved and regulated by state governments.382 Since the CTE system is highly 
decentralized, strengthening the vocational education system could prove to be very 
challenging. Nevertheless, some noteworthy federal efforts to set CTE standards have been 
already made. 
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Federal regulations about the CTE system are set in the Carl D. Perkins Career and 
Technical Education Act of 2006 (Perkins IV), administered by the Office of Vocational and 
Adult Education (OVAE). According to these regulations, CTE is an elective system: students 
at secondary and postsecondary education levels can choose one or more CTE courses 
from 16 so-called career clusters, i.e. “occupational categories with industry-validated 
knowledge and skills statements that define what students need to know and be able to do in 
order to realize success in a chosen field.”383 The Act requires states to cooperate between 
levels and form agreements with secondary agencies, postsecondary institutions, 
businesses, and labor organizations to deliver programs, services, and academic counseling. 
The aim of the cooperation is to provide students during their last years of secondary and 
first years of postsecondary education a vocational education pathway, known as Tech Prep 
education study programs. In order to support the states’ accountability for CTE, federal 
grants offered through Perkins IV are awarded to states through a formula based on the 
states' populations in certain age groups and on per capita income. The money is divided 
between states among CTE local actors to develop vocational curricula and encourage the 
emergence of local CTE consortia. 
It remains to be seen how the shortcomings of the current CTE system will be 
addressed by states under the forthcoming amended formula of the current Perkins Act, 
which is due for reauthorization in 2012. The need for educators to cooperate with employers 
in creating Tech Prep courses as well as increasing opportunities for young adults to 
participate in work-based education are considered priorities for future reforms. That more 
apprenticeships are needed is common knowledge but the federal government has still done 
little to address this shortcoming. In fact, the current number of available federally-
administered apprenticeships is still quite negligible. Nationwide, there are only about 
470,000 apprentices in programs registered with the Department of Labor by the federal 
Office of Apprenticeship of the Department of Labor (DOL).384 It is questionable whether the 
marginalized young adults, including certain sectors of immigrant youth, have access to 
these interesting but scarce offerings.385 The status of immigrant youth in the CTE and the 
job training system has not yet been a subject of discussion at the federal level. Considering 
proposals from youth advocacy groups to align the NCLB act with the Perkins act and to 
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support the development of integrated academic and technical curriculum could be an 
important step forward to help marginalized groups in their transition from school to work. 386  
Another feasible improvement of the US vocational education system would be to 
intensify the cooperation of business educators with state workforce agency partnerships 
supported by the DOL.387 In fact, alongside the Department of Education and Department of 
Health and Human Services, the DOL is the third important federal stakeholder in smoothing 
the transition of American youth from school to work in the US. Although none of the DOL’s 
programs focuses specifically on immigrant youth, most of them indirectly target all lawful 
permanent young residents, who can benefit from the services described below.  
Besides the apprenticeship program mentioned above, for almost half a century the 
DOL has run the Job Corps, America’s largest and most comprehensive residential 
education and job training program for at-risk youth from low income families.388 In addition, 
youth-related workforce service providers can apply for federal funds available under the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA).389 The WIA, administered by the Division of Youth Services 
of the Employment and Training Administration (ETA), is the principal source of funding for 
job training projects in the US. Under the WIA, each state is divided into one or more 
workforce areas, monitored by one or more workforce investment boards. Each board 
establishes strategic priorities, develops a workforce investment budget and a network of 
employment services, called One-Stop Career Centers, which assist job seekers in 
completing job applications and potential employers in finding good candidates for their 
openings. In cooperation with state and local Workforce Investment Boards, the federal 
government coordinates youth workforce systems and oversees state strategies in preparing 
youth for employment and/or postsecondary education across the country.390  
Whether and how local youth service providers reach out to immigrant youth in 
partnership with the WIA system is not being monitored, and in fact, none of WIA regulations 
specifically targets immigrant youth. Only recently has the DOL started cooperating with the 
ORR through the Refugee Employment Collaboration program, the first direct involvement on 
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the part of the DOL in activities for immigrants. Since 2007 this informal initiative has 
concentrated on developing common strategies to assist refugee services in becoming 
partners with local workforce investment agencies.391 It can only be hoped that more 
initiatives of a similar nature will emerge to promote networking among federal agencies in 
developing measures focusing on the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market 
across the US. 
 
Integration of immigrant youth either into the US education system or the labor market 
might constitute an additional burden for those who have already obtained qualifications or 
had job experience abroad and are now seeking recognition of their foreign degrees and 
certificates. Consequently, as the latest research findings demonstrate, many highly skilled 
immigrants are forced to take jobs below their occupational status when they move to the 
US. According to this research, legal permanent residents with US postsecondary education 
degrees were three times more likely to work in high-skilled sectors than those with foreign 
credentials.392 These worrisome statistics may result from the lack of a transparent 
framework for the recognition of foreign qualifications in the US. 
As the Federal Department of Education confirms, no single authority in the US deals 
with recognizing foreign degrees and other qualifications. Similar to the European divisions of 
professions, two general categories are distinguished: over 50 regulated professions require 
a US license or an official certificate while other unregulated occupations oblige an immigrant 
to fulfill the requirements determined by an employer. The following three state or local 
authorities are officially recognized by the federal government: 
 
1. The admitting school or higher education institution, for students who seek to study in 
the United States and who are presenting credits or qualifications earned abroad; 
2. The hiring employer, for individuals seeking work and who are presenting degrees or 
other qualifications earned abroad; and 
3. State or territorial licensing boards, for individuals seeking to practice regulated 
professions in a jurisdiction of the United States and who are presenting degrees or 
other qualifications earned abroad.393 
 
A young person who wants to transfer academic credits to a US educational institution or get 
their credentials translated into US equivalencies has to contact one of the institutions above. 
These in turn usually refer to independent credential evaluation services, which are generally 
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paid for either by the individual or sometimes by the employer. A standard for the recognition 
of qualifications exists for particular professions, but only at the state level rather than the 
federal level. Some states do not recognize foreign credentials at all for certain professions. 
Consequently, each state makes its own choices and decisions may vary from state to state. 
Generally, there is little transparency in validation methods applied to non-licensed 
occupations and decisions are taken on a case by case basis. To date, no government 
agency has tasked with monitoring the establishment of services for the evaluation of foreign 
credentials or for ensuring the uniformity of interpretations, recommendations, and the 
procedures of the evaluation process. However, such attempts have been made by some 
private national associations.394 
Since the whole system of credentials is quite complex and confusing for state and 
local authorities, without proper counseling young people are probably not aware of all the 
options they have.395 As critics of the current recognition procedures agree, “what is missing 
in the United States is a national-level coordination of the activities and standards,” which 
should be applied by state and local government offices as well as private evaluation 
services, professional associations and employment agencies.396  
  
This depiction of federal integration measures, with reference to education and the 
workforce, should be complemented by a general examination of the situation of immigrants 
on the labor market. Though the effectiveness and ways of applying the tools mentioned 
above may vary from state to state, certain variables remain universal: a legal framework for 
the employment of foreign workers, nationwide demographic trends in workforce 
development, and challenges triggered by the recession for the situation of immigrant youth. 
These variables combine to create a difficult environment for state and local management of 
immigrant integration.  
Access to the labor market in the US varies according to the type of permit of stay 
and work permit an immigrant has, but the same general rules apply to all young workers in 
the US. Upon turning 14 they are allowed to work only in certain occupations and with daily 
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hour limit. At the age of 16 their rights expand to all fields of work which have not been 
declared hazardous by the Secretary of Labor. Finally, at the age of 18 young people can 
work in any legal job for any number of hours.397 From the perspective of immigration law, 
integrating a young immigrant into the labor market is relatively easy only when the 
immigrant has been granted legal permanent residency in the US. As noted previously, 
obtaining LPR status, which authorizes a person to work permanently in the United States, 
can be challenging.398 The openness of the labor market for temporary immigrants who come 
for the purpose of work is restricted by the conditions of a given visa category. Those who 
come to the US on any other visa category than employment are generally not authorized to 
work in the US.399 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) also sets strict regulations on granting a 
work permit to anyone who seeks admission or status as an immigrant for the purpose of 
permanent or temporary employment.400 The process involves a number of government 
agencies and, of course, a future employer, who must first obtain Foreign Labor Certification 
for the future employee from the Department of Labor. The DOL must certify that “there are 
not sufficient United States workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time 
of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien 
is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor” and that “the employment of such alien will not 
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly 
employed.”401 Once the admission of a foreign worker has been approved by the DOL, the 
employer must submit an immigration petition to the USCIS of the Department of Homeland 
Security. According to official estimates, the filing process can vary between months and 
years.402 
Moreover, by law each employer has to comply with the employment eligibility 
verification requirements, introduced by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 
According to this act, all employers must verify the identity and employment authorization of 
anyone they hire after November 6, 1986.403 In turn an employee must be able to present 
documentation that establishes his/her identity and employment authorization in case of 
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routine workplace audits conducted by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 
In order to make the process of employment eligibility verification more effective, a 
nationwide internet-based E-Verify system has been established.404 Although participation in 
E-Verify is voluntary for most companies, it is mandatory for employers with federal contracts 
or subcontracts. In addition 14 states have imposed their own additional obligations. Though 
the number of new E-verify enrollments is growing,405 the system is still being revised and 
has been criticized for its ineffectiveness: high error rates, abuse, identity fraud, and high 
cost. Nevertheless, E-verify is considered an important federal attempt at securing the US 
labor market against unauthorized immigrants. Along with other immigration enforcement 
measures, such as militarizing the borders and building security walls along US borders, E-
verify has been controversial among critics of the creation of “Fortress America.” They 
usually point to the limitations of the US immigration system which ignores labor market 
needs. As Gordon H. Hanson points out, “legal mechanisms for low-skilled immigrants, at 
least in their current form, are not designed to meet the changing demands of US 
employers.”406 In fact, many immigrants, attracted by the demands of the low-skilled job 
market in the US, cannot find an easy, legal way to take up employment. As a result, it is 
becoming clear that the integration of immigrants into the US labor market requires a more 
flexible system for obtaining a US visa and participating in new guest worker programs, 
which have been lacking for almost 50 years.407 The US recession, which has been going on 
since December 2007, has changed the demands of the US labor market: it has mostly hit 
the low-skilled sector.408 Nevertheless, unauthorized immigrants still constituted of 5.2% of 
workforce in 2010.409 
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At first glance, it might seem that the young immigrants who were lucky enough to 
have authorization to work do not face so many hurdles in their integration into the labor 
market. Firstly, as Papademetriou and Terrazas remark, the workplace itself has always 
been “a powerful immigrant integration institution” in the US, providing ample opportunities 
for upward mobility to all willing to work hard to achieve their goals.410 Secondly, immigrants 
have always fared quite well on the US job market in comparison to natives. According to the 
OECD study mentioned earlier, in 2007 the unemployment rate of young immigrants 
(between the ages of 20 and 29) was approximately the same as that of the children of 
natives (see graph 6).411 
Graph 6 Unemployment of Children of Immigrants and Children of Natives Aged 20-29 and not in an 
Educational Program, 2007 
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Source:  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010). Equal Opportunities? The   
  Labor Market Integration of the Children of Immigrants. Paris: OECD Printing 
 
In fact, in contrast to many European countries, unemployment among immigrants in 
the United States almost never differs by more than 1 percentage point from unemployment 
among natives. However, as the authors of the Report Immigrants and the US Economic 
Crisis point out, the seemingly favorable statistics do not reflect the different experiences of 
different ethnic groups nor so-called “alternative hardships,” such as underemployment or 
labor market marginalization.412 These are the challenges that immigrant youth sometimes 
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face which are rarely discussed in comparative statistics and can really only be analyzed in 
depth through local empirical research. Moreover, since the recession hit the youngest 
segment of the US working population hardest, the aftermath of the crisis may see the 
raising of additional hurdles for immigrant youth in their transition into the US labor market 
system.413 Fortunately, the federal government has thus far not taken any drastic measures 
to restrict labor market access to immigrants. Quite the contrary, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended benefits for the long-time unemployed and increased 
federal funding for education, which both native and immigrant youth can benefit from. 
 
In conclusion, looking at the US mode of integration, the integration policies in 
education and the labor market which targets immigrant youth, it seems that much is yet to 
be done to create a coherent US integration strategy which would set standards for all 50 US 
states. However, the federal government’s hands-off approach to integration challenges is 
not only typical for the issues of immigrant integration but also applies generally to all social 
conflicts, which have always been solved at state and local levels. As Peter H. Schuck notes: 
“Compared to other nations, the United States looks more to the fragmented, integrative 
processes of civil society than to programmatic initiatives launched from the center[.]”414 This 
makes the US approach somewhat similar to the European Union’s approach of usually 
creating nonbinding integration principles for the EU member states. On the other hand, the 
new nationwide integration initiatives and the increase in the lobby work of policy advisors for 
the development of federal integration strategies, presented in this subchapter, mark a 
promising shift in focus away from immigration enforcement and towards immigrant 
integration. The change of discourse on immigration in the US towards integration was also 
noted during the first National Integration Conference in 2009:  
 
While the media focuses on the border, we gather to focus on the 17% of the American 
workforce that is foreign born, the 25% of American school children who have an immigrant 
parent, and the organizations that support and share in the process of moving millions of 
newcomers toward becoming Americans.415 
 
Only time will tell whether nationwide bottom up movements, like the NIC network, will result 
in more active governmental intervention in the management of immigrant integration at the 
state and local levels.  
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4.2 California 
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration have always been part and parcel of the social 
structure of California, the most populous state with the highest number and percentage of 
foreign-born inhabitants in the US.416 Since the annexation of California in 1850 the 
percentage of immigrants has fluctuated but never gone below 8% of the entire population. 
The first peak was reached after the massive immigration movements during the Gold Rush 
(38.6% in 1860), gradually declining towards the middle of the 20th century, and then 
moderately increasing up to the present.417 According to the most recent projections, the 
population of California will continue to diversify, although the popularity of California among 
new immigrants has started to wane.418 The ups and downs of immigration inflows 
throughout its history have led American researchers to classify California as one of the 
traditional US immigration states, with the highest numerical growth of foreign born but not 
the most rapid percentage growth.419  
It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze in great depth the reasons for the 
changing dynamics of immigration in California. However, it might be fair to assume that the 
dynamics correspond to the ups and downs of life in California, e.g. better job opportunities 
versus unaffordable housing. In addition, immigrants in California have always had to 
confront two sides of life there. On the one hand, the Golden State lures immigrants with 
many opportunities and promises of a life of opulence and comfort; on the other hand, it has 
become a trendsetter for anti-immigration movements across the US and a testing ground for 
much controversial legislation. In fact, the more recent liberal state policies towards 
immigrants stand in sharp contrast to many less noble episodes in California’s history of 
dealing with immigrants. The California Aliens Land Law of 1913420 or the infamous Angel 
Island on the coast of California, the so-called Ellis Island of the West, a place of 
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disillusionment for many immigrants awaiting entrance into California in the first half of 20th 
century, constitute only a few examples of the many radical steps taken to restrict 
“unwanted” immigration into the state. Moreover, the more recent rise of anti-immigration 
movements, such as the Minutemen Project, the Save our State initiative, or the construction 
of the US-border fence which began on the southwestern border of the City of San Diego,421 
have made many immigrants feel unwelcome there. Nevertheless, immigrants in California 
also have the backing of strong pro-immigration advocates. The fact that California had the 
first sanctuary cities in the US422 and had been an initiator of the largest pro-immigration 
march against anti-immigration legislation in Congress in March 2006, which has spread 
around the US,423 demonstrates that the life of many, especially undocumented immigrants, 
can be made more tolerable there than in other parts of the US. 
These contrasting attitudes towards the big share of Californian immigrants and 
consequently towards their integration will be examined in the next sections of this 
subchapter. Suffice it to say, these attitudes create a unique set of conditions for life and 
integration for immigrant youth in California. In fact, the metaphor of California as “a theme 
park roller coaster” could also be used to describe the reality of immigrant integration in this 
traditional immigration state, where immigrants even more than other citizens “experience 
the exhilarations of both ups and downs” of living in California.424  
 
4.2.1 Historical Context of Immigration  
 
The immigration and ethnic landscape in California today has been shaped by both 
domestic and international migration movements which occurred in the second half of the 
20th century. During the last decades of the last century, the number of immigrants and the 
ethnic diversity of California changed significantly. The first twenty years after World War II 
saw a significant increase in domestic net migration from other states, which was made a 
more important contribution to population growth than did international migration. Only in the 
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1970s did net international migration begin to make a greater contribution to California’s 
population growth.425  
Already during the Second World War, as part of the Second Great Migration in the 
US, African Americans began to move to California in large numbers to work there in the 
emerging defense industries.426 As a result California led all states in the inflows of blacks, 
turning into “a major black migrant ‘magnet’” in the late 1960s and the 1970s.427 According to 
the US Census Bureau, between 1940 and 1970 the black population in California grew from 
1.8% to 7% of the state’s population.428 During the 1960s, on the other hand, California had 
the lowest rate of foreign-born inhabitants in its history as a US state, when the number of 
immigrants accounted for a mere 8.5% of the population of California as a whole . Since 
then, the number of foreign born has grown rapidly, reaching its peak in 2007 (27.4%).429 At 
the same time, the Afro-American population left the state in droves at the end of the century. 
As a result of the third New Great Migration across the US, triggered by urbanization and 
better work opportunities in the southeastern United States, many blacks moved to Georgia, 
Maryland, Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina.430 As William H. Frey points out, the role of 
California changed “from a major black migration destination to a major migration origin.” 
According to Frey’s calculations, during the late 1990s California witnessed the first negative 
net migration among the Afro-American population. Moreover, there has also been a 
significant shift in the number of European immigrants. While in the 1950s, half of California's 
immigrants came either from Canada or Europe, by 1990 their numbers had dropped 
dramatically, to less than 10%.431 At the same time, two immigration inflows contributed to 
the rapid increase in the foreign-born population at the end of the 20th century: Hispanic and 
Asian immigrants, as we will see below. 
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The need for low-skilled field workers in the California agricultural sector sparked the 
post-war immigration of Mexican Americans, one of the largest minority groups in 20th 
century California. Mexicans came to the US either as contract workers, who were recruited 
in California until 1964 through the Bracero Program, or as undocumented labor migrants 
hired by farm owners and ranchers, who very often rejected the costly recruitment 
procedures required by the Bracero Program and thus arranged employment privately. Such 
practices resulted in increasing border control and enforcement operations in 1954, known 
as Operation Wetback. Through often aggressive sweeps in California and other border 
states in search of unauthorized workers, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) removed over one million Mexicans.432 During the entire period of the guest-worker 
program, approximately 80% (4 million out of a total of 5 million recruited) worked in 
California. According to US census data estimates, in 1970, after the Bracero Program had 
been concluded, 53% of all Mexicans immigrants in the US resided in California, in 
comparison to 36% in 1940.433 At the same time, Latinos in California grew in political 
strength and number and launched movements against the discrimination in employment, 
housing, and education that Hispanic Americans faced.434 Since the late 1960s, when 
Mexican immigration was restricted for the first time by a federal ceiling on immigration from 
the Western Hemisphere, legal immigration has dropped significantly. Simultaneously, the 
so-called “undocumented migrant era” in US immigration began: During the years 1965 to 
1985, a period of porous borders and unrestricted hiring of undocumented workers, two-
thirds of all undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US went to California.435 Most of them 
were initially temporary, male migrants coming for seasonal agriculture work, which nobody 
else wanted to take up. However, by the end of 1990s, both the immigration of 
undocumented and documented Mexicans into the US had transformed from temporary 
migration to larger scale, long-term settlement, when more women began to join their 
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spouses in the US.436 At the same time, population growth rates were also noted among 
Hispanics of Central or South American descent, who along with the Caribbean population, 
were the third Hispanic minority group present in California after World War II.437 Because 
the stronger border enforcement which began after the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 initially concentrated only on certain districts along the Californian-Mexico border (i.e. 
San Diego and El Paso), most undocumented immigrants still entered the US through 
California.438 Only following the escalation of enforcement operations in the mid-1990s (e.g. 
Operation Hold-the-Line in El Paso in 1993, followed by Operation Gatekeeper along the 
California border in 1994) were those trying to cross the border illegally assumed to have 
moved to other points outside of California.439 Nevertheless, despite stronger border 
enforcement in the last decade of the 20th century, in 15 years the number of unauthorized 
immigrants in California increased by more than one million (from 1500 thousand in 1990 to 
2650 thousand in 2005).440 It is worth mentioning that although in 2004 the majority of them 
were thought to have come from Mexico (65%), numerous other groups were reported to 
have come from other countries in Latin America (16%) and Asia (15%), and a very few from 
Europe and Canada (3%).441  
Asian immigration has led to the development of a major minority group in California, 
second to the Mexicans, which significantly changed immigration percentages there in the 
last century. During the first decades after the Second World War, inflows from Asia 
remained slow due to strict federal legislation against Asian immigration and the state Alien 
Land Law, which prohibited Asian immigrants from owning land. Once discriminatory state 
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legislation was annulled in 1952 and federal sanctions on Asian immigrants were finally lifted 
in 1965,442 California became the primary destination for several waves of Asian immigrants 
coming to the US. Rapid growth was first observed in the 1970s, among Chinese and 
Filipinos, followed in 1980 by groups from South Korea and South Eastern Asia. 
Consequently, as the Public Policy Institute of California reports, in 1990 California played 
host to most of the nation’s Asian immigrants: It was home to 50% of all Filipinos and 
Southeast Asians living in the US, 40% of the Chinese and Japanese, nearly one-third of all 
Koreans, and 20% of Asian Indians.443 Asian immigration continued in the early 1990s 
despite the recession in California, with net migration remaining strongly positive in contrast 
to that of other immigrant groups. By the late 1990s, their educational performance had 
started to improve exceed and their labor market integration was considered quite 
successful, with 80% holding managerial and professional positions or positions with 
moderate incomes.444  
Asians also rank among the largest refugee groups resettled in California since 1975. 
Before 1990, refugees seeking shelter primarily came from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as 
a result of the Vietnam War. Since the first years of the resettlement programs across the 
US, California has resettled the largest number of refugees (by 2010 over 688,000 refugees). 
More recent groups of refugees resettled in California have come from Iran, Vietnam, 
countries of the former Soviet Union, Iraq, and Africa, which has served to increase the 
ethnic heterogeneity of the state. 445 As a result of the new post-war immigration trends and 
the unprecedented migration of white residents to other states since the 1990s, at the turn of 
the 21st century California was declared a majority-minority state. By the same token, it took 
its place among the few states whose racial composition is less than 50% non-Hispanic 
whites, which elsewhere comprises the majority of the population.446  
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4.2.2 Immigration Scale 
 
Following the massive inflows of the second half of the last century, since the turn of 
the new millennium the immigration landscape has become more stable. In fact, the 
percentage of foreign born among Californians has not changed much in the past decade 
and remained steady at around 26-27 % (still the highest rate of all states). As mentioned 
earlier, immigrant inflows started to take new directions across the US and immigrants’ 
migration patterns at the moment increasingly reflect the pattern of native-born residents 
moving away from California to other states. As a result, California is no longer the top 
destination for new arrivals and the number of foreign born youth is likely to decrease if the 
trend continues. The demographics of immigrant youth is already much lower than the 
California average: in 2009 immigrants aged 5-24 accounted for 12.4% of all youth in the 
same age group.447 Nevertheless, numerically California is still home to the largest 
percentage of foreign born in the US (see graph 2). 
The top countries of origin of immigrants in 2009 still reflected recent historical 
immigration patterns: 43.3% were born in Mexico, 7.9% in the Philippines, and 5.3% in China 
(excluding Taiwan) (see graph 7). However, as the latest analysis New Patterns of Immigrant 
Settlement in California shows, new immigrants do not necessarily join the old, established 
immigrant enclaves. Instead, they are seeking new locations with little history of immigration 
but better prospects for integration into the workforce. According to the study, economic 
opportunity seems to play a major role in immigrants’ decisions on location. California 
counties with the largest immigrant populations in 2000 (i.e. Los Angeles and Orange, Santa 
Clara and San Diego Counties) experienced much lower growth in immigrant population than 
the new immigrant destinations of Alameda, San Bernardino, Riverside, Kern, and 
Sacramento Counties.448  
Available statistics do not enable us to determine the location of most undocumented 
immigrants. In total, as of 2010, California had the largest number of unauthorized (2.55 
million) nationwide, which accounted for nearly a quarter of the entire undocumented 
population living in the US.449 Moreover, as in the last century, California’s labor market is 
quite attractive to unauthorized migrants, with 1.85 million in the labor force in 2010. Drawing 
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on available statistics from 2004,450 when every seventh child had parents whose status was 
unregulated, it might be assumed that many immigrant youth today are still confronted with 
the challenges of clandestine life, which is not conductive to a smooth transition from 
childhood to adulthood nor to easing integration processes. 
 
Graph 7 Foreign-Born Population in California in 2009  
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Source:  The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009 
 
When considering the immigration landscape of California today, one naturally shifts 
the focus to the ethnic composition of the state. As a matter of fact, as mentioned before, 
ethnic diversity has always been key to the discussion of immigrant integration in the US.451 
The fact that California has become a majority-minority state, despite the slowing of new 
inflows of immigrants, has already raised many concerns about integration in the state in the 
future, in which a declining white, non-Hispanic population dominates many areas of social, 
economic and political life in California. The current demographic picture merely confirms the 
continuing decrease in the white population, which marks the next phase in California’s 
demographic evolution.452 According to the most recent report of the Greenlining Institute, 
California is not going to stop here. The state, which was once comprised of former white 
settlers, is projected to be inhabited by a Latino majority in the near future. According to 
recent projections from the California Department of Finance, by 2040 people of color will 
represent nearly 70% of the state's population, of which 48% will be Latinos.453 In fact, 
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current debates on immigration and integration in the state are inseparable from the issue of 
the increasing ethnic diversification of California. 
 
4.2.3 Public and Political Discourse 
 
As the US state with the largest number of immigrants, California has always seemed 
to play the role of paradigm in managing immigration for other US states. As William A. V. 
Clark, remarks, “[What] happens in California tomorrow is likely to happen in the nation as a 
whole the day after tomorrow.”454 Until recently, when its neighbor Arizona took over the role, 
the state had been considered a testing ground for various pro- and anti-immigration 
initiatives.455 Certain state laws on immigration, which will be briefly considered here, provide 
the best example of the California “roller coaster ride” in political discourse on integration, 
which has shaped California’s varied attitudes towards immigrants over the course of the last 
two decades. These laws have to be seen in connection with the US federal mode of 
integration, discussed previously, which taken together create a specific integration climate 
for immigrant youth in California: affected by past extreme anti-immigrant measures and 
recent more liberal policies towards both documented and undocumented inhabitants.  
The three main initiatives introduced by those Californians seeking to fight ethnic and 
immigration diversification and to stop the socio-economic progress of minorities in California 
at the end of the 20th century will be considered here. Firstly, California’s racial politics of the 
1990s has grown to symbolize anti-immigrant attitudes throughout the US. Proposition 187 
(the Save our State Initiative), which was intended to exclude undocumented immigrants 
from state services (including education, welfare, and health care), was approved by 59% of 
California voters in 1994.456 Although the California Supreme Court ruled the proposition 
unconstitutional, it became a model for future federal anti-immigration legislation, like 
PRWORA and the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.457 
Moreover, the prejudice against immigrants, fueled by a huge number of undocumented 
people living in California, persists. As Ostendorf points out, illegality does not foster 
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immigrant integration, which turns out to be quite true for California.458 The willingness of 
Californians to cooperate with immigrants to improve the integration of minorities was put up 
to a vote again in 1996, when Proposition 209 (the California Civil Rights Initiative) was 
passed. The law ended Affirmative Action programs in California, which up to that point had 
guaranteed many underprivileged ethnic groups easier access to education and the 
workforce. Finally, in 1998 an anti-bilingual education bill, Proposition 227 (the English for the 
Children Initiative), restricting the free choice of immigrant education, was passed. The 
proposition was intended to end bilingual education in the state, replacing it (with a few 
exceptions) with one-year Structured English-Immersion (SEI) courses for ELL students. As 
language education reports confirm, the proposition has not been evenly implemented 
across California and some school districts have developed alternatives, such as dual 
language education, in which immigrant students’ native languages are seen as an asset 
rather than a complication.459 Nevertheless, those who came out in support of the new law 
are considered advocates of the ideology of “forceful assimilationism,” which has given 
California a reputation as being anti-immigrant and more precisely anti-Latino, dividing public 
discourse and research on immigration there.460 According to the Little Hoover Commission, 
an independent state oversight agency, immigrants have been depicted either as illegal 
aliens, who have no respect for the rule of law, or as noble individuals braving hardship for 
their families and future.”461 
Since the turn of this century, however, the focus of public and political discourse on 
immigration in California seems to have become less biased, and some important steps have 
been taken by the state to offer important benefits to immigrant youth, often denied in other 
parts of the US. This change in political discourse may have been influenced by several 
factors, among them the reduced number of both documented and undocumented 
immigrants moving into California, a shift in the focus of enforcement policy towards other 
states bordering Mexico, and the recognition that immigrants and ethnic minorities represent 
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potential voters in elections, given the fact that the state is now a minority majority state.462 
Consequently, in California the prevailing tensions among average people on such 
immigration issues as the costs and benefits of immigration for the state seem to have 
waned in comparison to other states (see Arizona in the next subchapter). As a report by the 
Progressive States Network notes, along with some other states which have some of the 
largest numbers of undocumented immigrants (but not including Arizona), for quite some 
time California has been “quietly promoting policies based on the integration of new 
immigrants” which has not received as much media attention as the anti immigrant 
propositions in the past did. In fact, in comparison to other states, California can boast one of 
the most integrative state policies passed in the last decade in the US, although certain 
sticking points about rights for unauthorized immigrants remain unresolved.463 One of these 
sticking points is the crucial integration policy for the youth into the education system. 
Accordingly, regardless of their immigration status young immigrants can benefit from 
provisions in The California Immigrant Higher Education Act of 2001 (AB 540) which grants 
in-state tuition rates at California’s public colleges to students who have completed three 
years at a California high school and earned a high school diploma or equivalent.464  
Over time, many other pro-immigration bills have been passed which offer extra 
benefits for immigrants, who are not eligible for federal support. In fact, already right after 
passing PRWORA California created CalWORKs State Only funded program to aid those 
non-citizens who cannot receive federally funded TANF. In addition, since 2006, cities and 
counties have been authorized to provide aid to all residents who would not be eligible under 
requirements of PRWORA (SB 1534). Moreover, since 2007 (under provisions included in 
SB 77) educational facilities have been required to give priority to immigrants liable to lose 
federal funds under PRWORA in the allocation of resources for ESL courses, and since 2008 
Californian law (AB 88) has provided preparation services for citizenship and 
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naturalization.465 In addition, the E-Verify employment verification program, which has been 
the subject of great debate at the federal level, has thus far not been implemented in 
California, although many employers have voluntarily signed up for the program.466  
Despite the above-mentioned provisions for immigrants, little has changed in the 
debate on immigrant integration, which has not been the focus of attention at the state or 
national level. The Office of Immigrant Assistance, established in 2001 within the California 
Department of Justice, is the only state agency which directly targets immigrants.467 The 
scope of its operations is restricted to legal advice for the victims of discrimination and work 
exploitation. No other state programs focus on immigrant integration, beyond those federal 
measures for integration already discussed. The recommendations of the Little Hoover 
Commission Report in 2002, called for the creation of The Golden State Residency Program, 
have yet to be implemented. The program would target immigrants willing to declare their 
commitment to obtaining citizenship and participating actively in community life, obeying the 
law, developing their English proficiency and gaining legal employment. In turn, the state 
would grant participants eligibility for a range of benefits comparable to those of citizens.468 
Recent years have seen other integration proposals from community-based associations 
trying to shift political and public discourse towards the concept of immigrant integration, 
similar to that at the nationwide level.469 The California Immigrant Integration Initiative (CIII) is 
another recent statewide integration campaign, established in 2007 to strengthen the 
immigrant integration infrastructure throughout the state. This Initiative represents a joint 
effort on the part of members of California’s non-profit network of foundations, Grantmakers 
Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees (GCIR). The initiative seeks to engage municipal 
and county governments in developing integration programs, funding opportunities in local 
communities, and helping local organizations manage immigrant integration. Although 
GCIR's Immigrant Integration Toolkit is reminiscent of the USCIS federal agency’s integration 
instruments, the thematic scope of GCIR’s work far exceeds the USCIS integration agenda, 
which is restricted to civic integration programs.470  
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It remains to be seen how public and political discourse will respond to the subject of 
integration of immigrant youth, which does not seem to play any special role for the California 
state government. It is only through the work of state agencies, like the California 
Department of Education and the California Employment Development Department (EDD), 
that federal funds from the Workforce Investment Act and federal funds for ELLs are 
channeled to local communities which engage in work with immigrant youth. Despite the 
absence of any strong state support for integration of immigrant youth, California does not 
block local integration initiatives, something which cannot be said of some other states in the 
US. 
 
4.3 Arizona  
 
From the years after World War II until recently, little was to be heard in migration 
reports about immigrants moving to Arizona. Only at the turn of this century did the state 
begin to be considered not only a center for Native American folk arts and crafts and the 
breathtaking landscape of one of the seven natural wonders of the world, but also as an 
emerging gateway for both international and state migration. The rapidly developing state, 
initially a preferred destination for snowbird migration of domestic retirees, has turned into a 
more permanent destination for many young, working age newcomers, enticed there by the 
growth in jobs and affordable housing.471 In the decade between 1990 and 2000, the 
percentage increase in the number of foreign born inhabitants was estimated at 135.8%, a 
figure that started to attract the attention of migration researchers and led them to classify 
Arizona among the five top new immigration settlement states.472 Moreover, in the meantime 
many American citizens, also attracted by the positive economic prospects, have moved 
there from other states and started to contribute to overall population growth.473 Once a 
remote and sparsely populated region, Arizona is now projected to be the third most-
populous state in the west.474 The fact that practically all new settlers, both native and 
immigrant, “start their lives anew” in Arizona would seem promising for immigrant integration. 
At first glance, the most common remark among Arizonans, “Everyone in Arizona is from 
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somewhere else,”475 gives the impression that the state might turn out to be a pioneer in 
managing American unity in diversity. The last few years, unfortunately, show that, on the 
contrary, Arizona has become a national symbol of anti-immigration sentiment, enforcing 
harsh policies against the undocumented. Racial profiling and the infamous practices of 
sweeps and deportations of undocumented people in immigration communities, conducted 
by Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s Office in Maricopa County, home to more than half of the state's 
residents, bode badly for local immigrant integration efforts. In recent years, Arizona has 
become the perfect breeding ground for copycat punitive immigration policies, modeled on 
California’s past anti-immigration bills. Currently, it seems almost impossible to achieve the 
noble goal of unifying the state, which former Governor Napolitano advocated two years 
before she left office in 2009: “I believe this independent, confident, growing state of ours can 
be even stronger. It can become the ‘One Arizona’ […] – a state, and a state of mind, that fits 
the hopes and dreams of our people.”476 In fact current immigration issues in Arizona have 
divided not only the state but the whole nation, which makes the purported American ideal of 
E Pluribus Unum appear quite unrealistic. We could speculate that the outburst of anti-
immigration attitudes in Arizona is the result of the post–Second World War migration 
landscape in the state and anti-Latino rhetoric which has begun to dominate public and 
political discourse in recent years. 
 
4.3.1 Historical Context of Immigration  
 
Relatively few sources exist and little research has been done on the post-World War 
II immigration landscape in Arizona. In fact such an analysis might shed light on the reasons 
behind the current controversies there over immigration.477 In fact, most historical 
immigration studies focus on the largest city in Maricopa County, Phoenix, which is also the 
most important concentration of immigrants in Arizona.478 Nevertheless, like the rest of the 
state of Arizona, even the state capital was not among the prime US immigration destinations 
in the Southwest at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century. As Cecilia Menjívar 
and Lisa Magaña point out, Phoenix “was mostly a stopping point for immigrants en route to 
other US destinations.” It is worth noting that in the first years after Arizona became a state 
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immigration rates remained significantly high.479 In subsequent years, there was a dramatic 
decline from 24.1% in 1920 to Arizona’s lowest point of 4.3% in the 1970s. Even the Second 
Great Migration failed to bring many Blacks to Arizona. From 1940 to 1960, in Arizona the 
population increase among Afro-Americans population was reported at only 0.5%.480 
However, Phoenix, which was expanding in these years, did attract a significant number of 
black newcomers from the South with new jobs in construction and other services.481  
Until the late 1980s, Arizona was usually a secondary destination for immigrants, who 
saw it as a cheaper but less attractive alternative to California. Of course, as a border state 
with Mexico, more and more Mexican workers were coming to Arizona, both as part of the 
Bracero Program, which was in effect until the mid-1960s, and illegally, which prompted 
researchers to classify Arizona as a traditional destination for Mexican immigrants.482 The 
undocumented, who, as in California, became a target of Operation Wetback, mentioned 
above, were an easy and cheap labor force for Arizona farmers. However, the massive 
inflows of Mexican immigrants came much later. At the beginning of the 1990s, when labor 
demand started to shift geographically, Arizona became an attractive destination for 
immigrants, both documented and undocumented, able to compete with California. Between 
1988-1998, when employment in California grew by 15%, the job market in Arizona 
increased by 40%.483 In the twenty-five years since 1980, the percentage of immigrants going 
to Arizona rose from 2.5% to 7.5%.484  
The migration of the undocumented population to Arizona was a response to the 
stricter border controls in California, particularly after Operation Gatekeeper in 1994, which 
forced people to try to cross the border through the inhospitable deserts and mountains of 
southern Arizona.485 As statistics from the Pew Hispanic Center show, in the years 1990-
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2007, the number of undocumented rose from 90,000 to 500,000. As a result, Arizona 
became the center of roundups486 and anti-immigrant vigilante activities as well as citizen 
militias, which started fueling anger and fear of “the invasion of illegals” among some Arizona 
residents.487 Some groups, like the American Border Patrol or the Minutemen Project, either 
moved from California or emerged as newly-established state anti-immigration movements, 
like Protect Arizona Now, an initiator of a number of anti-immigration bills.488 At the same 
time, Arizona also began to witness new activism on the part of pro-immigration 
organizations, which organized peaceful pro-immigration March of 2006 and started to focus 
attention on the situation of the undocumented in the state.489 
Because Mexicans comprised a majority of the immigrants coming to Arizona in the 
period after the Second World War, the common perception remains that immigration to 
Arizona is only about Mexicans and, moreover, predominantly undocumented Mexicans.490 In 
fact, Latinos make up only one part of a very diverse population in Arizona. First, as 
mentioned earlier, better conditions for the resettlement of Asians, following the passing of 
the 1965 Immigration Act, have given rise to inflows of Asian Indian, Filipino, and Korean 
populations since 1965 and Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian groups since 1975.491 
Although Arizona has not been the magnet for Asian immigration that California has been, at 
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the turn of the 21st century Asians started contributing to the large immigration inflows, 
reaching about 12% of all immigrants in 2005. Moreover, Arizona has also opened the gates 
to an increasing number of refugees which has only increased the ethnic diversity of the 
state. In the early 1980s, most refugees came from Vietnam (58%) and Cambodia. Bosnians 
and Cubans and refugees from Somalia and Sudan were the largest groups in the early 
1990s, whereas more Iraqis and Somalis have been resettled there in the last 15 years. In 
fact, the number of refugees has grown significantly in recent years, from 2420 in 2000 to 
4320 in 2010. As a result, Arizona currently ranks fourth in the number of refugees resettled 
in the US. Indeed, the Refugees Resettlement Program has contributed significantly to the 
present immigration landscape, which is rarely emphasized in debates about immigration in 
Arizona today.492  
 
4.3.2 Immigration Scale  
 
Despite rapid outflows of immigrants due to increasing anti-immigration discourse, 
which will be examined later, Arizona still ranks as the young immigrant destination in the 
US. Between 2000 and 2009, the foreign-born population in Arizona grew by 41 percent, 
which is above the national average (see graph 8). In 2009 the 925,376 registered 
immigrants constituted 14% of the entire population, putting Arizona in 9th  place in the US 
ranking of states with the highest percentage of foreign born inhabitants. Immigrant youth 
aged 18-24 accounted for more than 9% of foreign born, which reflects the average for 
Arizona as a whole. Nevertheless, statistics show the foreign population is on average older 
than the overall population of Arizona. Immigrant children aged 5-17 account for merely 7% 
of all foreign born in comparison to 18.9% of the whole population of all young Arizonans in 
the same age group.493 
Graph 8, using data from 2009, shows the predominance of Mexicans among 
immigrants. They constituted by far the large majority of foreign born from Latin America, 
who account for almost 70% of the immigrant population. The Asian population was the 
second largest foreign group, followed by Europeans and then Canadians (see graph 8). 
Consequently, the white-skinned immigrant population is shrinking. With the steady increase 
in immigration and the continuing demographic boom of the Latino population, Arizona may 
soon follow California’s footsteps and become a majority-minority state. Back in 2009 white 
people who were not Hispanic constituted a mere 57.3% of the population as a whole. 
However, unlike in traditional immigration states, immigrants in Arizona have formed 
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neighborhoods which cannot be distinguished along ethnic lines.494 In fact, few ethnic 
enclaves exist in the new metropolitan areas, like Phoenix. New arrivals usually settle 
wherever they find enough jobs and affordable housing, which makes the geography of 
immigration in Arizona more heterogeneous and less racially segregated. 
 
Graph 8 Foreign-Born Population in Arizona in 2009 
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Source:  The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009 
 
Finally, the fact that the unauthorized population has actually been declining in 
Arizona for the past couple of years may surprise anyone reading reports published by anti-
immigration movements of invasions of illegal aliens. As the Pew Hispanic Center reports, 
the undocumented population is estimated to have declined by 100,000 between 2007 and 
2010. Nevertheless, the current estimate of 400,000 unauthorized immigrants constitutes 6% 
of the entire population. This puts the state in 5th place in the ranking of US states with the 
largest percentage of “illegal” immigrants and in 8th place among the states with the largest 
number of unauthorized immigrants.495 
 
4.3.3 Public and Political Discourse  
 
Summarizing the various debates which are currently taking place and the political 
climate around the issue of immigration in Arizona is one of the most challenging tasks of this 
research. In a very short span of time, Arizona has gained prominence for having some of 
the toughest anti-immigration laws in the country. The emerging signs of “fortress Arizona” 
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are, in fact, not only to be found at the Mexican border but first of all in people’s minds.496 In 
fact, a comprehensive analysis of recent developments in discourse on immigration and 
integration in Arizona, and its impact on other US states, would require writing a separate 
book. Moreover, emotional responses to human rights violations and racism may run high 
among those who watch or read reports about new crackdowns on undocumented 
immigrants, massive deportations, and the hopeless situation of many unauthorized 
immigrant youth in the state, which in turns discourages many documented immigrants from 
remaining in the state as well. Consequently, there might be a strong tendency toward 
reductionism as well as emotionalism in reviews of the serious social and political divisions in 
Arizona at the moment. 497  
Disillusionment and the insecurity that comes with living in constant fear of 
deportation are common among immigrants in Arizona, which strongly diminishes any faith 
immigrant youth might have in a prosperous future in the state. The intensification of anti-
immigration sentiment, fueled by new, strict immigration laws against unauthorized 
immigrants and increasing opposition to anti-immigration crusaders is dividing not only the 
state but the nation as a whole. Consequently, any discussion of integration policies in 
Arizona is overshadowed by the core issue: who is allowed to stay and who should be forced 
to leave the country; or, in other words, who is for and who is against enforcing Arizona’s 
anti-immigration laws. Integration debates then come down to the question of having 
documents or not. “If you don’t have papers, you’d better pack your bags” seems to be the 
current stance of the Arizona government on the potential integration of young immigrants. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that law enforcement practices in Arizona differ 
geographically, depending on local officials’ attitudes towards immigration. In fact, Arizona 
has given these officials quite a lot of authority over organizing workplace raids and 
deportations, which has already given rise to a number of controversies at the federal level. 
The most controversial practices are those of Joe Arpaio of the Maricopa County Sheriff's 
Office, “America’s Toughest Sheriff,” as he calls himself.498 Statistics obtained by the 
Associated Press show that his office was responsible for about a quarter of the national total 
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of 115,841 deportation cases since 2007.499 Along with deportations and workplace raids, the 
policy of so-called “Attrition Through Enforcement” has dominated Arizona immigration 
legislation for the last couple of years. The idea behind this policy is to create such harsh 
living conditions for unauthorized immigrants that they would rather leave the state of their 
own volition than wait to be deported. As state Rep. John Kavanagh told the Arizona 
Republic, “it's about creating so much fear they will leave on their own.”500 Such a slow but 
effective law enforcement approach allegedly results in the massive outflows of unwanted 
immigrants without many pangs of conscience from Americans and without the media 
attention and bad publicity which massive deportations normally involve. One of the fiercest 
advocates of such tactics, the think tank Center for Immigration Studies, points out that 
“political support for a new commitment to enforcement might well be undermined if an 
exodus of biblical proportions were to be televised in every American living room.”501 
However, what was not anticipated by the proponents of the Attrition Through Enforcement 
strategy is the fact that not only are undocumented deterred from remaining in the state but 
many legally residing immigrants are also choosing not to stay. They are leaving the state, 
either because they have close family ties with unauthorized or some are members of their 
circle of friends or simply because they no longer feel secure in a state where the fear of 
racial profiling and harassment of legal immigrants hinders their integration and their 
attempts at achieving a “normal” life. In fact, in contrast to the fears projected by the 
proponents of the new enforcement strategies, public attention has been drawn to the 
poignant stories of many immigrants from mixed-status families who are fleeing Arizona. As 
the CNN reported, these are the stories of people who are leaving the state which “allowed 
them to achieve the American dream and is now the state which took it away.”502 According 
to estimates from April 2010, nearly 100,000 undocumented immigrants had left the state. It 
is still impossible to estimate just how many of them are young immigrants who had planned 
on a future in Arizona, but it is reasonable to assume they are moving to other states or 
returning to their countries of origin due to the proliferation of harsh policies.  
Immigrant integration policies in Arizona are rather scarce. Apart from the 
implementation of federal integration initiatives through the Arizona Department of Education 
for ELL students and federal monies for Workforce Investment Programs for youth, 
distributed by the Arizona Department of Economic Security, Arizona cannot boast of any 
notable integration plans targeting immigrant youth. In fact, Arizona is now regarded as a 
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state with one of the most punitive immigrant policies against undocumented immigrants 
implemented in the first decade of the 21th century.503 Generally speaking, the integration of 
immigrant youth into the labor market is currently complicated by strict limits on employment 
and little state support for ELL students who are supposed to learn in monolingual classes. 
Arizona Proposition 203, English for Children, which passed in 2000, abolished bilingual 
education and replaced it, as we have seen, with immersion programs for ELL students. 
Significantly, more than one in every ten ELL student dropped out during the 2008/2009 
school year.504 Although modeled on California’s Proposition 227, the bilingual education bill 
in Arizona is much stricter, reducing the opportunities for parents to apply for waivers.505 The 
other Arizona law which directly affects students is Proposition 300, signed in 2006, which 
denies undocumented students in-state tuition at public colleges and universities in Arizona. 
The students are barred from any state monies and can only apply for limited privately-
funded scholarships to continue their education. The only integrative education policies, 
passed 2007 and 2008, provide for classes for immigrant and adult education in school 
districts, so-called “Americanization work,” and state monies for English immersion classes. 
At the same time punitive immigrant policies were making their way through the Arizona 
legislature. Passed in 2007, Arizona's employer sanction law prohibits employers from hiring 
undocumented workers. Employers face suspension or revocation of their business licenses 
if they fail to comply. Moreover, since 2008 they are obliged to sign up for the E-Verify 
employment verification program. All this legislation has created an environment in which 
integration issues began to be associated with sanctions against the undocumented in public 
and political discourse and to pave the way for the realization of attrition through 
enforcement. 
The practice of attrition through enforcement gained momentum in the Support Our 
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (known as SB 1070), signed by Republican 
Secretary of State of Arizona Jan Brewer506 in April 2010. The new law, which is widely 
considered the US’ toughest Immigration enforcement legislation, triggered a national 
controversy and legal battle between the state of Arizona and the federal government over its 
constitutionality. After filing a lawsuit against the state, the Justice Department found that 
federal law preempted the new law and blocked its most controversial provisions just one 
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day before it was due to take effect on July 29, 2010.507 Among other things, under the 
preliminary injunction all state and local enforcement officials were released from the 
obligation to investigate people's immigration status “if reasonable suspicion exists that the 
person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the US.”508 The federal judge also struck down 
the section which required immigrants to carry their alien registration papers with them at all 
times. Nevertheless, the modified SB 1070 banned the practice of sanctuary cities in 
Arizona. Consequently, the little room for maneuvering in managing the integration of 
undocumented immigrants, which sanctuary cities had once enjoyed, disappeared with the 
new law. 
As I write, the national debate over the lawsuit has not been exhausted. Arizona has 
appealed the federal government’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals and the 
future of the legislation is uncertain. The case of SB 1070 is reminiscent of California’s highly 
controversial Proposition 187, which has never been implemented, and many critics of the 
immigration “maelstrom” have warned Arizona against repeating the mistakes made by its 
neighbor.509 However, the key figures behind SB 1070, State Senator Russell Pearce, who 
sponsored the bill, and State Governor Jan Brewer, who signed it, do not seem to be 
deterred by ongoing lawsuits or protesting voices from across the nation.510 In fact, more new 
immigration restrictions are being prepared, which might have an enormous impact on the 
future of immigrant youth in the state. Among other provisions of the planned legislation, 
undocumented immigrants would be prohibited from driving in the state and enrolling in 
school. School officials would be compelled to ask prospective students for proof of 
citizenship. Moreover, citizenship through birth in the US would be denied to children of 
undocumented parents, so that these children’s access to education would also be limited.511  
It should be kept in mind that the impact of the rapidly developing anti-immigration 
discourse in Arizona goes beyond unauthorized immigrants. As many opponents of new 
legislation affirm, all citizens might feel targeted and fear racial profiling. Such fears have 
even been confirmed by United States District Court Judge Susan Bolton. As she declared, 
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passing all provisions of SB 1070 would increase "the intrusion of police presence into the 
lives of legally present aliens (and even United States citizens), who will necessarily be 
swept up."512 Due to the tension created by the legislation, many immigrants – both 
documented and undocumented – are leaving Arizona, which poses a serious challenge for 
Arizona’s future prosperity. Indeed, the focus of political and public discourse on immigration 
shifts back and forth between questions about possible human rights violations and serious 
economic repercussions which Arizona might face. The future of Arizona business is now 
threatened by national and international protests against the new immigration law, which 
involve boycotts of contracts and conventions by businesses, investors and tourists from 
other states and countries. Economists estimate that as a result of the controversies over SB 
1070 and current social and political divisions, the overall annual losses (i.e. in sales or 
wages, taxes) may reach as high as $54bn per year.513  
On the other hand, broad public support for Arizona’s strict immigration law has not 
waned. Reports of nationwide anti-immigrant organizations have long fueled anti-immigration 
sentiment in Arizona, creating fertile ground for strict legislation. The strongest arguments in 
favor of the new legislation cite the purportedly huge costs of keeping undocumented 
immigrants who pose a threat to US security. Although pro-immigration groups claim that SB 
1070 supporters are using faked data to make their case, in 2010 more than 60% of 
Americans reportedly approved of the strict immigration law and more than 20 states plan to 
introduce bills similar to Arizona’s.514 Consequently, we are already well beyond an isolated, 
distinct discourse on immigration limited to one state. The new wave of activism against 
federal immigration law which Arizona’s actions inaugurated seems to be infecting other 
states as well.515 The rhetoric of “Arizonification,”516 a newly-coined term, seems to be 
spreading across the whole nation. States are being challenged to take a position for or 
against strict immigration enforcement measures. The turmoil is inspired by the state which, 
as Morton M. Kondracke puts it, “has recently become renown for Minuteman vigilantism, 
death threats against politicians and judges, talk-radio demagoguery, and bullying of Latinos 
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and rival politicians.” Time will only tell to what extent other states view Arizona’s immigration 
policies as a pattern to imitate or to boycott. It is quite possible that the immigrants leaving 
Arizona for immigration gateways may inspire similar strict anti-immigration measures and 
state activism. Consequently the dialogue recently begun on integration in the US may once 
again be overshadowed by the discourse on immigration enforcement rather than network-
building for the integration of immigrant youth, unless comprehensive immigration reform 
from the federal government manages to resolve the tensions which have divided Arizona 
and the rest of the nation. 
 
4.4 The European Union 
 
4.4.1 EU Scale of Diversity 
 
The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and in 2007 by twelve new member 
states has definitely contributed to an intensification of the debates about the EU as a 
multicultural entity, sometimes compared to that of the US. As noted by Belgian researcher 
Marco Martiniello in 2006, “diversification of diversity,” an expression originally used by 
Hollinger in reference to the cultural landscape of the US, could now easily be applied to the 
EU.517 The present EU, consisting of 27 member states,518 with candidates for membership 
on a waiting list, is a showcase for even more diverse migration groups and consequently 
greater challenges to integration management across the EU. The diversity in the EU is 
reflected both in the cultural diversity of its member states and in their various levels of 
immigration. The new EU member states, like Poland, have only recently been faced with 
immigration. Others, like Germany, have dealt with immigration and integration challenges 
for many years, but are still discussing and modifying their integration policies. 
“Diversity of diversification” in the EU is best reflected in immigrant population in the 
EU. The number of all foreign citizens in the EU amounted to 30.8 million (6.2% of the total 
population) as of January 2008.519 As Stavros Lambrinidis, Vice-President of the European 
Parliament points out, “this number could make up a 28th Member State" and would be the 
seventh largest in size.520 More than one third (11.3 million) of foreign citizens came from the 
EU member states. However, the proportion of foreign citizens varied significantly across the 
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countries between 0.1% in Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia to 43% in Luxembourg 
(see graph 9). Therefore, each EU country must be examined separately in terms of its 
experience with migration. In 2008 more than 75% of all foreign citizens in the EU27 lived in 
Germany (7.3 million), Spain (5.3 million), the United Kingdom (4.0 million), France (3.7 
million) and Italy (3.4 million).521 Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom were also the 
countries with the largest absolute numbers of young non-EU foreigners aged 15-29 (1.8, 
1.4, and 1.25 million respectively) in 2007.522 
 
Graph 9 Population of Foreigners in the EU27 Members States, 2008  
   (in %) 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
 
 
Source:  Eurostat, 2009 
 
The land of origin of foreign citizens varies greatly between the EU member states. In 
six member states, the largest single group of foreign citizens accounted for more than 30% 
of the total foreign population in the EU. The highest percentage of foreign citizens from one 
single country was registered in Greece (64% of foreign citizens were from Albania), 
Slovenia (47% from Bosnia and Herzegovina), Hungary (37% from Romania), and 
Luxembourg (37% from Portugal). 
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In light of this diversity of experience and different national modes of integration within 
the European Union, it would be impossible to specify one common mode of integration 
across all EU countries. Nevertheless, the EU is developing a common immigration policy 
according to the principle of subsidiarity and with respect to differences in legal systems and 
transposition in different EU member states. As part of its immigration policy the EU can 
provide some instruments of support for local integration measures, which can be considered 
significant milestones for the European dialog on the management of immigrant integration. 
Mobility and demographic changes in the European Union are the main factors 
driving the development of migration and integration strategies in Brussels. In fact, there is a 
relatively high net migration rate in the EU, which in 2008 was almost three times higher than 
the rate of natural population growth.523 Moreover, immigrants, especially those in the 
younger generations, have become a necessity for the EU in view of the aging EU population 
and a projected decrease in the EU working-age population (between 15-64 years of age) 
from 67.2% in 2007 towards about 57% of the total in 2050.524 Already in 2006 “receiving and 
integrating migrants into Europe” were considered one of the key policy responses to 
demographic changes.525 
 
4.4.2 EU Mode of Integration 
 
Nevertheless, there is no common EU integration policy which is binding for all EU 
member states, as integration policies still remain within the competencies of the member 
states. Integration measures are steered at the EU level by the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC).526 The EU revisions of the implementation of national action plans in integration 
policies in each EU member states can theoretically put them under peer-pressure to take 
actions for reaching the goals of the EU mode of integration. 
Like other EU member states, both Poland and Germany are under the same 
umbrella of general European Union’s immigration policies. The area of integration policy 
remains within the competencies of the Directorate General Justice, Freedom and   
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Security of the European Commission. 527  The policy areas on immigrant youth and their 
labor market integration are at the crossroads with other indirect EU policies in education 
(within the competencies of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Education 
and Culture (DG EAC) and employment (within the competencies of the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion).528 
Assessing the quality of coordination between these units goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, the tools which they use to facilitate integration management in the EU 
member states and their cities are presented below. 
The development of the EU integration framework began only quite recently. After the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, which for the first time established the competencies of the 
European Community for immigration and asylum, the Tampere Program is considered the 
first step toward creating a common EU immigration policy. Its beginning dates back to 1999 
when the European Council in Tampere agreed on the necessary elements for immigration 
policies, like ensuring “that migrants benefit from comparable living and working conditions to 
those of nationals.” Moreover, the European Council emphasized the need for “the 
approximation of national legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third 
country nationals.”529 The results of Tampere agenda were presented in the Communication 
from 2000 which recognized a common responsibility on the part of the EU member states 
for network building among different sectors at the local level. As the Communication states, 
“micro-level actions” should be based on partnerships between regional and local authorities 
and their political leaders, especially from larger towns where immigrants usually settle. 
Accordingly, for the first time the crucial role of cities as practical work sites for integration 
has been officially recognized in the EU integration framework.530 Ever since then the EU has 
been slowly gaining more importance in complementing the primary responsibility of its 
member states for the management of immigrant integration. 
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The development of integration actions at the EU level can be divided into the 
following five- year stages: the Tampere Council meeting and EU actions which followed 
(1999-2003), the Hague Program (2004-2009) and, currently, the Stockholm Program (2010-
2014). These developments have resulted in EU measures in three subfields of the EU 
integration framework: 1) binding and non-binding policies (hard and soft laws), 2) network 
building and 3) financial support.531 
The binding normative framework refers to the EU acquis, which sets minimum 
standards on the admission and integration of different categories of third-country 
nationals.532 The directives for residence security, equal treatment and some socio-economic 
rights for the immigrants who want to come to EU countries have thus far been implemented. 
Only the most recent and controversial Blue Card directive is still under review.533 The Blue 
Card directive is supposed to be an instrument to encourage the inflow of highly skilled 
workers, giving them a right to work and live in any EU country, except for Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom. The directive has been rightly criticized as one of the measures 
which actually hinders the integration of resident immigrants into the local labor market.534 In 
fact, the directive diverts attention away from the immigrant youth residing in the EU 
countries and instead towards the integration of potential “ready made,” highly skilled 
workforce from abroad. Such a strategy does not apply any Positive Youth Development 
strategies for using immigrant potentials, already existing in a given country. The Blue Card 
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Directive is a warning sign that the international focus on some assumed EU integration 
measures for a specific group of immigrants may ignore the integration needs of others and 
overshadow existing important soft laws, which facilitate integration measures at the local 
level. These soft laws within the EU non–binding normative integration framework aim at 
establishing a common interpretation of the process of immigrant integration and EU key 
priorities for integration actions in all EU member states. 
Common Basic Principles (CBPs) for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU represent 
one of the soft laws on integration, in which integration is defined as “a dynamic, two-way 
process of mutual accommodation.”535 CBPs were proposed in the Hague Program and 
adopted by the European Council in 2004 in order to inaugurate a more coherent European 
framework on the integration of third-country nationals (non-EU citizens). CBPs are a non-
binding set of basic guiding principles on the basis of which EU Members can judge and 
assess their own integration efforts. The principles refer to the core eleven points, which 
have already given rise to other supportive integration mechanisms still in development: 
 
1.  Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all 
immigrants and residents of Member States. 
2.  Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union by every 
resident. 
3.  Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the 
participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host 
society, and to making such contributions visible. 
4.  Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is 
indispensable to integration, enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is 
essential to successful integration. 
5.  Efforts in education are essential in preparing immigrants, and particularly their 
descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society. 
6.  Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and 
services, on an equal basis to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is 
an indispensable foundation for better integration. 
7.  Frequent interaction between immigrants and citizens of the Member States is a 
fundamental prerequisite for integration. 
8.  The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other 
inviolable European rights or with national law. 
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9.  The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of 
integration policies and measures, especially at the local and regional levels, is a 
key to effective integration. 
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and 
levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public 
policy formation and implementation. The principle of engaging civil society is also 
endorsed. 
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to 
adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of 
information more effective, so as to transfer good experience.536 
 
The above list clearly shows that the CBPs encompass all aspects of immigrant 
integration: structural, cultural, interactive and identificational elements. Some CBPs 
postulates are of special interest for this paper: postulates on immigrant employment, 
education, language, and finally mainstreaming integration measures (points 3, 4, 5, and 10 
of the CBPs). These points are considered the most crucial for the successful application of 
Affirmative Integration Management to the integration of immigrant youth into the labor 
market. A successful mechanism for monitoring the stages of the implementation of CBPs in 
the EU member states does not yet exist. However, the future development of such 
monitoring is supported by two other tools within the EU integration framework: network 
building and funding for integration projects. 
In the 2005 Common Agenda for Integration the European Commission proposed a 
set of concrete measures and mechanisms to put the Common Basic Principles into 
practice.537 The Agenda outlines new and already existing measures for networking and 
exchanging best practices for integration: the network of National Contact Points on 
Integration (since 2003) and Annual Reports on Immigration and Integration (since 2004), 
Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners (since 2004), European Web 
Site on Integration (since 2009) and the European Integration Forum (since 2009). 
The National Contact Points on Integration (NCPs) were created back in 2003538 as 
an EU-level intergovernmental network of governmental experts from the EU member states 
in charge of national integration policy. As the Common Agenda states, “NCPs will continue 
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to play an important role in monitoring progress across policy fields and in ensuring that 
efforts at national and EU level are mutually reinforcing.” They are supposed to contribute to 
the exchange of information and best practices and to identifying priority areas in integration 
management.539 Three Annual Reports (2004, 2006, and 2007) on Immigration and 
Integration have been prepared thus far as a result of the cooperation of NCPs. The reports 
summarize the actions taken by the EU member states to reach CBPs and contribute to the 
exchange of best practices in integration, which has turned out to be central to publishing the 
Handbooks on Integration. 
The idea of developing a Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners 
came from the EU member states at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. The 
Handbook is supposed to serve as a guide for policymakers and practitioners in developing 
and promoting integration management. The three editions of the Handbook were prepared 
by the Migration Policy Group (MPG), an independent consultant to the European 
Commission. 540 The Handbooks are based on the cooperation of the European Commission 
with the National Contact Points on Integration, particularly on the outcome of technical 
seminars hosted by the ministries responsible for integration in different EU member states. 
They consist of theoretical input on the subject of integration as well as practical 
methodological guidelines, including challenges and solutions for integration management, 
especially in the area of actions recommended in the CBPs.541 The subject of gaining 
immigrant youth entry into the labor market has also found a place in the third edition of the 
Handbook on Integration (2010) as the final issue discussed. 
It is probably still too early to evaluate the impact of the Handbooks on the 
development of local integration initiatives. The fact that the handbooks have been translated 
into all EU languages should facilitate dissemination of their postulates among local 
integration stakeholders. The Handbooks have developed the community of practitioners 
across the EU, whose work is supposed to be continued within other integration measures of 
the Common Agenda, namely integration websites and meetings of the European Integration 
Forum. 
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The European Web Site on Integration (EWSI), which was launched in April 2009, 
provides a platform for networking on supporting immigrant integration, aiming to exchange 
policies and practices with other policy makers and practitioners with similar interests and 
fields of integration work. I would describe the website as an ongoing online integration 
handbook. In fact, the website is continuously updated by contributors from the European, 
national, regional and local levels of integration work: international organizations, EU civil 
society networks, academics and policy experts, and business and social networks. As one 
can read on the website, the integration portal serves as a documentation facility, on-line 
data collection tools for good practices, and finally a platform for the direct exchange of 
information between stakeholders.542 The EWSI helps find project partnerships, funding, 
current research reports and offers an online forum. It is questionable whether the website is 
used on daily basis as a communication tool between integration stakeholders across the 
EU.543 Currently it functions at least as a widely accessible and clearly structured navigation 
tool for integration networking among the EU member states, which is very useful at a time 
when there is a boom in integration research, networks and online platforms in Europe. Only 
time will tell whether the EWSI actually fulfills its ambitious plans to become “Integration at 
your fingertips” and to focus a bit more specifically on networking for immigrant youth.544 
Parallel to the establishment of the EWSI in April 2009 the development of the 
European Integration Forum started. The Forum is a consultation mechanism between the 
civil society and the European Commission in cooperation with the European Economic and 
Social Committee. The Forum enables the European and national civil society 
organizations545 and representatives of the NCPs to exchange opinions, run consultations 
with the representatives of national institutions, and prepare recommendations and own-
initiative reports to support the EU Agenda on integration. At the time of writing there have 
been three meetings so far. None of them have specifically dealt with the integration of 
immigrant youth into the labor market. However, relevant subjects, such as labor market 
discrimination against immigrants, brain waste, and a proper dialog between teachers and 
educators for education of immigrant children, have been discussed as priorities for the EU 
integration agenda. Like the EU Integration Website, the EU Forum is still a new tool for 
integration mainstreaming among stakeholders at all levels, whose success remains to be 
seen. 
Besides the above mentioned instruments for networking on integration within 2005 
Common Agenda on Integration, other efforts have been made to cooperate at both national 
and local levels in the EU. One of these instruments is the European Migration Network, 
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which was first launched in 2003 as a pilot project 546 and currently functions as a permanent 
structure under the direct responsibility of the Directorate General for Home Affairs. The 
Network aims to cooperate transnationally in order to support EU policymaking in the areas 
of migration and asylum. It consists of the EU member states’ national governments: 
seventeen members (including Germany) and five observers (including Poland). The 
initiative requires that its members develop a national network, which would monitor a 
particular migration or asylum topic. Although integration policy is not the primary focus of the 
network, the country reports and the EMN comparative report on policies of reception and 
integration arrangements for immigrants and unaccompanied minors may contribute to the 
EU member states’ involvement in the integration of young immigrants. 
Integrating Cities is another measure outside the framework of the EU Agenda 2005 
worth mentioning.547 The program was launched in Rotterdam in 2006 in the form of a 
partnership between the network of European cities Eurocities and the European 
Commission’s DG Justice, Freedom and Security, to work on the implementation of CBPs at 
the local level. The cooperation was based on a series of conferences promoting integration 
of immigrants in urban areas.548 The process has led to the development of Eurocities 
Charter on Integrating Cities, signed by the mayors of 17 cities. The Charter commits its 
signatories to promoting immigrant integration among policy-makers, service providers, 
employers and buyers of good and services. Among other postulates, the Charter recognizes 
the following needs for action in reference to immigrant youth and their integration into the 
labor market: 
- support equal access for migrants to services to which they are entitled, particularly to 
language learning, employment, and education; 
- reflect our city’s diversity in the composition of the city’s workforce across all staffing 
levels; 
- ensure that all staff, including staff with a migrant background, experience fair and 
equal treatment by their managers and colleagues; and respect diversity and equality 
issues.549 
The Charter is at the same time an example of a bottom-up EU initiative, which calls 
for the commitment of EU institutions to all three fields of action: anti-discrimination 
legislation and diversity policies, integration funding, and benchmarking. The initiative also 
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proves that horizontal cooperation at local levels across the EU member states is  
possible.550 
Finally, a financial support system for integration projects constitutes the third subfield 
of the EU integration framework. A number of EU financial instruments, tailored to a specific 
target groups and project goals, can also support the integration of immigrant youth into the 
labor market. 
The financial mechanism for integration measures started with the Preparatory 
Actions for the Integration of Third-country Nationals - INTI (2003-2006), which promoted 
transnational cooperation for the integration of people who are not EU citizens. More 
specifically, the program aimed to foster a dialogue with civil society, develop integration 
models, evaluate best practices, and set up a network in the field of immigrant integration at 
the European level.551 A relatively small budget of €18 million was granted to support 
transnational projects between several EU member states. The involvement and financial 
support was not equally distributed across all countries. Especially the new EU member 
states (among them Poland) were not represented enough in comparison to the largest 
beneficiaries of the project like Italy or Germany.552 
The INTI experience led to the establishment in 2007 of the European Fund for the 
Integration of Third Country Nationals, also known as the European Integration Fund (EIF). 
This program benefits from more extensive financial support, with a budget of €825 million 
for the period 2007 – 2013, as planned in 2005 Common Agenda for Integration. The Fund 
supports the implementation of integration processes of third country nationals into the EU 
member states, of activities to develop, monitor and evaluate integration measures for the 
third country nationals, and supports the exchange of information and best practices and co-
operation between integration stakeholders within a given EU member state and with other 
EU Countries. The EIF budget is divided among bids for calls for proposals and tenders for 
community action proposed and managed by the Commission and national programs, which 
are managed by the EU member states.553 According to the Commission’s strategic 
guidelines and following consultations with the Commission, each beneficiary state was 
supposed to develop their own multi-annual programming strategy (2007-2013) for the use of 
the resources they receive each year. 
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The European Refugee Fund (ERF) is currently the second important financial 
support system for integration. Similar to the EIF program, it functions on the basis of 
community action and national programs.554 The budget of €566 million for the Program 
2008-2013 is distributed among the EU member states on the basis of criteria relating to the 
number of asylum seekers and persons benefiting from international protection in a given EU 
country.555 Among other priorities the ERF supports the efforts of the EU member states to 
grant reception conditions and potential integration into the labor market to refugees, 
displaced persons and the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.556 
The third complementary support program for integration management of immigrant 
youth on the labor market is the funding managed by the DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion within the European Social Funds (ESF) program.557 The ESF is one of the EU 
Structural Funds, set up as early as 1957 to reduce differences in prosperity and living 
standards across the EU member states and regions. ESF Funding is spread across the EU 
member states and regions, in particular those where economic development is less 
advanced. The community initiative Equal (2000-2006) was implemented within the ESF until 
2008, supporting the development of actions to prevent discrimination against immigrants on 
the labor market. The new Progress program 2007-2013, which is managed by the 
Commission in the form of calls of tenders and proposals continues to complement the 
previous EQUAL program, focusing on employment, social inclusion and protection, working 
conditions, non-discrimination and gender equality. 
All of the above mentioned financial mechanisms, which are run by two EU DGs: DG 
Home Affairs and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, are considered the main EU 
stakeholders in the integration of young immigrants into the labor market. They are also 
complemented by a number of other sources of EU funding.558 Some financial sources come 
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 Only 10% of the total annual resources each year are allocated to community action, the rest is 
spent on national programs. 
555
 The European Refugee Fund has been in place since 2000. Currently, the third phase of the Fund 
is running within the Program 2008-2013. 
556
 Other objectives of the ERF actions involve: fair and effective asylum procedures and resettlement 
of UNHCR recognized refugees; emergency action, promotion of good practices in the field of asylum, 
protection of the rights of persons requiring international protection; and improvement of the work of 
asylum systems in the EU member states. 
557
 In 2011 the DG changed its name from DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities to 
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. 
558
 A good overview of the EU integration projects and funding opportunities has been compiled in the 
volume European Commission, Directorate-General for Research. (2009). Moving Europe: EU 
Research on Migration and Policy Needs. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities. 
The following projects were founded within the 7th Framework Program in relation to immigrant youth: 
- EDUMIGROM – Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging Prospects for Urban Youth in an 
Enlarged Europe; 
- EUMARGINS – On the Margins of the European Community. Young Adult Immigrants in seven 
European Countries; 
- GEITONIES – Generating Interethnic Tolerance and Neighborhood Integration in European Urban 
Spaces. 
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from the European Regional Development Fund of the DG Regional Policy559 or the DG 
Education and Culture, which engages in immigrant integration by supporting the Lifelong 
Learning Program and the Youth Program.560 
If one would like to apply Heckmann’s terminology for national integration modes to 
the EU perspective, all three pillars of the EU integration framework – policies, 
mainstreaming, and funding – can be considered a specific EU mode of integration. This 
integration mode is not free of conceptual traps and some shortcomings, constantly revised 
at ministerial conferences and by European think-tanks.561 
One of the controversies refers to the language which is used for immigrants. In fact, 
the terminology used in the EU law determines the national and local integration actions, 
restricting the available funds to specific target groups. Many terms have been used in EU 
policies and legislation in reference to immigrants such as labor migrants, family members 
admitted under family reunion arrangements, refugees, and persons enjoying international 
protection. As evidenced by the above analysis of the EU integration strategy, the 
controversial term “third country nationals” (TCNs) is commonly used today for immigrants. 
For example, the official target group of the European Integration Fund are legally resident 
“third-country nationals, who are defined as any persons who are not nationals of an EU 
member state.”562 This definition of immigrants excludes naturalized immigrants and EU-EEA 
intra migrants, who should not be overlooked in EU steps toward immigrant integration.563 
These groups seem to have been ignored in the CBPs postulates, which only targets 
immigrants outside the EU. In fact, the European ideal of equal opportunity for all EU citizens 
in any EU member state is still far from a reality.564 
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 For example see the European Program for Urban Sustainable Development (URBACT) project 
supporting EU city networks and their integration strategies. 
560
 There are four sub-programs of the Lifelong Learning Program, which fund projects at different 
levels of education and training for EU Nationals: Comenius for schools, Erasmus for higher 
education, Leonardo da Vinci for vocational education and training, Grundtvig for adult education. 
The Youth Program support projects related to intercultural education, school integration of migrant 
pupils and social inclusion for disadvantaged youth. 
For more on the role of the EU programs and Actions within the field of education of immigrant 
children and youth see European Commission. (2008). Green Paper: Migration and Mobility: 
Challenges and Opportunities for EU Education Systems, SEC(2008) 2173.  
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 So far four EU Ministerial Conferences on Integration have taken place in the EU: Groningen 2004, 
Potsdam 2007, Vichy 2008, Zaragoza 2010. 
The Migration Policy Group or the European Policy Center are examples of EU think-tanks active in 
the field of EU integration policies. 
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 See Glossary on the website of the European Migration Network: http://emn.intrasoft-
intl.com/Glossary 
563
 Throughout the dissertation the term “EU-EEA intra migrants” for immigrants from EU and EEA 
countries is used only in cases when legislation differences between them and other immigrants need 
to be discussed. In all other cases the general term “immigrants” will be applied to both groups.  
564
 Thanks to the provisions of migratory mobility of EU citizens, EU-EEA intra migrants are thought 
not to require extra integration measures. However, there are groups that need support, particularly 
with regard to education, vocational training and enabling their children to enter the labor market. 
For more on the need to integrate EU-EEA intra migrants in the new host society see Bosswick W. 
and Heckmann F., op. cit., p. 19. 
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Similar controversies about EU terminology concern the existing dividing lines 
between target groups of the two aforementioned EU funding programs, which often hinder 
the effectiveness of local integration programs. In fact, the beneficiaries of international 
protection cannot get assistance from the European Integration Fund as they fall under the 
European Refugee Fund. This division was made in the Hague Program in 2004, which split 
the procedures for dealing with immigrant integration into two strains: those for refugees and 
those for others.565 
Finally, persons with unregulated status cannot be formally funded by any of the EU 
financial mechanisms. These restrictions make target groups of the EU Integration Fund 
quite limited. As the interviews in both Germany and Poland show, these EU conditions have 
been very problematic for practical work at the local level.566 
Restricting integration programs to only one group of beneficiaries is often very 
difficult for both practical as well as humanitarian reasons. For practical reasons, quite often 
a wider range of immigrants unofficially benefit from projects officially aimed at just one target 
group.567 For humanitarian reasons, making differences between people on the basis of their 
migration status does not seem an appropriate strategy to integrate immigrants into the local 
environment. Similar difficulties with division lines among immigrants apply to education 
mobility. EU-EEA intra migrants can enjoy many more privileges granted by EU study 
exchange programs in comparison to third country nationals who are excluded from certain 
educational benefits.568 The EU mode of integration should be more inclusive especially with 
regard to immigrant youth. 
The DG Education has already made an attempt to expand the target groups of 
integration activities for immigrant youth. In its recent study on migration the terms “children 
from a migrant background,” “children of migrants” and “migrant pupils” are used to refer to 
the children of all persons living in an EU country where they were not born, irrespective of 
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 Common European Asylum System (CEAS), developed in Tampere 1999 and in Hague Program 
2004 formulates common minimum standards for a fair and efficient asylum process, conditions for the 
reception of asylum seekers, rules on the recognition of different statuses for international protection 
of refugees, subsidiary and other forms of protection. With reference to immigrant youth integration it 
might be criticized for its shortcomings in integration settings for asylum seekers. In fact, the EU 
member states can decide whether to grant asylum seekers' access to freedom of residence and 
movement, schooling in the mainstream classroom, the labor market, vocational training, and full 
housing and healthcare options. Huddelstone’s report presents an interesting critical analysis of EU 
integration measures for refugees. 
Huddleston, T. (2010). EU Support for Integration: what about Beneficiaries of International 
Protection? A User's Guide to EU Standards, Funds and Cooperation. Brussels: Migration Policy 
Group. 
566
 The challenges for financing local activities with EU Funds are discussed in the case study 
analysis, in chapter 5. 
567
 The restrictions often force integration practitioners to find room to maneuver in order to effectively 
run their projects, for example by not including all data on actual participants in integration programs in 
project reports. 
568
 For example, as opposed to TCNs, EU-EEA intra migrants do not have to pay for a study semester 
abroad in another EU country. For more on education programs for third country nationals see the 
next subchapter. 
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whether they are third country nationals, citizens of another EU member state or naturalized 
citizens of the host EU member states.569 Unfortunately, no similar changes in the 
terminology are foreseen in future developments of the EU integration mode, which could 
ease the coordination of integration programs at national and local levels. However, a new 
context for EU integration policy presents a more promising scenario for greater EU 
involvement in the future in national and local integration processes of member states. 
The forthcoming EU policy context is set by the European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum, which was adopted by the European Council in October 2008.570 One of five basic 
commitments of the Pact is the promotion of integration. The implementation of these 
commitments is one of the tasks of the Stockholm Program, adopted in December 2009 by 
the European Council. The Stockholm Program recognizes the potential that immigrants 
bring to a host country, stating that “the successful integration of legally resident third-country 
nationals remains the key to maximizing the benefits of immigration.”571 Moreover, the 
commitment to a increased involvement of the EU in immigrant integration in the EU member 
states should be supported by developing new instruments of cooperation: the European 
Modules for Migrant Integration and European Indicators to evaluate the results of national 
integration policies.572 Finally, the Lisbon Treaty provides a new legal context for integration. 
While the Treaty still excludes formal harmonization of integration policies, it allows the 
European Parliament with the EU Council to provide incentives and support for integration 
procedures of the EU member states.573 This is a historical move towards the enlargement of 
the EU competencies in the integration policies of the EU member states. 
Time will only show to what extent the ambitious plans to tackle various aspects of 
integration policies with these new instruments will improve the management of integration 
measures for providing immigrant youth access to the labor market at national and local 
levels of the EU member states. 
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 European Commission. (2008), op. cit. 
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 Council of the European Union. (2008). European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 13440/08, 
ASIM 72. 
571
 Section 6.1.5 of the Stockholm Program.  
Council of the European Union (2010). The Stockholm Program – An Open and Secure Europe 
Serving and Protecting the Citizens 16484/1/09 REV 1 JAI 866 + ADD 1. 
572
 Common European modules are intended to constitute an established point of reference that can 
be adapted to different contexts and can contribute to the design of integration programs across 
Europe. 
See European Commission. (2010). Commission Staff Working Document. The Consolidation of the 
EU Framework on Integration Report to the 2010 Ministerial Conference on Integration, SEC(2010) 
357 final. 
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 “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States 
with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, 
excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.” See Article 79.4 of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
European Union. (2007). Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, 2007/C 306/01. 
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4.4.3 EU Integration Frameworks for Education and Labor Market 
 
The general EU integration policies, presented above, cannot be analyzed in 
reference to citizenship, education, and labor market structure. They are unique for each EU 
member state and will be discussed in reference to Poland and Germany in the next sections 
of this chapter. However, the EU education and labor market frameworks within the Open 
Method of Coordination set standards for the EU countries and may influence their 
management of the process of integrating immigrant youth. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyze the entire EU education and employment strategy. Only particular areas of 
the recently developed European Youth Strategy, Lifelong Learning Program, and the 
European Employment Guidelines will be discussed as instances of the EU’s indirect 
integration measures for immigrant youth. 
The European Youth Strategy dates back to the first framework for European 
cooperation on the issue of youth from 2002574 and the European Youth Pact from 2005.575 
The Youth Pact is a political instrument which aims to promote the participation of young 
Europeans in three main fields: employment, integration and social advancement; education, 
training and mobility; and reconciliation of family life and working life. The EU for the first time 
took into account the existence and circumstances of non-European youth residing in the EU 
as part of the EU Youth Strategy in EU Youth Report 2009. The report provides numbers of 
non – European immigrants and acknowledges their contributions and the need for 
integration measures, focusing mainly on the EU funded project UP2Youth which targets 
young immigrants' transition from school to work.576 Moreover, the report draws attention to 
the unequal access to opportunities by those with a migrant background, referring to them as 
“third culture kids,” a rather controversial phrase.577 
The EU Youth Report, which should be regarded as a milestone in addressing 
immigrant youth at the EU level, is a supporting document for the new cooperation 
framework outlined in the strategy Youth – Investing and Empowering from 2009. The 
document presents new new EU youth strategy with eight fields for action (among them 
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 Council of the European Union. (2002, June 27). Resolution Regarding the Framework of 
European Cooperation within the Youth Field, 2002/C 168/02. 
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 During the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon (March 2000), the Heads of State and 
Government launched a Lisbon Strategy aimed at making the European Union (EU) the most 
competitive economy in the world and achieving full employment by 2010. The European Youth Pact 
was adopted as part of the revised Lisbon Strategy in 2005. See Council of the European Union. 
(2005). Presidency Conclusions 7619/1/05. 
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 The UP2Youth project was funded under the 6th framework Program of the European Union from 
May 2006 till April 2009 and involved research partners from 15 countries (Germany, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Finland, Romania, Austria, Slovakia and Ireland), 
For more see Directorate-General for Education and Culture (2009). EU Youth Report 2009. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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 As in the case of “third country nationals,” the prefix “third” establishes a controversial ranking of 
youth. Employing such a categorization, the question arises who are the “first” and “second” youth with 
a migration background?  
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education, employment, and entrepreneurship), recognizing young people as one of the most 
vulnerable groups in society and acknowledging the need for a youth policy. The proposed 
youth policy is based on principles similar to those of the AIM policy proposed in my 
dissertation. As the EU Council states, youth policy can only develop in cross-sector 
cooperation at national and regional levels of policymaking.578 Unfortunately, the EU Strategy 
itself does not refer to immigrant youth directly. 
In the field of education and training the EU youth supportive measures basically refer 
to the Lifelong Learning Program, and various International co-operations in education and 
training with non EU countries.579 There are also common European frameworks and tools to 
enhance the recognition and quality of competencies and qualifications, which by the same 
token comprise the EU transparency education framework for non EU countries. The 
European Qualifications Framework (EQF) establishes eight reference levels describing what 
a learner knows, understands and is able to do, so-called “learning outcomes.” Each level of 
national qualification in the EU member states should correspond to the EU reference levels, 
ranging from basic (Level 1) to advanced (Level 8). This should ease a comparison between 
national qualifications, enhance recognition of qualifications and ensure that people do not 
have to repeat their education/training if they move to another country. The EQF applies to 
all types of education, training and qualifications, from school education to academic, 
professional and vocational. The recognition of foreign qualifications in all EU member states 
is regulated by the Professional Qualifications Directive and supported by the EU NARIC 
Network (National Academic Recognition Information Centers).580 
As regards EU employment strategies, the European Employment Guidelines set out 
common binding regulations for the EU member states in reference to both young people 
and immigrants. Accordingly, integrating immigrants and minorities is considered “particularly 
essential.” The EU member states should guarantee that no young person is left behind 
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 In addition, similar to the AIM principles, the EU Council warns against duplicating existing 
integration mechanisms and calls for improving “knowledge-base and effective dissemination of best 
practice.” See Commission of the European Communities. (2009). An EU Strategy for Youth – 
Investing and Empowering. COM(2009) 200 final, p. 12. 
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 The following programs exemplify EU cooperation with third country nationals: 
- Erasmus Mundus: enhancing quality in higher education through scholarships and academic co-
operation worldwide; 
- Jean Monnet: promoting teaching and research on European integration; 
- Tempus: building cooperation between the EU and neighboring regions; 
- Edulink: capacity-building and regional integration in higher education in ACP (Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific) states and regions; 
- Alfa: supporting co-operation between higher education institutions in the EU and Latin America. 
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 European Parliament and Council. (2005). Directive on the Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications 2005/36/EC. 
The NARIC network is an initiative of the European Commission, created in 1984. The network 
consists of national centers, which aim to provide information concerning the academic recognition of 
diplomas and periods of study undertaken in other countries. 
Other EU measures in the field of recognition of qualifications in the EU member states concern the 
development of Europass, the European Credit System for VET (ECVET), and the European Quality 
Assurance Reference Framework for VET (EQARF). 
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without training or employment and that the employment gaps between third-country 
nationals and EU citizens be reduced “in line with any national targets.”581 Since the EU 
Employment Policy is based on the Open Method of Coordination, these guidelines leave the 
EU member states much room to maneuver. Fortunately, recent trends point to a further pro-
immigration discourse in EU employment strategies. The guidelines for 2010 call for a policy 
of inclusive growth, “removing barriers to labor market participation especially for women, 
older workers, young people, disabled and legal migrants.” The guidelines should be 
implemented through National Reform Programs on the part of the EU member states,582 
which will be monitored by the Commission. The Programs should be developed in 
accordance with the EU labor market strategy of flexicurity and the new Europe 2020 
Strategy for Jobs and Growth.583 First, the principle of flexicurity supports the transition of 
workers into better jobs, "upward mobility" and the development of their talents. 
Consequently it harmonizes with the Positive Youth Development strategy. Both strategies 
could be complimentary in the EU member states’ policies for integrating immigrant youth 
into the labor market. Secondly, the first target of Europe 2020 Strategy for Jobs and Growth 
refers to integration of immigrants and young people into the labor market.584 Out of seven 
”flagship initiatives” to reach the targets of Europe 2020 Strategy, three of them are 
particularly important for immigrant youth integration into the labor market: Youth on the 
Move, An Agenda for New Skills and Jobs, and European Platform against Poverty. The last 
one refers directly to immigrants, aiming to develop a new promising agenda for their 
integration in order to enable them to “take full advantage of their potential.”585 
Recent developments in the EU employment strategy demonstrate that the 
importance of immigrants and young people has been acknowledged in both the general EU 
education and employment frameworks, in addition to direct integration policies within the 
DG Home Affairs. The success of the EU supportive mechanism for immigrant integration 
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 “Every unemployed person should be offered a job, apprenticeship, additional training or other 
employability measure; in the case of young persons who have left school within no more than 4 
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Council of the European Union. (2008). Council Decision on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of 
the Member States 10614/2/08 REV 2. 
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 Council of the European Union. (2010). Council Decision on Guidelines for the Employment 
Policies of the Member States Part II of the Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines SEC(2010) 488. 
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Commission of the European Communities. (2007). Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity. 
COM(2007) 359. 
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 Of five core targets of EU Strategy 2020 the first one aims “to raise to 75% the employment rate for 
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European Council. (2010). Conclusions EUCO 13/10. 
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 For more on all flagship initiatives see Commission of the European Communities. (2010). Europe 
2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. COM(2010) 2020. 
  
165 
depends in part on the coordination of different DGs on the issue of immigrant integration. 
However, it is generally up to the national modes of integration of the EU member states and 
local integration management as to how these EU principles and guidelines on integration 
will benefit immigrant youth in the EU countries. 
 
4.5 Germany 
 
Germany has the highest number of foreign citizens among the EU member states. 
Although the country has experienced a decreasing inflow of foreigners in recent years586, 
more than one fifth of all foreign citizens in the EU were living in Germany as of January 
2009.587 Past massive inflows of immigrants date back to the second half of 20th century. 
Ever since the post-war guest worker programs, which were in effect until 1973, Germany 
was an “undeclared” country of immigration, which turned out to be one of the most important 
immigration countries in the world.588 Germany’s migration and integration policies have in 
fact been developing very slowly over time. As many migration researchers point out, 
immigrants have been living in “a social paradox” in Germany.589 They were residing in an 
immigration country which until the beginning of the 21st century had not addressed existing 
integration needs for immigrant population. 
There are many speculations in research about the reasons for Germany’s reluctance 
to officially admit their status as an immigration country. Migration cycle theory posits that 
Germany has followed a general pattern of transition into one of the mature immigration 
countries in Europe. According to this theory mature (or “old”) immigration countries received 
most immigrants during the third quarter of the 20th Century or before. A significant 
percentage of the newcomers remained after the crisis of the mid-70s. Family reunions had 
started to take place before that date, and greatly intensified afterwards. Consequently, a 
significant portion of the population of mature immigration countries, like Germany, have a 
migration background which dates back several generations. In most mature immigration 
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See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (n.d). Inflows of Foreign Population 
into OECD Countries. 
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See Eurostat. (2010, September 7). Foreign Citizens Made up 6.4% of the EU27 Population. Eurostat 
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 Thränhardt, D. (1995). Germany: An Undeclared Immigration Country. New Community. 19-36, p. 
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- Bade, K. J. and Oltmer, J. (Eds.). (2004). Normalfall Migration: Deutschland im 20. und frühen 21. 
Jahrhunder. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung; 
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countries a significant legislative gap existed between real demands for efficient migration 
and integration policies and the actual time the appropriate legislation was implemented, 
which also occurred in the case of Germany.590 
However, the transition of Germany into an immigration country must also be 
understood through the lens of German post-war history and a specific political migration 
discourse prevailing in the country. Both of these factors suffice to explain why immigration 
had long been taboo in German politics. 
First, as Holger Kolb points out, for a long time Germany was unable to finish its 
nation-building project and was thus obliged to deny its immigration and integration reality. 
The German reunification in 1990 represented a turning point, which led to the end of the 
period of self-renunciation. Secondly the public debates about German guiding culture 
(Leitkultur) and a parallel society (Parallelgesellschaft) which have exploded recently may be 
a sign of a deeply ingrained fear of immigration. It was only after the terrorist attacks that the 
issue of real integration problems has been more present in public discourse. The 
Immigration Act of 2004 constituted an important step on Germany’s turn from informal to 
formal immigration country. 
The complexity of both the historical background to German nation building and the 
early 21st century political changes in the German government make Germany an interesting 
case study, which shows just how rapidly a national integration strategy may emerge after a 
long “official silence.” In light of recent policy developments, Germany as an old unofficial 
immigration nation-state has made its millennium breakthrough in official debates on 
migration and integration, which turned the republic into a reborn immigration country.591  
 
4.5.1 Historical Context of Immigration 
 
The immigration landscape in Germany today has been shaped by four main 
population inflows in the post war period. These included ethnic Germans from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet states, so called (Spät-)Aussiedler, Jews from the successor 
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 The concept of “migration cycles” is based on the assumption that all European nation-states 
alternate between being countries of emigration and of immigration in similar stages (cycles). The 
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states of the former Soviet Union592, other groups searching for international protection 
(asylum-seekers) as well as guest workers. Although the first two groups are not a main 
focus of the current political and social debates about integration policies, they should still be 
considered immigrants, who may experience integration challenges just like any other 
immigrant group. 
In the first years after the Second World War Germany underwent massive population 
movements. In the period 1945–1950, about ten million people (forced laborers and former 
prisoners) left Germany and returned to their home countries. At the same time, as a result of 
forced resettlements, 7.9 million refugees and expellees were residing in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and 3.6 million in the German Democratic Republic, according to the 
1950 Census. In other words, right from the very beginning the Federal Republic of Germany 
was actually a country of immigration.593 
Furthermore, a significant increase in the migration of ethnic German resettlers took 
place in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end 
of the travel restrictions of the former Communist countries. From 1988 until 2005 a total of 
three million ethnic Germans entered Germany, mostly from Poland, Romania, and the 
former Soviet Union. However, the number of German repatriates arriving annually has been 
declining since the mid 1990s (from 397,073 in 1990 to 3,360 in 2009) when the government 
started to take restrictive measures to stop massive returns.594 
The political changes in Central and Eastern Europe triggered other massive 
migration movements of the second and third migration groups to Germany: asylum seekers 
and persecuted ethnic Jews. The number of asylum applications rose significantly in the 
second half of the 1980s and reached almost 440,000 in reunified Germany in 1992, with the 
most numerous groups from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and the Russian Federation. In the 
1990s, Germany granted asylum to more people than any other European country. Such a 
large number of applicants resulted from the political turmoil of the time, like the war in the 
former Yugoslavia, the Civil war in Sri Lanka and the crackdown on the Kurdish minority in 
Turkey. In fact, Germany was considered an attractive destination country because it had the 
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most liberal asylum laws in Europe, a quite attractive support system for refugees and 
enjoyed good geographical location between the West and East of Europe. In fact, for many 
immigrants applying for asylum was one of the few ways to regularize their stay in Germany 
at that time.595 
As a reaction to the high number of asylum applicants, restrictions of the fundamental 
right to asylum were introduced in 1993, which significantly reduced the annual number of 
asylum applications but thereby increased illegal immigration.596 Since that time, those 
entering Germany from countries considered “free of persecution” or so-called “safe third 
countries” could no longer be granted the basic right of asylum. Other rules started to apply 
to Jews from the former Soviet Union, who had begun emigrating to the GDR already in 
1990. Jewish immigrants do not need to prove that they have been persecuted in order to 
immigrate to Germany. The preferential resettlement procedure for Jewish immigrants is 
officially considered legitimate in light of “the background of Germany’s historic 
responsibilities.”597 
Guest workers were the fourth important immigration strand after the Second World 
War. They were recruited to Germany in order to fulfill labor shortages mainly in the low 
skilled industrial sector during the German post-war economic boom.598 The massive inflow 
of immigrants started after 1961. At that time steady economic growth and the construction of 
the Berlin Wall, which cut off the flow of workers from East Germany, resulted in increasing 
labor shortages in West Germany. The largest groups were migrants from Italy, Spain, and 
Greece. Only at the end of the 1960s was there an increase in Yugoslavs and Turks. In total, 
from the late 1950s until 1973, the year when Germany entered an economic recession and 
recruitment was finally stopped, some 14 million foreign workers came to Germany, of whom 
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 Since the end of the recruitment program in 1973, there were no other better options for immigrants 
than to apply for a refugee status in Germany. Germany had no comprehensive immigration law at 
that time. Consequently in the early 1990 more than 30% of all migrants entering Germany were 
asylum seekers. See more Klusmeyer, D. B., and Papademetriou, D. G. (2009). Immigration Policy in 
the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation. Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, p. 137. 
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 Consequently, the annual number of asylum applications was falling since the end of the 1990s 
from more than 104,000 in 1997 to just over 19,000 in 2007. Only the recent years saw a slight 
increase: 2008 (22,085) and 2009 (27,649). 
See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2010). Azyl in Zahlen 2009. Nuremberg: Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees. 
However, there are no reliable estimates on the number of “illegal’  immigrants who have come to 
Germany. See more on illegal migration in Germany subchapter 4.5.5. 
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 German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN). (2009). Annual Policy 
Report 2009. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, p 11, and p. 108. 
Because of the preferential treatment of Jews one should distinguish them from other asylum seekers. 
Until 2004, the Act on Measures in Aid of Refugees Admitted under Humanitarian Relief Program (the 
so-called Quota Refugee Act) served as the legal basis for admitting Jewish immigrants. Since the 
new Immigration Act came into effect in 2005, admissions have been based on instructions from the 
Ministers and Senators of the Interior of the federal states, in accordance with the Residence Act. 
598
 Between 1955 and 1968, the German government signed recruitment agreements first with Italy 
(1955), Spain and Greece (both 1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia 
(1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). 
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about 3 million stayed and were joined by their families. During the whole period of the 
“guestworker program,” a consensus prevailed both in the government and society that the 
immigration of the recruited labor migrants was merely a temporary episode, and thus there 
was no need to integrate them. They were expected to leave soon.599 In fact, many of these 
“guest immigrants” settled, obtained residence permits, and were joined by their foreign 
spouses. Nowadays many children of these immigrants still live in Germany. 
The second wave of temporary labor programs reemerged soon after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, this time exclusively from Central and Eastern Europe, among them Yugoslavia 
(1988), Hungary (1989), and Poland (1990). In 2002, a total of 374,000 temporary work 
permits were granted, the majority of them for Polish citizens. Guest workers were recruited 
either as trainees, contract workers, or for seasonal work in several categories (e.g. they 
received temporary residence and work permits ranging from three months for seasonal 
workers to a maximum of two years for contract workers, usually for construction projects). 
With the enlargement of the EU in 2004, Germany, like many other “old” EU states, 
introduced exceptional measures restricting access to the labor market for the new EU 
member states until 2011. This restriction is yet another indication of German regulation of 
immigration inflows tested throughout the post war period and used with great discretion. 
 
4.5.2 Immigration Scale 
 
The above mentioned post war immigration inflows and more recent ones have 
shaped the immigration landscape today. As a result of many long-term migrations to 
Germany in the post-war period, many immigrants have raised generations of children, who 
obtained German citizenship, and were no longer visible in traditional statistics on foreigners. 
In an attempt to differentiate these generations from the native German population, the 
German Federal Office for Statistics and Regional Offices for Statistics started collecting data 
on people with a so called “migration background,” a quite controversial categorization, which 
was introduced for the first time in 2005 in the national registration of Microcensus.600 People 
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 Bade, K. J. (2007). Versäumte Integrationschancen und nachholende Integrationspolitik. In K. J. 
Bade and H. Hiesserich (Eds.), (2007). Nachholende Integrationspolitik und Gestaltungsperspektiven 
der Integrationspraxis (pp. 21-95). Göttingen: V&R Unipress. 
The situation of guest workers in Germany can be compared to the current allegedly temporary 
character of migration in Poland. Although the scale of migration in Poland cannot be compared to the 
massive inflows of migrant workers into Germany at the end of the 20th century, a similar way of 
thinking can be noticed among some Polish circles who keep neglecting any needs for immigrant 
integration. Many argue, it is still too early to take integration measures for migrants who are thought 
to be only in the country temporarily. 
600
 People with a migration background belong to one of the following groups: 
- foreigners both born abroad or in Germany, 
- naturalized foreigners,  
- ethnic German repatriates,  
- children with at least one parent who fulfils the above criteria. 
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in Germany who were either born abroad and migrated to Germany or who are German 
residents or naturalized citizens from the second or even third generation of children of 
immigrants, are labeled as having a migration background. 
Consequently, the magnitude of immigration in Germany can be perceived in two 
ways. In a more standardized and common method of registering immigrants in international 
immigration statistics, immigrants who do not have citizenship in the host country are 
counted as foreigners. However, a new method of collecting data on people with a migration 
background has recently become more common in the newest German research as well as 
in international research and statistics on migration and immigrant integration. Both 
approaches are still employed by policy makers, which sometimes causes confusion when 
comparing data from different sources in policy papers and migration reports.601 
Consequently, both methods of counting immigrants, as foreigners and as people with a 
migration background, are meaningful and cited in my research. The level of immigration in 
Germany presented below is through the lens of two sources of recent data.602 
As of the end of August 2009 there were 7.2 million people living in Germany who did 
not have German citizenship, which equates to 8.7% of the population.603 Immigrant youth 
(between 15 and 25 years of age) amount to 889,200. More than half of foreigners were long 
term immigrants with residence permits for more than 15 year and almost two thirds of non-
German citizens came from the countries outside the EU (64.7%) (see graph 10). 
The immigration population is not evenly distributed across the country and differs 
from one federal state to the next. Only 2.8% of the entire foreign population live in the states 
of the former GDR. The largest percentage of foreigners of the whole population is located in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Rühl, S. (2009). Grunddaten der Zuwandererbevölkerung in Deutschland. Nuremberg: Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees, p. 16. 
601
 Among both policy makers and social workers in Germany there is a strong tendency to use the 
rhetoric of people with migration background with reference to estimates about the immigration 
landscape in Germany. For more on the implications and controversies surrounding the use of the 
category “migration background” see the next section on the political and public discourse. 
602
 The statistical data from the most recent sources come from 2009, or if not available from 2008 
statistics: 
- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2010). Migrationsbericht 2008. Berlin: Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees; 
- German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), op. cit.; 
- Destatis, (2010). Ausländische Bevölkerung, Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters. Fachserie 1 
Reihe 2 – 2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt;  
- Destatis, (2010). Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2009. 
Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 – 2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.  
603
 The Central Register on Foreigners records foreigners who are resident in Germany and have 
registered with the alien authorities. This register provides information about citizenship, status under 
residence law, duration of residence, age and marital status. In addition, information is available on 
the overall population that is the German and the foreign population which builds on the population 
census and the data reported by the registration authorities of the Länder (local population registers- 
AZR). These data make it possible to depict the geographical distribution of foreigners. The statistics 
provided in this dissertation are taken from both of the sources, depending on the information 
required. However, it is important to note that the two sources of statistics differ slightly. AZR are 
always lower, since they register only foreigners who reside in Germany longer than 3 months: the 
AZR estimated number of foreigners as of the end 2009 at 6.69 million. 
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Hesse and the metropolitan areas of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg with more than 11%, 
followed by Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, and south-western part of Baden 
Wuertemberg. 
The largest immigrant groups reflect the composition of the former guest workers, as 
noted in the previous section. Turkey, Italy, former Serbia and Montenegro, Poland, Greece, 
and Croatia belong to the top immigration countries (see graph 10). It is worth noting that 20-
30% of immigrants from these countries were born in Germany with the highest percentage 
being those of Turkish descent, at 33%. Only Polish immigrants were the exception with the 
lowest percentage of Poles born in Germany at 3.8%. 
 
Graph 10  Foreign Population in Germany in 2009 
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The register of people with a migration background makes it much easier to track the 
long-term stay of post-war immigrants in Germany, who might have already become 
naturalized by the time of data collection on foreigners. According to the Microcensus 2009, 
nearly one fifth of the total population of Germany (16.0 million) has a migration 
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background.604 Among them there are 2.3 million young people between 15 and 25 years of 
age. 
More than two thirds of the population with a migration background are foreign born, 
while 5.1 million of those with a migration background had no migration experience (they 
were all born in Germany), and these young people today constitute a big share of the youth 
population.605 The percentage of people with migration backgrounds among the youngest 
generation is disproportionately high in German metropolitan areas. In 2008 more than half 
of the children under the age of 15 living in large cities such as Frankfurt, Munich and 
Stuttgart came from a migration background.606 
 
Graph 11  People with a Migration Background in Germany, 2009 
(in thousands) 
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Looking at the whole population of people with a migration background in Germany, 
the major ethnic groups come from the countries of former guest workers, like the majority of 
foreigners. Most of the people with a migration background have their roots in Turkey (3.0 
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 The number of people with a migration background rose from 15.1 million in 2005 to 16.0 million in 
2009. Of the population with a migration background, 8.8 million people are of German nationality (in 
contrast to the 7.2 million foreigners mentioned earlier). In other words 10.8% of the population in 
Germany, who would be considered German citizens in international statistics on migration, have 
migration roots.  
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 Because fewer immigrants are coming to Germany, the growth of this group in recent years has 
mainly contributed to the growth in the percentage of people with a migration background in the 
German population as a whole. People with migration backgrounds are much younger than the whole 
population, the average age being 34.7 in comparison to 45.6 for the rest of the population which 
shows that the young generation of people with a migration background is quite significant in 
Germany. 
606
 Deutsches Institut für Internationale Pädagogische Forschung (DIPF), et al. (2010). Bildung in 
Deutschland 2010. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, p. 18. 
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million), the former Soviet Union (2.9m), the former Yugoslavia (1.5m), and from Poland 
(1.5m). Former guest workers (excluding those from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia) 
amount to 1.7 million, with the most numerous groups those from Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain (see graph 11 and graph 12). A geographical distribution of people with a migration 
background shows the same pattern as the one seen among foreigners: 81.2% live in the 
former West Germany. Hence, it might be concluded that long term migration patterns from 
the last century continue to prevail both in terms of ethnic diversification as well as the 
geographical distribution of immigrants in the country. 
Although the number of immigrant residents still remains quite stable (with a slight 
decrease in 2009 by about 0.5% in comparison to 2008), a decreasing trend in the inflows of 
new immigrants has been noted in recent years (since the mid-1990s).607 In 2008 about 
574,000 immigrant arrivals were recorded, out of which 57.6% were from the EU member 
states. Looking at recent immigration trends it is obvious that some old components of 
immigration flows have started disappearing. The main countries of origin of immigrants in 
2008 were still Poland and Turkey, although in comparison to previous years these numbers 
decreased as well.608 Overall, the year 2008 saw a constant decrease in immigration for the 
purpose of family reunification, particularly of third-country nationals609 as well as in the 
immigration of ethnic German repatriates and their family members.610 72% of all repatriates 
who came to Germany after 1950 still reside there. While about 85,000 ethnic German 
repatriates came to Germany with their family members in 2001, the figure dropped after 10 
years to less than 4,000 people in 2009. A similar decreasing trend can be seen in the 
resettlement of Jews. Only 1008 Jewish immigrants were resettled in 2009, which is less 
than 10% of the total number of Jews coming to Germany in 2004.611 
There are, however, new immigration countries appearing on the horizon, which 
might alter the immigration landscape in Germany in the near future. Since 2007 more 
citizens from the newest EU member states, Romania and Bulgaria, started coming to 
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 In 2006, the lowest immigration numbers were recorded since German reunification, with 
approximately 559,000 foreigners. 
608
 In the case of immigration from Turkey, 2008 saw the lowest number of inflows of Turks since 
1983. Net migration with regard to Poland was negative for the first time in 2008. However, since most 
Polish immigrants are seasonal workers, they are not registered in the German statistical database. 
609
 In 2008, approximately 40,000 people moved to Germany for family reunification in comparison to 
the highest rate, over 85,000, in 2002. One reason for a lower number of such cases might be the 
introduction of compulsory language tests for immigrants who come on the basis of family 
reunification. Since September 2007 foreign spouses of third country nationals who live in Germany 
have to prove a basic knowledge of German before coming to Germany in order to obtain a residence 
permit. It is quite a controversial legislation, as the process of learning German still in the host country 
is often challenging, especially for the candidates from countries with high illiteracy rates or a lack of 
foreign language courses. 
610
 Most of them are from Russian Federation, Kazakhstan Poland, and Romania. 
611
 German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), op. cit., p. 11, and p. 
108. 
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Germany.612 Moreover, more numerous groups of asylum seekers, mostly Iraqi and Afghani 
applicants have been requesting protection in Germany. They account for an increase in all 
applications in 2009 by 25.2% in comparison to 2008 (after steady fall in the years between 
2001 and 2007). The rise in asylum applications has generally contributed to a growth in the 
percentage of the young population in Germany. In fact, more than two thirds of all applicants 
are under 30 years of age.613 
 
Graph 12  People with a Migration Background from Europe in Germany, 2009  
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However, despite an increase in asylum applications, the German asylum system has 
not been very generous. The total protection ratio fell from 37.7% in 2008 to 33.8% in 2009. 
Of all applicants, 1.6% were granted asylum, 26.6% were recognized as refugees under the 
Geneva Convention and 5.6% were given subsidiary protection. The protection ratio in 2009 
was highest for asylum seekers from Iraq (63.9%) and Afghanistan (58.6%), with most of the 
Iraqi asylum seekers being recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention and most 
of the Afghani applicants being granted subsidiary protection. North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg were the states with the highest acceptance quotas 
estimated for 2009.614 
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 The figures are 7% from Romania and 3.5% from Bulgaria in 2008. 
613
 The proportion of youth aged 16-25 amounts to 31.7% of all applicants. 
614
 The geographical distribution of asylum seekers in Germany is made on the basis of the 
acceptance quotas of the individual federal states according to the so-called Königstein Key 
(Königsteiner Schlüssel). The latter is calculated annually on the basis of state revenue and state 
population. 
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Among other regular inflows of immigrants, a positive ratio of immigration inflow has 
been recorded among foreign students, which further adds to the number of immigrant youth 
in Germany. In 2008, there was an increase of 9% in the number of foreign students who 
started their studies in Germany, with a total of 58,350 students.615 
In reference to irregular migration, the knowledge about real numbers and the life 
situation of undocumented immigrants in Germany is rather fragmentary.616 There are a 
couple of rough estimates regarding the overall figures of undocumented immigrants in 
Germany. The most recent ones come from 2004 after the accession of ten new EU member 
states. Accordingly, there are between 500,000 and 1 million irregular foreign residents in the 
country. The estimates of irregular migration are based only on qualitative studies and some 
statistical indicators which can never reflect the actual size of the clandestine residence and 
work. Available numbers on irregular migration point to decreasing inflows of undocumented 
immigrants since 2000.617 Serbia, Turkey, Vietnam, the Russian Federation, and Iraq are the 
top five countries represented in the statistics on irregular migration.618 Additionally, 
qualitative research studies point to irregular immigrants from some Latin-American countries 
(Brazil, Ecuador), Africa (Ghana, Cameroon), and Asia (Philippines), who do not appear in 
official statistics. 
It is worth mentioning however, that the available data does not reflect cases of illegal 
employment. The numbers apply only to illegal residence. Consequently, the number of 
people illegally residing in Germany probably fell significantly following the EU enlargements 
in 2004 and 2007, when a large proportion of undocumented people from countries today 
part of the EU were automatically legalized.619 
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 In 2008 the top ten countries of origin for foreign students both from the EU and third-country 
nationals were the following countries: China, France, US, Spain, Poland, the Russian Federation, 
Italy, Austria, Turkey and India. 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). Berufsbildungsbericht 2010. Bonn: Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research. 
For more on education and integration policies see subchapter 4.5.6. 
616
 There are several paths assumed to be the main irregular entryways into Germany, which again 
cannot be proven by quantitative studies. The use of visa-free entry and then obtaining illegal 
employment, overstaying a visa or irregular entry without documents are considered the most 
common ones. For more on irregular migration see subchapter 4.5.5. 
617
 In total 8,394 decisions on expulsion were made in 2008 (slightly more than in 2007), which points 
to a general decreasing trend. See German National Contact Point for the European Migration 
Network (EMN), op. cit. 
618
 Available data is based on three main numbers, which have fallen since 2001: unauthorized entries 
(from the Federal Police), persons suspected of residing illegally (from Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 
PKS) and asylum applications (from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, BAMF). Only the 
latter indicator saw a slight increase in 2008 and 2009. Although asylum applicants are granted a 
temporary regularization for the time of the asylum procedure, most asylum applications are rejected, 
which it can be assumed results in decisions to stay illegally. 
For more see Kovacheva, V. (2010). Security Challenges and the Composition of Irregular Resident 
Populations in Europe: Overestimating the Young Men? Working Paper 8.  Hamburg: Hamburg 
Institute of International Economics (HWWI), Database on Irregular Migration.  
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 However, they may still work in the shadow economies without a work permit. For more on the 
legal framework for granting a work permit see the next section of this chapter. 
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All available data indicate that the majority of undocumented immigrants are between 
20 and 40 years old.620 It might be assumed that a significant stock of older immigrant youth 
belong to the majority of irregular immigrants in Germany, which have important implications 
for the scope of this research. 
 
4.5.3 Public and Political Discourse 
 
The development of public discourse on immigration and integration in Germany at 
the turn of the 21st century reflects an important shift in the nation state which has 
transformed itself from an unofficial immigrant country into an official one. Firstly, the rhetoric 
of “a reluctant land of immigration,” which receives but does not “want” immigrants used to 
concentrate on the issues of unwanted immigrants who flooded into the country.621 Such a 
self-perception in Germany as “the boat is full” prevailed during a period of massive inflows 
of asylum seekers in the nineties. As German media researchers point out, until 2000 the 
German media coverage fueled negative attitudes towards immigrants.622 
With the political changes in Germany when the red-green coalition government took 
office in 1998, the political discourse on integration became part of a political game between 
the pro-immigration left-wing government (social-democratic SPD and the Green Party) and 
conservative right-wing parties of the opposition (coalition CDU/CSU and the Free 
Democrats FDP). The Independent Commission on Migration, which was set up in 2000 to 
present recommendations for structuring immigration and integration, fostered public 
discourse on facilitating immigrant integration in German society. The Commission 
recommended adopting an integration policy of “Fördern und Fordern” (supporting and 
requiring), now a commonly used concept in political integration discourse, which is based on 
a mutual obligation on the side of both the state and immigrants to work for immigrant 
integration.623 
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 For more, see Cyrus, N. (2008). Undocumented Migration in Germany. Counting the Uncountable: 
Data and Trends across Europe. Country Report – Germany. Clandestino Project. 
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 Martin, P. L. (1994). Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration. In Controlling Immigration: A Global 
Perspective (pp. 189-227). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
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 Kovacheva, V. (2010). Irregular Migration in Germany since the Turn of the Millennium – 
Development, Economic Background and Discourses. Working Paper 5. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute 
of International Economics (HWWI), Database on Irregular Migration, p. 20. 
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 The Independent Commission on Migration (Unabhängige Kommission „Zuwanderung“) unofficially 
called The “Süssmuth Commission” was chaired by former Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth, CDU. 
In its 2001 report the Commission recommended individual integration contracts, obliging the state to 
offer integration courses to new immigrants, and obliging immigrants to participate in these courses as 
well as to pay part of the expenses. This report led to a new immigration law which finally came into 
force in January 2005. 
See Unabhängige Kommission „Zuwanderung.” (2001). Zuwanderung gestalten - Integration 
fördern.(Structuring Integration - Fostering Integration) Bericht der unabhängigen Kommission 
"Zuwanderung,” Berlin, 4. Juli 2001. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern. 
For more on the role of the Commission, see Bosswick W. and Heckmann F., op. cit. 
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The turn of the 21st century was also marked by a heated discussion about the 
principles of German guiding culture (Leitkultur)624 and fear of isolated ethnic communities, 
so called parallel societies, in which immigrant minorities live and work. The guiding culture, 
according to the government opposition parties, was supposed to be the basis for the 
integration of immigrants, which was understood as one-sided assimilation. Learning the 
German language, professing loyalty to the German nation and accepting German legal and 
politician institutions were the core points of the collective identity immigrants should adopt to 
be successfully integrated.625 This ethno-nationalistic rhetoric became the negative buzzword 
of the year626 and is still highly contentious. Leitkultur is contrasted with a more integration 
friendly concept of the German culture as “a work in progress,” which embraces and 
welcomes diversity.627 The battle over the question to what immigrants should actually 
integrate constantly recurs in national integration debates. 
The official self-perception of Germany as an immigration country and the recognition 
of pending needs for immigrant integration in the political and public discourse are 
determined by factors other than political changes in German government at the turn of the 
century. Three public topics, especially interesting within the scope of this paper, have been 
pushing integration debates back and forth from pro integration efforts towards mistrust of 
diversity: demographic changes, security concerns, and educational success of immigrant 
children. 
First, recent concerns about an ageing population have sparked discussions about 
the need for more immigrants. The fact that German nationals, 44.5 years, have the highest 
median age of all EU countries and a declining birthrate are serious arguments for attracting 
more immigrants to ensure future economic and demographic stability in the country.628 The 
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 The term “Leitkultur” was first used in Bassam Tibi’s 1998 book Europa ohne Identität (Europe 
without Identity). This German-Arab sociologist defined the concept in terms of common European 
values and was not referring solely to German culture. It was only in 2000 when Christian-Democratic 
Party politicians (among them Friedrich Merz, then leader of the CDU) started using the concept, 
advocating limits on immigration and immigrants’ duty to assimilate to a core German culture. 
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recent figures on negative net migration worry demographers.629 The successful 
management of immigrant integration may facilitate German competitiveness to get more 
immigrants and change, as Klaus J. Bade puts it, the “not exactly inviting” image of 
Germany.630 Good integration policies are supposed to be a good business card for Germany 
in the European competition for the best talents. In the face of the above mentioned 
demographic challenges, immigrant youth are slowly gaining special attention from a 
shrinking German population. Both politicians and public media have started realizing the 
benefits of investing in the young generation already in the country. 
Demographic changes in Germany however are gradual and have been anticipated 
for decades. Moreover, the problem of an ageing population affects many industrialized 
countries and Germany is merely one of the most striking examples.631 In fact, shocking and 
sobering events, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, provoked much more heated 
integration discussions in German society. Apart from security concerns, dilemmas about 
integration of Muslim immigrants into the Western world have become especially topical in 
Germany, home country to the Hamburg-based terror cell responsible for 9/11 attacks. In 
fact, the 2001 terrorist attacks were a wake up call for Germany to take action to address 
immigrant integration, which had previously been ignored. Currently, immigrants who fail to 
integrate into German guiding culture are supposedly considered a potential threat to 
homeland security. 
Fears of “otherness” and fundamentalism among Muslims, whose population is 
estimated at about 4 million in Germany, coincided with a still ongoing “headscarf dispute.”632 
The dispute was brought about by the court case of a Turkish teacher who was banned from 
wearing a headscarf in 1998 as a violation of the requirement of neutrality by government 
officials. Although, the teacher won her case in 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled 
that the federal states could prevent teachers from wearing headscarves in classes. This 
episode triggered a national debate about the limits of tolerance and integration requirements 
for immigrants. The amount of attention one piece of Muslim attire has gained proves that the 
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debate about the German self-perception as a homogenous country is not yet over, 
especially given the latest fears of Muslim cultural influences in Germany.633 
Finally, the results of the PISA 2000 study proved important news, which focused 
public attention on immigrant integration, this time especially on the integration of immigrant 
youth. The difficulties experienced by first and second generation immigrant children in the 
German education system, revealed by the study, raised the question of possible deficits in 
German immigration and integration policy. This time, the focus of the integration discourse 
shifted from obligations imposed on immigrants towards the actions taken by the receiving 
society in order to secure equal opportunities for disadvantaged immigrant youth in German 
schools. The PISA 2000 study has paved the way for the inclusion of the issues of immigrant 
youth into the political discourse on integration policies of the federal government.634 
In the face of the above mentioned media stimulus and the development of national 
integration policies in the new Immigration Act of 2004 the term “integration” has evolved into 
a catch word for current political and public discussions. As some researchers agree, the 
term “integration” has replaced the former rhetoric of assimilation in Germany, as a more 
political correct expression and a positive symbol in politics.635 In fact, the term “assimilation” 
has connotations with the exclusionist policies of the former Ausländerpolitik in Germany, as 
in all other Western European countries.636 However, it is worth noting that integration 
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courses and programs are not something totally new but have only recently hit the headlines 
as a result of the development of the symbolic politics of integration.637 Indeed, immigrant 
integration has become a symbol of the unresolved challenges faced either in security, 
education or cultural diversity. Similarly, much of the public discourse on immigrant 
integration in Germany has been focused so far on missed opportunities, negative integration 
outcomes, worst case scenarios and deficits in immigrant youth. The dimension of integration 
debates is also rather unpredictable: either the topic “integration” hits the headlines as an 
immediate reaction to new provocations in international or home affairs or disappears for a 
time until the next “shocking” news report emerges. 
Less emotional dialog regarding migration issues and integration challenges has 
been initiated by the lobby organization Council for Migration, active since 1998, and the 
Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), established in 
2008.638 According to the SVR’s most recent annual report, from 2010, the presumed 
integration crisis and the exclusion of immigrant populations do not reflect the realities of 
immigrants’ lives in Germany. Alongside many lingering challenges, there are some success 
stories which have not yet been recognized by German society.639 According to the results of 
SVR’s Integration Barometer, the degree of integration in Germany is satisfactory or even 
good, quite the contrary of prevailing opinion which maintains integration efforts have 
failed.640 As the study confirms, both immigrants and the host society have a positive attitude 
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toward immigration and integration. In fact, despite existing shortcomings in integration 
initiatives on the part of the government, integration and migration have finally entered the 
political mainstream in Germany, which is a milestone for the development of a national 
mode of integration. 
 
4.5.4 National Mode of Integration 
 
As mentioned above, for a long time Germany put off dealing with immigrant 
integration at the national level. The Immigration Act of 2004 should be considered the most 
important “official step” towards the development of a German national mode of integration. 
The Act is the first German immigration law which contains regulations on the integration of 
immigrants at the national level. It has laid the ground for a new political integration 
framework and for new administrative structures responsible for integration at various levels 
of governance. 
“Promoting the integration of foreigners permanently living in Germany” has officially 
become one of the most important tasks of home affairs policy.641 Interestingly enough the 
concept of “integration” was not clearly defined in the Immigration Act 2004. In fact, the Act 
includes few references to integration in its statement on the purpose of the government’s 
integration measures: “to acquaint foreigners with the way of life in the Federal territory to 
such an extent as to enable them to act independently in all aspects of daily life, without the 
assistance or mediation of third parties.”642 This ambivalent definition does not yield a clear 
answer to the question of which role the host society plays in the integration process. 
However, in later official integration documents, reports and summits of the German 
government, successful integration is more often interpreted through the lens of mutual 
cooperation on the part of both the receiving society and the immigrants.643 Moreover, the 
Government’s Nationwide Integration Program 2010 emphasizes that integration measures 
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should be also directed towards the host society which needs to open itself to growing 
cultural diversity.644 
Since the Immigration Act 2004 took effect in January 2005, the national mode of 
integration in Germany has become a highly institutionalized national integration strategy. 
The strategy is based on new competencies on the part of federal institutions as well as 
some key new processes in national integration policies, which will be elaborated below. 
Although Germany is a federal state and the competencies of the federal ministries 
are quite limited, the Federal Government has taken a strong role in coordinating and setting 
standards for integration policies. All legislation on migration, refugee and resettlement 
policies are regulated by federal laws (such as issues of nationality, freedom of movement, 
immigration and emigration, national identity cards, registration issues and foreigners’ rights 
of residence). The only major policy areas which are relevant for immigrant integration and 
which are regulated by the federal states are education, research and police affairs, whereas 
labor market and youth policies are already to a certain extent controlled at the national 
level.645 
With the Immigration Act 2004, a new centralized integration administration was 
established. At the federal institutional level the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), with its 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)646, assumes primary responsibility for 
migration and integration policies. Additionally, in coordination with the BMI, the Federal 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) now regulates legislation on the employment of 
immigrants and their integration into the labor market. Since 2005 the BAMF has undertaken 
the tasks of developing and implementing integration courses for immigrants, promoting 
integration projects, submitting reports to the Federal Government on the promotion of 
integration and developing the Nationwide Integration Program. The Immigration Act 2004 
also promotes the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and 
Integration to the rank of a state minister. The Commission is appointed by the federal 
government as an advisory body for legislative projects on migration and integration and also 
functions as a promoter of the integration of migrants who are permanently resident in 
Germany.647 
As regards integration policies for immigrant youth at the federal level, the Federal 
Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth plays an important role as a 
supporter of a network of more than 400 youth migration services (Jugendmigrationsdienste, 
JMD) across the nation. These services offer counseling and assistance in developing 
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individual integration plans for young immigrants between 12 and 27 during their transition 
from school to work.648 
Federal coordination of local integration policies takes place through twenty-two 
branch BAMF offices, which are spread across all German federal states. Moreover, each 
federal state has its own Commissioner for the Integration of Immigrants 
(Integrationsbeauftragte), who advises the government of a federal state in all matters 
regarding integration and immigration policy. The scope of the activities and initiatives of the 
state commissioner may vary from federal state to federal state. Generally each 
commissioner is responsible for the development and implementation of a so-called 
“integration concept” and initiatives aimed at promoting intercultural understanding at the 
institutional level. The commissioner is also supposed to cooperate with local municipal 
authorities; welfare and charity organizations; institutions, networks and other assemblies 
organized by immigrant groups active in the field of integration. All commissioners are also 
expected to cooperate with the Federal Commissioner for Integration of Immigrants, other 
commissioners in other states of Germany and with local municipal authorities. 
National and state integration policies are intended to be complementary to local 
integration measures at the municipal level. The BAMF local agencies still rely heavily on 
other local organizations for hands-on experience in local integration work. The BAMF offices 
delegate most of their practical work to welfare agencies649 and networks of municipal 
authorities with civil society organizations. 
In fact the real origin of the national mode of integration in Germany has its roots in 
bottom-up organizations at the local level, which are now important stake-holders in top-
down integration policy. In many cases city mayors have played and continue to play a 
leading role in advancing local integration programs, supporting a so-called “intercultural 
opening” of the administration (e.g. recruitment of more staff from a migration background 
and intensified efforts to confront immigrant integration challenges) or strengthening the role 
of the consultative bodies of immigrants in local politics. In fact, non-profit initiatives are 
considered the first considered initiators of local integration policies in Germany (e.g. 
community organizations, worker’s groups, schools, kindergartens, and immigrant 
organizations).650 
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Four significant processes in the development of a German national integration policy 
can be distinguished: the development of integration courses, implementation of the National 
Integration Plan, development of the aforementioned Nationwide Integration Program and 
the establishment of the German Islam Conference. The integration of immigrant youth has 
become one of the main priorities of all four of these official national integration processes as 
the below examples will show.651 
The integration courses represent the core element of the state-run integration 
measures.652 The courses are generally obligatory for all newly arrived immigrants outside of 
the EU or for those immigrants who entered Germany since January 1, 2005 or EU citizens 
who face problems with employment or have special integration needs.653 Those who refuse 
to take the courses can be fined by up to €1,000 or have their social benefits cut. In other 
cases immigrants who wish to attend such a course may sign up if there are sufficient seats 
available in the course. The participants must as a rule pay a symbolic fee of one Euro per 
lesson, which is supposed to thereby increase their motivation.654 The standard course 
consists of a 600 hour language course and a 45 hour orientation course on the German 
legal system, history and culture.655 After passing the final exam, participants are awarded an 
“Integration Course Certificate,” which offers certain advantages, such as easier access to 
unlimited settlement permits or naturalization.656 
Since their introduction in 2005, integration courses have been growing in the number 
of participants and new types of courses have been developed for different target groups: 
youths, women, parents, and the illiterate. The special courses include both language 
                                                                                                                                                                     
underdeveloped. Integration policies at the local level, however, remained divided between numerous 
bodies, usually demonstrating a lack of coordination and communication. See: 
- Heckmann, F. (2010). Recent Developments of Integration Policy in Germany and Europe. Bamberg: 
European Forum for Migration Studies, p. 6; 
- Uhl, K. (2005). Germany. In R. Süssmuth and W. Weidenfeld (Eds.), Managing Integration: the 
European Union's Responsibilities towards Immigrants (pp. 156-160). Washington, DC: Migration 
Policy Institute, p. 156; 
- Bommes, M. (2006), op. cit. 
Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2009). The National 
Integration Plan: Driver of Integration Policy. Berlin: The Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, p. 2. 
651
 Discussing all federal activities in integration policy is beyond the scope of this paper. The next 
sections of this subchapter will give only a brief overview of those integration measures, which are 
considered important for this paper: the integration of immigrant youth. 
652
 Regulated by Integration Course Ordinance (Integrationskursverordnung, IntV) of December 13, 
2004, last amended by the First Ordinance Amending the Integration Course Ordinance dated 5 
December 2007. 
653
 The Labor Agency may oblige those immigrants who receive unemployment benefit II to attend an 
integration course. The local foreign affairs offices determine what equates to “special integration 
needs.” For more detailed regulations see Sections 44 and 44a of the Residence Act. 
654
 Based on an unrecorded interview with the local BAMF agency in Munich. 
655
 “Framework Curriculum for Integration Courses – German as a Second Language” was developed 
by the Goethe Institute in cooperation with Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich (LMU) and 
Friedrich Schiller University in Jena (FSU) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI). 
656
 They are also eligible for an unlimited permit of stay. In addition, the necessary period of residency 
can be reduced from eight to seven years. 
  
185 
lessons, increased to 900 hours, as well as the same 45 hours of orientation lessons, as in a 
standard integration course. The Youth Integration Courses are offered to young immigrants 
up to 27 years of age as part of compulsory education programs in preparation for school 
attendance or for higher or vocational education in Germany. The courses are run in 
cooperation with the aforementioned nationwide youth migration services, which helps to 
adapt BAMF’s integration offering to the local needs of immigrant youth.657 
The 2007 National Integration Plan (NIP) and the annual National Integration 
Summits are key national measures to make integration policy a joint strategy for all involved 
in integration work at federal, state, and local levels. The National Integration Plan consists of 
more than 400 ambitious goals for all integration actors to work towards a sustainable 
integration policy. The federal government, federal states, local authorities, migrant 
organizations, institutions and organizations from science, media, culture, sports, trade and 
industry, trade unions and religious groups are all committed to fulfilling these 400 goals. 
Promoting learning the German language, obtaining an education and qualifications, and 
expanding labor market opportunities are among the ten core issues of the Plan.658 Following 
the NIP’s Progress Report, the cooperation of the federal government both with state actors 
and industry brought about further concrete commitments for an inclusive approach towards 
immigrants in the field of education and employment.659 The NIP of 2007 was developed into 
the future National Action Plan with clearly set-out deadlines for the achievement of the NIP’s 
goals.660 
The work at the NIP has been discussed at four National Integration Summits, which 
formed the basis for the discussion of integration work and the development of the NIP at the 
local levels of states and cities. Beginning in 2006 the Summits were organized at the 
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initiative of the Federal Chancellor (in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010). In addition two Youth 
Integration Summits in 2007 and 2008 offered consultations with youth with a migration 
background about their integration needs and consulted them about Federal Government 
plans for new integration measures. 
The development of the Nationwide Integration Program is the third national 
integration measure which, along with integration courses, is regulated by the Immigration 
Act. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees has been developing the Program since 
2006 on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with individuals who are 
involved in integration work.661 The aim of the integration program was to take stock of the 
existing integration program offered by the federal government, states, local authorities, and 
other providers and to make recommendations and establish strategies for successful 
integration in line with the NIP. Key areas for immigrant youth integration into the labor 
market were analyzed in depth and evaluated: language support and vocational language 
training, integration into the workplace, education, and recognition of qualifications. The 
Nationwide Integration Program builds on the subjects and preliminary work of the NIP and 
assist in its further implementation. Along with the NIP, core recommendations of the 
Integration Program are supposed to form the basis for the future integration action plan.662 
Finally, national integration measures have recently started to focus on a single group 
of immigrants, Muslims, as a significant population inside Germany. The German Islam 
Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, DIK), headed by the Federal Ministry of Internal 
Affairs has become a formalized platform for dialog between the State and Muslims. The 
conference, brought into being in 2006, gathers federal, regional and local authorities and 
Muslim organizations which aim to foster social cohesion, sound inter-religious relations and 
the integration of Muslims in Germany.663 The first phase of the DIK, from 2006-2009, 
consisted in the work of thematic groups, which developed recommendations for future 
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action in four areas: values, religious issues, the economy and the media, and security and 
fundamentalist Muslim movements. Quite significantly, the integration of immigrant youth 
became an important point of discussion during third plenary session in 2008, a fact which 
unfortunately has not gained much media attention. The working group “The Economy and 
the Media as Bridge-builders” focused especially on the area of school education. As the 
working group concluded, some special integration programs were for schools needed, such 
as intercultural trainings for the staff in kindergartens and pre-schools, improved cooperation 
between parents with migration backgrounds and schools, and additional language teaching 
parallel to everyday schooling.664 
The integration strategy in Germany is highly institutionalized and, especially within 
the DIK, it seems to be rather politicized. However, besides the above-mentioned platform for 
discussions, summits and strategies for future integration actions, there is also financial 
support for local integration practitioners. Both federal and EU Funds allocated for Germany 
are administered and distributed by BAMF.665 
The latest news, information about all of the national integration measures mentioned 
above together with the main integration project contactors are updated on the BAMF’s 
website in the section “Welcome to Germany.” The section is a central national information 
platform on integration, containing practical tips for newly arrived immigrants and integration 
stakeholders in Germany.666 The portal makes the national mode of integration more 
accessible for all who do not deal with integration policies on a daily basis. However, the 
website without doubt presents the subject of immigrant integration in Germany in a much 
more positive light than is generally reported by the media.667 
Much as the theoretical concepts about integration are present in German national 
integration reports and research analysis, another important issue has begun to occupy the 
attention of policy makers, namely how best to measure the success of immigrant 
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integration, starting from the structural integration into German society.668 The recent process 
of developing indicators for nationwide integration monitoring constitutes an attempt to 
standardize integration monitoring across federal states. The indicators may also facilitate 
establishing future standards for monitoring the integration of immigrant youth in all federal 
states.669 
The attempts to monitor integration in Germany challenge the aforementioned 
questions about the national understanding of integration: is immigrant integration 
measurable at all and can integration finally be completed? In light of recent developments in 
the national mode of integration in Germany some migration experts warn that integration 
should not be formalized in terms of a program which immigrants and the host society are 
obliged to complete. Integration measures should be offered as a form of counseling, rather 
than imposed duties.670 However, recent plans for integration contracts prove how 
controversial national mode still is. The contracts, which both newly arrived or established 
immigrants will have to sign, are supposed to include binding statements about expectations 
imposed on immigrants (such as improving German language skills, obtaining education and 
job training) and commitments on the part of German public institutions to provide 
information and assistance for immigrants. Such steps would impose new national sanctions 
on immigration and national controls on immigrants’ lives in German society.671 In this light, 
the participation of immigrant youth in local integration programs might also be negatively 
impacted. In fact, as anecdotal evidence already shows, youth tend to stay away from 
anything obligatory during the often difficult transitional process from childhood to adulthood. 
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In general, the various integration measures planned at the federal level discussed 
thus far comprise an apparently comprehensive national integration strategy, gradually 
impacting more fields of immigrants’ lives, including immigrant integration into the labor 
market. On the other hand, the planned integration measures sometimes remain abstract 
and are not coordinated among different actors at different levels of the German government 
(federal, state, and commune). As the SVR notes, even at the federal level there is a lot of 
overlapping of competencies and competition, for example between BAMF and the Federal 
Commissioner, which might hinder concrete actions.672 According to Bade, recognition of 
integration challenges in Germany is already widespread across the country, but concrete 
solutions are still lacking.673 
 
4.5.5 Legal Status 
 
Like in all other EU countries, including Poland, citizens of the European Economic 
Area (EU-EEA intra migrants674) enjoy special privileges, including the freedom of movement, 
the right to residence, and access to education and the labor market.675 In fact, EU 
citizenship has opened the gates to legality and offered new integration opportunities in 
Germany for many immigrants from the new EU member states previously residing illegally 
there. Their structural integration is first of all much easier than that of the third country 
nationals, who need to meet visa requirements and to obtain residence permits. Like 
Germans, EU-EEA intra migrants need only register their stay with the residents’ registration 
office in their place of residence, without applying for a residence title. In order to stay longer 
than ninety days all other foreign citizens in Germany are usually required to have one of the 
following residence permits: either a Schengen visa for shorter stays, visas issued for 
specific purposes (e.g. education, gainful employment), temporary residence permits or an 
unlimited settlement permit. Also persons who enter Germany without a visa must apply for a 
residence permit for stays of more than three months or stays leading to gainful 
employment.676 
There are a few special provisions in the legal framework for granting a residence title 
for immigrant youth from the third countries. Immigrant youth, like other foreigners, can be 
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issued temporary residence permits for the purposes specified in the Act of Residence: 
education or training, gainful employment, humanitarian, political or family reasons. Until the 
age of 18 children of immigrants are permitted to join their parents entering Germany. If their 
parents already reside in the country, children are permitted to join their parents until the age 
of 16. Only in some cases, when a so called “favorable integration prognosis for the child” 
exists, for instance because the child possesses good knowledge of German, or in case of 
hardship, is entry also possible after that until the age of 18.677 
In order to obtain a permanent settlement permit a young immigrant like other 
immigrants must have held a residence temporary permit for five years and meet some 
additional requirements, including having a secure income, no criminal record and adequate 
knowledge of the German language. A foreigner who has been granted asylum or whose 
deportation has been deferred initially receives a residence permit limited to three years, and 
then an unlimited settlement permit if the preconditions for asylum continue to apply. Asylum 
seekers are granted a permission to remain (a so-called Aufenthaltsgestattung) which is 
renewed for six months, as long as the asylum proceedings continue. Immigrants who are 
obliged to leave Germany, but who cannot leave and the authorities cannot deport for legal 
and/or practical reasons, can be granted an exceptional leave to remain (a so-called 
temporary suspension of deportation: Duldung). However, the permission to remain and a 
temporary suspension of deportation are not residence titles, and they restrict immigrants’ 
access to economic, social and integration benefits (e.g. integration courses). By the same 
token immigrant youth with one of these statuses have less chance for labor market 
integration than their peers. They enjoy only “secondary" access to the German job-
market.678 Moreover self-employment is not permitted for this group of immigrants. In fact, 
the status of suspended deportation may last many years, which leads to a chain stay of 
deportation (a so-called Kettenduldung) when immigrants are in limbo and not allowed to 
function in the German host society as legal residents.679 
As of August 2008 one option for immigrants with an exceptional leave to remain was 
to apply for a residence permit on the basis of time-limited provisions for old cases.680 
Immigrants could be granted a residence permit if, on July 1, 2007, they had been 
continuously residing legally or with an exceptional leave to remain in Germany for eight 
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years or six years if one or more minor children lived in the household. Additionally, they had 
to demonstrate adequate knowledge of spoken German and have committed no criminal 
offence. The residence permit issued under these provisions was initially limited until 
December 31, 2009 but it could be prolonged if the foreigners could independently make a 
living largely from their own gainful employment. Many applicants, however, were only 
granted “a residence permit on trial,” as they were not self-sufficient, in the wake of the 
economic crisis. The provisions could be extended until December 2011, if the holder of a 
provisional residence permit had held at least a part-time job for the past six months, as of 
December 31, 2009 or would have had a part-time job for six months by January 31, 2010.681 
The same rules applied to immigrant youth with “a residence permit on trial,” who had 
successfully completed school or vocational training by the end of 2009 or were still in 
training (as this suggests that they are well integrated and will be able to ensure their 
livelihoods in the future). For children whose parents did not succeed in fulfilling the 
requirements of the legal regulations governing old cases and who had to leave the country, 
issuing a separate residence permit was possible. In such cases children had to have been 
14 years of age as of July 1, 2007, been unmarried, well-integrated or, in the case of minors, 
personal custody had to have been guaranteed.682 In addition to these provisions, well-
integrated unmarried adult children of foreigners whose deportation has been suspended for 
several years can apply for a residence permit even if they have not lived in Germany for the 
required eight years. 
The route to obtaining German nationality is much longer. As a general rule, 
immigrants have the right to become naturalized after eight years of lawful residence in 
Germany. Participation in an integration course can, however, shorten the naturalization 
period to seven or even six years in the case of a “special integration performance” on the 
part of the applicant. The waiting time for naturalization can be even shorter for the spouses 
of German citizens. 
Additionally, the reform of the nationality law introduced elements of the jus soli 
principle: obtaining citizenship in the country of birth. As a result, children born after 
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December 31, 1999 automatically enjoy German nationality683 if one of their parents have 
been residing in Germany for eight years and had had an unlimited residence permit before 
the child was born. Obviously, immigrant children born in Germany of parents who are 
temporarily suspended from deportation cannot benefit from these provisions. 
There is an ongoing debate among researchers, policy analysts and immigrants 
themselves about whether naturalization is an ultimate goal of integration or just one of the 
tools to full participation in the German host society.684 In terms of social and economic rights 
the permanent settlement permits offer practically everything which German citizens have, so 
that more and more immigrants opt for the status of denizen, that is the person is not a 
citizen of Poland but enjoys nearly all rights of citizenship with the exception of the right to 
vote.685 According to statistics and surveys, interest in naturalization has been dramatically 
decreasing over the last few years. Only some 96,100 foreigners were naturalized in 
Germany in the course of 2009, much less than the average for the years 2000 to 2007: 
140,000 naturalizations per year. Moreover, only 1.95% of those entitled to apply for 
naturalization took the opportunity to do so in 2009. Dual citizenship in Germany is generally 
not allowed, hence the necessity of giving up their own nationality might be one of the 
reasons for immigrants’ low interest in applying for German citizenship.686 Additionally, the 
obligatory naturalization test, introduced in 2008, might not be encouraging either. 
The decision to renounce their own citizenship might be especially difficult for 
immigrant youth with dual citizenship who are supposed to decide by the age of 23 at the 
latest whether they want to have a German passport or have the same one as their 
immigrant parents, following the “option provision.” If they do not make a declaration in favor 
of German citizenship before the age of 23 and thereby renounce their second citizenship, 
they automatically lose their German one, unless the authorities decide on its retention. On 
the other hand, naturalization is still the most popular option among the younger generation 
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of immigrants. According to statistical data from Microcensus 2006, over 85% of naturalized 
citizens were under the age of 45.687 
The arguments I present here as to why naturalization is crucial for the integrating 
immigrant youth into the German labor market are only educated guesses. First, the right of 
full political participation in the German electoral process, which is only guaranteed by 
German citizenship, can make a young person a respectful, fully-fledged shareholder in 
German democracy, in the eyes of the host society, and in particular in the eyes of a future 
employer. Secondly, German citizenship removes bureaucratic hurdles during the job 
application process for immigrants. Finally, there is a political consensus that German 
citizenship is a sign of identification with German society, which might also facilitate 
integration into the German workforce.688 
The positive impact that German citizenship has on labor market integration has also 
been empirically demonstrated. According to Holger Seibert’s report, German citizens with 
migration backgrounds have better results in their education and labor market performance 
than immigrants with the same origins who have not obtained German passports.689 
Microcensus 2008 shows that naturalized youth aged 20-25 with a migration background are 
more often found to study at German universities than those without German citizenship.690 
Despite these figures, naturalization is still not considered the most important factor for 
successful immigrant integration, as the SVR’s Integration Barometer proves.691 Indeed, a 
decreasing number of naturalizations suggests the lack of an awareness of the impact of 
naturalization on immigrant integration into the labor market. 
Undocumented immigrants face little chance for legalizing their status in the near 
future. As the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees officially admits, “Germany has not 
taken any measures to legalize the residence of illegal immigrants. It continues to regard 
legalization critically, not least against the background of the recent economic crisis.”692 
Moreover, the issue of undocumented immigrants has become a strongly tabooed social and 
political problem. In fact, not only the undocumented but also those who know the 
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undocumented may feel they are endangered, a result of the controversial restrictive Federal 
legislation regulations of the German Residential Law, which remained unchanged in the 
2004 Immigration Act. Consequently, Germany is still the only European country in which not 
only is staying in the country illegally a criminal actor, but providing assistance to those in the 
country illegally is also considered a criminal act. Similarly, public service employees who fail 
to report an undocumented person to the Aliens Office are liable to prosecution.693 Only 
recently have certain public sectors, such as health care and social work services, been 
exempted from the obligation to provide such information. In addition, those providing help 
and support to the undocumented on a professional or a voluntary basis do not face any 
legal consequences for not reporting an undocumented person.694 Consequently, support 
organizations for immigrant youth can also legally counsel undocumented immigrants and 
plan their integration paths which are much more difficult than for those with residence titles. 
The recent reforms mentioned above are promising changes in the common federal practice 
to criminalize undocumented immigrants, which has been the norm thus far.695 
In fact, the challenges to local communities and public service in dealing with people 
sans papiers remained unrecognized by the federal government for a long time and were left 
in the hands of local authorities. Fortunately, as a result of intense information campaigns 
from NGOs and church organizations, along with a great increase in research on the rights of 
the undocumented in the last few years, the issue of undocumented immigrants has finally 
garnered political attention at the national level.696 Three basic topics have been the focus of 
public and political debates so far: access to health care, education and economic 
exploitation of irregular immigrants. The last two issues, especially, are of great importance 
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for the potential integration of immigrant youth into the labor market.697 Indeed, pro-
immigration researchers and activists consider undocumented children and immigrant youth 
the most vulnerable group among the sans papiers. Consequently, these groups should not 
be held responsible for their illegal status, mostly determined by parents’ decisions to stay 
illegally in Germany. 
Despite the new developments in legislation on the undocumented, the status of 
undocumented immigrant youth remains grave and is still not recognized in the legal 
framework for immigrant integration.698 Discrepancies between various interpretations of the 
federal law regarding the undocumented are still quite common at state and commune 
administrative levels. Different practices across Germany still generate an atmosphere of 
fear and uncertainty around questions of which integration measures for undocumented 
youth are still legal and which are criminal. 
Generally, the legal status of immigrant youth is of great importance for ensuring their 
smooth integration into the labor market. Theoretically, acquisition of German citizenship 
should be the most desired status for all immigrants. Practically, naturalization is still not as 
significant among immigrants as German politicians and the host society could wish them to 
be. 
 
4.5.6 Education 
 
The field of education has been the most contentious and emotional issue regarding 
the integration of immigrant youth in the first decade of 21st century in Germany. At the end 
of 2001, with the release of the PISA results, Germany for the first time ranked toward the 
bottom in the international ranking of the competencies and skills in reading, math, and 
science in comparative international education surveys. Particularly worrying was the high 
correlation between students’ migration backgrounds and students’ performance and 
students’ school careers.699 In the following years new comparative international data pointed 
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to even more shocking results. The PISA 2003 study showed that the educational 
opportunities for immigrants decreased the longer they had been in the country: the 
achievement gap between the “second generation” pupils (with at least one parent born 
outside the country) and non-immigrant pupils was much greater than it had been with the 
“first generation” (born outside of Germany). Since the “PISA Shock,” the education system 
in Germany has been continuously under close scrutiny, subject to debates about the need 
for reform. The early distribution of pupils into different school systems was recognized as a 
hindrance to integration and the full development of the intellectual potential of immigrant 
children.700 As a consequence of the unsettling results from international surveys, students 
with a migration background have begun to be recognized as the most vulnerable 
disadvantaged group and a primary challenge for integration policies.701 Moreover, the issue 
of managing diversity and promoting multiculturalism in education has gained much attention 
from policy makers.702 The results of the SVR’s Integration Barometer show that both the 
native as well as the immigrant population still have a largely negative perception of the 
performance of schools in ethnically diverse settings.703 
In fact, the decentralization of the education system in Germany is not conducive to 
quick educational changes across all 16 federal states. Because of the German federal 
structure of governance, debates about the reform of the education system take place at 
both Länder and Federal levels. According to the Constitution (Grundgesetz), education is 
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subject to the supervisor of the state Ministries of Education, Cultural Affairs and Science as 
well as the regional authorities (Bezirksregierung/Oberschulamt) and the lower-level school 
supervisory authorities (Schulamt). Usually the primary and the lower secondary school 
sectors and special need school sectors are under the supervision of the local governments, 
whereas all other types of schools – vocational education, training schools, and the tertiary 
education sector – are governed by the Ministry. Individual states cooperate with each other 
through the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the 
States of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (KMK), which determines core 
curricula, programs for teacher training and teacher recruitment and decides on national 
recommendations, agreements and joint reports.704 The Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF) and the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BiBB) are the main 
agencies influencing Vocational Education and Training.705 
Full time education is compulsory in Germany for children from the ages of 5 or 6 until 
the ages of 15 or 16 (depending on the State). If a person attends a part-time education 
program, his/her schooling is obligatory until the age of 18 (including vocational training). 
Compulsory schooling is free of charge. Since the year 1964 compulsory education includes 
all children of immigrants with a residence permit.706 In most of the federal states compulsory 
education has also been extended to children of refugees with temporary residence permits 
and to undocumented immigrant children (in Bavaria since 2005).707 In three states (Hesse, 
Baden-Württemberg und Saarland as of May 2008) undocumented children still have only 
”the right to schooling” (Schulbesuchsrecht) upon the application of their parents, which does 
not guarantee schooling in cases of organizational or administrative hurdles. Moreover, 
because teachers from public schools are still obliged to report to immigration authorities 
once they have been informed about the presence of an undocumented student at school, 
school attendance of undocumented children is still risky for teachers, students and their 
parents. According to the latest estimates, in 2008 about 30,000 children of age for 
compulsory education were without regular status.708 It might only be assumed that for 
reasons of security many children of undocumented parents probably do not attend schools, 
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despite their right to an education. Only recently has the federal government agreed to take 
measures to counteract the absurdities and inconsistencies across states in the education of 
children of undocumented immigrants. The results of the preliminary plans to make 
education accessible to everybody until the age of 18 regardless of legal status have yet to 
be seen.709 
Germany’s three-tiered school system is one of the basic concerns among advocates 
for education reform (see graph 13). The system divides children quite early (usually at the 
age of 10 depending on the state) into different types of secondary schools based upon their 
school performance, teachers’ recommendations or the decisions of the children’s parents.710 
Generally, all children are in school together only for the first four years of schooling. The 
primary school may be preceded by kindergarten, which the federal government considers 
an important integration tool for immigrant children at a very early stage of educational and 
language development.711 
After completing primary school pupils are streamed into Secondary Level 1 schools: 
Secondary General Schools (Hauptschulen), intermediate Schools (Realschulen) or 
Grammar Schools (Gymnasien). These three educational paths are also offered at 
comprehensive integrated schools (Gesamtschulen), which are considered an alternative 
structure to the divisive tripartite system.712 Special Needs Schools (Sonderschulen) are 
aimed at children who cannot attend classes in mainstream schools, either because of 
learning difficulties or a particular disability. 
 
                                                     
709
 Plans for reform at the federal level started with Schäuble’s Initiative in 2008. Then German 
Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, called for legalising school education for undocumented 
children and by the same token respecting the human right of each child to free access to education. 
The initiative was followed by a Bundestag discussion in 2009 and active campaigns of social 
organizations, which resulted in a draft bill by the SPD parliamentary group. See Deutscher 
Bundestag. (2009). Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Aufenthaltsgesetzes.  Gesetzentwurf 
der Fraktion der SPD. Bundestag Printed Paper 17/56.  
In March 2010 Maria Böhmer officially announced pending reforms. Such recommendations have 
been already made among others in the official report Federal Government Commissioner for 
Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2010), op. cit., p. 67. At the time of writing, however, the 
necessary changes have not been approved.  
710
 Admission to one of the school types at secondary level depends on the regulations of a given 
State.  
711
  Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). Berufsbildungsbericht 2010. Bonn: Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research. 
712
 In some German federal states the Secondary General School does not exist and pupils attend a 
comprehensive school which does not select students by aptitude. Comprehensive schools have also 
seen their fair share of controversies. There are those who praise the development of comprehensive 
schools in Germany as a measure against unfair early streaming according to ability. Opponents 
emphasize either that comprehensive schools actually replicate the same streaming system or that 
German comprehensive schools in fact ranked below other German schools (e.g. in PISA 2003). 
- Ehmke, T., Hohensee, F., Heidemeier, H., and Prenzel, M. (2004). Familiäre Lebensverhältnisse, 
Bildungsbeteiligung und Kompetenzerwerb. In M. Prenzel, et al. (Eds.), PISA 2003. Der Bildungsstand 
der Jugendlichen in Deutschland - Ergebnisse des zweiten internationalen Vergleichs (pp. 225-253). 
Münster: Waxmann. 
- Leffers, J (2008, January 3). Gesamtschule folgenlos - Bildung wird vererbt. Spiegel Online. 
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Graph 13  Education System in Germany. 
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Courses of education at lower secondary level are expected to prepare pupils for 
either vocational education or university entrance qualifications achieved at the upper 
secondary level. People without a formal higher education entrance qualification, but 
boasting an excellent vocational track record, have almost no chance to enroll in university 
courses. 
Secondary General Schools provide basic general education, focusing on practical 
subjects, which prepare students for vocational education and training within a dual 
system.713 This dual system of vocational education and training is comprised of two 
components: in-company training and part-time vocational schooling. The trainees work 
three or four days a week at the company and spend up to two days at the vocational school 
(Berufsschule). Those who do not succeed in finding an apprenticeship, usually land in the 
transition system. There are numerous programs with training courses running under the 
transition system, which is supposed to help young people find future training positions or a 
job. 714 
Graduates from Secondary General Schools can also enroll in full-time vocational 
schools (Berufshochschulen), which prepare pupils for a specific occupation. They introduce 
                                                     
713
 The vocational training in the dual system is possible for 350 professions. The training companies 
and the proper provision of training are monitored by the relevant autonomous industrial bodies 
(Chambers of Commerce). Education in the dual system lasts from 2 to 3.5 years, depending on the 
particular occupation. 
714
 The most established programs are as follows: 
- Pre-vocational Training Year (Berufsvorbereitungsjahr - BVJ): The BVJ is a one-year 
course of training usually offered by schools as a full-time program and designed to prepare 
young people for the demands of vocational training. A clear majority of participants do 
not have a secondary general school certificate. However, this can be acquired during the 
course of the BVJ, thus improving the holder’s prospects on the market for training 
places. 
- Company-based Introductory Training (Einstiegsqualifizierung - EQ) 
consists of a prevocational work experience placement in a company lasting from 6 to 12 months. 
Young people have the opportunity to obtain partial qualifications while training for an occupation via 
qualification modules (Qualifizierungsbausteine) and specific vocational modules 
(berufsfeldspezifische Module). On the basis of a testimonial from the company, the 
successfully acquired entry-level qualification is certified by the Competent Body (e.g. Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce, Craft Chambers). 
- Prevocational Training Measures are provided by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit - BA) (berufsvorbereitende Bildungsmaßnahmen - BvB) under Section 61 of the 
Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB III). The target is young people and young adults who have not undergone 
initial vocational training, are not yet 25 and have completed their compulsory general education. 
- Foundation Basic Vocational Training Year (Berufsgrundbildungsjahr - BGJ) is basic vocational 
education which can be completed either in the form of a year at school full-time or in a cooperative 
form at a company and in a school. Successful completion of the BGJ can be credited as the first year 
of vocational training in the training occupations assigned to the relevant occupational field.  
In the BGJ, students receive basic education in a specific occupational field  
(e.g. metalworking techniques, electrical engineering, business and administration). 
- Vocational Qualification Prospects (Perspektive Berufsabschluss) is a program of the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), which was launched at the beginning of 2008 to improve 
vocational training opportunities for disadvantaged young people and to offer second-chance 
qualifications for young adults. The intention of the program is to optimize the regional transition 
management system to support young people requiring special support. 
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students to one or more occupations, provide them with partial vocational training in one or 
more training occupations, or guide them through to a vocational training qualification in one 
occupation. A Secondary General School Leaving Certificate is the only possible general 
education qualification after the 9th grade. As the lowest possible qualification, the General 
Secondary School is primarily chosen by disadvantaged children including immigrant 
students. Intermediate Schools (grades 5-10) offer pupils a more extensive general 
education, ending with Mittlerer Abschluss, and by the same token more opportunities to 
enroll in upper secondary level courses that lead to further vocational education or higher 
education entrance qualifications. Grammar School covers both lower and upper secondary 
level and ends with an Abitur as the exit exam, which qualifies the student for university. 
Gymnasium is considered an elite type of schooling, with a focus on academic achievements 
aimed at gaining entrance to higher education.715 A direct transition from vocational 
education and training to higher education, the so-called third chance education (Dritter 
Bildungsweg), although theoretically feasible, is practically impossible.716 Consequently, an 
immigrant youth’s future on the German labor market is determined early by his/her choice of 
one of the tertiary system schools. 
A migration background in Germany is usually associated with unequal opportunities 
and a lower level of education. Indeed, looking at the statistics on German education and the 
vocational training system, many inequalities between pupils with and without migration 
backgrounds can be observed. The scale of the problem is not small. In 2008 there were 
over 800,000 foreign pupils, which made up 8.9% of all pupils in Germany.717 Students with a 
migration background accounted for 3.03 million students in all types of secondary education 
(of this group 2.2 million were born in Germany and had no personal migration 
experience).718  
The PISA studies from 2000 and 2003 studies as well as the most recent detailed 
German education statistics from 2008 demonstrate that immigrant youth are distributed 
unevenly among several types of schools and are greatly underrepresented among pupils 
who qualify to enter higher education (see graph 14).719 ( 
                                                     
715
 For the list of available schools in the tertiary education sector, see Graph 13. 
716
 Since 1990, all Länder have introduced various measures for entry into higher 
education for applicants who possess full vocational qualifications but lack the higher education 
qualification. However, third chance education (Dritter Bildungsweg) only accounts for 1% of all 
university admissions and 2% of all admissions to universities of applied sciences. 
See Authoring Group Educational Reporting. (2008). Education Report 2008. Summary of Important 
Results. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, p. 17. 
717
 Destatis. (2009). Fachserie 11, Reihe 1 Schuljahr 2008/2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches 
Bundesamt, p.7. 
718
 Destatis. (2010). Sonderauswertung Mikrozensus 2008, Tabelle 3. Wiesbaden: Statistisches 
Bundesamt. 
719
 Data on the distribution of pupils with migration background is still missing. The available statistics 
differentiate between Germans and foreigners, but they are supposed to be updated in 2011, see 
Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit., p. 137. 
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Graph 14  Foreign and German Students in 2008/2009 
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In 2008 only every sixth immigrant pupil was in Gymnasium (13.4%) in comparison to more 
than every fourth German (28.7%). Immigrants were more often found in Secondary General 
School: 20% of all immigrant pupils in comparison to only 8.6% of all German ones.720 
Another worrying tendency can be observed in Special Needs Schools. Foreign children tend 
to be overrepresented in this school type, with a 14.4% share of the entire school population. 
It is worth mentioning that the above trends are not the same for all immigrants, and there 
are many differences in education performance among different migrant groups based on 
country of origin.721 However, not all statistical data on education differentiates between 
people of different migration backgrounds, and the overall performance of immigrant pupils 
turns out rather sobering with a drop-out rate of 14.2% (in comparison to 1.8% among 
Germans) in 2008. In the face of recent international UNESCO recommendations for equal 
education opportunities, such ratings have further increased public attention on the 
segregated German education system, which neglects immigrant kids and consequently the 
problems of their future integration into the labor market.722 
                                                     
720
 Bad notes, teachers’ recommendations and the decisions of immigrant parents, who are not always 
informed well enough about the German education system often lead immigrant pupils to choose 
Secondary General School rather than one of the alternatives. As the NIP reports, discriminatory 
practices against immigrant pupils have been reported among some teachers who do not grade 
equally and do not provide similar recommendations to pupils with or without a migration background, 
whose school performance is similar. See Bundesregierung. (2007), op. cit., p. 63. 
721
 In fact, certain nationalities outperform German students, for more details see 
Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, (2010), op. cit., p. 93. 
722
 See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (UNESCO). (2009). Policy 
Guidelines on Inclusion in Education. Paris: UNESCO.  
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In vocational education and training (VET) the gap between people with and without a 
migration background is also significant.723 Youths with migration backgrounds are less 
successful in obtaining an apprenticeship training position, although every year there are 
more training positions available. Only 23% of youth with migration backgrounds do not 
experience any difficulties entering the German dual system of vocational education (in 
comparison to 35% of students without a migration background).724 According to the 2008 
report of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the VET enrolment rate of 
young foreigners in 2008 was significantly lower than that of young Germans (32.2% in 
comparison to 68.2%).725 No data is available to confirm whether or not the above statistics 
include immigrants without residence permits. Since access to VET is dependent on legal 
registration, getting any kind of vocational training legally is almost impossible for 
undocumented adolescents, except for those immigrant youth whose deportation has been 
suspended.726 
In 2009, 14.0% of people with a migration background had no secondary graduation 
certificate and 42.8% were without any vocational qualifications (in comparison to people 
without a migration background: 1,8% and 19,2% respectively).727 Consequently, more and 
more immigrant children are at risk of end up in the questionable transition system. There is 
also a relatively low percentage of university graduates among people with a migration 
background living in Germany.728 
On the other hand, despite tuition fees which have been recently introduced in some 
German federal states, the tertiary education sector in Germany remains quite attractive for 
                                                     
723
 The number of apprenticeship positions corresponds to the demand in different regions. Many 
companies complain in certain regions, mostly in the eastern Germany that the vacant training 
positions cannot be filled. In western Germany, where most people with a migration background live, 
fewer vacant positions are available. Immigrant youth usually lose the competition against native 
Germans. In fact, not only are good graduation notes and certificates important, but good connections 
and network-building are also key to successful applications. For more on current challenges and the 
prognosis for vacant apprenticeship positions on the German labor Market see Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research. (2010). Berufsbildungsbericht 2010. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research, p. 21. 
724
 Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration. (2010), op. cit., p. 
111.  
725
 The VET enrolment rate is derived by calculating the number of young people with a new training 
contract as a percentage of young people in the same age group in the resident population. See 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). Berufsbildungsbericht 2010. Bonn: Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research, p. 29. 
726
 See Anderson P.(2011), op. cit. For the exceptions for young foreigners whose deportation has 
been suspended, see subchapter 4.5.7. 
727
 Destatis. (2010). Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2009. 
Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 – 2009, op. cit. 
728
 In 2008 the share of new entrants to the transition system among immigrant students accounted for 
88% without and 67% with a Secondary General School certificate (in comparison to 75% and 48% of 
German students). The overall percentage of people with a migration background among students 
aged 20-30 is significantly lower than that for the  population without a migration background (17% in 
comparison to 23%). See Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). Berufsbildungsbericht 
2010. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
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foreign students.729 In 2008 there was an increase in the number of foreign students who 
began their studies in Germany. Over 58,000 first year foreign students were reported, 9% 
more than in the previous year.730 
As a result of the unequal access to education in Germany, the federal government 
has taken up a couple of important measures in an attempt at counteracting the worrying 
trends, trying to follow the ambitious aims of the National Integration Plan of 2007.731 A few 
federal integration measures directly target young immigrants, while other federal youth 
integration programs are aimed at all youth groups, regardless of their migration 
backgrounds.732 
Fostering German language competencies at very early childhood stages has 
become one of the top priorities on the current federal integration agenda.733 According to 
various studies, the existing preparatory German language courses for children prior to 
starting schools are not very successful, as immigrant children still lag behind German 
children in language competencies.734 Therefore, the federal government is planning to 
provide support for early childhood language classes even in daycare centers. For older 
children of immigrants special transitory classes of intensive German language courses will 
prepare them to attend regular classes if bilingual education is not available. 
Recently the German government has launched supportive actions for language 
diversity at schools. In a joint statement with other migration organizations, Integration as a 
Chance – Together for More Equality, KMK officially expressed support for the inclusion of 
the languages of origin of immigrant children in everyday school life and required all federal 
states to promote language diversity.735 Other federal commitments involve the recruitment of 
                                                     
729
 Most take out of foreign students (about 80%) come from Europe and their percentage at German 
universities varies from 1% to 5% depending on the state. The tuition fees for universities also vary 
across the states from very low to more than € 600 Euro per semester. As a recent study shows, 
tuition fees have not influenced the number of new foreign students in Germany. 
For more on tuition in higher education in Germany see Hetze, P. and Winde, M. (2010). 
Auswirkungen von Studiengebühren. Essen: Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft.  
730
 Destatis. (2010). Mikrozensus 2008, Hochschulstatistik. Bonn: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
731
 See the priorities of the national integration policy in the field of education in the National 
Integration Plan: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. (2008). Nationaler Integrationsplan - 
Vertiefte Bilanzierung. Bonn: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, p. 64. 
732
 In the paper I only cite a couple of measures which are considered the most important for the 
scope of my research. It is worth mentioning that of the measures discussed/agreed upon during my 
field research in the years 2007 and 2008 only some have been implemented so far, but were already 
in planning or the subject of political debate at both national and state levels. 
733
 See Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration.(2010), op. cit. 
734
 The pre-school courses have been introduced in almost all federal states within the last couple of 
years but neither the language test, nor course curricula or the duration of course have so far been 
standardized across the country. The courses last form 6 to 18 months depending on the state. 
For more on the debate, see Bade, K. J., et al. (2010), op. cit., pp. 147-149; 
Spiewak, M. (2010, October 22). Zu kurz, zu spät, zu abstrakt. Zeit Online. 
735
 Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs. (2007). Integration als 
Chance – gemeinsam für mehr Chancengerechtigkeit (Integration as a Chance – Together for More 
Equality).  
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migrants as kindergarten teachers and the extension of legal provisions for the employment 
of “consular teachers” for immigrant children’s native-language lessons at schools.736 
Education authorities and researchers are still undecided on the extent to which education in 
an immigrant’s native language facilitates or delays German language acquisition by 
immigrant youth. Consequently, at the state level different practices and education policies 
exist either for or against bilingual education.737 
Another set of federal commitments to education reform deals with improving access 
to VET for immigrant youth and smoothing their transition to the labor market.738 More 
programs are being introduced at the federal level to support all young people, and 
particularly youth with migrant backgrounds who are “suspended” between school and 
vocational training in the transition system. However, these measures have also begun to 
receive criticism for the lack of proper monitoring mechanisms and for not really being 
effective. According to some critical reports the transition system measures leave youth in 
limbo. As the statistics suggest, the training opportunities in the transition programs lead to 
the improvement of individual skills, but not necessarily to actually signing a VET contract or 
achieving the final VET qualifications. Moreover, 20% to 30% of those who have participated 
in the transition system programs failed to find an apprenticeship over a period of three 
years. This is usually a problem of newly arrived young immigrants who still lack an 
understanding of the German education system. Consequently, the existing transition system 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Bilingual education in Germany, like in five other EU countries (Belgium, France, Spain, Luxembourg, 
and Slovenia), is also supported by bilateral agreements between Germany and some of the 
immigrants’ countries of origin (Croatia, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey), which 
were concluded at the state level. 
Under these agreements, both countries have input in the decision-making process regarding the 
teaching of the languages of origin. 
See Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA P9 Eurydice). (2009).  
Integrating Immigrant Children into Schools in Europe: Measures to Foster Communication with 
Immigrant Families and Heritage Language Teaching for Immigrant Children. Brussels: Education, 
Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. 
736Consular teachers have been employed by the former recruitment countries. Supervised by the 
responsible consular representative in Germany, they give language lessons at German schools.  
737
 For example, Bavaria has its own bilingual education system for immigrant pupils who are not able 
to attend regular classes. They are taught in bilingual classes until their knowledge of the German 
language has reached an appropriate level. In North Rhine Westphalia, on the other hand, bilingual 
education at the primary level has been extended to all types of school at the secondary level as a 
useful tool for the general development of intercultural competences among all students rather than 
merely a rudimentary measure for immigrants. At the same time accumulation of pupils of the same 
migration background in the same classes is strongly discouraged, so that immigrant children are 
exposed to languages other than their native ones. In contrast, CDU politicians from Rheinwald want 
to stop bilingual classes and substitute them with obligatory German preparatory classes. See 
Verpflichtende Sprachtests statt Muttersprachlicher Unterricht (2010, September 14). MIGAZIN. 
For more on the German and European debate on bilingualism see: 
- Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit., pp. 147-148; 
- Heckmann, F. (2008). Education and Migration, Strategies for Integrating Migrant Children in 
European Schools and Societies. Brussels: Nesse, pp. 68-69.  
738
 Innovation Circle on Vocational Education and Training at BMBF. (2007). Ten Guidelines for the 
Modernization and Structural Improvement of Vocational Education and Training. Berlin: Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research. 
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might more accurate be described as “a system on hold,” which leaves youth in limbo rather 
than guarantees them a smooth transition to future gainful employment.739 Therefore, the 
training courses may develop so-called “subsidized careers,” which lead to dependence on 
the transition system rather than independent future work.740 As the representatives of 
employers point out, those who remain “on hold” in the transition system are often 
stigmatized already for taking part in remedial courses. The trade unions also fear that the 
regular VET will be replaced by funded training schemes, with more and more young people 
enrolling in such schemes instead of signing a contract for VET and training for an 
occupation. As the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) argues, the 
system should be further streamlined by coordinating measures between the federal 
government, the state, and the business sector.741 
Although federal measures have not counteracted the failure of the transition system 
programs, they try to set standards and foster cross-sector cooperation among the VET 
initiatives. Since 2004, Federal Government and Trade Associations have been working 
together in the National Pact for Career Training and Skilled Manpower Development 
(Nationaler Pakt für Ausbildung und Fachkräftenachwuchs in Deutschland) to increase the 
number of new training positions and to recruit new training companies. In a new plan for the 
years 2010-2014 the Pact partners have committed themselves to increasing the percentage 
of youth with a migration background in vocational training and to intensify and structure 
supporting actions for youth with a migration background nationwide.742 Campaigns focusing 
on the dual education system for both immigrant and ethnic economies, which are regarded 
as potential key providers of traineeships for immigrants in the future, are an example of 
such supportive actions. The Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees 
and Integration has recently joined the Pact, taking up some promising responsibilities as a 
Pact partner. According to the Pact’s new plan, the Ministry will continue to regularly 
organize VET conferences for Pact partners, migration organizations, schools and state 
Ministries of Integration, as well as additional annual parents’ conferences with parents’ 
                                                     
739
 As an SVR report points out the transitional system serves as a metaphorical “parking lot” for 
students („Mehr Parkplatz als Übergang“) see Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit., pp. 161-162. 
740Opinion on the Draft Report on Vocational Education and Training for the Year 2009 submitted by 
the group of employees' representatives on the Board. In Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
(2010). Report on Vocational Education and Training for the Year 2009. Berlin: Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research, pp. 56-63. 
741
 Opinion on the Draft Report on Vocational Education and Training for the Year 2009 submitted by 
the BIBB Board, In Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2009), op. cit., pp. 50-52. 
742
 Pact partners include: Federal Employment Agency, Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), 
German Association of the Self-employed (BFB), German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) 
e.V, Federation of German Industries (BDI), German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH), Federal 
Association of German Employers (BDA), and two new partners as of 2010: The Federal Government 
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration and KMK. 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. (2010). Nationaler Pakt für Ausbildung und 
Fachkräftenachwuchs in Deutschland 2010 – 2014. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology. 
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associations. Moreover, the new Pact will continue work in currently existing projects, like the 
Jobstarter program, which offers funding for additional traineeships, opportunities for second-
chance training and the retaking of vocational qualifications (e.g. in the Jobstarter Connect 
subprogram) and supports companies in providing vocational training (e.g. within KAUSA 
subprogram for ethnic entrepreneurs).743 
The new developments in the federal VET strategy are promising steps towards 
improving the situation of immigrant youth in the transition period from school to work. 
Looking at the demographic changes in German society, the federal measures are not 
surprising. It is definitely in the interest of the German economy and training system to focus 
on the numerous groups of immigrant youth who will determine future labor market 
conditions in the country.744 
It remains to be seen whether or to what extent the above-mentioned federal 
initiatives will help youth with a migration background to enhance their qualifications. 
Qualifications are key preconditions for successful integration into the certificate oriented 
labor market in Germany. In fact, migrants with foreign certificates still face many challenges 
in getting their qualifications recognized. According to the SVR Report, more than half a 
million people who have migrated to Germany with foreign certificates are either 
overqualified for the job positions they hold, have taken up career re-training to get adjusted 
to the German labor market or have remained jobless. Recognition procedures for the 
younger generation of immigrants do not give cause for optimism, either. In 2008 63.9% of 
young foreigners aged 15-35 who had migrated to Germany received their school graduation 
and vocational training certificates abroad. Of them only 15.3% had their qualifications 
recognized as equivalent to German ones. In contrast, claims for the recognition of the 
qualifications of 36.6% people in the same age group were either rejected, still being 
processed or for some reason the claims had not yet been filed.745 
This low rate of success in gaining recognition of qualifications obtained abroad 
results from the lack of a transparent and standardized system of evaluation of foreign 
certificates across German states. The Central Office for Foreign Education in the Secretariat 
of KMK is the only national body responsible for information and advice on recognition 
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 At the time of writing the Pact has just been prolonged for the second time and the new plan signed 
for the next four years (on 26 October 2010). The new information campaign “Migrants and Vocation,” 
which aims to win more immigrants and ethnic economies for the dual training system, is supposed to 
build on Jobstarter. For more information see the website: http://www.jobstarter.de/ 
744
 This interest was publicly expressed by the Federal Government. Entering the National Pact when 
Maria Böhmer publicly emphasized that support for immigrant youth in vocational training was a top 
priority not only for federal integration measures but also for the future success of the German 
business sector. See Bundesregierung. (2010, October 26). Integrationsbeauftragte neues 
Vollmitglied des Ausbildungspaktes. Press Release 395.   
For more on German demographics see subchapter 4.5.2. 
745
 30% of this group considered the recognition of qualification “not important” while 29% did not 
provide any information. Based on my own calculations of the results of Microcensus 2008 from 
Destatis. (2010). Mikrozensus 2008, Hochschulstatistik. Bonn: Statistisches Bundesamt.  
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procedures for all federal states. However, the office does not have any rights to recognize 
foreign qualifications but merely to assess them. Decision-making is left to the federal states 
and various local authorities. Local schools decide on the equivalence of the education path 
of immigrant students with the German education system, whereas universities are 
responsible for the recognition of foreign graduation certificates, which entitle to study at their 
institutions.746 The competent authorities, responsible for recognition of foreign certificates 
which entitle the bearers to further vocational education or work in certain professions, are 
dispersed into hundreds of units across the federal states (e.g. ministries, universities, 
courts, etc.). However, not all immigrants can make a legal claim for individual recognition of 
their professional qualifications. A formal recognition procedure depends on the profession or 
type of education certificate, the location of the future employer in Germany and, finally, on 
the country in which the qualifications have been obtained. Only qualifications in 
approximately 60 regulated professions undergo formal recognition procedures in the 
competent authorities in the state where the employment will be taken.747 Recognition of 
other professions are left to the discretion of employers. Following implementation of the EU 
Directive (2005/36/EC) in 2007, EU residents in Germany have the right to recognition of 
their qualifications in professions obtained in other EU member states but regulated in 
Germany, provided that the level of their qualifications match the German standard. As in the 
case of Poland, the rules also apply to those non-EU citizens whose qualifications have 
already been recognized in another EU member state, if they have practiced their occupation 
at least three years in that country.748 
Simplification of the complicated process of recognition of foreign qualifications in 
Germany has recently become one of the top priorities of federal integration policies. The 
BAMF criticized that the existing “recognition jungle” results not only from the lack of 
transparency in the recognition process, but also from the lack of networking and of 
comparable information services.749 The Federal Government has taken already some 
measures toward improving the system, although no concrete changes have been 
implemented thus far. The information and counseling Network IQ (Integration durch 
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 e.g. certificates equivalent with secondary level certificates in Germany or Bachelor certificates. 
Germany has signed bilateral agreements on the equivalence of education with many countries. For 
an overview of all agreements see Database Anabin (Anerkennung und Bewertung ausländischer 
Bildungsnachweis): Home page: http://www.anabin.de/ 
747
 Access to or practice of regulated professions is conditional upon the possession of certain fixed 
professional qualifications, regulated by law or administrative provision (e.g. doctors or lawyers). 
Paradoxically, decisions about the recognition of the same qualifications in regulated professions may 
differ from state to state. 
748
 For more information on mutual recognition within the EU see subchapter 4.4.3. 
749
 For more on the recent discussion of the main federal stakeholders and of the shortcomings of the 
recognition system in Germany see 
- Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Soziales. (2009). Brain-Waste - Anerkennung gestalten, 
Dokumentation: Fachtagung. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. 
- Englmann, B. and Müller, M. (2007). Brain Waste. Die Anerkennung von ausländischen 
Qualifikationen in Deutschland. Augsburg: Tür an Tür Integrationsprojekte. 
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Qualifizierung)750 and the Qualification Initiative for Germany751 are examples of some 
promising nationwide federal actions, which have contributed to the federal proposal for 
future reforms. In December 2009 the federal cabinet approved a draft paper by the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research that introduces a simple procedure to assess and 
recognize the qualifications of immigrants to Germany. Since the new law is planned to come 
into force in 2011, the Ministry of Integration has already begun calling for administrative and 
legal adjustments at the state level.752 
 
4.5.7 Labor Market 
 
The implementation of current and future reforms in education, vocational training and 
the recognition of foreign qualifications should increase the size of the workforce with 
qualifications in Germany. Making good use of the potential of skilled immigrant workers and 
academics currently residing in or coming to Germany are among the priorities of the new 
federal advisory body “Alliance for Labor.” Established in 2009, the body is tasked with 
monitoring and analyzing labor market changes and issuing recommendations on steering 
labor migration, while recognizing at the same time challenges of immigrant youth.753 
In general, the access to the German labor market is easier for certain immigrant 
youth groups. EU-EEA intra migrants or immigrants with an unlimited settlement permit in 
Germany are not required to have a work permit to take up gainful employment or start their 
own businesses. Exceptions still exist for citizens from the new EU member states. Due to 
the EU transitional rules relating to the freedom of movement for workers, nationals from the 
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 The IQ Network was initiated by the German Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) to 
coordinate measures for integration of migrants into the labor market. The network consists of six focal 
centers acting nationwide which are organized into thematic study groups. One working area, 
Recognition of Foreign Qualifications, has been assigned to Bavarian MigraNet (with one of its sister 
offices in Munich, see more in subchapter 5.2.3). For more information see the home page 
http://www.intqua.de/ 
751
 The Federal Government along with the federal states initiated the Qualification Initiative during the 
Qualification Summit in Dresden on October 22, 2009, which aims to enhance the educational 
success of people regardless of their social or migration background in accordance with the National 
Integration Plan. The improvement of the recognition system is one of the objectives of the initiative. 
See Conference of Heads of Government of the Länder. (2008). Getting Ahead through Education. 
The Qualification Initiative for Germany. Education Summit Dresden, 22 October. 
752
 Among other postulates, all immigrants should have a legal claim on an individual recognition 
procedure for qualifications in both regulated and non-regulated professions obtained abroad. If the 
qualifications are not equivalent to German requirements, a partial recognition should be granted. In 
this case the Federal Government should support offers of supplementary specialized education. 
See  Bundesregierung. (2009, December 9). Eckpunkte zur Verbesserung der Feststellung und 
Anerkennung von im Ausland erworbenen beruflichen Qualifikationen und Berufsabschlüssen. 
For calls for action at the level of the federal state see Bundesregierung. (2010, October19). 
Staatsministerin Böhmer: "Bundesländer müssen schnellstmöglichst eigene gesetzliche Regelungen 
zur Anerkennung ausländischer Abschlüsse auf den Weg bringen." Press Release 389.  
753
 The Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration is one of the 
Alliance’s consultants. Other members include representatives of the responsible federal ministries 
and high-ranking representatives of the federal states, trade unions, employers’ associations, craft 
associations, chambers of commerce, business and academia. 
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ten new EU member states are still required to apply for admission to the German labor 
market, unless exceptional rules apply.754 Despite the transitional rules, the new EU nationals 
enjoy already a “community preference” over nationals of third countries while applying for a 
work permit. They are also allowed to become self-employed and to run their own 
businesses in Germany.755 
In order to work legally in Germany, all immigrants who do not belong to one of the 
groups mentioned above have to apply for a residence title (either a visa or residence permit) 
with a work permit in their respective foreigners’ office or consulates. Both asylum seekers, 
people with a permission to remain or a temporary suspension of deportation are eligible for 
a work permit only after one year of residence in Germany. 
Third country nationals with no temporary residence permit in Germany face 
numerous restrictions in gaining access to the German labor market. The recruitment ban on 
foreign labor, in force since 1973, generally suspends the issuance of work permits to non- 
and low-skilled foreign workers, although certain exemptions are common, e.g. for certain 
professional groups based on statutory ordinance, in accordance with labor market needs 
and bilateral agreements.756 In most cases applicants for a work permit still need the 
approval of the Federal Employment Agency before the Aliens Office or consulate can issue 
a residence title with a work permit.757 The complicated approval procedure also involves the 
applicants’ future employers, who have to agree with the Employment Agency on the 
recruitment procedure for a given post offered to a foreigner in order to conduct job market 
investigation, known as a “priority examination.” This priory examination seeks to find other 
possible candidates who have priority over third country nationals for employment in 
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 These restriction on the free access to the German labor market remain in force until 30 April 2011 
for countries which joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (EU-8: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary), and until 31 December 2012 for the countries which 
joined the EU on 1 January 2007 (EU-2: Bulgaria, Romania). 
755
 Section 39 subsection 6 of the Residence Act. 
According to a recent analysis more lower skilled EU migrant are attracted to Germany than highly 
skilled workers. For an analysis of the results of German labor market policies towards the EU 
accessions countries see Brenke, K., Karl, Y., Yuksel, M., and Zimmermann, K. F. (2009). The Effects 
of EU Enlargement and the Temporary Measures on the German Labor Market. In M. Kahanec and K. 
F. Zimmermann (Eds.), EU Labor Markets after Post-Enlargement Migration (pp. 111-129). Berlin: 
Springer. 
756
 It is beyond the scope of the paper to discuss all regulations on the employment of migrant workers 
in Germany. I focus primarily on currently residing foreigners and those provisions which obviously 
directly affect the status of immigrant youth temporarily residing in Germany during their transition 
from school to work. 
For detailed information on all rules impacting the employment of migrant workers, see Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit. (2009). Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland. Merkblatt 7.  Nürnberg: 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit.  
757
 New regulations have replaced the dual approval procedure from the Foreigners Act of 1990. The 
Residence Act consolidated the two permits, the residence permit and the work permit, into a single 
permit, providing for one stop government, as it were. Before 2005 with the dual approval procedure, 
immigrant workers had to separately apply for residence (residence authorization) and for access to 
the labor market (work permit). See Parusel, B. and Schneider, J. (2010). Satisfying Labor Demand 
through Migration in Germany. Research Study in the Framework of the European Migration Network 
(EMN). Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
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Germany. Such a procedure is quite time consuming and requires much involvement on the 
part of the employer of a potential immigrant worker.758 
With the Immigration Act 2004 and the new ordinances of 2009, certain immigrants 
with a residence permit can enjoy exemptions from priority examinations or even the 
involvement of the Federal Employment Agency. Immigrant youth residing in Germany can 
benefit from such exemptions, provided that they have come to Germany prior to turning 18 
and possess a valid residence permit. In such cases no approval from the Employment 
Agency for getting a work permit for an apprenticeship is necessary. In addition, no approval 
is required for obtaining a work permit for gainful employment if immigrants have graduated 
from German general secondary education schools or have taken part in vocational 
education.759 
Skilled immigrants and their family members benefit from a privileged situation when 
looking for opportunities for a legal work.760 Immigrant graduates from German university or 
other institutions of higher education, as well as immigrants who have completed a 
recognized vocational training in Germany, are allowed to take up employment without a 
priority examination. Moreover, immigrant youth with higher qualifications earned in Germany 
have the right to stay in the country after graduation for one year to look for employment 
without a priority examination.761 In addition, qualified immigrant youth whose deportation has 
been temporarily suspended may be granted a residence permit for the purpose of 
employment without a priority examination, if they are well integrated and possess 
occupational qualifications.762 If they want to commence a work training program, they can 
also apply for a work permit without a priority examination.763 
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 In the labor market review, the Federal Employment Agency has to decide whether the applicant's 
employment would have "negative consequences on the labor market" (section 39 of the Residence 
Act). In the priority test it must be ascertained whether any job applicants with labor market priority are 
available for the job. 
759
 Section 3a of Ordinance on Official Procedures Enabling Resident Foreigners to Take Up 
Employment (2004, November 22). BGBl. I S. 2934. 
760
 The Immigration Act 2004 does not fully uphold the ban on recruitment of third country nationals 
from 1973 in Germany. The Act greatly eases access to the labor market for high skilled immigrant 
workers, granting them a permanent residence permit. Moreover, third country nationals may be 
granted a residence permit to start their own business if the activity is likely to have a positive impact 
on the economy of the region.  
Two further ordinances extend provisions for immigrants: the Employment Ordinance and the 
Ordinance on official Procedures. These ordinances enable resident foreigners to take up employment 
in the Labor Migration Control Act, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. Among other things, 
the Act makes it easier for university graduates from new EU member states and third countries and 
for graduates of German schools abroad to emigrate to Germany, improves labor market access for 
family members of highly-qualified immigrants and grants well-qualified persons temporary suspension 
of deportation.  
761
 Third country nationals’ residence permits that were issued for study purposes can be extended for 
up to one year to enable them to seek employment in the occupations which match their qualifications. 
See Parusel, B. and Schneider, J., op. cit. 
762
 Section 18a of the Residence Act. 
763
 Section 10 of the Ordinance on Official Procedures Enabling Resident Foreigners to Take Up 
Employment. As of January 1,2009 young foreigners whose deportation has been suspended and 
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The new regulations in 2009 also made it easier for third country nationals to become 
self-employed. Now immigrant entrepreneurs need to invest €250,000 (only one fourth of the 
previously required sum) and create five jobs to prove that their activity is likely to have a 
positive impact on the economy.764 
The slow liberalization of German labor market with regard to foreigners has resulted 
in slightly greater ethnic diversification. In recent years there has been a steady growth in 
self-employed foreigners on the German labor market. In 2009 their number reached 
360,000, 11,000 more than in the previous year. The younger generation of immigrants in 
particular have contributed to the recent growth.765 In 2009 the proportion of the young 
population with a migration background constituted more than one sixth of the entire 
population of the gainfully employed over 15 years old (of the 41% without German 
citizenship: 17% EU nationals and 23% third country nationals).766 
Despite recent reforms, the legal framework for admission of immigrants into the labor 
market in Germany still does not guarantee equal chances for getting a job for immigrant 
youth irrespective of national group. Third country nationals are almost twice as likely to be 
unemployed as those from the EU member states (18% in comparison to 9.5% of 
employable people over 15 in 2009).767 Many discrepancies in the labor force still exist 
between people with and without a migration background.768 According to Microcensus 2009 
data, people with a migration background can more often be found in the lower skilled 
occupations, while they very rarely take up positions as civil servants or clerks. In fact, the 
overall proportion of people with a migration background who remain without work is much 
                                                                                                                                                                     
who have resided in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany more than one year can be 
issued a work permit for vocational training in one of the accredited professions without a labor market 
test (according to section 11 of the Ordinance on Official Procedures Enabling Resident Foreigners to 
Take Up Employment). They can also receive easier access to education (according to section 10 of 
the Ordinance on the Admission of Newly-Arrived Foreigners for the Purpose of Taking up 
Employment) 
764
 Parusel, B., and Schneider, J., op. cit. 
765
 In 2009 there were 78,000 self-employed foreigners aged 25-35, 6,000 more than in the previous 
year. See  Destatis. (2010). Ausländische Bevölkerung, Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters. 
Fachserie 1 Reihe 2 – 2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
Self-employment has become an attractive option especially for those EU nationals who still do not 
enjoy the full freedom of movement of workers within the EU.  
For more on the structure of foreign entrepreneurships see the study: 
Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. (2010). Wirtschaftliche 
Selbstständigkeit als Integrationsstrategie. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für 
Integration und Migration. 
766
 Although in general the percentage of people with a migration background employed in Germany 
has risen since 2005, the percentage of foreigners among them decreased by 10%: 51% in 2008 in 
comparison to 41% in 2009. See Federal Government Commission for Migration, Refugees and 
Integration. (2010), op. cit., p. 158. 
767
 These are my own calculations based on Microcensus Data 2009. Destatis. (2010). Bevölkerung 
mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2009. Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 – 2009. 
Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
768
 The overall success of immigrants with German qualifications depends on the immigrants’ country 
of origin. As recent studies show, there are many disparities among national groups, e.g. between 
Turkish people and citizens from the EU countries. See Bade, K. J., (2010), op. cit., pp. 167- 168.  
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greater than those without a migration background at all levels of qualification (see graph 
15).769 
Similarly worrisome trends can be observed among the younger population. OECD 
international comparative data on the unemployment rate of young people in 2007 put 
Germany at one of the lowest rankings in labor market participation of children of immigrants 
in the national labor market770 (see graph 6). The same OECD study also shows that labor 
market segmentation exists already at very early stages of immigrants’ careers. Children of 
immigrants take up more job positions in the lower skilled sector and remain 
underrepresented among clerks and professionals (see graph 16). 
 
Graph 15  The Proportion of Unemployed in 2008 in the age group 25-65 in Germany 
 by levels of qualification (in %) 
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 In 2008 8% of all qualified workforce with migration background in the age group 25-65 with 
university certificates remained jobless, in comparison to only 2% without migration background in the 
same category.  
See Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). Berufsbildungsbericht 2010. Bonn: Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research, p. 198 and Graph 15. 
770
 Every fifth young immigrant and almost every fourth native born child of immigrants aged 20-29 
who is not in education anymore was unemployed (in comparison to only 15% children of natives).  
See OECD international studies, on the participation of native and immigrant children into national 
labor markets:  
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010), op. cit.,pp. 32-33.  
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Graph 16 Employment of Children of Natives and Children of Immigrants aged 20-29 and not in   
Education, Divided by Occupation, 2007 
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The huge gap between unemployment rates for immigrant and native workers has 
existed for decades and is not a result of the recent economic crisis. In fact, the crisis has 
largely affected big companies rather than individual workers. Between 2008 and 2009 
unemployment rates for Germans increased by only 0.4 percentage point (from 7.1% in 2008 
to 7.5% in 2009), whereas the figure for immigrants is 0.8 points (from 15.7% in 2008 to 
16.5% in 2009). It is believed that the government’s stimulus package program, which was 
introduced in February 2009, secured many jobs in large companies across the country.771 
Nevertheless, the highest increases in jobless rates usually affected the medium and high-
skilled sector, where migrant workers are generally underrepresented. In contrast to the 
majority of the EU countries, the recovery of the German economy from the recession began 
earlier and has gone faster. Consequently, the government has not taken up any specific 
crises-driven measures to protect native workers against immigrant residents.772 
One of the core reasons for the long-lasting marginalization of immigrants in the 
workforce might be discrimination against immigrants on the part of German employers, 
which however has not been statistically demonstrated. The recent integration survey (SVR’s 
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 Industries and firms in recession were able to take part in the government’s “short-time work 
scheme.” In the program the working hours and salaries of full-time employees had to be cut. The 
government, in turn, took over the social security payments of those with reduced salaries. 
772
 The extension of transitional status for the 10 new EU member states was the only restriction which 
the government introduced towards potential labor workers newcomers.  
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Integration Barometer) among people with and without a migration background points at a 
surprisingly high share of people with a migration background (almost 70%) who claimed 
they had not experienced any discrimination while working or looking for work. On the other 
hand, the study suggests that immigrants (mostly people from Turkey and Latin America, 
Asia and Africa) more often feel discriminated against during their job search in comparison 
to natives. It remains to be seen whether the new federal projects and campaigns, such as 
XENOS or Vielfalt als Chance (Diversity as an Opportunity), which seek to promote 
intercultural openness and to fight against discrimination in the workplace, will improve the 
situation on the local labor market.773 
Generally, Germany which is well-known in Europe for its generous social welfare 
system, offers many supporting programs for those who are unemployed. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to elaborate on all of the numerous labor market integration measures 
which are supported by various offices of the Federal government. These measures 
indirectly target immigrants who legally reside in Germany.774 Some important integration 
measures for youth, which directly seek to aid people with a migration background (such as 
Youth Migration Services or BAMF Youth Integration Courses) have already been mentioned 
in the section on education. 
Two other federal initiatives, both of them supported within the European Union 
European Social Fund and open for all local organizations nationwide, support immigrants on 
the German labor market. The first of the federal projects is a recently launched BAMF’s 
program German for Professional Purposes of the Federal Ministry for Migration, which 
combines business-related German lessons, specialist teaching, internships and work 
placements and company visits. The program targets people who have a migration 
background and are available for work, i.e. who have registered with the Employment Office. 
Immigrant youth are also able to benefit from the program if they have completed compulsory 
education.775 
The other one, The Federal ESF Program on Labor-market Support for Migrants with 
a Refugee Background and Refugees with Access to the Labor Market is run by the Federal 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS). The program finances networks which focus on 
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 For a comprehensive summary of the federal measures against discrimination taken within the 
National Integration Plan, see Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, (2008), op. cit. 
774
 For an overview see the catalog of best federal practices see Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training, GPC - Good Practice Center run by the Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training see GPC home page: http://www.good-practice.de 
775
 The courses, which started in 2009 are supported by the European Social Fund (ESF) and 
organized by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Those entitled to participate are 
recipients of the unemployment benefit under Book Three of the Social Code, of unemployment 
benefit II under Book Two of the Social Code, as well as persons registered as job-seekers. In 
addition, employees can apply for the participation if teaching vocation-related German-language skills 
is necessary in order to retain their employability. For more information see Federal Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs. (n.d). Assistance for Migrants. 
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advising and training and job placement for immigrants, who possess a “residence permit on 
trial” or immigrants who have the status of temporary suspended deportation or with (at least) 
secondary access to the labor market. The projects in the established networks have thus far 
helped many young refugees to start schooling or obtain a training contract.776 
A labor shortage in the ageing German population, negative net migration, and 
inequalities in education and labor market outcomes between natives and immigrant 
constitute the principal challenges for the governments’ plans to improve management of 
immigrant integration into the labor market.777 According to the recent projections, and in 
contrast to popular opinion, not only the high skilled sector is in need of a foreign labor force. 
In fact a large number of vacancies are still registered among jobs for unskilled workers, 
something which is often overlooked in reports on the future need for a qualified labor force 
and plans for new recruitment strategies.778 
 
In conclusion, some improvements can be noted in the federal measures for 
immigrant integration since 2006, when the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 
assessed labor market integration in Germany as in the middle on the scale of best practices 
in Europe.779 With its integration policies and federal programs in the areas of education and 
the labor market, the federal government has finally started to focus on the potentials of 
immigrants living in the country and to try to more effectively match the needs of young 
immigrant job seekers with current job vacancies. It remains to be seen what outcomes of 
the recent reforms will be and how local organizations and policies will profit from these new 
                                                     
776Labor market integration of people with a temporary suspension of deportation stay had been 
neglected or even rejected by policy-makers for a long time and only gained acceptance recently. The 
first integration measures which give tolerated persons with many years of residence the prospect for 
obtaining a right to stay were implemented in 2006. The Federal ESF Program, which has been 
running since 2008 and has been recently extended until the year 2014, is a significant step by the 
Federal Government towards finally recognizing the potentials of this long-neglected immigrant group. 
Thanks to the program young immigrants now have prospects for residence and increasing their 
chances of finding long-term employment. 
Fiebiger, K., et al. (Eds.). (2009). Interim Report: Milestones and Stumbling Block. Munich: National 
Thematic Network on Asylum Seekers. 
For more on the legal situation of immigrant youth with a residence permit on trial or immigrants who 
have temporary suspended deportation status see subchapter 4.5.5. 
777
 Interview with Ursula Von der Leyen: 
El-Sharif, Y., Nelles, R., and Wittrock, P. (2010, October 20). Von der Leyen startet das Feilschen um 
Hartz IV. Spiegel Online. 
778
 The national number of high skilled vacancies in the first quarter of 2010 showed the largest 
shortages in corporate management consulting and controlling, auditors and IT specialists, office jobs 
and clerks, and engineers. See Parusel, B. and Schneider, J., op. cit. 
779
 The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), a project developed by the EU think tank Migration 
Policy Group evaluated and compared what governments were doing to promote the integration of 
migrants in all EU member states and several non-EU countries. It used over 100 policy indicators to 
present immigrants’ opportunities to integrate into the European societies. According to MIPEX report 
Germany's labor market integration measures would achieve best practice if migrants had equal 
access as EU nationals to vocational training and study grants; and if the state helped them get their 
skills and foreign qualifications recognized fairly, quickly and cheaply. See Migrant Integration Policy 
Index (MIPEX). Home page: http://www.integrationindex.eu/ 
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developments. The case study analysis of Munich will show whether a rapidly developing 
and quite promising federal integration strategy for integrating immigrant youth into the labor 
market can practically contribute to local integration management in German cities. 
 
4.6 Poland 
 
Poland is a very interesting case study in migration research: a country with one of 
the lowest immigration rates in the EU, little governmental interest in national immigration 
issues and with a surprisingly wide scope of research on migration trends done by either long 
established or newly emerging migration research centers and bottom-up projects.780 
The net migration of a given country is usually a deciding factor for its classification as 
an emigration, transit or immigration country. Poland has long been considered an 
emigration country with a large number of Polish emigrants both in Europe and in other parts 
of the world. Polish emigration was and still is a focus of global attention with current 
speculation and projections on Polish return migration during the world economic crisis. 
However, a slow change in the discourse in migration research on Poland has taken place 
since its EU accession in 2004, when Poland began to be perceived as a potential gateway 
to the Western World and thus a transit country. 
Poland is now considered a country in a period of transition from emigration to 
immigration, a country in an “embryonic stage,” in which emigration is declining and 
“nucleuses of immigrant settlements are being set up.”781 Current research on Polish 
immigration and integration policies therefore emphasizes the onset of social change which 
may bring about changes in migration patterns and concrete action at the national and local 
levels of integration policymaking. The fact that Poland is in the early stages of development 
its integration policy makes it a platform for negotiations among researchers, historians and 
political and civil society actors, regarding the future of Polish integration and migration flows. 
On the other hand, debates continue to focus on sheer numbers and statistics of migration 
inflows and outflows in order to determine whether Poland is still an emigration country or if it 
has already become a transitional or future immigration country. 
Taking a step back from the significance of the numbers and the rhetoric of migration 
cycle theories,782 I would simply call the Polish case a “laboratory for integration 
management.” In this laboratory integration practice is still developing on a small scale. The 
national government offers little support for new studies, but there is much optimism and 
determination among laboratory workers that their experiments will prove useful and broadly 
                                                     
780
 For example, there exists a long established Center of Migration Research in Warsaw and a newly 
set up Center for Migration Studies in Poznan. 
781
 Górny, A. et al., (Eds.). (2010). Poland: Becoming a Country of Sustained Immigration. IDEA 
Working Paper 10. 
782
 For more on the concept of “migration cycles” see subchapter 4.5.  
  
218
applicable. This laboratory is located in a central European country on the border between 
the East and West political post-war powers, the communist and the capitalist, which resulted 
in unique national conditions for the development of immigrant integration initiatives at the 
local level.783 
The first examination of the history of migration patterns in Poland since the end of 
the Second World War will concentrate on immigration rather than emigration. Although the 
latter attracts much more interest worldwide, Polish emigration goes beyond the scope of this 
research and will be summarized very briefly later.784 
 
4.6.1 Historical Context of Immigration 
 
The dynamics of migratory flows in postwar Poland and under communist rule, which 
diminished the ethnic diversity of the country, are one of the reasons for a relatively low 
number of immigrants in Poland today. However, before World War II, approximately 31% of 
the population within the boundaries of Poland were non-Poles.785 Following World War II the 
massive outflow of German war prisoners and ethnic Germans from Poland to Germany took 
place, and many Polish nationals, either displaced during the war or resettled from the pre-
war Polish territories, returned. Poland also experienced a massive outflow of ethnic Jews, 
Ukrainians, and Belarusians. 
As in other communist countries, Poland followed the ideology of ethnic homogeneity 
and unity within the Soviet Bloc. The priority of the government was to improve settlement 
conditions for Polish people repatriated from the Soviet Union, while other immigration flows 
were quite rare.786 Those who settled, usually as the spouses of Polish citizens, came to 
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Poland in student exchange programs, or as trainees and workers from other socialist 
countries (usually from the USSR, Bulgaria, and Vietnam). 
In all communist countries before the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989, restrictions 
on international travel and political and economic isolationism were not conducive to massive 
migration flows. Polish citizens could not easily leave the country because of the restrictive 
passport and exit-visa policies.787 Similarly, the number of foreign tourists was rather 
insignificant. Polish law did not permit an inflow of foreign workers or offer any protection to 
refugees. Consequently, the issues of immigration and integration were hardly raised in 
Polish politics and public opinion. The Polish communist regime granted political asylum to a 
large number of political (pro-communist) refugees only twice: to Greece (in the 40s) and 
Chile (in the 70s). Many of them, disappointed with Polish realities, eventually left the 
country, either returning to their home countries or heading for Western Europe or 
Sweden.788 Apart from these two governmental actions, Poland did not engage in any other 
international cooperation for refugee resettlement. Both United Nations as well as UNHCR 
were considered tools of the Cold War.789 Since Poland did not sign the United Nations’ 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention) until 1991, other groups 
of asylum-seekers, who started to seek international protection in Poland in the 80s, were 
served by the Polish Red Cross. It was the only institution which officially dealt with asylum 
seekers in Poland.790 
Because the presence of any foreigner in Polish society was considered quite 
unusual in the postwar period and international migration was restricted, the collapse of the 
communist regime in 1989 brought about crucial political and social changes, which had a 
great impact on migration in Poland. In the years that follow the populations of the former 
Soviet block countries, Romania, Bulgaria and other countries of Eastern Europe, gradually 
gained the freedom to travel abroad. As a result of previously concluded agreements, Poland 
was one of the few countries which East Europeans could easily enter.791 This fact sparked 
off a large number of tourist visits and later commercially oriented trips. According to some 
reports Poland was considered a very attractive western country, or at least “a vestibule to 
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the west.”792 Indeed, foreign tourists might be considered as “first immigrants” on a larger 
scale in the consciousness of the people in post-communist Poland. 
Increasing inflows of foreign tourists from the East gave birth to prohibited economic 
activities (e.g. black market trade or illegal gainful employment) among those without a work 
permit. Those who had one were in minority. Therefore, immigrants usually stayed 
temporarily, having no prospect for settling permanently. The shadow economy in Poland 
has been based on short-term contracts between employers and flexible commuting 
migrants, usually traveling from the Ukraine several times a year, according to the demands 
of the clandestine employment. 
The Vietnamese community formed a quite unique group of immigrants. Their 
presence in Poland dates back to the economic cooperation and exchange of students and 
staff in the 1970s (when 800 Vietnamese students entered Polish universities). Some of 
them married and stayed in Poland, some left, however still maintaining ties with Poland. The 
transition and opening of borders in Poland and the Vietnamese perestroika, which 
stimulated the rise in entrepreneurship, caused renewed waves of Vietnamese citizens to 
Poland. Encouraged by new economic opportunities, they immigrated back to Poland or 
joined already Vietnamese relatives established in Poland, setting up family businesses. 
In reference to legal labor migration the number of work permits granted each year 
has steadily increased over time.793 Many legal labor immigrants were highly-skilled 
academics, who came to Poland attracted by Polish demands for specific qualifications, or 
managers and delegates of transnational corporations from the West and Asia, which 
established their sister companies in Poland in order to invest in the cheap post-communist 
country. It is questionable how long they intended to stay, but certainly their presence in 
Poland represented a significant step towards diversification of Polish post-communist 
society, if only on a very small scale.794 
The political changes of the 90s were also connected with the violent civil wars in 
former Soviet Bloc regimes or federal States (especially the Soviet Union and the former 
Yugoslavia) and ethnic cleansing in countries soon to be divided into separate nations, which 
led to an influx of asylum seekers in Poland, especially from Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, and 
Romania.795 Since Poland signed the Geneva Convention in 1991, the country has had the 
right to grant refugee status. Ever since then the country has experienced a steadily 
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increasing number of refugee applications from various countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa: 
from just over 3,400 in 1998 to over 10,500 in 2009. Since the end of 1990, the majority of 
applications have come from Russians, most of whom come from the war-torn region of 
Chechnya. 
However, for many asylum seekers, Poland has not been a destination but rather an 
unintended site for temporary international protection on the way to the West. The requests 
for protection specifically in Poland have often been unplanned by people on the escape 
route to Europe. The quite harsh realities of living in Poland without mastery of the Polish 
language and consequently grave difficulties in entering the labor market do not encourage 
asylum seekers to settle there. Accordingly, Poland has frequently been described more as a 
stop on the way rather than an anchor for those who seek more permanent destinations. 
The character of circular and temporary immigration of non-EU immigrants to Poland 
was supposed to change with Poland’s entrance into the EU in 2004 and to the Schengen 
zone in 2006. For a number of reasons immigration was expected to become more stable, 
resulting in more immigrants with long-term or permanent residence in Poland. First, 
Poland’s geopolitical position as an EU member state with borders (becoming an Eastern 
border country of the EU) to the West could become attractive to the neighboring non-EU 
nationals who could easily live in the EU as well as in a close vicinity to their home countries. 
Secondly, the Schengen regime was theoretically supposed to reduce the inflows of irregular 
immigrants and prohibited trades of circular immigrants on the eastern border. On the other 
hand, since the labor markets were opened to all new and old EU member states in 2007, a 
rather advantageous situation on the Polish labor market was supposed to be conducive to 
the inflow of qualified migrants from the EU which the Polish labor market needed.796 These 
projections remain mere speculations. 
In fact, Poland's accession to the EU brought about radical changes in migratory 
patterns in both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of emigration but to a lesser degree 
in immigration. On the eve of EU enlargement more people were leaving Poland than 
entering. Nevertheless, the gap was still narrowing. The highest net migration loss started 
two years after Poland's accession to the EU. The year 2006 shows a rapid increase in 
emigration: more than twice as many as in the previous year left the country. However, a 
slow but steady increase in the number of registered immigrants has been seen in the years 
since 2004 (see graph 17). Entering the EU in 2004 and the Schengen area in 2007, has 
definitely made Poland a part of the European migration management program, although the 
current immigration scale is still rather insignificant as evidenced below. 
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Graph 17  Annual Emigration and Immigration in Poland, 2004 to 2009 
 (in thousands) 
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Source:  Central Statistical Office 
 
4.6.2 Immigration Scale  
 
The brief summary of Poland’s unstable immigration inflows in the post-war period 
presented above is likely to raise many questions about the current composition of 
immigration to Poland, the share of immigrant youth in the immigration stock and the outlook 
for the future. Unfortunately, no adequate statistical data is available, which can calculate the 
total number of immigrants in Poland. The 2002 census estimates the number at only 49,221 
people, which makes up a mere 0.1% of the total population.797 The most widely represented 
nationalities in the 2002 census were Ukrainians (20%), Russians (8.8%), Germans (7.5%), 
Belarusians (5.8%), and Vietnamese (4.3%). However, migration experts considered these 
numbers to be far too low. 
There are also some shortcomings in the current data on immigration of foreigners 
from the Central Population Register of the Central Statistical Office (CSO), which monitors 
all new residents coming to Poland who have registered for permanent residency, not only 
foreigners. It is noteworthy that in the CSO’s definition, an immigrant is a person coming to 
Poland from abroad in order to settle permanently, so there is no differentiation among 
incoming Polish citizens and foreigners.798 Moreover, not all immigrants qualify for permanent 
residency, for which a special permission is required. 
                                                     
797
 The Population Census collected migration data in Poland for the first time since the Second World 
War in 2002. 
798
 For more on the fluid concepts in Polish migration discourse see the next section of this 
subchapter. 
  
223 
There are also several other statistical sources which can only provide a rather 
sketchy picture of the level of immigration in Poland, for example a register of residence card 
holders. Again, the latest number of residence card holders – 92,574 (0, 24% population) as 
of the end of 2009 – does not encompass all foreigners residing in Poland. Along with the 
unanticipated number of undocumented immigrants, neither EU citizens nor work permit visa 
holders are included in these statistics.799 In fact, the register of work permits related to the 
employment of foreigners, the register of those employed in companies with 10 or more 
workers, which specifies foreign workers, or the Polish Labor Market Survey are two 
additional sources of scattered statistical data on immigrants in Poland. According to Polish 
researchers on migration, this maze of decentralized foreigner registration systems cannot 
be expected to yield high quality data.800 Such imprecise databases set up on confusing 
definitions of migration groups cannot accurately reflect the reality of the scale of 
immigration. 
Keeping in mind the shortcomings of available statistical data, it might be concluded 
that the largest national groups of non-EU immigrants in Poland (both legal and illegal) stem 
from the eastern Europe and Asia: the Ukraine, Belarus, Vietnam and Armenia. Russian and 
Moldovan nationals and, recently, Chinese belong to the majority as well (see table 3 and 
table 4).801 Such different constellations of immigrant ethnic groups suggest different 
challenges for the process of immigrant integration. While Eastern Europeans from 
neighboring countries find it quite easy to mingle with the Polish host society, the process of 
integration is much more difficult for the groups who come from elsewhere – immigrants from 
very different cultures who live in ethnic enclaves like the Vietnamese or Armenians and 
Chechens live according to quite different religious and cultural values, which may be 
problematic for Polish society.802 In fact, for more than 10 years the majority of refugee 
applications have come from Russians, most of whom are from the war-torn region of 
Chechnya, and recently from Georgia. Both groups, along with other Far Eastern immigrants, 
contribute to the ethnic and cultural diversification of Polish-European society, although still 
on a relatively small scale. It is noteworthy, however, that not all Polish regions display this 
diversity. 
The distribution of immigrants in Poland is strikingly uneven across voivodeships.803 
The twenty refugee centers in Poland are located mostly in the central part of Poland (8 
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refugee centers are in the Masovian Voivodeship), a couple in the less economically 
prosperous eastern and southern regions of Poland (Podlaskie, Silesian, Lublin) and only 2 
in the West and North (Lubusz, and Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeships). The majority of 
immigrants, with the exception of refugees, are predominantly concentrated in the Masovian 
Voivodeship, with the highest concentration in Warsaw. In 2009 residence card holders in 
this region outnumbered by almost four times those in the south regions. The only exception 
to this distribution pattern can be observed for the places of residence of the EU-EEA intra 
migrants registered in Poland, who are concentrated both in the Masovian Voivodeship and 
the northeastern border region with Germany (the West Pomeranian Voivodeship).804 
Different distributions of immigrants in different regions strongly influence the levels of 
sensitivity to the issue of immigrant integration, which vary in different locations in Poland. 
Different levels of public awareness of challenges of immigrant integration, in turn, reflect 
various approaches to immigration and integration management evident in the analysis of 
Polish case studies.805 
It must also be considered that the confusing numbers on Polish immigration do not 
include those who stay without documents. Despite a strict migration regime, the inflow of 
irregular immigrants is common. Assessing their numbers is quite difficult. According to the 
most recent reports on undocumented immigrants in Poland there are no studies which 
estimate the total number of irregular immigrants currently residing in Poland. The 
Vietnamese are the only group, which has been the subject of a deeper analysis among 
researchers. This immigrant group reveals irregularities in regard to both length of stay and 
work. The Migration Policy Unit in the Ministry of Interior and Administration was the first 
institution to count immigrants of Vietnamese origin residing legally in Poland. The Ministry 
claims that probably one in two Vietnamese living in Poland is an irregular immigrant, which 
means between 12,000 and 22,000 undocumented people.806 
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Table 3 Total and Top Six Nationalities Granted Temporary Residence Permits in Poland, 2004 to 
2009 
 (Country order by 2009 figures) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
TOTAL 25,425 22,625 22,376 23,240 28,865 30,567 
Ukraine 8,518 8,304 7,733 7,381 8,307 8,489 
Belarus 2,008 1829 1,647 1,992 2,380 2,452 
Vietnam 1,875 1704 1,496 1,496 2,580 2,389 
China 415 606 383 672 1,205 1,963 
Russia 1,605 1,495 1,393 1,265 1,468 1,366 
Armenia 1,793 1,418 1,199 1,273 1,452 1,287 
Top six total 16,214 15,356 13,851 14,079 17,392 17,946 
Top six as a percentage of 
all permits 
64% 68% 62% 61% 61% 59% 
 
Source:  Office for Foreigners, Statistics 
 
Table 4 Total and Top Five Nationalities Granted Settlement Permits in Poland, 2004 to 2009 
 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
TOTAL 5,094 4,064 3,255 3,124 3,625 2,938 
Ukraine 1,905 1,654 1,438 1,609 1,685 1,280 
Belarus 472 645 602 567 640 638 
Russia 527 376 286 224 255 146 
Vietnam 486 216 138 125 162 121 
Armenia 226 148 110 91 116 88 
Top five total 3,616 3,039 2,574 2,616 2,858 2,166 
Top five as a percentage of 
all permits 71% 75% 79% 84% 79% 74% 
 
Source:  Office for Foreigners, Statistics 
 
Among irregular immigrants there are also those who treat Poland as a springboard 
to the EU. A rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers from Georgia since April 2009 
in Poland is part of a new wave of irregular immigrants from Asia. Since there are no visa 
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requirements for Georgians entering Belarus, crossing the Polish-Belarusian border is often 
the easiest and the cheapest way for them to enter the EU.807 
According to the Office for Foreigners, in total 21,890 decisions on expulsion have 
been issued to undocumented immigrants between 2006 and 2008. However, this number 
cannot help with figuring out the actual number of undocumented immigrants. Other available 
estimates about various groups of undocumented immigrant refer solely to the numbers of 
irregular workers in shadow economies. Considering the circular undocumented labor 
migration, Ukrainian citizens constitute the largest group of illegal workers in Poland. They 
usually find employment in the household sectors, such as cleaning, cooking, caretaking of 
children and the elderly, construction or agricultural sector or open-air markets in Poland.808 
Unfortunately, the percentage of immigrant youth in Poland remains unknown. Based 
on the statistics from the Central Statistical Office in Poland (CSO) it might be assumed that 
the young generation, 20 to 29 years of age, together with a significant number of newborns 
and children up to 4 years old are the most numerous groups among immigrants in Poland. 
Consequently, it might be concluded that Poland is slowly starting to attract more young 
foreign newcomers, although one has to remember that the CSO’s data also includes 
returning Polish migrants. Obviously, none of the available estimates reflects the situation of 
undocumented immigrant youth, who might still not be visible on the Polish black market. 
Their numbers, their access to education and their transition from school to adult life have 
not been monitored thus far. 
The only evidence of a rise in legal foreign residents from the younger generation is 
to be found in those enrolled in higher education. It has been estimated that 15,862 foreign 
students were studying in Poland during the academic year 2008/2009, an increase of more 
than 2 thousand over the previous academic year. The largest groups came from the 
Ukraine, Belarus, Norway, the US and Canada. It would be difficult to predict whether these 
groups plan to stay longer. The anecdotal evidence suggests that western students are 
usually attracted by low fees in Poland for higher education and that they will probably head 
back to their home countries upon completion of their degrees. 
On the one hand, return trends of young foreign students and unstable circular 
patterns of immigration to Poland appear to counter any arguments for intensified measures 
for the integration of young immigrants. On the other hand, public interest in the integration of 
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immigrants should not depend on immigrants, their numbers and the length of their planned 
stay. In the massive global movement of migrants, who are in this country one day and the 
next in the neighboring one, temporary migration and temporary stay have become more 
common. The lack of prospects for immigrants to settle in Poland does not invalidate efforts 
toward their integration. Quite the contrary, successful integration into the host society can 
encourage immigrants to prolong their stay if they find good conditions for the development 
of their potential. Still the insignificant size of the immigrant population, apparent in the poor 
statistical data on Polish immigration, and mundane speculations about who the current 
immigrants are and for how long they want to stay in Poland hinder any constructive political 
and public discourse on migration and integration. 
 
4.6.3 Public and Political Discourse 
 
Several factors influence the present public discourse on immigration and integration 
in Poland: 1) the turbulent Polish history, 2) the country’s communist past, 3) the accession 
to the EU followed by massive emigration waves and recent return migration, and finally 4) 
“the sacred numbers”: the ambiguous figures on immigration, which have just been 
discussed. 
First, Poland as a Central European country was extremely vulnerable to invasion 
and partition throughout a significant portion of its post-16th century history. The state, split by 
neighboring states, was frequently forced to fight for its endangered sovereignty and national 
unity against foreign influences. This fact has probably shaped and given rise to heated 
political and public discussions on the protection of Polish cultural homogeneity and fueled 
the interest of Polish citizens against “the others” from outside the Polish territory and without 
Polish cultural ties, still visible in the current public discourse on immigration. 
The post war communist period in Poland might have reinforced this historically 
conditioned protectionism. Additionally, communist isolation and eradication of pre-war 
Polish ethnic diversity has turned an immigrant in Poland into an exotic object of curiosity. An 
immigrant was not necessary somebody who Poles did not trust but merely somebody, at 
least an immigrant from the Western Block, who they could rarely saw on a daily basis. It 
seemed inconceivable that under the communist regime somebody from the West would 
ever decide to come to Poland in order to work and stay longer under unfavorable conditions 
in a poor country.809 
Certainly, after the transition to democracy and the opening of the Polish borders the 
situation changed but an isolationist frame of mind still prevails in the Polish mentality. Those 
who were able to travel were finally exposed to contact with foreigners, so that a foreigner 
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was not “so foreign” anymore.810 Nevertheless, for a long time ordinary people remained in 
their protective confinement, exposed only to things Polish, as something safe and normal. 
Only the younger generation with new travel possibilities can change public attitudes of fear 
and uncertainty about immigrants. Thus far, the government has not made much of an effort 
to ease immigrant inflows, except for the actions toward the repatriation of ethnic Poles, a 
refugee program, selective and restricted labor market openings since 2006 and recent labor 
market legislation.811 
Much of the political and social discourse since the Polish EU accession has focused 
on the image of Poland as an emigration country. Indeed, as statistics show, nearly 2 million 
Poles have left the country, mostly young Polish emigrants, who left the Polish labor market 
unfulfilled and in need of a new labor force. Surprisingly, immigrants are still treated more as 
an unavoidable consequence of migration movements than a structural necessity and source 
of economic benefit. In fact, there are very few governmental incentives to make Poland 
attractive for immigrants to settle.812 The political concerns have focused on questions of how 
to attract Polish emigrants back, rather than how to welcome the foreign labor force. In 
November 2008 Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk launched a governmental campaign 
entitled, “Have you got a plan to return?” Its aim was and is to facilitate the smooth return of 
emigrants and to put on view the new economic opportunities in Poland.813 The government’s 
efforts to trigger massive Polish remigration are currently part of a political campaign to 
demonstrate the stability and prosperity of the country. However, such actions only reinforce 
the Polish mind-set that theirs is a country of emigration rather than a potential destination for 
immigrants. 
As a result, little has been done to facilitate active civic participation on the part of 
immigrants in decision-making processes in Poland, so that immigrants remain absent from 
the political scene. In fact, civic engagement of immigrants is publicly visible only in their 
cooperation with pro-immigrant NGOs and other civil society actors (like research institutes) 
who engage in immigrant integration work and try to raise the allegedly “homogenous” 
society’s awareness of the presence of immigrants in Poland.814 These bottom-up initiatives 
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have only recently begun, so that that the general societal discussion of immigration and 
integration is slowly changing. 
The perception that Poles are still homogenous is also reinforced by the sacred 
statistical numbers of foreigners. As mentioned above, these figures do not reflect the real 
scale of immigration due to the lack of a centralized data collection system for different 
groups of immigrants. As a result, the low immigration rating discourages decision-makers at 
the institutional levels from discussing the importance of immigrant services or integration 
work. In fact, the statistics serve as a hidden support for reactive rather than proactive 
immigration and integration actions. The anecdotal evidence appears to show that “it does 
not pay off” to set up extra services for immigrants, whose presence is rather insignificant in 
Polish society.815 
Polish migration researchers agree that the reactive measures in migration and 
integration issues have been undertaken as a response to internal (such as the Polish 
transformation process and labor market needs) as well as external stimuli. Polish 
Memberships in the EU and the Schengen area have undoubtedly stimulated the 
development of Polish migration policy, which has been created in a top-down way, as a 
reaction to external EU regulations and the Polish commitment to acquis communautaire.816 
However, the EU requirements for institutional and legislative adaptation to EU immigration 
policies by the EU member states does not apply to the measures of integration policies.817 
These measures are still highly influenced by the political and public discourse on immigrants 
in Poland, presented above. This unique Polish discussion, characterized by post-communist 
isolationism, neglect of immigrants and new trends toward openness and Europeanization of 
Polish society, constitutes the background for the current national mode of integration in 
Poland. 
 
4.6.4 National Mode of Integration 
 
The development of a national mode of integration in Poland is determined by a 
relatively underdeveloped framework for general migration policy in Poland, which is still 
“under construction.” There is neither an institutional structure responsible for migration 
management nor a single policy document which conceptualizes the principles and goals of 
Polish immigration policy. The lack of direction for such a development is reflected in the 
                                                     
815
 The citation comes from my personal conversation with a representative of the National Health 
Insurance System, who commented on the proposal to provide a foreign language brochure on the 
healthcare system in Poland. 
816
 Since 1997 the need for Poland’s compliance with the acquis communautaire has resulted in three 
restrictive amendments to the 1997 Alien’s Act (the most recent one in April 2005). Polish EU 
Accession also contributed to the establishment of new institutional structures, such as the Office for 
Repatriation and Refugees, and the Council for Refugees, which is an independent body of appeal. 
817
 For more on non-binding EU integration measures see subchapter 4.4. 
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institutional structure responsible for migration matters. Although the Ministry of Interior and 
Administration officially coordinates the state’s activities in the field of migration policy, the 
division of competencies in relation to migration is scattered across many administrative 
bodies in different ministries with no transparent hierarchy. As a result of the confusing 
framework for cooperation in migration issues, Poland lacks any comprehensive immigrant 
integration strategy. The main unit responsible for immigrant integration management at the 
national level is the Department of Social Assistance and Integration in the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs.818 The unit determines the entire area of social assistance in Poland. 
Consequently, immigrant integration is only one of its many activities. 
Until recently integration processes had been aimed at only one group of immigrants, 
those with refugee status. The first attempts of integration programs for this group in Poland 
date back to the early 1990s, targeting a significant wave of refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia at that time. The concept of the integration of refugees was only introduced into 
Polish legislation in 1996. Since then local governors (voivodes) have been responsible for 
coordinating measures for integrating refugees in their voivodeships. 
Integration programs are restricted to the assistance of persons under international 
protection. The Individual Integration Program (IIP), agreed upon between the County Family 
Support Centers and a foreigner does not exceed one calendar year, which is usually too 
little to result in any positive outcome. During this period of time a program participants are 
provided with cash benefits for maintenance and coverage of expenses connected with 
learning Polish language, contributions to health insurance and the costs of specialized 
guidance services, finding accommodation, and social work activities.819 As of May 2008 
these provisions have been extended to immigrants with subsidiary protection status. Only a 
few of these provisions, such as shelter, meals and financial aid in critical situations, are also 
granted to those with ‘tolerated’ status.820 In 2007 only 521 refugees were beneficiaries of 
these programs. Of this group, only 17 took advantage of the subsidies for language 
courses. Because County Centers for Family Support are usually understaffed the extent to 
which the agencies can really address immigrants’ needs and boost their motivation to 
integrate is questionable.821 No other integration measures at the national level exist for other 
groups of immigrants in Poland. 
                                                     
818
 The Ministry of Interior and Administration overviewed the coordination of integration measures 
until 1998, when the former Ministry of Social Affairs was transformed in 2005 into the current Ministry 
of Labor and Social Policy which overtook this function. 
819
 Based on the Act on Social Assistance of March 12, 2004. 
820
 Subsidiary protection status is granted to those who do not fulfill the requirements for becoming a 
refugee but who would be endangered upon return to their countries. Tolerated status may be granted 
when refugee and subsidiary protection status has been rejected. 
821
 According to Katarzyna Gmaj’s assessment of the situation in 2007, refugees rarely integrated into 
the Polish society. The prospect for success on the labor market, rather than integration programs, 
stimulated immigrant determination to integrate in 
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The shortcomings of integration policies in Poland relate to the lack of proper 
definitions and of a conceptual framework for integration measures. Basic “fluid concepts,” 
such as integration and immigrants are still problematic. First of all, the process of integration 
has yet to be defined in any legal document. Until recently Proposals for Actions Aimed at 
Establishing Comprehensive Immigrant Integration Policy in Poland from 2005 had been the 
only official document which sketches out the limited national integration processes and 
plans for their future development.822 Secondly, there is no consistent definition in Polish 
legal documents of who is an immigrant. As mentioned earlier, a person who has 
permanently settled in Poland is considered an immigrant. This definition, for instance, does 
not exclude people with Polish citizenship who have returned to Poland from abroad to 
register for permanent residency. Consequently, the meaning of the term “immigrant” in 
Poland is very confusing with reference to the concept of immigrant integration policy. “Polish 
immigrants” definitely face different challenges for integration than “foreign immigrants.”823 
If an attempt were made to apply the above mentioned definition of an immigrant in 
Poland to potential immigrant integration measures, such measures would in reality only 
target a very limited number of immigrants: those with permanent residency. As a result, 
integration of newly-arrived immigrants would be of little importance, as the eligibility for 
“immigrant integration programs” requires that a foreigner stay in Poland for an extended 
period in order to obtain a settlement permit.824 Such a perception still seems to prevail in the 
existing Polish legal system (see below). However, the recent debate on the need for “pre-
integration measures” for asylum seekers, who are awaiting a decision on their refugee 
applications, has increased the public focus on the issue of integration. Since integration 
procedures are quite often too long, the need for providing immigrants access to the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Gmaj, K. (2007). ’Do it yourself.’ Immigrants´ Integration to Polish Society. In K. Iglicka and K. Gmaj 
(Eds.), Integration Policies in the EU and the US (pp. 51-56). Warsaw: Center for International 
Relations. 
822
 Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. (2005). Proposals for Actions Aimed at Establishing 
Comprehensive Immigrant Integration Policy in Poland. Warsaw: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. 
In April 2011 a new document has just been published by the Interministerial Team for Migration. The 
document outlines the future plans for the development of integration policies in Poland. Ministry of 
Interior and Administration. (2011). Polityka migracyjna Polski - stan obecny i postulowane działania 
(Poland’s Migration Policy – State of the Art and Postulated Actions). Warsaw: Ministry of Interior and 
Administration.  
823
 Throughout this chapter I use the term “immigrant” according to the definition of immigrants 
provided in chapter 1, Introduction. However, at this point in the text I use the term “immigrants” in 
quotation marks to indicate differences between the Polish definition and the definition employed in my 
research. In Polish legislation, to my understanding, an immigrant is considered “cudzoziemiec,” which 
directly translated into English stands for “a person from a foreign land.” In the translations of Polish 
documents into English the terms “alien” or “foreigner” are used. These terms are usually found in 
most legal documents, the official discourse of administrative institutions, as well as in public debates 
on immigration. For example, the Polish Act of Aliens of 2003 does not include a single word in 
reference to “an immigrant” in my understanding. See also references to public discourse on 
immigration in this subchapter. 
824
 A person of citizenship other than Polish can get a settlement permit after 5 years in the country. 
For more see subchapter 4.6.5. 
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structures of society, e.g. by learning the Polish language, has begun to receive broader 
recognition.825 
In addition to the very limited national integration measures addressed only to people 
under international protection (refugees and people with subsidiary protection status), the 
Polish legal system offers immigrants access to the rights and opportunities which apply to 
Polish citizens: social assistance benefits, health care, unemployment and family benefits, as 
well as the right to education. Some of these rights (with the exception of social and health 
care benefits and the right to education) require permanent residency, which limits 
integration opportunities for short term immigrants.826 Having to wait as long as five years to 
access the aforementioned provisions may be one reason why few immigrants decide to stay 
longer in the country. 
No examination of the Polish national mode of integration, as described in this 
section, would be complete without mentioning the strong support of bottom-up integration 
initiatives acting locally. This sector has been developing for a long time, especially in 
Warsaw. In fact, work on immigrant integration has been on the agenda of several well 
established NGOs and charities like Polish Humanitarian Action or the Polish Red Cross for 
many years, which in the past received little recognition and support from Polish 
governmental organizations. In fact, the issue of immigrant integration has only recently 
reached a broader audience among local authorities and ministries in Poland. A recent boom 
in new immigrant programs and integration measures has been made possible through an 
allocation of the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (EIF).827 These 
new opportunities for starting integration work have resulted in promising new network-
building among new service providers for immigrants with the state actors, such as County 
Family Support Centers. Unfortunately the integration of immigrant youth, especially in their 
transition from school to work, is still not a focal point of local integration initiatives.828 
Anecdotal evidence suggests a couple of NGOs do recognize the need to start special 
programs for immigrant youth and are eager to cooperate internationally with more 
experienced partners.829 
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 For further discussion of this topic see subchapter 5.2.4 on Warsaw. 
826
 See later sections of this chapter on citizenship, education and labor market. 
827
 The EIF funds have been allocated to Poland since 2008. There are many doubts about the 
effectiveness of the work of the Polish EIF Implementing Body of Polish Government, which allocates 
the EIF money to beneficiaries of the program. The existing bureaucratic procedures are often too 
confusing and funds are paid out to NGOs with delays, as many organizations report. See subchapter 
5.2.4. 
828
 It might be due an anticipated relatively low number of second-generation immigrants, who are still 
invisible in available statistics on immigrants. 
829
 A Polish-German Conference “Integration Network for Immigrant Youth” in Bad Liebenzell, 
Germany, in May 2010 brought together a few Polish organizations eager to partner with German 
integration NGOs in the field of immigrant youth integration. As a result, the Integration Network for 
Immigrant Youth has been established, which is intended to facilitate cooperation between Polish and 
international integration stakeholders. For more see http://www.integration-network.eu 
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In addition to the NGOs’ work and advocacy the EU and the European Fund are an 
important motivating factor for the national ministries to commence dealing with the issue of 
an increasing need for immigrant integration. In fact, Polish policy makers have recently 
become slightly more interested in immigrant integration of foreigners in Poland. In 2007 the 
Ministry of Interior and Administration established a Working Group on the Integration of 
Foreigners within the Interministerial Team for Migration established in the same year.830 The 
results of its work will be presented in the future Migration Strategy for Poland, which is also 
expected to address the issue of immigrant integration strategy for Poland.831 According to 
preliminary projections and conclusions after the Working Group’s three-year long 
consultations, the issues of the integration of immigrants’ children, which have thus far been 
neglected, have finally been recognized as key priorities for future migration strategy.832 
Another promising program calling for cooperation between governmental sectors on 
immigrant integration was launched in 2010 with the project International Organization for 
Migration (IOM): Cooperation as a Way to Integration, funded by the EIF (Współpraca drogą 
do integracji).833 Thanks to EU financial support, the project set up a National Platform of 
Cooperation, which gathers together different stakeholders in migration policies and 
integration measures, including ministries, local administration, NGOs and migrant 
organizations. The regular consultations are supposed to assist in establishing a constructive 
framework for future National Migration and Integration Strategy. 
It is still too early to talk about any Polish integration strategy for immigrants in 
Poland. However, the abovementioned recent developments in the national mode of 
integration in Poland gives some hope for the potential establishment of future national 
integration management within the area of immigrant youth on the labor market as well. 
 
4.6.5 Legal Status  
 
An immigrant youth’s access to citizenship, education and the labor market in Poland 
depends on which category of residence permit the person has. Immigrant youth from the 
European Economic Area are not required to hold a residence permit to reside in Poland. 
Consequently, they enjoy more privileges than other immigrants in a number of ways, which 
will be discussed in this and the next sections of this chapter. 
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 Translated from Polish: Grupa Robocza do Spraw Integracji Cudzoziemców and Międzyresortowy 
Zespół do Spraw Migracji. 
831
 At the time of writing the Inter-ministry Team for Migration plans to announce the Polish Migration 
Strategy by the end of 2010. 
832
 The final conference of the project Polish Migration Policy: Its Principles and Legal Aspects was 
held in Warsaw on November 23, 2009.  
833
 For more on the IOM in Poland in the field of integration work for immigrants see the Warsaw case 
study. 
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Poland boasts a quite complicated system of legal statuses. Apart from the various 
types of residence visa, there are three categories of a residence permit, which regulate the 
legal status of immigrants: a residence permit for a specified period of time (a temporary 
residence permit), a residence permit for a permanent stay (a settlement permit) and a 
residence permit for a long-term EC resident. An immigrant without permanent residency has 
limited access to social and economic benefits, thus limiting their structural integration into 
the society. Requirements for getting permanent residency are quite stringent. Among other 
requirements, an immigrant has to continuously reside legally in the territory of Poland for at 
least five years or two years if he or she is the spouse of a Polish citizen.834 
Permanent residency is a key to obtaining Polish citizenship. Naturalization requires a 
minimum five year legal stay in Poland with a settlement permit or at least three years of 
marriage with a Polish citizen and a settlement permit. Polish citizenship is automatically 
extended to the children of the naturalized person. Once the children are over 16, they must 
decide for or against becoming Polish citizens. 
A permanent stay permit is the most valued among immigrants for two main reasons. 
Firstly, since it is granted for an unlimited period of time, there is no need for immigrants to 
cope with bureaucratic hurdles to extend their residence permits every two years, as is 
required with temporary residence permits. Secondly, permanent residency informally grants 
the status of Polish denizen. Consequently there is little interest in gaining Polish citizenship 
among immigrants, especially if they will be forced to surrender their citizenship in their home 
countries.835 
In conclusion, permanent residency, not naturalization, is a key to integration into the 
labor market for immigrant youth in Poland. Polish citizenship is granted at birth to children if 
at least one of their parents already possesses Polish citizenship, regardless of the 
birthplace (jus sanguinis). Permanent residency is granted to children born in Poland to those 
who possess permanent residency or are under the custody of people with permanent 
resident permits. Therefore, the children of immigrants who have not legally resided in 
Poland longer than five years are automatically ineligible for permanent residency. Youth 
who apply for refugee status or political asylum and are awaiting the decisions are naturally 
also excluded from the rights of a permanent resident. Moreover, the adult children of 
                                                     
834
 A stay in the Republic of Poland is regarded as continuous if no absence period has exceeded six 
months and the total absence has not exceeded ten months unless the result of: 
1) performance of professional duties or performance of work outside the territory of the Republic of 
Poland upon a contract concluded with an employer whose registered office is located in the territory 
of the Republic of Poland; 
2) accompanying a spouse performing his/her professional duties or work in circumstances referred to 
in point (1); 
3) medical treatment. 
835
 Polish law does not prohibit dual citizenship and there are no penalties for its possession. However, 
people with dual citizenship are treated as if they are solely Polish citizens in territorial Poland. See 
Act of Citizenship. (1962). Journal of Laws 2000, No. 28, item 353. 
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permanent residents who come as part of family reunification are initially granted a 
temporary permit, not automatically a permanent one. 
It should also be kept in mind that there may be a significant number of 
undocumented immigrant youth living in Poland. There are hardly any statistics in Poland on 
the undocumented, to say nothing of estimates of their age.836 The assumption is that thanks 
to the Polish government’s cooperation with the EU Border Agency Frontex (with 
headquarters in Warsaw) and the application of Schengen zone regulations, which restrict 
the number of visas issued, strong border control will probably restrict future inflows.837 For 
those who stay illegally, there have been limited measures of regularization in Poland. 
However, relatively few undocumented immigrants have taken advantage of potential 
amnesties due to the severe requirements.838 As a result, very few options currently exist for 
gaining legal status. 
Moreover, no official measure for integration of undocumented immigrants into the 
Polish host society is permitted. Currently civil society organizations in Poland are discussing 
the needs of immigrants sans papiers more openly. However, without any financial support 
pro-immigration activists form organizations which are hardly in a position to provide 
integration help to the undocumented. In fact, the prime source of money for most of 
integration projects in Poland comes from EU Funds, which are restricted to taking action on 
behalf of authorized immigrants. Very few projects for the undocumented have been founded 
by private donors. Although few organizations are willing to admit it publicly, some attempts 
are being made to include young undocumented immigrants in language courses or job 
training programs for regular immigrants, simply by not asking about their legal status.839 
 
4.6.6 Education 
 
Polish national education authorities had for a long time shown little concern for the 
education of immigrant children. Challenges of immigrant education were usually first 
experienced and discussed at the lowest levels of school administration, by schools and 
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 For estimates of the number of undocumented people living in Poland see a former section of this 
subchapter. 
837
 A foreigner can cross Polish borders and remain on Polish territory if they possess a valid travel 
document and a visa, unless they are citizens of EEA countries or come from a state bound by a 
bilateral agreement with the EU on the visa-free regime. 
838
 During the course of the first Amnesty Program in 2003 2,747 illegal immigrants (out of 3,512 
applications) were able to change their status from irregular to regular. During the second Program in 
2007 1,244 out of 2,028 applicants got a legal status. Among other strict conditions, the biggest 
obstacle for undocumented immigrants was the requirement to prove the length of their illegal stay in 
Poland. In order to get the legal status the immigrants had to have resided in Poland at least since 
January 1997, which was impossible for those without any documents. Currently there is a running 
campaign for a new abolition. See Iglicka, K. (2008), op. cit. 
839
 See more on the controversies about helping undocumented in Poland in subchapter 5.2.4.on the 
case study of Warsaw.  
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educational boards. Only the development of education policies in recent years or even 
months, moving towards including immigrant pupils in the ministerial education statistics and 
preparatory Polish cultural and language courses, marks a slow yet positive change. 
The national education policy in Poland is developed and carried out centrally, while 
the administration of education and the running of schools, pre-school institutions and other 
educational establishments is decentralized. The Ministry of National Education is 
responsible for almost the entire education system, with the exception of higher education 
which is under the supervision of the Minister of Science and Higher Education. The Ministry 
supervises educational content, sets educational policy and, by the same token, determines 
the access of immigrant children to education. However, the implementation of these rules is 
left in the hands of the Local Educational Boards, or with education superintendents in each 
Polish province.840 
The Polish Constitution guarantees the right to education, whereas the Act on the 
Education System sets the frame for compulsory education of children from seven years old 
until their graduation from gymnasium, usually at the age of 16 or in some cases until 18 (if a 
child fails to complete an educational program within the usual timeframe). According to a 
new regulation on the admission of foreigners to Polish schools, as of April 2010 education is 
free of charge for all immigrant children regardless of their status in public primary, 
secondary and all types of upper-secondary schools until the age of 18841 (see graph 18). 
This new regulation also simplifies admission procedures. Immigrant children unable to 
provide certificates of their past education are admitted following an interview with the school 
head and upon written declarations of their parents about the number of years of schooling. 
The interviews have to be conducted in the school candidates’ native languages if their 
knowledge of Polish is not adequate. 
 
 
                                                     
840
 The responsibility for the administration of public kindergartens, primary schools and gymnasia has 
been delegated to local authorities (gminy). Districts (powiaty) now have statutory responsibility for 
administering upper secondary schools, artistic and special schools. The voivodeships (województwa) 
perform a co-ordinating function, supervising the implementation of the Ministry's policy and providing 
pedagogical supervision. 
841
 Before the New Regulation on Admission of Foreigners into Polish Schools was adopted on April 1, 
2010, education in public schools was free of charge for all immigrants only until the secondary level. 
Consequently, free post-gymnasium schools, necessary for obtaining a first vocational qualification, 
were not available to all. Undocumented immigrants could not continue their education for free 
(including vocational training and apprenticeships) unless they were granted a scholarship, which was 
almost always impossible to obtain due to their irregular status. 
Post-gymnasium schools include (see Graph 18):  
- basic vocational schools which lead directly to a diploma attesting to vocational qualifications and 
possibly further education in supplementary schools 
- those which lead to the Matura certificate (upon passing the Matura examinations) which entitles 
students to enter tertiary education: upper secondary school, specialized upper secondary schools 
offering education in specializations of general vocational education, and technical upper secondary 
schools.  
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Graph 18  Education System in Poland 
                         Ages 
                         29 
                        28 
                        27 
              PhD studies       26 
              
  
      25 
                        24 
                  Second level studies   23 
          Uniform master-level   
  
  22 
          
  
          
                First level studies   21 
                    
Post-secondary                   20 
                  
Te
rti
ar
y 
Ed
uc
at
io
n
 
school 
                19 
 
        
      
  
      
    
 
 
        
      
  
      
  22 
        
      
            
        
      
    
    
  21 
        
  
    
        
        
  
    
      20 
        
  
Supplementary general 
    
        
  secondary     
Supplementary 
technical 
secondary school 
  19 
school   
      18 
  17 
General 
secondary 
school 
Profiled general 
secondary school 
Technical 
school 
Basic vocational school 
  16 
  15 
  14 
Se
co
n
da
ry
 
le
ve
l 
Lower secondary school: gymnasium 
  13 
  12 
  11 
  10 
  9 
  8 
Pr
im
ar
y 
Ed
uc
at
io
n
 
Primary school 
  7 
 
Obligatory pre-school education 
  6 
 
Source:  Eurydice 
 
Since school assignment depends on where the children live, the number of 
immigrant children is disproportionally higher in districts close to refugee centers. These 
schools face the greatest challenges of managing immigrant youth integration, as they have 
little experience with multicultural classes. Until recently, with the exception of Polish 
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language classes, there had been no preparatory courses for newly enrolled children, who 
were unable to follow the Polish syllabus. Since the new above mentioned regulation from 
2010 became law, remedial classes can be provided along with Polish language courses.842 
Moreover, immigrant children have now the possibility of having their own education 
assistants, who can support them in confronting communication difficulties and intercultural 
misunderstandings within a given school community. 
Schools can apply to their local education boards for additional funds for language 
and tutorial courses for immigrant pupils. However, many schools are still unaware of such 
provisions, which stems from the fact that information sharing about the recent reforms has 
been insufficient.843 It is to be hoped that the new opportunities for integration measures in 
schools will become better known and more efficient over time. 
There are still many other hurdles with reference to managing immigrants’ education, 
which have already been recognized by Polish research and have been confirmed by my 
interviews in the city of Warsaw. First, the lack of cooperation of schools with immigrant 
parents and, at the same time, the refusal to accept the presence of immigrant children at 
schools by parents of Polish pupils are issues that require greater attention from teachers. 
Another challenge involves exam procedures, which prohibit any additional time for 
immigrant children or a teacher’s assistance in solving particular exam questions and tasks. 
Finally, the shortage of statistical data on the education on immigrant children in Polish 
schools has ensured that the issue has not gained sufficient attention from the general 
public. In fact, little is known about current numbers of immigrant pupils.844 On the basis of 
the provisional data from the Ministry of National Education, it can only be assumed that the 
number of foreigners in Polish schools has ranged between 4,000 and 6,000 in the recent 
years. In fact, more exact figures on immigrant populations at schools, including their ethnic 
backgrounds and the geographical distribution, might be important for planning national 
integration policies particularly at local levels. 
The immigrant population is much more visible and better documented at the higher 
education level. According to the statistics they constituted 0.9% of the student population in 
the academic year 2008/2009. More than 500 students came from the Ukraine, Belarus, the 
US, and Taiwan.845 
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 Earlier Minister of National Education regulations from October 4, 2001 only offered free Polish 
language classes. 
843
 For more about schools’ lack of awareness of organization procedure for Polish language courses 
for immigrant pupils, see Gmaj, K. and Iglicka, K., op. cit. 
844
 See the remarks about the role of statistics on public discourse, subchapter 5.2.4. 
For more on the above mentioned shortcomings in the statistics on immigrant education in Poland see 
Gmaj, K. (2011). Immigrant Pupils – Realities and Challenges of Polish Schools. In M. Ziółek-
Skrzypczak and G. Gandeberger (Eds.) Labor Market Integration of Immigrant Youth: Challenges for 
Education and Economy in Germany and Poland. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Wema.  
845
 Central Statistical Office. (2010). Higher Education Institutions and Their Finances in 2010. 
Warsaw:  Central Statistical Office. 
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The right to higher education is guaranteed to all immigrants holding a residence 
permit (visa or residence cards or citizens of the EU member states). However, unlike Polish 
students, immigrants have to pay tuition, which is not fixed and depends on the type of 
university and the major. Students may be exempted from paying tuition by the head of a 
higher education unit on a case by case basis. As a rule each student must have a residence 
permit to be able to enter any higher education institution. However, exceptions to this rule 
are not ruled out. Anecdotal evidence suggests that no clear pattern exists for acceptance or 
rejection of undocumented candidates who apply for admission directly to the head of a 
given unit. 
If immigrants have completed their secondary education abroad, recognition of 
foreign academic qualifications is a prerequisite for their admission to higher education in 
Poland. Their certificates may be recognized on the basis of existing bilateral agreements on 
the equivalence of education with other countries or if such an agreement does not exist 
through the process of nostrification. Nostrification is a procedure which compares foreign 
certificates to Polish ones by competent authorities who can either accept or reject an 
application for nostrification. Education superintendents of a given region make decisions 
with regard to school and maturity certificates.846 Higher education institutions, which are 
authorized to confer the academic degree of PhD in the corresponding field of study to the 
one completed abroad are responsible for recognizing higher education diplomas (university 
degrees).847 Such a recognition system is thoroughly decentralized in Poland and seems 
quite complicated for an individual seeking a responsible authority. Fortunately, the 
Department of Recognition of Diplomas at the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, a 
central coordinating and counseling body, offers assistance at the national level to both 
individuals and institutions.  
Similarly, there is a national Unit for Coordination of the Professional Qualification 
Recognition System, which can help immigrant youth and immigrant service providers find an 
authority responsible for recognizing professional experience gained abroad.848 According to 
employees at the Unit there has been a strong increase in the demand for consultations by 
potential employers and employees.849 
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 The requirement to recognize immigrants’ school certificates below the level of secondary 
education was abandoned with the new regulation of April 2010, which provides immigrant children in 
Poland easier access to primary school. 
847
 Minister of Education and Science. (2006, April 6). Regulation on the Nostrification of School 
Certificates and Maturity Certificates Obtained Abroad. Journal of Laws, No. 63, item 443. 
Minister of Education and Science. (2006, February 24). Nostrification of Higher Education Diplomas 
Obtained Abroad. Journal of Laws of 3rd March, 2006, No. 37, item 255 with further amendments. 
848
 This system is regulated by the EU Recognition of Professional Qualifications Directive 
2005/36/EC, see subchapter 4.4.3. 
849
 According to my telephone conversation with one of the workers in the Unit, there is a steady 
growth in the number of immigrants who seek advise on the recognition of foreign qualifications in 
Poland (with 8- 10 phone calls a day answered in the Unit). 
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There is a list of more than 330 so-called regulated professions in Poland with the list 
of the authorities entitled to recognize the professional qualifications in a given field. If the 
profession is not regulated in Poland, the decision on the recognition of foreign qualifications 
can be made by the employer, who can require the recognition of education obtained abroad. 
No studies thus far have monitored the success of this complicated procedure for the 
recognition of both academic and professional qualifications. Moreover, little is known at the 
national level of the extent to which immigrants have to do jobs which are below their 
academic qualifications. Therefore, the degree of success with regard to the coordination of 
the recognition procedure can only be speculated on by local site research and the basis of 
individual cases. The awareness of the problem is crucial to evaluating the educational 
opportunities for young immigrants and their qualifications on the labor market. In fact, the 
situation on the labor market is not always conducive to the employment of foreign workers 
on an equal basis with Poles. 
 
4.6.7 Labor Market 
 
The employment figures for legal immigrants in Poland is regarded as insignificant 
due to the relatively low number of immigrants as well as due to the quite complicated 
application procedure for getting a work permit. In fact, the procedure is complicated for all 
parties in the application process: immigrants, potential employers and local agencies. First, 
employers must first apply to the appropriate voivode for a work permit for the immigrant who 
they wish to employ. 
A work permit can be issued after the status of the local labor market has been 
evaluated by the regional Labor Market Agency. Beginning in the 1990s the application 
procedures were changed a number of times with the goal of creating longer and stricter 
application procedures until the Polish labor market experienced shortages. Then, the first 
liberalization steps were taken, which was regarded as a promising sign for boosting foreign 
employment in Poland. In August 2006 the right to employ workers from the Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia without work permits for three months in a given period of six months 
was granted for the agricultural sector and one year later in the construction branch. The 
pressure on the labor market for skilled and unskilled workers forced further modifications. 
On February 1, 2008 the legal duration of work without a work permit was extended from 
three to six months in a given period of twelve months for Ukrainians, Belarusians and 
Russians. These provisions have been also extended to the nationals of the countries that 
signed mobility partnerships with the EU: for Moldavians (June 2008) and Georgians 
(November 2009). The new law from January 2009 changed the former two-step 
employment procedure into a simpler one-step process and reduced the number of 
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documents required for work permit applications. These new developments seem to facilitate 
immigrant employment. According to recent data from the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy, in 2009 there was a significant increase in work permits issued to immigrants (from 
18,022 in 2008 to 29,340 in 2009). 
However, there are still a number of cases where immigrants are exempted from the 
requirement of having a work permit. For this reason one should not draw conclusions about 
the level of immigrant employment based on the number work permits issued. In fact, the 
amount of legal employment is quite hard to measure due to a lack of comprehensive data. 
Estimates range from 0.07 to 0.55 % of the total population employed in the national 
economy in last few years, depending on various data sources.850 
The legal framework in Poland makes legal employment possible without any work 
permit to all citizens of the European Union member states, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland, or who have a permanent stay permit or are under international protection 
(refugee status, a tolerated stay or subsidiary protection). Generally, those with a visa or a 
residence permit for a specified period of time are required to have a work permit. There are, 
however, many exemptions from this rule. For example, immigrant students and immigrant 
graduates from Polish schools may take up legal employment. Since in most cases 
immigrant youth do not need to have a work permit, it is important to look at other potential 
restrictions on their access to the Polish labor market. 
First, the level of unemployment and the status of the local labor market, which differs 
in all the Polish regions, has just as strong an impact on employment as the legal right to 
work for immigrant youth. The unemployment rate fluctuated in the years 2007-2009851 but 
was generally quite stable in comparison to the overall increase experienced across the EU. 
The Polish national labor market has not become more protective towards employment of 
nationals because of the current recession. According to the IOM’s report, the Polish 
government has not made any attempts to introduce more restrictive admission policies due 
to the economic crisis. Similarly, Poland did not introduce any restrictive admission policies 
at the time of the crisis, like some other EU countries did.852 In fact, the economic recession 
has not sparked any significant changes in the number of work permits issued in Poland. It 
might also be assumed, though due to the lack of appropriate data one cannot say with 
certainty, that the economic crisis has not played an important role for the employment of 
those who do not need work permits, either. 
Secondly Polish employers’ skepticism about employing foreign workers might be 
another deciding factor for immigrant integration into the labor market. In fact, employers 
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 Górny, A. et al. (Eds.), op. cit. 
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 Unemployment and Labor Market in Poland 2010. (2011, January 10). Portal Instytucji Rynku 
Pracy (Portal of Labor Market Institution). 
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 Koehler, J., Laczko, F., Aghazarm, C., and Schad, J. (2010). Migration and the Economic Crisis in 
the European Union: Implications for Policy. Brussels: Research and Publications Division, IOM. 
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might not be aware of all legal measures required to employ an immigrant, so that the 
unclear procedures or lack of promotion of foreign workers on the Polish labor market makes 
the demand for the foreigners quite insignificant. As Polish researchers acknowledge, 
immigrants are often thought to be taking jobs away from native workers rather than 
complementing native workers, a point repeatedly emphasized by my interviewees. 
Employers usually hire foreign workers when they cannot find Polish ones with the proper 
skills (e.g. can speak a foreign language or have international experience that immigrants 
usually have) or when the position has been left vacant by Polish workers and cannot be 
easily filled.853 However, employers seem to be less reluctant to employ immigrants once 
they have already had a good experience with one from the same ethnic group.854 
Finally, the segmentation of the Polish labor market among different ethnic groups is 
another important factor for the successful integration of immigrants into the Polish 
workforce.855 This ethnic segmentation has its roots in the Polish transition period, during 
which the labor market was opened for new investments from the West and cheap labor from 
the East. Consequently, since the opening of the borders in the 1990s foreigners from 
Western Europe and the US have found employment on the primary labor market only, 
people from Asia have been employed in the primary and secondary sectors whereas 
foreigners from the former Soviet Union have primarily worked in the low skilled sectors of 
the secondary labor market.856 By the same token, the irregular labor market was and still is 
supported by the employment of the Eastern transit migrants from the East in the low-skill 
sector. The exact figures are not known but according to various estimates they oscillate 
between 0.4 and 3.5 % of the Polish workforce.857 However, the aforementioned recent 
changes in regulations regarding seasonal workers in 2006 might have contributed to 
regularization of irregular workers from Eastern Europe and consequently reduced illegal 
employment.858 The reforms may be regarded as one of the very few first steps taken 
towards labor market integration for youth from the East seeking employment in Poland. On 
the one hand, the seasonal work program is aimed at circular migration and temporary 
migration, whose main objective is not long-term integration.859 On the other hand, the 
program may encourage and enable immigrant youth from the East to look for a longer term 
legal work opportunities in Poland. This might happen through new contacts and networks 
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 See subchapter 5.2.4.  
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 The segmentation of the labor market refers to the division of the labor market into two sectors: the 
primary and secondary sectors, see subchapter 2.2.  
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 Iglicka, K. (2000). Ethnic Division on Emerging Foreign Labor Markets in Poland during the 
Transition Period. Warsaw: Center of Migration Studies. 
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 Górny, A. et al. (Eds.), op. cit. 
858
 The policy has probably resulted in an increase in the number of employers’ declarations to employ 
currently unregistered immigrants, substituting unregistered employment for the legal employment of 
foreigners.  
859
 As mentioned before seasonal programs impose the requirement that immigrants leave the country 
after a period of six months, see subchapter 4.6.5. 
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they might build during the seasonal work, so that they would not need to risk clandestine 
and insecure work. 
The labor market’s ethnic segmentation not only puts immigrants at the risk of having 
little job security but also of having jobs, which do not match their qualifications. Although, as 
mentioned before, no reports are available detailing how many immigrants’ qualifications 
have been recognized in Poland, based on my interviews in Warsaw it appears that both 
long-term and temporary migrants in the low sector find it difficult to make use of their 
qualifications. In many cases immigrants also have qualifications which do not match Polish 
labor market needs.860 In fact, third country nationals in Poland face similar hurdles as in 
other EU countries in matching their current jobs with the qualifications they have obtained. 
The complicated recognition procedures, elaborated in the last section, is not solely a Polish 
problem. Unfortunately, in 2006, in the European rating on Integration, MIPEX, Poland was 
the second to last place in the area of open labor market access to immigrants.861 Time will 
show whether the first simplifications of the procedure for making a work permit application 
and the introduction of more attractive seasonal programs will create more opportunities for 
both immigrants living in Poland now and those who come here in the future. 
In the country where labor is officially allowed as of the age of 16 and where the birth 
rate is decreasing, in the future a demographic priority might lead to opening the Polish labor 
market to those young immigrants who seek future employment across Europe after 
graduation. Most of the current talks about foreign labor in the media are about the 
forthcoming 2012 UEFA European Football Championship (EURO 2012), which has sparked 
a need for foreign labor mostly in the secondary sector. However, the EURO 2012 is instead 
an incentive to fill the labor market gap for low skilled workers in the construction sector, 
which does not necessarily foster immigrants’ potential or their upward mobility. 
The issue of integration measures on the labor market in Poland is still not recognized 
at national level. Consequently, integration of one specific group of immigrant youth has not 
won enough attention among policy makers either. The Polish national mode of integration 
still does not offer favorable conditions for integration management at the local level. The 
facilitating measures seem to come from the EU level rather than from the Polish national 
government. The extent to which these EU and national integration frameworks and 
instruments facilitate and hinder management of local integration will be presented in the 
Polish case study of the city of Warsaw in chapter 5. 
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the EU member states, see subchapter 4.4.3. 
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5 Local Integration Management in the City Case Studies  
 
The different top-down contexts for local integration management of immigrant youth 
on both sides of the Atlantic, presented in chapter 4, demonstrate just how difficult it is to 
establish one universal approach to integration. Neither the US nor the EU has thus far been 
successful in creating a single approach and probably will never be. In fact, even individual 
US states and EU countries have yet to develop immigrant policies which could be applied 
universally at the local level. Integration management of immigrant youth in cities, which are 
the primary gateways for immigrants in countries and states, is powerfully impacted by 
unique local factors which have not yet been mentioned in the analysis of the top-down 
framework. Consequently, this chapter will present local integration frameworks and practical 
efforts toward immigrant integration in city case studies focusing on San Diego, Phoenix, 
Munich and Warsaw. Two levels of consideration and two modes of analysis, collective and 
separate, are at work here. Firstly, the cities will be briefly examined from a comparative 
perspective as the context and gateways to integration for both young immigrants and the 
receiving society. Secondly, the integration work of local organizations will be analyzed 
separately for each local case study against the background of top-down national and state 
policies and the cities’ own mode(s) of integration. 
 
5.1 Local Context: City Integration Profiles  
 
Drawing on the AIM thesis, which posits that integration is a multi-dimensional 
process resulting out of the encounter between the receiving society and immigrants, two 
contexts of integration should be differentiated: city integration contexts for immigrants and 
city integration context for the receiving society. These contexts will be presented through the 
prism of the available statistical data from the end of 2009, the time which marked the 
completion of empirical data collection in these cities. 
The first context is presented in table 5, which gives an overview of the cities’ 
demographics and employment conditions against national averages (in the case of Munich 
and Warsaw) or state averages (in the case of San Diego and Phoenix). In fact, the size and 
economic prosperity of a given city determines the level of available opportunities for young 
immigrants behind its gates. All case studies are quite prosperous metropolises in their 
respective countries and states with a high potential for attracting immigrants from local 
areas. Although the situation on the labor market is slightly worse in American cities in 
comparison to the European ones, overall all cases represent booming economic centers, 
commonly regarded as places with lots of employment opportunities. This might be one of 
the deciding factors in respect to why immigrants choose these cities as their destinations.  
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Table 5 City Integration Context for Immigrants 
(Data for 2009) 
 
 San Diego California Phoenix Arizona Munich Germany Warsaw Poland 
Total 
Population. 
[thousand]1 
1,306 38,293 1,594 6,596 1,330 81,802 1,714 38,167 
Area [km2]  963 423,970 1,344 295,254 310 357,114 516 312,679 
Unemploy-
ment rate2 10.3 % 12.2 % 8.3% 9.7% 5.8% 7,8% 2.9% 11.9 % 
Average 
salary 
*hourly 
**monthly3 
22.53 $* 23,82 $* 19.50 $* 19.67 $* [4290 $] ** 4608 $ ** 1561 $ ** 1107 $ ** 
 
Sources:  
1 2009 American Community Survey, German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), Central Statistical 
Office in Poland  
2
 US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistisches Amt München – ZIMAS., Polish 
Central Statistical Office 
3 Government Revenue in the United States of America, Eurostat, Statistisches Amt München – 
ZIMAS. (Available data are only for the State of Bavaria, it is assumed that the average salary in 
Munich is higher). 
 
City integration context for the receiving society refers to the migration situation which 
native residents confront in these cities. The numerical picture of this situation is presented 
through the scale and types of migration inflows into the cities in table 6. In comparison to the 
other cities’ migration situation, Warsaw significantly differs, with the share of foreigners of 
the total population more than 20 times lower. The most diversified immigrant groups in 2009 
were found in Munich whereas the largest proportion of one single group was reported in 
Phoenix (61% of Mexicans). The percentage of immigrant youth among whole youth 
population was very high in Munich (28%) and quite large in Phoenix (22%), whereas fewer 
young immigrants were reported in San Diego (15% of the whole young population). 
While the countries of immigrants’ origin are similar in American cities, no such trend 
can be seen in Munich and Warsaw. Such a difference could be viewed as surprising, since 
the difference in distance between the two cities in two neighboring US states and the two 
cities of two neighboring EU varies by only slightly more than 300 km.862 This shows that the 
metropolis of Warsaw still attracts the traditional Polish immigrants from the countries of the 
former Soviet-Bloc: Asians and East Europeans. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
862
 The distance between Warsaw and Munich is 810 km, between San Diego and Phoenix 490 km. 
  
247 
Table 6 City Integration Context for the Host Society  
(Data for 2009) 
 
 
San Diego1 Phoenix2 Munich3 
Warsaw 
[Masovian 
Voivodeship]4 
Total foreign 
born  325,819 346,430 308,569 
No data available 
[33,930] 
Percent foreign 
population 25% 22% 
25% 
(36% people with a 
migration background) 
[0,7%] (?) 
Share of 
immigrant youth 
of total youth  
*(18-24)       
**(18-25) 
15%* 25%* 28%** No data available 
Top 5 countries 
of origin 
(percentage of 
all foreigners)  
Mexico (61%) 
Canada (4%)    
India (3%), 
Philippines (3%) 
China (2%) 
Mexico (48%) 
Philippines (13%) 
Vietnam (5%)           
China (4%)         
Iraq (2%) 
Turkey (13%) 
Croatia (8%) 
Austria (7%) 
Italy (7%) 
Greece (7%) 
[Ukraine (20%) 
Vietnam (16%) 
Belarus (8%) 
Russia (6%) 
China (3%)] 
Gateway 
category5 
emerging gateway post-World War II 
gateway  
continuous gateway pre-emerging 
gateway (coming 
soon?) 
 
Sources:  
1 2009 American Community Survey. Data on top 5 countries of origin refer to San Diego-Carlsbad-
San Marcos, CA Metro Area.  
2 2009 American Community Survey. Data on top 5 countries of origin refer to Phoenix-Mesa-
Scottsdale, AZ Metro Area. 
3 Statistisches Amt München – ZIMAS. 
4 Polish Office for Foreigners. Due to the shortcoming of the Polish methods of collecting data on 
immigrants, data on foreigners are only available for voivodeships, not for the cities. According to the 
estimates from 2002, 71 % of foreigners in Masovian Voivodeship lived in Warsaw. 863 It is assumed 
that today foreigners account for about 1,5% population in Warsaw. Improvements in monitoring the 
numbers of immigrants in Poland are expected in 2011. 
5
 On the basis of Audrey Singers’ terminology, see chapter 3. 
 
5.2 Integration Work  
 
Differing city integration profiles lead to unique conditions for the development of 
integration initiatives within city gates. On the other hand, organizations in the local case 
studies frequently face similar challenges in carrying out integration work locally. The 
analysis of the similarities and differences in managing the integration of immigrant youth in 
the different cities will be guided by the thematic topics of the interview questions employed 
in the research.864 Accordingly, the following issues, which focus on the labor market 
integration of immigrant youth, will be discussed in each case study against the background 
of top-down integration policies and the local integration context:  
- understanding of immigrant integration  
- integration challenges  
                                                     
863
 Piekut, A. (2008). Foreigners in Warsaw. Warsaw: Center of Migration Research.   
864
 For more on interview question groups, see subchapter 3.6. 
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- integration measures 
- reaching out to immigrants and the host society  
- network-building  
I would like to point out from the beginning that the analysis of the local case studies will be 
based on data collected during the period of my field work in the cities, which preceded 
certain important developments in both the state and national policies discussed in chapter 
4.865 Moreover, the account of local integration management will be presented through the 
lens of interviews held with a limited number of organizations and therefore cannot be 
considered comprehensive enough to draw general conclusions about all organizations 
working in the field of immigrant integration in a given city. Nevertheless, the profiles of the 
organizations interviewed encompass all important fields of work toward the integration of 
immigrant youth: education, workforce development, special refugee programs,866 as well as 
municipal offices involved in immigrant integration work. It is noteworthy that the scope of the 
programs discussed is not always restricted to the particular city but sometimes 
encompasses other metropolitan regions. Appendix 2 provides an overview of the 
interviewees and their institutions on a city by city basis.  
 
5.2.1 San Diego  
 
5.2.1.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration  
 
It is almost impossible to avoid the subject of undocumented immigrants when talking 
about immigrant integration in the border city San Diego, “the birthplace” of the first border 
fence on the Mexican–US border. Nevertheless, few respondents’ interpretations of the 
integration process were determined by the legal status of the immigrants. Perhaps because 
of the proximity to Mexico and the fact that immigrants have always been an integral part of 
San Diegans’ daily lives, undocumented immigrants seem to have already blended into the 
city structure.867 As the 2007 Immigration Survey of San Diego County Voters showed, most 
respondents believe that undocumented immigrants are trying to make a better life for 
themselves and their families and returning all undocumented immigrants in the US to their 
countries of birth is impractical.868 
                                                     
865
 Consequently, changes in the scope of integration work as well as the positions of interviewees in 
their organizations may have undergone certain changes in the meantime. For more on the empirical 
research methodology, see chapter 3. 
866
 Refugee programs often constitute a separate and distinct unit of immigrant integration work. 
867
 This contrasts with those in new immigration gateways for unauthorized populations, like in 
Phoenix.  
868
 See the report: Immigrant Rights Consortium of San Diego County (2007). Immigration Survey of 
San Diego County Voters. Presentation. 
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From the outset, most of the organizations I interviewed interpreted immigrant 
integration through the lens of their program goals: integration stands for what they are trying 
to achieve through their work. Two interesting interpretations of integration, proposed by 
Pedro Rios from American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), illustrate the processes of 
integration in San Diego: survival in the short term and adaptation in the long term. In the 
long run, as Rios pointed out, for those who do not have a work permit but wish to stay there 
is no standard way to integrate into the labor market. In practice, however, many immigrants 
simply want to survive and fit in, to be able to earn money, and later return to their home 
countries. They have no aspirations to become American citizens. Consequently, the AFSC 
views integration as a formal relationship between immigrants and Americans which can be 
proved by documents. As Rios maintained, “[i]n a more realistic sense, integration is 
acquiring the job where they can get their paycheck to meet the immediate needs of their 
families [….]”869  
Following the principles of the US Refugee Program, Mike McKay at Resettlement 
Agency Catholic Charities considered the integration of immigrants into American society as 
the process of immigrants “getting on their own feet” and becoming independent: “that is the 
work of the agency, to make them [refugees] realize they have to start on their own like every 
American has to do.” In other words, integration of immigrant youth means that they have the 
same opportunities as American youth. According to McKay, nobody will give immigrants 
assistance in achieving the goals which every American has to achieve on his or her own, 
e.g. obtaining an entry-level job to afford studying. Consequently the sooner immigrants learn 
the language, the better their chances of speeding up the process of attaining equal 
opportunity with other Americans.870 
In fact, not only English language skills but also bilingualism were emphasized quite 
often by most interviewees as a key to success in San Diego for both immigrants and 
Americans. As Bobby Brown from Job Corps remarked, “[i]t is increasingly important to 
speak Spanish now. It can hinder them [immigrants] not to speak English, but it is a plus to 
speak Spanish. No matter how we stand on immigration issues, it is important that folks are 
bilingual.”871 San Diego is a living example of how both immigrants and the host society 
influence each other and change the demands of the local labor market and the conventions 
of social interaction.872 Many organizations interviewed emphasized the indispensable 
contributions immigrants make to the development of local economies. As Kurt Farrington 
from Youth One Stop Career Center reported, people in San Diego “have been dealing with 
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 During my field visit to an informal pickup site for day laborers in front of the Home Depot in San 
Diego, I came across a group of seven men waiting to be hired. Ironically, there was one American 
man who was not able to communicate with the other six who were immigrants and spoke only 
Spanish.  
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immigrants for years” and consequently the immigrant population has become deeply 
involved in the economic structure of the city.873  
However, fast integration through gaining employment as quickly a possible, is not 
always considered the best option for young immigrants. As Christina Piranio, coordinator of 
Youth Programs at the International Rescue Committee (IRC), pointed out, immigrant youth 
should first learn about the American system of education and become familiar with the 
norms and values, in order to feel that a city is a safe and secure place, not only physically 
but also psychologically. San Diego should become the place where they can be accepted 
as they are: “Integration is about learning from the standpoint where you really are and at the 
same time celebrating where you really come from …” 874 Consequently, the development of 
immigrants’ emotions and skills should be fostered by setting high career expectations, like a 
college education sometime in the future. “Education should be first” - said Somsack 
Thongchanh, a police service officer and the coordinator of the San Diego Asian Youth 
Organization (SDAYO).875 In fact, many organizations admitted that some immigrants seek 
only fast and easy employment opportunities but do not want to learn English and obtain an 
education. By the same token, young immigrants easily go through a downward integration 
to the margins of San Diego society. In fact, a lack of motivation among immigrants often 
results in drug addictions and frustration, Waldo Lopez from the Day Labor Center 
observed.876 Consequently, many organizations regard the labor market integration of 
immigrant youth as more than getting a low-skilled job but first and foremost as something 
requiring continuing education. 
Immigrants’ involvement in their communities was considered the third important 
element, alongside employment and education, for immigrant integration. Since many 
immigrants in San Diego still cluster within ethnic enclaves,877 the development of their own 
organizations and leadership skills in their communities is considered a higher priority. As the 
representatives of SDAYO emphasized, they want to see their community involved in their 
youth programs: “everybody is supposed to be a leader.”878 According to the philosophy of 
the community development agency Casa Familiar in the community of San Yzidro, the next 
important step for immigrant integration is to find a way to “integrate outside of the 
community” and to “live up to [the standards of] a larger and more diverse society.”879 In 
other words, integrating into the city in San Diego is not merely a question of mixing in with 
the host society but also with other immigrant groups.  
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 See subchapter 5.1. 
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879
 Interviews SD/2 and SD/3.  
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5.2.1.2 Integration Challenges  
 
One integration challenge young immigrants face is breaking away from their own 
communities and escaping future labor market segregation. As many organizations 
emphasized, the connections immigrants have to establish are prerequisites for finding a job 
in the city.880 In fact, immigrants’ networks are often restricted to their ethnic communities. 
Consequently, the occupations of certain immigrant groups do not reflect the level of their 
skills but common ethnic origins. As Doug Elliot at Career Development Services remarked, 
the first generation of every group of immigrants confronts similar difficulties and people do 
not even realize that certain ethnic groups are working in certain professions. A stereotype in 
San Diego is that East Africans (usually from Somalia and Ethiopia), for example, work as 
taxi drivers, while Iraqis and Iranians find employment in liquor stores, Mexicans work 
predominantly as cooks, even in Chinese restaurants, and Filipinos take jobs as nurses.881  
Without providing more specific details, the IRC claimed that some refugee groups 
even seek illegal employment in their established communities, which of course has a 
negative impact on their future employment opportunities.882 As Elliot pointed out, although 
San Diego is a big city, it tends to operate at times like a small town, and it is very easy to 
earn a certain reputation. Therefore, immigrant youth need to learn the system of getting a 
job in the city: “it is actually not about who you know, but who knows you,” Elliot said. 
Consequently getting outside the ethnic community and gaining a reputation as a reliable 
and skilled worker is one sign of integration success for immigrant youth.  
Credentials are certainly tools which can help immigrants to establish a good 
reputation as an educated professional. As counselor Sheyla Castillo from Transfer Academy 
remarked, “the tricky procedure of evaluation of foreign qualifications” in the US makes life 
difficult for educated immigrants in San Diego.  Paradoxically, too many credits earned 
abroad may hinder acceptance by a university.883 As Castillo asserted, sometimes 
immigrants attend a particular higher education institution in San Diego only because the 
institution director is more lenient about formal recognition than in other schools.  
In general, young immigrants in San Diego have found integration easier, and they 
are more willing to take risks, in comparison to older generations of immigrants, according to 
my source at Casa Familiar. On the other hand, they have to become more confident in 
using verbal and non-verbal communication to adjust to American realties. Quite often this 
takes place at the cost of rejecting their own cultural values and traits, as well as their 
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 Students earn three credits for each course they take at the university level. If students have too 
many credits, they might be considered seniors so some universities will not accept them. Interview 
SD/10. 
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language, even in a society as multicultural as San Diego.884 Marilyn Harvey from Transfer 
Career Center argued, “American society is more much into the looks, hair, body … I know 
the students who take the wrap-up off when they enter the school.” 
 Finally, the perseverance and motivation of immigrant youth quite often depends on 
parental involvement as well as the country of origin. For example, high drop-out rates have 
been reported by Job Corps among those who have an affiliation with the Mexican border 
city of Tijuana. It seems that having relatives just across the border sometimes distracts 
young immigrants from completing their education in San Diego. As Brown admitted, 
immigrant students often leave the campus, cross the border, and Job Corps staff never hear 
from them again. Supposedly, they usually leave for family reasons. Either they have to earn 
a living or take care of their families in Mexico. 
Integration challenges immigrant youth face in San Diego are obviously harsher for 
the undocumented than the documented. Federal programs such as Job Corps or youth 
programs funded by WIA money are unavailable to the undocumented in San Diego and 
elsewhere. Those without a work permit cannot easily find employers because companies 
have become more cautious about hiring somebody with a fake social security number, 
locally known as chuecos.885 They prefer to hire immigrants with a regulated status, which 
automatically improves employment prospects for refugees.886 
Nevertheless, due to the introduction of slightly more liberal immigration policies in 
California, the problems which unauthorized immigrant youth face in San Diego are not as 
bad as those faced by immigrants living in Arizona cities.887 First of all, under the provisions 
of the California Immigrant Higher Education Act (AB 540) certain undocumented immigrants 
are granted in-state tuition, which guarantees them equal access to higher education with all 
other California residents,888 although undocumented students still cannot apply for federal 
and state grants and loans. Because the City of San Diego boasts “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
sanctuary policies,889 most of the public and private organizations interviewed tend to be 
more open about the issues of unauthorized youth, either trying to find funds for their 
education or options for legalizing their status, as the next section of this subchapter will 
show. Consequently, the undocumented can approach many institutions with more trust and 
less fear of deportation, although the ICE raids in the vicinity of the cities are still common. In 
fact, most undocumented immigrant youth, hereafter immigrant border youth (IB youth),890 
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live in rural areas surrounding the City of San Diego and are thus excluded from the 
protection offered by the sanctuary policies. As Rios pointed out, more recently IB youth 
have often been as young as eleven. They try to make ends meet working in the fields 
around San Diego to support their families across the border. For this segmented group, AB 
540 cannot help them deal with their disadvantages and insecurities about the future: they 
lack English language fluency, cultural competence, access to education resources, and can 
easily fall prey to border vigilantes. They are often completely dependent on their employers, 
working every day in the fields or on construction sites without much hope or time for any 
educational advancement. In fact, some of them abandoned their education and aspirations 
in their home countries to earn in the US.891 
 
5.2.1.3 Integration Measures  
 
No official City of San Diego immigrant integration policy exists which would set the 
framework for immigrant integration work. The Citizens Equal Opportunity Commission and 
the Human Rights Commission are the city agencies which advise the mayor, City Council, 
Civil Service Commission, and other agencies of city government on issues concerning equal 
opportunity, including equal opportunity in employment for various ethnic groups in San 
Diego.892 Nevertheless, without much steering from the city, various public and private non-
profit organizations offer a wide range of measures for integrating immigrants of various age 
groups into the labor market. Quite often they have a long tradition of working within various 
ethnic communities in the city and its surroundings.  
Integration work for youth is either part of the comprehensive intergenerational 
community programs, like those of the community development agency Casa Familiar or 
specific youth projects, which rarely aim only at immigrant youth. Integration work for 
refugees in the ORR programs in San Diego is one of the few exceptions. The resettlement 
agency Catholic Charities, federally funded by ORR’s Wilson Fish Program, is responsible 
for orientation programs solely targeting refugee families. The programs provide language 
training and a case manager for each refugee family. The manager acts “as an anchor” for 
refugee youth by offering them potential educational opportunities and fast job placement 
options.893 On the other hand, the IRC, another leading resettlement agency in San Diego, 
has managed to develop programs for other disadvantaged immigrant youth, primarily 
through funds from private donors. “That is why we are able to serve not only the refugee 
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population but anyone who is in the need,” said Piranio, explaining the rationale behind fund-
raising from sources other than the ORR program.894 As a result the IRC’s After School 
Youth Program can provide additional academic assistance and college preparation 
resources to all immigrant newcomers at the Crawford Educational Complex, one of the most 
diverse campuses in the San Diego Unified School District. In addition to educational 
support, the IRC organizes enrichment activities, such as workshops, tournaments, and field 
trips to the City of San Diego. All of these activities aim to develop the young people’s skills, 
interests, tolerance of cultural differences, and to foster integration with the community 
outside of the school and the white American society.895 The main pedagogical method of the 
program is to establish dialog with young immigrants rather than provide authoritarian 
teaching. As the program manager pointed out: 
 
We do not encourage to change students. We often have to communicate that things are done 
different in the US, so sometimes you have to change to be successful [….] We do not teach 
them that in the classroom, but in conversation[,] we provide this space for conversation 
during the program activities. You can call it counseling, [but] we do not.896 
 
In fact, this interdisciplinary immigrant youth program has become a model for other refugee 
agencies, as the next subchapter will show. 
Surprisingly, not all youth programs promote a similar intercultural dialog between 
different ethnic groups, as promoted by the IRC program. As the representatives of SDAYO 
admitted, they are open for everybody; however, they do not mix activities with other ethnic 
groups such as the African Youth Program or the Latino Youth Program: “Everybody has the 
same goal to work within your own ethnic groups.”897 Of note, though, is the fact that SDAYO 
focuses on the development of leadership and organizational skills under the supervision of 
adult advisors from the San Diego Police Department. The activities range from fun activities 
to fundraising and establishing contact with the business sector for SDAYO’s young 
members, who are usually 13-18 years of age. It is a unique cooperation between immigrant 
youth and police officers who exemplify a true commitment to immigrant integration and 
youth development, breaking down the barriers of fear and mistrust of the police in the ethnic 
communities.898  
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The San Diego Police Department’s immigrant integration initiatives are in fact rather 
small in comparison to those of other important San Diego public stakeholders in youth labor 
market integration. San Diego Continuing Education (SDCE), a non-credit educational 
institution which is part of the San Diego Community College District (SDCCD), the public 
community college division in the city, provides a wide range of courses and programs, most 
of which are free, to support older immigrant youth who need ELL or GDE preparation 
courses, citizenship classes, or want to proceed with higher education.899 A special, relatively 
new unit – Career Development Service – focuses exclusively on the transition into the 
workforce of all interested applicants for the career preparation program. The unit offers 
workforce counseling, online resources, contacts with employers, job fairs, and labor market 
information. As career counselor Elliot put it, his service functions as “workforce brokers,” 
mediating the relationship between the business community and the students.900  
Another noteworthy new division of the SDCE, the Advanced ESL Transfer Academy, 
offers extra counseling to higher-level ESL groups with at least a Bachelor’s degree. As the 
Academy’s counselor Castillo remarked, her clients usually have different backgrounds and 
educational needs than limited-literacy ESL students. They do not necessarily want to 
immediately find jobs but hope to develop their English competencies and professional 
careers in the US. Workshops on the US education system, labor market education 
opportunities, and recognition of qualifications are at the core of the innovative program.901 
Additionally, as a local coordinator of CalWORKs confirmed, SDCE also offers eligible 
documented young adults with children a state welfare work-study program.902 During the 
intake assessment, the counselor helps eligible immigrants determine their personal 
interests, strengths, and the job fields which would best match their qualifications and/or 
interests.903 
Moreover, in cooperation with the San Diego Unified School District, the San Diego 
Community College District provides a unique opportunity to less motivated and younger 
students to get a taste of college education and on-the-job training in a 16 week program at 
City Middle College (CMC). The aim of the program is to boost the motivation and confidence 
of low-performing students who are at risk of dropping out of Garfield High School, a San 
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Diego school with many immigrant students, both documented and undocumented. Each 
student who participates in the program goes through a preparation course, a so-called “get-
ready-for-the-catapult/boot camp,” on the school premises. The course focuses on team-
building, creative problem-solving, study skills, and career awareness. Only later does a 
student attend college classes, assisted by a private mentor, usually a college peer student. 
Employment preparation courses, including visiting various vocational programs, and career 
planning are important components of the college units. Finally, the course ends with a two 
week internship. As one CMC counselor noted, the program has successfully lowered the 
drop out rate and helped more Garfield students improve their educational performance.904  
One of the important funding sources for workforce development measures for 
eligible youth in the city comes from the Local Workforce Investment Board of the San Diego 
Workforce Partnership, a non-profit organization that manages job-training programs, 
including one-stop career centers, on behalf of the City and County of San Diego. The 
Workforce Partnership grants federal WIA money not only to public institutions like the San 
Diego Community College District, but also to many youth service providers who facilitate the 
school-to-work transition of at-risk youth, aged 14 to 21. Some of the providers target more 
specific groups, like the One Stop Youth Center which serves only pupils from a nearby 
Juvenile Court and Community School (JCCS): students who were expelled or are 
delinquent, living with a foster family, homeless, gang-affiliated, or on probation. Others 
youth service providers like ACCESS YES Transition Network are open to a wider variety of 
groups of low-income students who are either enrolled in a regular public high school and 
need assistance in obtaining a high school diploma, or those who attend Charter Schools or 
simply want to sign up for GED courses.905 Nevertheless, each of the WIA youth providers 
can also serve immigrant youth with documents, following WIA criteria guidelines.  
However, helping those without a Social Security Number is only possible in cases 
when the regulations of program donators do not explicitly prohibit serving the 
undocumented population. Consequently, the After School Youth Program of IRC, financed 
by the California Department of Education’s ASSETs Program, is open to all immigrants 
regardless of their status.906 Similarly, Casa Familiar manages to obtain city and county 
community development grants which do not exclude services to the undocumented. As 
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Andrea Skorepa confirmed, “everybody can come to us; we do not care if you have papers or 
not.”907 Moreover, most of the organizations interviewed were talking openly about those who 
provide assistance to undocumented immigrants and, as they admitted, they tend to refer 
their undocumented clients to those who can provide help. For instance, the CEO of 
Workforce Partnership Mark Cafferty frankly admitted that resource centers at One Stop 
Career Centers are generally open to the public and consequently the undocumented can 
also use them.908 Some organizations, like ACCESS, even advertise their services to the 
undocumented population on their websites: “For nearly ten years, we have directed our 
efforts toward assisting Mexican immigrants, especially those who have no legal status in the 
US.”  
Moreover, undocumented people are the main focus of the work of some pro-
immigration groups in the city, the organization Border Angels among them. Founded by 
Enrique Morones, Border Angels gathers volunteers and activists fighting racial-
discrimination crimes against immigrants. In the San Diego area, their main goal is to prevent 
the deaths of individuals crossing the Imperial Valley desert areas and the mountain areas 
surrounding San Diego County. In the city, they provide undocumented day laborers water 
and food at the informal pick-up sites and also hold community forums with immigrants, 
encouraging them to integrate, to get an education and better jobs. The Project Voice, a 
more structured integration program for the undocumented, led by the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC), trains immigrant communities on leadership and labor market 
rights in the US. 
Nonetheless, some organizations remain wary of talking about serving the 
undocumented. As Elliot admitted, 
 
The official policy is “don’t ask, don’t tell.” We do not ask people whether they are here legally 
or illegally, and we do not want them even to tell, because when they tell, once we find out, 
technically we are not supposed to teach them.909  
 
Similarly a CMC counselor was afraid of talking openly about funds raised to pay the 
tuition for college classes for undocumented students or to support the activities of Migrant 
Rights Awareness (MIRA), a student support group for undocumented students at the 
campus where she works. Neither Job Corps in San Diego, nor Day Labor Center wanted to 
elaborate on the activities of those who support immigrants without documents on the record. 
Nevertheless, it seems that there is a lot more transparency around the issue of providing 
help to undocumented youth in comparison to Phoenix, as subchapter 5.2.2 will show.  
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5.2.1.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society 
 
Many well-established public services for education and vocational training in San 
Diego, like San Diego Community College District or Job Corps, need no special methods for 
recruiting in the city. San Diego Continuing Education is one of the largest institutions of its 
kind in the US and continuing education courses are well-known among immigrants.910 “Job 
Corps sells itself on its own [….] There are lots of things we can offer a younger person they 
cannot get anywhere,” Brown said. Immigrant youth usually learn about these opportunities 
by word of mouth, and few organizations think they need to run information campaigns. 
According to SDAYO, peer pressure is the best technique to involve others: “pulling my 
friends is pulling your friends.”911  
Offering comprehensive family programs for immigrant communities is an important 
way of engaging immigrant youth in education and in labor market readiness courses. As 
Skorepa pointed out, a holistic approach to organizing educational programs for the 
community is very important. Adults who come to Casa Familiar to attend Parent Education 
Programs encourage their children to participate in a wide range of projects targeting youth: 
for example, courses in entrepreneurship or modern technology.912  
Certainly few integration offers can reach those who live outside the communities, like 
San Ysidro where Casa Familiar works. Just the same, some immigrant youth on the 
margins are not aware of the opportunities they have. To my question “Porque no quieres 
aprender Inglés (Why don’t you want to learn English),” a young day laborer from Guatemala 
in his 20s who couldn’t speak English said that he did not know anything about English 
language courses although he had been in San Diego for several years. Similarly, IB youth 
cannot even think about accessing the wide range of ESL courses in the sanctuary city. 
Fortunately, some clandestine civil society initiatives, friends of the Border Angels, try to give 
them a small taste of integration into American society and education. Weekly meetings after 
church services are a common place for English tutorials. This is a potential site for IB youth 
to come into contact with other immigrants and those Americans who want to interact with 
them and help the unauthorized in the local San Diego area.913 
Many of the above-mentioned integration initiatives targeting immigrant youth are the 
work of US born San Diegans. In fact, some institutions and agencies offer volunteer or paid 
opportunities to engage in work for underprivileged and immigrant youth. For example, the 
IRC recruits college students who are seeking internship opportunities in the field of 
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education as volunteer tutors for The After School Program. San Diego City College 
students, in turn, are recruited as paid CMC mentors to assist Garfield students in their first 
college classes. Activist groups like Border Angels bring together volunteers to work with IB 
youth or to assist border crossers on the deserts. Through media campaigns as well as 
scientific research, the AFSC makes waves about immigrants’ potential and the civil rights of 
immigrants, breaking taboos about unauthorized immigration in the city.  
 
5.2.1.5 Network-Building 
 
Network-building for immigrants, including immigrant youth, is an integral part of the 
integration work of civil society organizations in San Diego. In fact, during most of the 
interviews I was referred to at least three other partner organizations with which I should get 
in touch to get a more comprehensive understanding of the management of integration work 
in the city. Education about network building for immigrant rights is at the forefront of 
community building programs, like Project Voice of the AFSC, which provides guidelines and 
technical support for cooperation between immigrant communities and potential allies. As 
Rios pointed out, “[e]ach community group is not alone; they are part of a larger network. Our 
challenge is to help them and to find the way to communicate with each other.”914 
Additionally, the AFSC chairs the San Diego Rights Consortium (SDRC), a notable example 
of a fairly new (established in 2007) cross sector collaboration of twenty-two community, 
faith, labor, and legal organizations, based in the city (see appendix 3) The core goals of the 
network include supporting comprehensive immigration reform, fighting anti-immigration 
policies that violate the human rights of immigrants, educating immigrants about their rights, 
and informing the public about the important contributions immigrants make to the local 
society.915  
The City of San Diego Human Relations Commission’s membership in the SDRC 
marks a significant engagement on the part of the city government in integration initiatives for 
immigrants. Moreover, the city also indirectly supports network-building among main 
workforce stakeholders through a consortium with San Diego County in the Workforce 
Partnership. Regular meetings of the Workforce Partnership Youth Council gather county 
youth service providers who are beneficiaries of WIA grants, and offers a platform for 
exchanging ideas and potentially collaborating on the issues of immigrant youth. It is not 
clear, however, to what extent the grant winners are willing to collaborate. Mark Nanzer from 
the Metro Region Career Center could only confirm that competition among NGOs hinders 
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cooperation.916 As a contact at Casa Familiar warned, many non-profits have become “for 
profits,” they have lost passion and have just become service providers, boasting about what 
they are doing. She also admitted that some immigration activists “[…] believe in their own 
press and are talking the talk but not walking the walk.”917 However, it might be argued that 
they do not want to get headlines out of vanity but simply want bring to light local immigration 
issues that the wider public – both local and national – may not be aware of.918 This is true 
for local organizations like Border Angels, who are not part of any national or worldwide 
network as are the International Rescue Committee or the American Friends Service 
Committee. In fact, for smaller organizations, going public is an important way of creating 
networks, gaining recognition, attracting volunteers, and reaching out to possible sponsors 
for their integration work. 
 
5.2.2 Phoenix 
 
5.2.2.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration 
 
In none of the other case studies is immigrant integration such a controversial topic 
as in Phoenix. At the time of my empirical research in May 2008, nearly a year and a half 
after the passing of Proposition 300 and a full year after the passing of Arizona's Employer 
Sanctions Law, Phoenix was already the hot spot for US debates on immigration policies. 
Consequently, the interviewees’ interpretation of immigrant integration presented here 
usually depends on the point of reference: integration of documented or undocumented 
immigrant youth. In fact, in Phoenix having legal status in the US is considered the main 
prerequisite for successful integration. The idea seems to be that once you have a job, you 
have already been integrated into the city. “Just” to be able to work legally you have to show 
proof of your legal residency. Jany Deng, a Somalian refugee at the AZ Lost Boys Center, 
claimed that if you do not have a job you will be isolated from your community. Interestingly 
enough, employment was considered even more important than education and learning the 
English language, since “[once you have a job] you have the resources to be a positive 
member of the community, which means you pay taxes, you are mobile, you buy food, and 
you are not a drain on the society.”919 Accordingly, in order to integrate you have to compete, 
you have to learn the language on the work site, and you must overcome cultural barriers. 
The approach to integration at the AZ Lost Boys Center is reminiscent of the general position 
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of the ORR on the integration of refugees in the United States, which puts an emphasis on 
resettled people becoming self-sufficient in the shortest possible period of time.920 For 
obvious reasons, educators offered other points of views, placing great value on schooling as 
the first step toward integration. Post-high school education and college courses were 
thought to keep immigrants on the track to success. The ORR subcontractor, IRC in Phoenix, 
also questioned the pressure put on immigrant youth to make their way into the labor market 
as quickly as possible. “Children should be children. In the long term we want to help them to 
develop into the labor market. We want to focus on how to develop them into adults rather 
than how they are part of the labor market now,”- pointed out Jennifer Doran, program 
manager of the IRC’s Family and Youth Services.921 Moreover, education also constitutes a 
way of surviving and integrating into society for youth without a Social Security Number. 
Trino Sandoval at Phoenix College argued that continuing education, and not job placement, 
seems to be the only reasonable plan for the near future for all undocumented youth, who 
will otherwise face harsh punishment for working in Arizona.922 
The City of Phoenix has no agency which deals with immigrant integration as a 
concept and there is no official city policy. Generally, the phrase “immigrant integration” 
appears to be rarely used in the city government’s daily work.923 Many of the community-
based organizations interviewed also seemed unclear about what integration actually meant 
once they started thinking about the concept during the interviews. Consequently, those who 
deal with integration work on a daily basis usually called the process something else. Several 
reasons for these differences could be observed. Jacquelyn Ehrenberg of the Florence 
Project, which provides legal services to men, women, and unaccompanied children detained 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Arizona, admitted that in her organization 
they have not defined integration, as they lack the capacity to develop any comprehensive 
programs which would address services other than legal counseling.924 Charles Shipman, 
Arizona State Refugee Coordinator with headquarters in Phoenix, drew attention to 
differences in the understanding of integration between Europe and the US: “In America, 
even in refugee resettlement, you talk about dependence and independence and not about 
integration.”925 Shipman went on to say that integration is more about giving immigrants 
equal access to opportunities and freedom of choice in the American society, but said 
immigrants must choose what they want. Consequently, integration in America does not so 
much involve taking care of immigrants as European models seem to imply. In fact, similar to 
                                                     
920
 For more on the concept of integration developed by the ORR, see subchapter 4.1.2. For more on 
a similar approach to integration by refugee agencies in San Diego, see subchapter 5.2.1.1.                                                                                
921
 Interview P/10. 
922
 Interview P/8. 
923
 Based on unrecorded informal conversations with representatives of the Public Information Office, 
the City of Phoenix.  
924
 Interview P/6. 
925
 Interview P/13. 
  
262
the federal level, the rhetoric of integration is quite new in Phoenix. Raul Yzaguirre, former 
President and CEO of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) remarked, “we don’t often 
use the word integration in this country.”926 
No organization interpreted integration as a two way process which also imposes 
changes on the American society, as if a binary opposition existed between the two groups: 
the immigrants and American society. Identification with a given group depended on the 
background of a particular organization or interviewee. Obviously, representatives of Latino 
organizations, such as Friendly House or Chicanos por La Causa, seemed to identify with 
the Latino immigrant population. Acculturation to them is forgetting their Latino roots; 
assimilation, in turn, means working hard, learning English but still living in the worlds of two 
cultures, as Yzaguirre pointed out.927 
The subject of immigrants in the workforce is a very loaded issue in light of the 
recently-introduced, obligatory E-verification system in Arizona and the lack of a 
comprehensive immigration reform program in the country. Bitterness and skepticism 
seemed to prevail among civil society organizations which serve the undocumented in 
Phoenix.928 Anthony Alberta, from Chicanos por la Causa, summarized the approach of 
American society to the labor market integration of immigrants ironically: “I am encouraging 
you and your grandchildren to pick lettuce because we will need somebody to do so.”929 He 
saw the core problem of illegal employment being agricultural employers who offer illegal 
work in the fields, rather than urban life in Phoenix. In general, the impression that immigrant 
integration in Phoenix is a very touchy issue prevailed among most of the respondents from 
both governmental and non-governmental organizations. None of them seemed to approve 
of federal migration policy, harsh Arizona immigration laws, and the controversial raids of 
Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County. Many of these issues, in fact, overshadowed 
discussions of integration challenges for immigrant youth in Phoenix. 
 
5.2.2.2 Integration Challenges 
 
Propaganda against the undocumented hinders the integration of immigrant youth in 
Phoenix, for both those with and without papers, and causes a rift in discussions on local 
integration challenges. In fact, those organizations which deal with both groups on a daily 
basis tend to shift their attention towards the integration hurdles of the unauthorized 
population, which for obvious reasons are more challenging than those of legally-residing 
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immigrants. In fact, the hot topic of the precarious situation of people without documents in 
Phoenix fairly often took over all discussion about possible challenges faced by other 
immigrant groups, who were sometimes no longer even considered “immigrants.”930 On the 
other hand, in interviews with representatives of the City of Phoenix agencies and refugee 
resettlement agencies, who are not supposed to serve the undocumented, concentrated 
primarily on other groups of young immigrants, who purportedly mingle with others and do 
not stand out as a special, vulnerable group.931 
At the postsecondary education level, those who have papers have no trouble 
obtaining financial aid, a part time job, or gaining admission to a work-study program, 
Sandoval pointed out.932 However, teachers at the K12 level pointed to education challenges 
such as the lack of bilingual education and enough ESL language programs or the lack of 
parental involvement in the education of their children. Those whose immigrant parents do 
not understand the American education system face more challenges in Phoenix.933 
Nevertheless, at the high school level, a high drop out rate is reported among both immigrant 
and American youth. Therefore, remedial tutoring and motivation programs are needed for 
both groups, without clearly differentiating who is an immigrant and who is not, as the work of 
the youth service provider Arizona Call a Teen Center emphasized.934 In fact, motivation is 
sometimes even higher among immigrant students than natives. Sam Georgia from Job 
Corps Phoenix argued that immigrant students are even more motivated and independent. 
Their integration into Job Corps is said to be quite high there: 
 
They take more advantage of the education and not as much of social activities; they try to 
more get a job and earn money […] They strive a lot harder to accomplish what they are set 
up to do. They know what they want, they devote themselves to prospering in the future. They 
are on a mission. […] They don’t play the games, they are not yet Americanized.935 
 
However, organizations which tend to deal more with refugees in Phoenix put more 
emphasis on the difficulties than the opportunities young immigrants face: a lack of trust in 
people, the struggle with cultural barriers, post-traumatic stress disorder, constant 
competition with natives for jobs, and gaining recognition of the potential they brought from 
their home countries.936 On the other hand, as in San Diego, refugees are much better off on 
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the labor market, ironically because of Arizona’s harsh E-verification policy. They are 
considered a safe group of workers who can prove their legal status. Consequently, 
employers are more eager to approach resettlement agencies in search of potential 
workers.937  
Generally, undocumented youth live in the shadow of Phoenix and have few options 
for integrating into the city workforce system. Most of those who have remained in Phoenix, 
despite Arizona’s new immigration law, are probably hoping that a miracle will occur some 
day and once the DREAM Act or some federal comprehensive immigration reform is passed, 
they will be able to obtain legal status and start working without fear of deportation. 
Apprehended as a result of the enforcement strategy practiced by Sherrif Joe Arpaio in 
Maricopa County,938 long before SB 1070 was passed young undocumented people had 
been especially vulnerable to a fast removal procedure. As Carmen Cornejo, executive 
director of CADENA,939 a Phoenix-based activist group for undocumented students, 
declared, the young just lack knowledge of their legal right to contact a lawyer. When 
stopped by ICE they are easily persuaded to agree to a voluntary departure, land in jail, and 
await removal. Since a car is still the most common means of getting around the city, driving 
without valid documents is the most common trap for undocumented youth in Phoenix.940 
The young who aspire to college or university degrees but cannot prove their legal 
status in Arizona are often forced to abandon their educational goals due to expensive out-of 
state tuition they would have to pay. Sandoval reported that the tuition at Phoenix College is 
more than double for non-residents and the enrollment rate at the college has significantly 
decreased since the passing of Proposition 300. In addition, as mentioned previously, 
Proposition 300 blocked all access to state- and city-funded scholarships for talented but 
unauthorized students in Phoenix.941 Yvonne Watterson, a renowned advocate for 
undocumented students and, at the time of my stay in Phoenix, principal of GateWay Early 
College High School in Phoenix, sadly confessed that the situation has become so grievous 
that the best option for all unauthorized students is simply to leave Phoenix. The best advice 
she could give to her undocumented students, given the current legislation in Arizona, was: 
“Go to a different state, go to a sanctuary city, go where you can get a license, where you 
can enjoy being young…[…] you should be able to move with confidence through your 
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city.”942 Nevertheless, the inspiring stories of Watterson’s undocumented students, who 
managed to graduate from Early College High School programs thanks to private donations, 
show the stamina and resilience of underprivileged immigrant youth in coping with the 
challenges of living in Phoenix. “They need the DREAM, and they will preserve it until it is a 
reality,” Watterson strongly believes.943 
Paradoxically, stringent law enforcement policies against the undocumented in 
Phoenix have cause great hardship for some documented immigrant youth in making the 
school to work transition. Adolescents from mixed status families are often compelled to earn 
a living for their families or even to take care of their younger siblings, who are orphaned, for 
all intents and purposes, since their parents have been deported from Phoenix.944 
Additionally, the fear of parents being deported leaves a deep scar on the development of 
school-age children, as Tammy Tusek, principal of Crockett Elementary School, reported.945 
In fact, integration challenges in Phoenix effect not only the undocumented but also people 
with brown skin color who are frequently suspected of being illegal aliens and thus face racial 
profiling, as many organizations attested. Luis Enriquez, from Friendly House, pointed out 
that the problem of “Brown America” is spreading across the nation but is especially 
noticeable in Arizona and Phoenix.946 
 
5.2.2.3 Integration Measures 
 
Similar to San Diego, most of the organizations interviewed in Phoenix do not restrict 
integration measures to young immigrants only but reach out to all members of a given 
community who fulfill the eligibility criteria. The City of Phoenix itself has no special office or 
grants targeting immigrants. The tools for labor market integration, administered by the city, 
are open to all documented residents of Phoenix. Cases of discrimination against immigrants 
in the workforce inside the city limits are handled together with the complaints of all citizens 
by the city’s Equal Opportunity Department and its subdivision, the Phoenix Human 
Relations Commission.947 
Since no large ethnic enclaves exist in Phoenix, organizations which offer services to 
people in the local surroundings, such as the Golden Gate Community Center or Friendly 
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House, attract mixed target groups, which include both immigrants and the native born. This 
bodes quite well for immigrant integration. The AZ Lost Boys Center, which primarily serves 
Sudanese, is a noteworthy exception. In fact, it is one of the few organizations in Phoenix 
which serves immigrants from a particular country of origin. Regardless of the participants’ 
ethnic background, the eligibility criteria for most community services depend on restrictions 
imposed by the grant regulations through which the program is funded. The rules usually 
refer to the legal status of potential program participants, which is currently under special 
scrutiny in Arizona. Federal and state money and grants from the City of Phoenix formally 
rule out the possibility of aiding undocumented youth. In practice, only through private 
donations can organizations help all young people, regardless of their residence status, deal 
with integration measures. Additional criteria are imposed on the local ORR contractors, 
VOLAGs. For example, the International Rescue Committee is obligated to limit target 
groups to the youth eligible according to the federal ORR regulations adopted by the IRC’s 
main financial supporter, the Arizona Refugee Resettlement Program. 
The Phoenix Workforce Connection (PWC) at the Community and Economic 
Development Department of the City of Phoenix is the most important grant provider for 
comprehensive youth programs, which facilitate labor market integration of all low-income 
teens and young adults, aged 14 to 21, in Phoenix who “are experiencing circumstances that 
make it difficult […] to find and keep a job,” including documented English Language 
Learners.948 It is an important venue of recourse for the development of such integration 
measures as career counseling, work readiness, internships, work experience, leadership 
development, classroom skills training, and GED preparation.949 The PWC functions as the 
Local Workforce Investment Board for the area of the City of Phoenix. In accordance with the 
federal Workforce Investment Act, the PWC runs One-Stop Career Centers for adults and 
offers WIA grants, among others, for youth programs to the seven largest youth service 
providers in the city, Chicanos por la Causa and ACYR among them. As Sharler Barnett, a 
counselor at ACYR, put it, they “do a lot of everything” for the youth, which means providing 
almost all labor market integration measures as defined in this research.950 ACYR’s 
comprehensive programs offer a wide variety of school-to work transition tools (e.g. GED 
courses, online or personal assistance in self-assessment, career goal setting, outside as 
well as within their own charter school Center of Excellence High School) and by the same 
token great flexibility in the ways young people can develop their potentials: “pretty much 
they get to choose what is going to work best for them,” Barnett said. Chicanos por la Causa 
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offers a similar, nearly complete “workforce development packet” for all eligible youth, except 
for assistance with the evaluation of foreign credentials services, which is the task of Friendly 
House, another big player in youth training programs, and one financed by the City of 
Phoenix.951 In fact, the well-organized structure of the labor market integration measures of 
these organizations results in part from their long tradition of serving the Phoenix community, 
sometimes more than half a century. For example Friendly House, established by the 
Phoenix Americanization Committee back in 1920, started off serving the foreign born, 
teaching English and citizenship to newly-arrived immigrants in Arizona. “We were the 
Americanization movement,” as Enriquez proudly admitted. Only in the 1960s did the 
organization extend the scope of its work to a wider community, focusing on education, 
employment, training, and social services for all needy families.  
Some organizations’ long tradition of running social services in Phoenix has made 
them familiar, and given them a reputation as trustworthy and reliable in the local area, which 
appeals to potential public and private donators.952 Younger and not–so-well established 
initiatives face much greater hardship in finding enough staff and financial capacity to 
accomplish their work for immigrant youth. Starting a new program for a particular target 
group, like refugee youth in a new IRC Youth Program in Phoenix, seems much easier: there 
are federal and state grants for such programs. In addition, private donors are not afraid of 
investing their money in a service which assists refugees and not “illegals.” 
The successful fundraising campaigns run by the refugees in the AZ Lost Boys 
Center, a relatively new refugee organization in Phoenix, is a noteworthy exception to this 
rule.953 Through yearly marathons, Journey of Hope Dinners, or the Cow Project, the 
Sudanese can practice their entrepreneurship skills and develop the center together.954 
Those who serve the undocumented are forced to rely on the generosity of brave private 
donors. Fundraising for the undocumented in Phoenix is quite challenging, given the current 
hostile environment. On the one hand, as Ehrenberg optimistically noted, there are still some 
ways of changing the perception of helping the undocumented, unaccompanied minors they 
serve: 
 
I at least get in front of somebody to talk about them. If they give me five minutes to talk about 
what we do, they do not necessarily have that negative opinion that they have had at the back 
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of their minds about illegal aliens […]. The foundations and corporations that give me some 
time see the human rights interest of immigration. They see it [donating money] as an 
investment in human rights.955 
 
The efforts of indomitable Principal Watterson to raise money for the out-of-state 
tuition for college classes for her undocumented students, who comprised 22% of all 
students in Early College High School in 2008, are another noteworthy example of the 
hardships which educators face in helping immigrant youth without Social Security Numbers. 
Watterson’s campaigns turned out successful. Thanks mostly to anonymous donors, the 
students were able to graduate from Early College High School, often with flying colors. Their 
achievements should make it possible to change the perception of the undocumented in 
Phoenix. As 15-year-old graduate Nora wrote in her thank-you note to her donor: 
 
I wish from the bottom of my heart that others could see beyond the fact that we are not 
American citizens and pay more attention to our grades, our dedication, and the positive 
impact we will definitely have on Arizona. Thank you for seeing this, for believing in us, and for 
supporting our dreams with your contribution.956 
 
However, future prospects for helping those young people are not good in face of the 
increasingly hostile anti-immigration environment in Phoenix. Michael Crow, president of 
Arizona State University (ASU), was forced to discontinue the Sunburst Scholarship which 
aided undocumented students at the University957 and Principal Watterson was quite 
suddenly fired.958 Crow’s initiative was not totally abandoned but merely moved to an 
affiliated non-profit organization and given a new name, the American Dream Fund. 
However, the future of the fund is uncertain due to the lack of new donors.  
It seems that the safest way for those who want to help immigrant youth, regardless 
of their status, is simply not to ask who, among the people they serve, has a social security 
number. One of my interviewees claimed the requirements from their grant makers do not 
oblige them to know if a client is documented or not. In the recruitment office for ELL classes 
in this organization, a sign posted warned against giving any information not required when 
signing up for the course: “We do not ask your country of origin and it is not a requirement for 
eligibility.”959 Similarly, nobody is forced to ask parents about their migration status when they 
participate in the American Dream Academy, an educational program in the American school 
system for immigrant parents run by the ASU. However, working with the unauthorized 
population “gives a bad cast on everything” in Phoenix, as Tusek declared when talking 
about working in her school where most of the people in the pupils’ families do not have 
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social security numbers.960 Consequently, many integration initiatives seem to go 
underground, and big organizations fear losing state and federal grants if information about 
their work for the undocumented becomes public. One frequently receives evasive answers 
like, “The only people we can help are those documented; there is nothing we can do for 
undocumented” to the question: Do you work with the undocumented? Some organizations 
were even surprised that I inquired about their work with the undocumented. “Why do you 
want you to get yourself into something that is so controversial?” one person asked me. 
Probably a similar question prevents many private donors from getting involved in secret 
initiatives for the undocumented, which might possibly hurt their business and damage their 
reputation in Phoenix. 
 
5.2.2.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society  
 
Since few of the above-mentioned integration measures exclusively target 
immigrants, with the exception of the fundraising for the undocumented and programs for 
refugees, there are not many methods of reaching out solely to the immigrant population. 
Moreover, the organizations I interviewed did not typically mention any special measures 
they would need to find youth interested in their programs. As in San Diego, Job Corps’s 
recruitment procedures are generally well known, therefore no extra information campaigns 
are necessary to recruit candidates.961 Similarly, it is common knowledge that colleges in 
Phoenix, like in all other US cities, have an open enrollment procedure which also 
encourages immigrant youth to sign up for the courses. Nevertheless, according to 
Sandoval, high school or college counselors or faculty members are said to advise those, like 
undocumented youth, who cannot afford the tuition to take fewer credits but to at least start 
or continue their education. Quite often the students can also get college assistance in 
finding financial aid for the future.962 
Noteworthy examples of positive reinforcement in developing workforce skills among 
youth come from youth themselves. As ACYR reported, word of mouth is the most effective 
method of attracting immigrant youth who have to cope with similar language challenges: 
“They will flock to us because, as I said, they want to take advantage of the opportunity. You 
have to touch at least one of them […] and they will tell all other friends.”963 Similarly 
Sudanese refugees learn about the good experiences of members of the AZ Lost Boys and, 
attracted by these positive stories, find their way to the organization. “They have to come 
individually. You cannot force them” says Sarpicio.964  
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Nevertheless, a couple of organizations show greater ingenuity in reaching their 
target groups. For example, Golden Gate Community Center has developed a unique way of 
addressing the real needs of the local community by conducting surveys on specific wishes 
and expectations about their programs. By the same token, as Daniel Zaopata, director of 
Family Education asserted, they try to avoid duplicating the services of other 
organizations.965 The American Dream Academy, in turn, on behalf of the principle of a given 
school participating in the Academy’s parental education program, sends special invitation 
letters to parents of immigrant students. Maria Luis admitted that it is sometimes challenging 
to persuade undocumented parents to participate in the program, since as a rule they prefer 
to avoid contact with any public institution.966 
Talking about integration with immigrants to American residents in Phoenix also 
seems challenging. The best way to gain the support of donors and to raise the interest of 
the people of Phoenix in a given organization’s activities toward integration is simply to 
assure them that the organization is legal and does not provide any assistance to the 
undocumented. The emphasis on the fact that, first of all, the organizations want to teach 
immigrants the rule of the law in the country is very important. Friendly House talked about 
their official public relations strategy in the following way: 
 
We let people know we are part of the system. We are not here to break the law; we are here 
to help enforce the law. We do not help undocumented people; we help the people who are 
here, help people in transition. We are a transition organization and help people to link them 
and to facilitate so they will not get into trouble, so that they understand the regulations, the 
laws of the country, the rules about how to get a job, what is acceptable and not [...]967 
 
On the other hand, it seems that people are sometimes aware of the unfair approach to 
undocumented youth in Arizona and find indirect ways of informing potential clients that their 
services are available to people without documents. Codified language is one of the 
methods. For example, instead of declaring “we accept undocumented,” they assure 
potential clients: “We treat you with dignity and respect.” 968 In fact, most of my respondents 
seemed to sympathize with the unauthorized but quite often were too cautious to openly talk 
about it.  
CADENA bravely breaks this silence, fighting for the passage of the DREAM Act. As 
Cornejo said, she and her organization have nothing to lose.969 This non-profit organization 
provides information to undocumented youth, visits congressional representatives and 
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senators, and actively reaches out to local students, scholars, and teachers to educate them 
about the legal implications of being an undocumented youth and how to defend student 
rights. CADENA enlists anonymous volunteer teachers who spread information on the 
DREAM Act and who monitor the situation and bring to the attention of the media and the 
general public serious cases of students in detention centers or other abusive situations 
related to the lack of legal status. CADENA has also created a Know Your Rights Brochure, 
a web site, and educational resources to teach students about their rights, other educational 
opportunities, changes in immigration law, and private scholarship funding options.970 
Looking at the organization, it seems that the vehement anti-immigration mood in Arizona 
has inspired a few passionate counter-movements in the state capitol Phoenix. 
 
5.2.2.5 Network-Building  
 
Most organizations are aware that cooperation on the issue of immigrant integration 
at the local level is needed to leverage resources in order to better serve the community. At 
the same time, however, they are involved in a competition for funds and a good reputation. 
Interestingly enough, as Luis reported, cooperation among NGOs is more complicated than 
when NGOs cooperate with public institutions.971 When the social functions of two institutions 
are different they complement each other and send each other clients, e.g. Phoenix College 
refer students to Friendly House. It must be much more complicated when the organizations 
are competing for the same funds, like for example from two important stewards of 
cooperation for immigrants’ integration in Phoenix – the Arizona Refugee Resettlement 
Program and the Phoenix Workforce Connection. Their representatives both admitted that it 
is not always easy to allocate money, and they wished they were able to provide more funds 
to all their partners.972  
Nevertheless, even if the organizations are forced to compete, they are aware of their 
own constraints. They want to tap into the skills of others who are experts in a given area 
and do not want to offer the same services. As AZYR admitted, their goal is to meet the basic 
needs of the youth they are serving.973 In fact, nearly all organizations interviewed mentioned 
using the expertise of others if available. Moreover, many talked about their more frequent 
attempts to involve the business sector in their work, either through funds or job placement 
opportunities for their clients. There are, however, niches in networking which cannot be 
always filled. As Ehrenberg pointed out, the Florence Project is the only organization in the 
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area that works for unaccompanied minors, and they are eager to find any partners. They 
network every spare minute they can.974 
Few of the interviewed non-profit organizations, however, are involved in networks 
outside the state, except for networking with the National Conference of La Raza. Only one 
organization mentioned involvement in a cooperation with other states, (e.g. the American 
Dream Academy collaborates with the precursor of their program for parents, the Parent 
Institute for Quality Education [PIQE] in California). This lack of cooperation is surprising, 
given the fact that other states have much more experience in dealing with immigrant 
integration. No federal integration network-building seemed to be meeting any success at the 
time of my interviews in Phoenix. Few knew about the federal Task Force initiative and those 
who did found it to be quite useless. “They have good intentions […] but there is nothing to 
be implemented.”975 Most of the organizations appear to be searching for their own solutions 
to their own particular local challenges of working with immigrants, rather than thinking about 
national or supranational network-building on a larger scale. 
 
5.2.3 Munich  
 
5.2.3.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration 
 
As a result of the recent development of a federal German immigrant integration 
policy and the emergence of an official Munich City Integration Policy, the concept of 
immigrant integration has become a widely used operational term for many public institutions 
and private non-profits serving immigrant youth in the city. In fact, many of the organizations 
interviewed view their immigrant services as part of Munich’s newly-developed Intercultural 
Integration Concept - an important tool for facilitating integration work in the city. 
The Concept was unanimously approved on February 20, 2008 by the Munich City 
Council and since then it has served as the core principle and guideline for all municipal 
decisions, projects, plans and city services which might have an impact on integration.976 
Accordingly, the city of Munich’s Intercultural Integration Concept, which has become an 
integral part of the official Munich City Integration Policy, contains a definition of integration:  
 
For us, integration means the long term process that immigrants go through of becoming 
involved in core areas of society and of bonding with others in the community to achieve equal 
opportunities. Both the newcomer and the long-standing member of a community are equally 
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responsible for [the] success or failure of this process. Our vision of integration respects and 
values cultural diversity and promotes [the] potential that such diversity offers.977 
 
The integration concept points to core indicators of integration in the life of Munich residents, 
which encompass most of the key prerequisites for labor market integration of immigrant 
youth, as adopted in this research. According to the concept, the main most important fields 
of actions for integration should include: “intercultural mainstreaming; promotion of 
participation; education; vocational training and job market; language training; fighting 
discrimination.”978 Additional integration guidelines for life in the city are thought to facilitate 
the immigrant integration process as summarized in the Eleven Principles of the Munich City 
Integration Policy .979 They include three important prerequisites for successful integration 
which were usually emphasized by the interviewees: recognizing diversity as valuable for the 
city, valuing the potentials of immigrants, including their mother tongues, and the 
professional experience gained in their home countries, and finally the inclusive vision of the 
integration of all city residents without exception. Principle 2 emphasizes that “Integration 
concerns everybody,” which again highlights the shared responsibility for the integration of all 
immigrants on the part the receiving society. The concept does not exclude undocumented 
people in the city, although, as Philip Anderson, the leading researcher on the unauthorized 
population in Munich pointed out, the inclusion of this important sector of immigrant life in the 
city is not explicit enough: “Allerdings schließt dieses ansonsten solide und fundierte Konzept 
‘Illegale’ nicht ausdrücklich mit ein – was ich sehr bedauerlich finde.”980 Nevertheless, it is 
significant that the city of Munich is renowned for its openness and concern for the 
unauthorized, including the undocumented immigrant youth. The so-called Münchner Modell 
(Munich Model), which has been an official city policy since 2005, does embrace the 
undocumented. The model is based on a study conducted by Anderson, commissioned by 
Munich City Council. The study’s conclusions and calls for action, published in August 
2003,981 resulted in the creation of a set of promising social and health provisions for 
undocumented people.982  
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Both the Intercultural Integration Concept and the implementation of the study’s 
conclusions have created a path beyond German taboos regarding the unauthorized983 and 
formulated an official structure for approaching the subject of immigrant integration, which 
has been cited by many of the organizations interviewed.984 Nevertheless, the interviewees 
still had their own particular way of interpreting integration. A couple of respondents who 
have been dealing with the concept of integration on a daily basis were a bit skeptical about 
overusing this word.985 Barbara Bornemann at the IG Jugendmigrationsdienst (IG JMD) 
pointed out that 50 people will have 50 different opinions about what integration entails. For 
job counselors working with unemployed immigrants in the Munich Sozialbürgerhaus, 
integration was considered first and foremost “die Einbindung in den ersten Arbeitsmarkt,” 
depending on immigrants’ abilities and efforts to adapt to the city’s labor market demands. 
The responsibility of the receiving society for the success of this process tended to be 
neglected.986 Other interviewees, primarily those from NGOs, revealed their own particular 
visions of immigrant integration which were more in line with the Intercultural Integration 
Concept. Interestingly enough, all of them were opposed to using the notion of assimilation 
when talking about immigrants. Manfred Bosl, head of the non-profit InitiativGruppe – 
Interkulturelle Begegnung und Bildung e.V. (IG), said, “man kann auf ein Slogan 
komprimierend sagen ‘Bildung ist Integration.’”987 For Angela Illmberger, principal of the 
general secondary school in Ramersdorf, one with the highest percentage of immigrants in 
Munich, integration involves respect for other cultures in their educational environment: 
“Kenntnisse erweben bis Fähigkeiten haben. In Rahmen der Interkulturalität lernen […] im 
Umgang mit ganz vielfältigen Biographien und Erfahrungen der Kindern.” Accordingly, she 
perceived assimilation as “eine platte Geschichte” which simply does not happen in real life. 
As she pointed out, none of her immigrant students comes to the school as a tabula rasa, 
without any cultural norms and experiences from their home countries.988 Similarly Cuman 
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Naz, head of the Foreigners’ Advisory Council, strongly opposed any kind of “einseitige 
Anpassung” and the predominance of the Leitkultur, both of which have created a hierarchy 
of cultures in Germany.989 Alberto Martínez, a priest at the Spanish Catholic Mission and a 
renowned advocator of the undocumented in Munich, drew attention to the fact that a solid 
identity and an awareness of their immigrant background and cultural roots is a prerequisite 
for the successful integration of young immigrants.990 
Apart from education and a respect for the value of other cultures, a couple of 
organizations also emphasized the strong role of the service providers in showing immigrants 
how to take advantage of the opportunities the receiving society offers to immigrants in 
Munich. Consequently integration is not merely about providing all residents same chances, 
following the US equal rights integration model, but also showing immigrants how they can 
benefit from them: “es nutzt nicht nur Zugang zu schaffen und dann Leute alleine zu lassen,” 
pointed out Kerstin Schmitt, youth intercultural trainer at the INKOMM project Center.991 In 
fact, several organizations interviewed seem to take on the role of caretaker and guide for 
immigrant youth in confronting challenges they might face in the city. 
 
5.2.3.2 Integration Challenges  
 
The perception of integration challenges facing immigrant youth in Munich is still 
influenced by the national controversies surrounding education gaps and differences in 
school performance between Germans and those coming from a migration background.992 
On the question about hurdles to the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market, 
most of the interviewees started off by citing the failed education system in the German 
federal states. In fact, the city of Munich, although governed by a liberal coalition, is trapped 
in the conservative Bavarian education system, governed at all education levels by the 
Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus. At the time of writing, the Ministry 
does not foresee any school reforms which would reduce early age school segregation. 
Immigrants still end up in the lowest-ranked schools, as exemplified by the general 
secondary school in Ramersdorf,993 while they are underrepresented in Gymnasium 
(secondary schools for university-bound students).994 Consequently, as Hauptschule 
graduates many immigrant children find it much more difficult to obtain apprenticeships in 
Munich, losing in competitions with Realschule graduates. The controversial transition 
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programs, discussed earlier, are the only alternative.995 Referring to each student who was 
not successful in finding a position for vocational training, Illmberger soberly remarked: “Das 
ist so eine Missachtung seiner Leistungen, der er wirklich gebracht hat.”996 Lack of 
recognition of the achievements of immigrant youth often leads to frustration and helps to 
maintain the high dropout rates among students who already know that they do not have the 
same chances as natives and that they are widely perceived as losers.997 Moreover, the 
school achievements of immigrants are purportedly not the sole deciding factor in granting 
apprenticeships. Margret Spohn, manager of the Office for Intercultural Affairs within the 
Social Services Department of Munich, pointed out the preliminary results of a longitudinal 
study from the German Youth Institute in Munich on the school-to-work transition, which 
showed that immigrant students face more difficulties in obtaining training positions than their 
peers with the same grades but no migration background.998 Similar discrimination was also 
observed among employers who, because of cultural differences and different physical 
appearances, do not want to employ youth from certain immigrant groups. Sabine Nowack, 
office manager of the Sozialbürgerhaus Pasing reported that one of the main integration 
hurdles she could see for her clients is a “deutliche kulturelle Abweichungen.” In Munich, the 
headscarf is a symbol of “eine schlechte Integration,” as she puts it.999 In fact, those of 
Nowack’s clients who wore headscarves, generally Turkish girls, turned out to have no 
chance of employment in their dream jobs as perfumery assistants.1000 Moreover, as many 
interviewees pointed out, the aspirations of immigrant youth, especially of those who face 
many more difficulties than others due to their unregulated legal status in Germany, are 
much higher than people might expect. 1001 As Martinez pointed out, not all young immigrant 
boys dream about becoming a car polisher, an image commonly promoted in public 
discussions of integration. The “successful” young immigrant who graduated from the 
Hauptschule said Martinez, is quite often presented as the role model for immigrant 
integration.1002 In fact, Martina Unger, a social worker from the Schlau project, sadly noted 
that many young skilled immigrants fail to pass a wide variety of assessment centers or 
admissions tests, commonly used by employers in Munich to select potential future 
employees, sometimes only because of a mere three words that they were not able to 
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decipher. Although the Munich labor market is generally perceived to be the most open in 
Germany, my interviewees often considered employees’ expectations too high.1003 As a 
result, despite their high aspirations and qualifications gained abroad, many young immigrant 
job candidates fail when they lack a command of written and spoken German. Only a couple 
of foreign languages are generally recognized as an asset, depending on the company, said 
Bornemann in talking about her experience with potential employers in Munich. Additionally, 
the system of recognizing foreign credentials is no less confusing than in other parts of 
Germany. Spohn critically remarked, “Es ist ein absoluter Wildwuchs in Deutschland.”1004  
For those in Munich without a residence permit, challenges to labor market integration 
must be analyzed at a very different level. Rather than discovering how to fulfill their 
aspirations, the undocumented first have to learn how to survive in a country under whose 
laws they are considered criminals. As Poppert suggested, for this group integration would 
mean decriminalizing their presence in the city.1005 The school system, not to mention 
vocational training, is inaccessible or only possible once they have taken state exams which 
require documentation. The other (punitive) option, as Anderson admitted, is to obtain 
falsified documents.1006 Fortunately, the integration policies and a wide variety of integration 
measures in Munich are designed to alleviate the school-to-work transition challenges of 
both documented and undocumented youth. 
 
5.2.3.3 Integration Measures 
 
Although the rhetoric of integration is fairly new in the city of Munich, the work toward 
the integration of immigrants is not innovative, as in many other German cities.1007 Integration 
measures must be seen as the continuation of services offered back in the 1970s by many 
long-established organizations, like traditional welfare agencies or such civil society 
initiatives as the IG in Munich. Friederike Goschenhofer, from the municipal network 
REGSAM, remarked that in the 1970s organizations offering services to immigrants were not 
thought to be providing integration tools but assistance to guest workers who were not 
expected to stay long in Munich.1008 At the same time, the city was the first German 
municipality to start analyzing the situation of the increasing number of immigrants in the 
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city.1009 The expansion of integration measures is impressive, and it is impossible to list them 
all here. At more than 100 pages, the organization directory of the Foreigners’ Advisory 
Council,1010 which includes a wide range of direct services targeting immigrants, many of 
them focusing on immigrant youth, indicates the wealth of services offered.1011  
The involvement of the City Council in the management of the city’s integration 
policies is remarkable. The Munich Intercultural Integration Concept not only frames the 
official discourse on integration in the city, but first and foremost it provides measures and 
structure for intensive work toward the so-called mandatory intercultural mainstreaming.1012 
The Office for Intercultural Affairs manages the implementation of the Eleven Principles of 
the Munich City Integration Policy and the mainstreaming process throughout all city 
departments.1013 The intercultural training programs, which have been or are still to be 
conducted in the departments, emphasize the importance of the potential of employees from 
migration backgrounds for the promotion of the intercultural opening in city governance. 
These principles require some important reforms in recruitment procedures. Spohn indicated 
that the focus of the job recruitment criteria is shifting from academic achievement 
demonstrated by school and job certificates towards candidates’ intercultural competencies. 
By the same token, the Office for Intercultural Affairs hopes to foster intercultural openness 
and improved employment opportunities for immigrants from inside the city apparatus. 
Internal German language courses for the city’s immigrant employees constitute extra 
integration measures to reduce language difficulties.1014  
Since the city council does not have separate funds for immigrant integration 
services, according to Spohn, each department is responsible for providing services open to 
immigrants and creating programs using their own budget, possibly supplemented by state 
and federal funds or external EU funds. The strong involvement of the city in the integration 
of young immigrants into the labor market can be seen in both direct and indirect measures 
for young immigrants. The service of 13 Sozialbürgerhäuser, led by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
für Beschäftigung München GmbH (ARGE), 50% of whose clients come from migration 
backgrounds, is widely considered one of the most important coordinators of indirect 
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integration measures for immigrant youth receiving Unemployment Benefit II. Together with 
psychologists special job counselors, so-called U25 counselors, direct young unemployed 
persons to youth service providers in the city which offer immigrant integration courses 
(among them integration courses financed by BAMF), language courses, and coaching for 
job-applications.1015 Some of the service providers are part of the network of Verbundprojekt 
Perspektive Arbeit (VPA),1016 coordinated and financially-supported by the Department for 
Labor and Economic Affairs, City of Munich. Many school-to-work transition measures which 
indirectly target immigrant youth are located in schools. For example, Jugendliche an die 
Hand nehmen (JADE) is a school project, led by the city and supported by ARGE and the 
Federal Employment Agency, which offers career and job preparation training courses for 
pupils in 44 general secondary schools in Munich. 1017 In view of the fierce competition for 
apprenticeship positions, the training courses aim at increasing the chances of successful 
application for all students without any positive discrimination in favor of immigrant 
children.1018 
However, some integration programs aim specifically at immigrant youth. The network 
of eight Jugendmigrationsdienste in Munich offers personal counseling to all people aged 12 
to 27 with a migration background and a regular residence status. The scope of the services 
differs and depends to a great extent on the individual work of the counselor with the client. 
One of the JMD services, “ein Geschenk von der Bundesregierung,”1019 as Bosl called it, 
focuses specifically on work-readiness skills and career counseling. Counselor Bornemann 
explained that the aim of her work is first of all “Löcher stopfen” and showing immigrant youth 
the skills they should develop. The Individual Integration Plan, which the client determines 
with the assistance of the counselor, is based on an analysis of individual skills and goals. 
Bornemann described her approach as follows: „Ich lasse die Leute wie sie sind, damit sie 
lernen sich in ihrer Persönlichkeit zu zeigen und das zu vertreten oder dazu kommen; ‚wo will 
ich hin?’. Das geht immer darum, dass die Klienten selbst für sich herausfinden: was passt 
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für mich?“1020 Such an approach to case management appears to be a successful Positive 
Youth Development strategy for immigrant integration, if also very time consuming. 
Bornemann called for more staff as the demand for counseling is steadily increasing. 
Fortunately, the rapid development of new integration projects at the IG is helping to partially 
counterbalance this growth. In fact, the IG is said to be the largest non-profit organization in 
Munich and, among other immigrant services, provides free or low-cost education and work-
readiness training to immigrant youth in the city. It is always on the look out for new funds 
and new ideas for integration projects.1021 Interestingly enough, the organization does not 
focus solely on disadvantaged immigrant youth from the lowest-ranked schools but also 
supports those who have attended Gymnasium and Realschule and aspire to higher 
education. Indeed, the organization needs this latter group as role models to boost the 
motivation of other immigrants at the IG: “Wir brauchen erfolgreiche Leute, die die 
Multiplikatoren für die andere sind.”1022 
The MOVA plus project, run by the Department for Labor and Economic Affairs, is 
another interesting innovative program in Munich, primarily helping immigrants to establish 
contacts with the business sector and apply for internships. The project reaches out to non-
German entrepreneurs in Munich, who might potentially offer apprenticeship positions to 
immigrant youth and to bridge the gap between the business world and integration service 
providers who want to support the school-to-work transition of immigrant youth. In fact, as 
many interviewees emphasized, the involvement of the corporate sector in immigrant 
integration is still not at the level it should be. Other deficits in integration management 
include the lack of adequate support for the recognition of foreign qualifications. However, 
the issue has finally been addressed by the city. The Office of Housing and Migration has 
become involved in the national IQ Network, which inspired the establishment of the first city 
counseling service for recognition of foreign qualifications in Munich.1023  
Despite a wide range of integration offerings for immigrant youth, underprivileged 
immigrant youth still stand in the shadow: without a permit of residence they have little 
access to educational support measures. In fact, many service providers are restricted by the 
guidelines of their federal or EU fund programs (like EIF or BAMF), which prohibit providing 
services to those who are not legal residents. Two significant education initiatives sponsored 
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by the city of Munich, Schlau School and Project FLÜBS at the Münchner Volkshochschule 
(MVHS), offer young asylum seekers the opportunity to attend free German courses, prepare 
for secondary school final exams, and/or help them find vocational training and their first 
jobs. Despite Munich’s open policy towards the undocumented, no city monies can be used 
officially for this group. Commenting on the Munich Model, Spohn said: “Die Stadt macht 
nichts, was illegal ist. Wir haben nationale Verpflichtungen. Wir nutzen nur die Spielräume. 
Jede Stadt könnte das machen.” The city’s suggestion that schools not check the residential 
status of students is the city’s only integration measure for undocumented people addressing 
educational restrictions.1024 Several better known, smaller initiatives help undocumented 
youth with their education, for example the Jesuit private gymnasium, which does not charge 
people sans papiers, and the Spanish Catholic Mission which primarily assists 
undocumented Spanish-speaking immigrants in Munich and provides legal counseling and 
German language courses. Finally Café 104, whose services focus for the most part on 
medical help to the undocumented, provides information and counseling on social services 
as well as educational assistance for the undocumented in the city.  
 
5.2.3.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society 
 
Most of the organizations interviewed do not employ any special techniques for 
reaching out to immigrants and encouraging them to use their integration services. The 
majority of young immigrants come to them of their own accord, because they need the 
services and help the organizations offer. Another important reason is that they are required 
to do so by federal law. Those who want to receive unemployment or social benefits or 
attend German schools are obliged to contact ARGE job counselors and attend language 
and integration courses and job preparation training, if needed. Integration courses are 
obligatory for many newcomers, regardless of their social status.1025 
Cooperative agreements between organizations and schools are another way 
immigrant youth find their way to labor market integration programs. Usually, teachers have 
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to integrate language and work-readiness programs and workshops, organized by a given 
service provider at schools, into the regular school curriculum. As some organizations 
emphasized, the role of the immigrants’ parents in motivating their children should not be 
overlooked. The parents’ lack of involvement in their children‘s education can sometimes be 
quite surprising: “Man muss Eltern dazu begeistern, wenigstens einen Schreibtisch den 
Kindern zur Verfügung zu stellen.“1026 
Finally, word of mouth recommendations for integration services, either coming from 
participants or alumni, also brings new waves of applicants. In fact, many organizations lack 
sufficient capacity to assist all who come to them. Most of the interviewees reported that they 
needed more staff and more funds to be able to meet the increasing demand for integration 
services for immigrant youth. As Unger disclosed the Schlau School has a long waiting list of 
applicants. Other organizations would willingly extend their offers but, because their 
organizations are understaffed with paid personal and their services often depend on 
volunteerism, they are not able to expand.1027 Although many service providers for immigrant 
youth operate in Munich, they are well-connected and refer clients to each other. Only the 
undocumented seem to remain on the margins, and it is hard to see them reaching those 
who could help. The story of Martinez’ undocumented friend who, after living in Munich for 
seven years, was still not sure of the location of Marienplatz, the central market square in 
Munich, makes it clear that for the undocumented in Munich “life in the shadow” is not merely 
a figurative expression.1028 Consequently, the recently-established city hotline serving people 
sans papiers is receiving more calls than anticipated.  
Information campaigns on immigrant integration and media activities sponsored by 
many integration stakeholders in the city show that the city has taken the task of mobilizing 
Munich residents very seriously. As an interviewee at REGSAM pointed out, it is very 
important to show the public positive examples and the success stories of immigrants 
prospering in the city, focusing on their potential rather than their shortcomings as the PISA 
study does.1029 A wide range of intercultural events, panel discussions, intercultural 
happenings, research project presentations on cultural diversity are on the daily cultural 
program.1030 In fact, all the interesting offers can at times be overwhelming.  
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According to many interviewees, the past few years have seen society start to 
assume their responsibility for integrating immigrants into the city, in line with the 
recommendations found in the Intercultural Integration Concepts. The city council publicly 
supports intercultural diversity in the city’s political, social, and business affairs, e.g. by 
signing the Charta der Vielfalt or through close cooperation with the Foreigners’ Advisory 
Council.1031 Moreover, the city is also open to the subject of the undocumented and supports 
all information campaigns and research on the subject of integration, including integrating the 
undocumented. For example, the award for social commitment and personal courage, 
Münchner Lichtblicke, organized yearly since 2000 by the association Lichterkette1032 in 
cooperation with the City of Munich and the Foreigners’ Advisory Council, brings to the 
attention of the public people and organizations that are not yet well-known and whose work 
and commitment to the integration of all immigrants in the city deserves recognition.1033 
Labor unions have also lobbied for the integration of immigrants into the city and 
fought against workplace discrimination. Ulrich Gammel of the regional Bavaria verdi section 
briefly described verdi engagement in integration campaigns in Munich: 
 
Wir laden Vertreter der Migranten in unserer Organisation zu Sitzungen, Veranstaltungen und 
Aktionen ein. Wir führen Seminare zu migrationspolitischen Themen durch, wie z.B. Gegen 
Rassismus und Rechtsradikalismus und für den Erwerb von mehr Multikultureller Kompetenz. 
Es gibt bei verdi eine „Richtlinie zur Migrationspolitik“ und eine „Programmatische Erklärung 
zur Migrationspolitik.“1034 
 
Moreover, individual organizations launch advertising campaigns which is an 
important way of recruiting native citizens for involvement in integration initiatives for and with 
young immigrants. By the same token, reaching out to the public is yet another way of 
ensuring the continuing existence of an organization. Many interviewees reported that they 
                                                                                                                                                                     
- A series of discussions by the Munich Kammerspiele Theater, LMU and Goethe Institute in 
cooperation with the Allianz Kulturstiftung and the Bayerischen Rundfunks (Hörspiel und 
Medienkunst).  
- Seasonal IG JMD intercultural events.  
- Tag des ausländischen Unternehmers, organized by the Department for Labor  and Economic 
Affairs, during which successful immigrant entrepreneurs spoke about their achievements. 
- A book release party promoting the results of the migration research project, München migrantisch - 
migrantisches München, at the Institute of Ethnology, LMU.  
See the project’s publication, Hess, S. and Schwertl, M. (2010). München migrantisch - migrantisches 
München. München: Herbert Utz Verlag.  
1031
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are constant searching for volunteers and donors to guarantee the continuing functioning of 
their organizations.1035 
 
5.2.3.5 Network-Building 
 
Information campaigns and public events on immigrant integration support network-
building, during which many integration stakeholders meet and establish cooperations. In 
fact, most of the integration programs and initiatives, mentioned thus far, are based on cross-
sectional cooperation between schools, organizations, and the city council. An important task 
for schools is finding a reliable partner interested in a long term cooperation, investing in 
schools, and which is not interested in action merely for the sake of action, as Principal 
Illmberger warned.  
As many organizations affirmed, networking at the local level is often quite 
successful. Bosl happily remarked,  
 
Ganz viele Institutionen arbeiten mit uns, je nach Projekt und dessen Schwerpunkt. Früher 
wollten die Schulen nicht so viel mit außerschulischen Einrichtungen zu tun zu haben, jetzt 
haben wir ganz viele Kooperationen und Verträgen mit Schulen, z.B. für Projekte zum 
Übergang: Schule-Beruf. Vielmehr, ARGE und Bundesagentur für Arbeit schicken uns den 
Menschen, also in jedem Bereich unserer Arbeit gibt es die Kopperationspartner.1036 
 
In fact, cooperative networks for the integration of immigrant youth are so complex that only 
by means of graphs could the interviewees from some organizations clearly explain the 
interdependencies with other integration stakeholders, e.g. schools, ARGE, the city council, 
and others. As the example of IG JMD’s cooperative network in appendix 5 shows, the work 
of IG JMD has many synergies with other governmental and non-governmental institutions in 
the city. Networking with the business sector appears to be the greatest challenge for many 
organizations and their job counselors. The coordinator of the MOVA plus project said that 
approaching entrepreneurs in Munich to cooperate on integration projects in the city requires 
excellent public relation skills and special persuasive strategies, which are not necessarily 
the strong points of social service providers.  
Surprisingly, one respondent remarked that competition among organizations is not 
conspicuous because the needs and demands for immigrant youth services still exceeds the 
capacities of the existing organizations.1037 On the other hand, competition for funds is never 
easy, especially for new and little-known initiatives like Lotsenprojekt Pontis. In such cases, 
networking with a bigger and better-known partner when applying for funds is a common 
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solution.1038 The city of Munich reportedly tries to balance the distribution of money for 
integration projects to different institutions, so that no monopoly develops.  
The content of the present integration concept was discussed in detail during more 
than 50 meetings with a range of charity and immigrant organizations and labor unions 
before it was finally implemented in 2008.1039 In fact the city unites organizations together 
within broader or more specific fields of integration work, including youth services. The 
Verbundprojekt Perspektive Arbeit (VPA) gathers 27 service-providers of work-readiness 
programs for long term unemployed residents of the city, with a special focus on immigrants. 
Round Tables bringing together organizations which deal with the undocumented and 
asylees also receive city support. In fact, municipal representatives are not only participants 
but are also, to a great extent, initiators of networking, both with integration practitioners as 
well as migration researchers.1040  
Along with the introduction of new integration initiatives in Germany, presented in 
chapter 4, cooperation and communication among the interviewees, especially in Munich, 
with other federal states and cities has increased significantly. For example, the Office of 
Housing and Migration was recently selected the seat of the Bavarian branch of the 
nationwide IQ Network, which coordinates cooperative projects for research on labor market 
integration in Bavaria. Augsburg MigraNet Transferstelle is the Munich role model for 
managing the issues surrounding the recognition of foreign credentials. The Munich Model, 
in turn, is promoted as one of the best approaches on the part of a municipality for 
welcoming the undocumented in the country. Moreover, small scale integration projects in 
Munich have been modeled on local best practices in other cities, for example the MOVA 
plus project is modeled on its forerunner in Hamburg and the Lotsenprojekt Pontis on the 
well-established Lotsenprojekt in Berlin.  
In contrast to the above-mentioned positive examples of networking and the 
exchange of best practices, the cooperation of city authorities with federal agencies seems to 
be a little more troublesome. My contacts claimed that federal agency BAMF’s regulations 
are not flexible and that administrators do not respect local, well-established ways of 
managing integration projects which the City of Munich has been using for many years, long 
before the federal integration policy took effect back in 2005.1041 Although the BAMF is 
respected as a valuable source of funds for integration courses, most respondents had many 
misgivings about bureaucratic hurdles and the strict regulations (like the restriction of funds 
                                                     
1038
 Interview M/15. 
1039
 Interview M/3.  
1040
 In fact, the theoretical background of the Intercultural  Integration City Concept is based on the 
cooperation with F. Heckmann, whose integration theory was discussed back in chapter 2.   
See Sorg, U., and Spohn, M. (2008). Grundsätze und Strukturen der Integrationspolitik der 
Landeshauptstadt München. München: Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München. 
1041
 For example the city used to compensate the cost of transportation to integration courses which 
BAMF currently does not allow. 
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and integration courses only to people with resident status), which sometimes hinders the 
cooperation. Surprisingly, none of the interviewees expressed any interest or enthusiasm for 
a cooperation with the Bavarian state network, the Bayerisches Integrationsforum of the 
Bavarian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Family, and Women's Issues. The role of the 
Bavarian Commission for the Integration of Immigrants in coordinating integration initiatives 
in the city, similarly, has contributed little to the development of integration policies in Munich 
and has generally created little interest in those interviewed.1042 
In view of the various possibilities of forming networks with local and national 
integration stakeholders, little room is left for cooperation with other countries. Looking for 
funding opportunities with other countries, especially from the new EU member states (which 
usually bodes well for receiving EU funds), is probably the most common incentive for 
seeking partners abroad.1043 Many interviewees wish they could be more engaged in 
European network-building, which happens too sporadically, but would be a good way to 
tackle common challenges, like integration measures for asylees or the undocumented.1044 
Most of the smaller youth providers focus exclusively on local work to solve challenges 
immigrant youth face there and cannot invest any more time in examining what is happening 
elsewhere in the world. 
 
5.2.4 Warsaw  
 
5.2.4.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration 
 
Despite the lack of a national integration strategy in Poland, several years ago a few 
non-profit organizations in Warsaw started providing services to facilitate immigrant 
integration into the city. Since the issues of immigration and integration are just emerging in 
Poland, at the time of my research there were not yet many immigrant service providers 
based in the Polish capitol. Nevertheless, because the largest proportion of immigrants in 
Poland resides in Warsaw, the city was still considered the center of integration programs on 
a national scale.1045 
                                                     
1042
 The Bavarian Integration Concept, issued in the aftermath of Integration Concept in Munich, does 
not introduce any innovations to the city management of integration. See Bayerisches 
Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Familie und Frauen. (2008). Leitlinien zur Integration 
von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund: „Integration lohnt sich“ - Beschluss des Bayerischen 
Ministerrats vom 10. Juni 2008. München: Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung, Familie und Frauen.  
1043
 The application for EU funds for some understaffed organizations is reportedly very complicated. 
See interview M/9.      
1044
 Interviews M/3, M/4, and M/11. The engagement of the Office of Housing and Migration with 
international partners in a number of the EU projects is a notable exception.  
1045
 Looking at the statistics of the two calls for proposals from the European Integration Fund (EIF) in 
2007 and 2008, the majority of beneficiaries were based in Warsaw. Consequently the sample of 16 
interviewed organizations (see appendix 2) may be considered more representative for the local 
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The aims of integration work, as described by the interviewees, sometimes varied 
significantly. The regional Polish office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
drew on a clearly-defined official IOM integration concept, which is supposed to apply to all 
IOM fields of work around the globe.1046 IOM and Migrant Integration was the only official 
document I was referred to during the interviews which conceptualizes the immigrant 
integration process. Even the Warsaw Family Support Center, a branch of the national 
County Family Support Centers, which are responsible for carrying out the Individual 
Integration Program (IIP) for foreigners with humanitarian protection status in Poland,1047 
operates without any top-down guidelines on what integration actually involves.1048 
Consequently, in the view of individual counselors at the Center, the process should lead to 
self-sufficiency and life independent of the social benefits of the IIP. Moreover, integration is 
subject to an agreement between a beneficiary and an IIP social counselor, which only 
theoretically makes both parties responsible for the successful completion of the integration 
process.1049  
Nevertheless integration has become the core program for some organizations which 
were inspired by the emergence of the new funding possibilities from the European 
Integration Fund (EIF) in Poland. They are finally able to offer integration measures aimed 
not only at refugees and asylum seekers but also other groups of immigrants with a 
documented status in Poland. Consequently, the issue of integration “is no longer so exotic,” 
as a person at the Polish Migration Forum, an EIF beneficiary, put it.1050 Nevertheless, most 
of the organizations, even those which have been granted EU monies, are opposed to the 
EU idea of limiting the process of integration just to immigrants residing legally in a city. 
Accordingly, the Association for Legal Intervention (SIP) emphasized a strong need for “pre-
integration measures”:1051 
 
If you want to talk about a reasonable integration process for immigrants you should think 
about their integration from the very moment they arrive in Poland, and not from the time at 
                                                                                                                                                                     
integration management than those in the other case studies See  Implementing Authority for 
European Programs in Poland (n.d.). Results of the EIF Calls for Proposal 2007 and 2008. 
1046
 “Successful integration is a two-way process that involves mutual adaptation of migrants and the 
host society, as well as equality of rights and obligations. It involves acceptance by the host society 
and adjustment by the migrant. It is not something that happens once in a static manner. Integration is 
a dynamic relationship between two communities.” See International Organization for Migration. 
(2006). IOM and Migrant Integration. Geneva: IOM. 
1047
 For more on the IIP, see subchapter 4.6.4. 
1048
 Interview W/12. 
1049
 Because the center is understaffed, IIP counselors are simply unable to fully engage in individual 
case management. 
1050
 Interview W/9. 
1051
 Polish respondents called for pre-integration measures which would help immigrants awaiting the 
regularization of their status in the country, but which still do not exist. Of note is the fact that pre-
integration programs in different national contexts can refer to preparatory courses for immigrants 
before they leave their home countries, like German language courses organized in the sending 
countries for immigrants heading for Germany.  
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which their status becomes legal. Legalization procedures sometimes last many months or 
years and just letting them eat and drink in refugee centers but not thinking about their 
integration is not very smart. Learning self-sufficiency in a couple of days, which many would 
expect of immigrants once they have obtained legal status, is simply unrealistic.1052 
 
Most interviewees tended to believe that immigrants should not be left alone to deal 
with the difficulties inherent in integration and that city residents should offer assistance.1053 
Moreover, they viewed immigrant integration as a crucial step in triggering a sociological 
change in Polish society, which, because of the long period of isolation in the post-Second 
World War era, is still not open enough to accept other cultures.1054 “Many Polish citizens 
might not tolerate Muslim immigrants rolling out their carpets and starting pray on the floor 
during the school breaks, as they do in our school,” a Polish language teacher from Lingua 
Mundi pointed out. Therefore, integration is more about getting to know each other and 
promoting mutual acceptance on the part of both the newcomers and the host society – the 
ideals close to the vision of a multicultural society, which Warsaw finally has a chance to 
achieve.1055 As a matter of fact, the city government of Warsaw has only recently started 
acknowledge the growing cultural diversity of their city in its official documents. Warsaw’s 
current social strategy involves recognizing the increasing number of immigrants in the city, 
whose integration is a prerequisite for social cohesion inside the city gates, as well as the 
challenges integration brings with it.1056  
 
5.2.4.2 Integration Challenges  
 
In no other city case study did interviewees report so many differences in the 
integration challenges of immigrant youth, on the basis of the country of origin, as in 
Warsaw.1057 In fact, the situation of the two dominant Asian immigrant groups in the city, 
Chechens and Vietnamese, was often contrasted with the circumstances of the two largest 
                                                     
1052
 Interview W/13.  
1053
 The Fu Shenfu Migrant Center is an exception. As center coordinator Jacek Gniadek pointed out, 
all integration courses would not be needed if all immigrants had work permits. Accordingly, the 
integration process will take place automatically once immigrants are granted the right to work 
(interview W/15). 
1054
 For example, see interviews W/11, W/15, and W/16. 
1055
 For more on Polish isolationism from immigrants in the post WWII period, see subchapter 4.6.1.  
1056
 Many interviewees pointed to the strategy as a milestone in the city’s changing approach to 
immigrants. See The Council of the Capital City of Warsaw (2008, December 18). Strategy for the 
Development of Social Problems for Years 2009-2020.  
1057
 Although different integration challenges for different immigration groups were obviously reported 
by interviewees in all city case studies (as in the cases of the Turkish in Germany or Mexicans in San 
Diego and Phoenix), they were made most explicitly by the interviewees in Warsaw. They focused 
sometimes on only one particular ethnic group of immigrants, Chechens, which presented quite a 
challenge for keeping to my scope of research. I will resist profiling and will not focus on particular 
immigrant groups in the rest of this chapter. In fact, the evaluation of the integration challenges based 
on country of origin goes beyond the scope of my research. 
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groups of East Europeans, Belarusians and Ukrainians. Because of a cultural background 
similar to that of Poles and special provisions on the Polish labor market, discussed in 
subchapter 4.6, most organization do not consider the East Europeans to be such a 
“problematic group” to handle as people from Chechen or Vietnamese enclaves.  
Two main factors account for the segregation of these two groups in the city. First, 
regulations from the Office for Foreigners keep Chechens in separate refugee centers for 
fear of potential inter-ethnic conflicts with other immigrant groups. Secondly, the Vietnamese 
are well established in their own districts, and do not seem to be eager to mingle with other 
Warsaw residents.1058 Consequently, breaking away from their ethnic enclaves was 
considered one of the most common barriers to integration for immigrant youth. 
Paradoxically, as the counselor from Family Support Center pointed out, immigrant families 
often hinder integration measures on the part of service providers.1059 In fact, discussing 
integration challenges in Warsaw led to the airing of many complaints about the 
unwillingness of these two culturally-distant groups to learn the Polish language, get to know 
Poles, or to enter the Polish labor market, as if only the immigrants shouldered the burden of 
confronting integration challenges. For example, one of the teachers at the Lingua Mundi 
language school reported that in her classes too many immigrants of a particular ethnic 
group used to stir up conflict with others.1060 
The alleged unwillingness and low motivation of some young school-age and 
working-age immigrant groups to learn Polish could be explained by several factors, 
according to most interviewees. Firstly, primary and secondary schools in Warsaw are still ill-
prepared to accommodate immigrant children: assistance with Polish language and 
additional tutoring was still uncommon in schools when I was carrying out my research.1061 In 
fact, most schools are afraid of accepting immigrant children, who might potentially lower 
their performance rankings. The usual practice of separation of pupils into Polish and 
immigrant classes was harshly criticized by Krystyna Starczewska, a principal at a private 
secondary school.1062 Education and learning the Polish language in ethnic enclaves is not 
motivating. The Office for Foreigners reported that few of those eligible immigrants actually 
attend such classes in the refugee centers.1063  
                                                     
1058
 For an interesting volume of reports on the different integration challenges of different immigrant 
groups in Warsaw, and in Poland more generally, see Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. (Ed.) (2008). Między 
jednością a wielością. Integracja odmiennych grup i kategorii imigrantów w Polsce (Between Unity and 
Diversity. Integration of Different Groups and Categories of Immigrants in Poland). Warsaw: Center of 
Migration Research.   
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 Interview W/12.  
1060
 Interview W/5. 
1061
 The New Regulation on Admission of Foreigners into Polish Schools was adopted in 2010. See 
subchapter 4.6.6. 
1062
 Interview W/16.  
1063
 Interview W/4. 
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Secondly, due to the lack of command of the Polish language and difficulties in 
gaining recognition for their credentials, high-skilled young immigrants have little chance of 
obtaining jobs which meet their expectations.1064 Teresa Stępniak, a job counselor at Polish 
Humanitarian Action (PAH), reported that some of the qualifications are useless on the 
Polish labor market (e.g. refugees who specialized in the war industry in their home country 
have no chance of finding work in this field in Warsaw). “Getting a job often requires giving 
up your ambitions,” Stępniak admitted.1065  
Finally, the generally quite harsh conditions on the Polish labor market for third 
country nationals, presented in subchapter 4.6, complicate the smooth transition of 
immigrants into the workforce, even in Warsaw, the city with one of the lowest unemployment 
rates and the most prosperous economy in Poland. As a result of restrictive regulations, the 
labor market in the city still tends to protect Polish workers, asserted Marek Roman, job 
counselor at one of Warsaw’s employment agencies.1066 Discrimination against foreign 
workers who are not from the West is still prevalent.1067 Employing foreigners in sectors 
which are not affected by shortages of Polish workers is more the exception than the rule.1068 
“Colorful” immigrants are attractive for ads and media, but are considered less reliable as 
workers.1069 Finding illegal work seems to be less problematic, and quite often immigrants 
with documents and a work permit still end up working illegally, noted Jacek Gniadek at 
Migrant Center.1070 In fact, illegal work is sometimes the only way to survive in Poland’s most 
expensive city.1071 Unfamiliarity with the rules governing the employment of foreign workers 
and ignorance of an employee’s legal rights hinder immigrants’ legal access to work. Most 
interviewees insisted that further education on employment regulations is needed for both 
employers and immigrants. 
All of these challenges, in turn, lead to disillusionment among some immigrants, 
especially asylum seekers. The first metropolis across the EU border, Warsaw, is not the 
dream destination they had expected. Many young immigrants receive no positive 
reinforcement from the Polish education system or the labor market, which lowers their 
motivation for integrating. Consequently, the demand for integration measures is huge. 
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 Interviews W/1 and W/13.  
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 Based on an unrecorded, informal conversation.  
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 “The West” in this context refers to the old EU countries, the US, and Canada.   
1068
 One of the advertisements in Lingua Mundi read: “I employ all: both black or yellow.” See interview 
W/5. 
1069
 Stępniak claimed the easiest jobs to arrange for immigrants are hand-clappers for TV shows. See 
interview W/2.  
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 Interview W/15. 
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 Most of the interviewees complained that renting a flat in Warsaw was too expensive. See for 
example interviews W/8, W/11, and W/12.  
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Agnieszka Kosowicz, founder of the first online Polish migration counseling service for 
immigrants, said that many seek assistance anonymously.1072 
 
5.2.4.3 Integration Measures 
 
Although in comparison to the other city case studies relatively few measures for 
immigrant integration exist, a boom in integration projects for immigrants began around the 
time of my research in Warsaw. Many of those interviewed were working on initiatives that 
had been in place for no longer than two or three years, or were just at the point of starting 
their integration work.1073 Great enthusiasm and strong belief in the mission of helping 
immigrants was evident among the interviewees, because almost all of their projects were 
new in the field in Warsaw. 
On the other hand, since the majority of their projects generally relied on short-term 
EU funding,1074 concerns about the sustainability of the various projects was among the 
biggest challenges the organizations were then facing. In fact, the majority of the 
organizations are understaffed and the personnel capacities do not allow them to work 
efficiently as both fundraisers and service providers. For example, the closing of the 
Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation (MCAZ), the only organization which had 
offered not only Polish language courses but also workforce readiness skills and vocational 
training programs for immigrants, because of a lack of funds, was heart-breaking.1075 At the 
time of my research no other project had appeared on the horizon to fill the gap in labor 
market integration measures. As Aleksandra Chrzanowska from the Association for Legal 
Intervention (SIP) pointed out, many immigrants come to her organization and ask for an 
alternative to MCAZ courses.1076  
The City of Warsaw does not provide special grants to subsidize integration programs 
for immigrants but does support projects aimed at general social integration in the city. By 
the same token, some of the organizations interviewed can count on financial aid from the 
city in the form of grants for Warsaw social programs. However, such aid does not suffice to 
run an integration project without additional EU funds.1077 Similarly, the governor of the 
Masovian Voivodeship has just started co-financing the first three-year long EU funded 
program Information Center for Foreigners, run by the SIP in cooperation with the Polish 
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 The oldest of the organizations interviewed, Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), started providing 
humanitarian aid to immigrants in the middle of 1990, when the first refugee groups appeared in the 
city.  
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 Such funding sources include the European Refugee Fund (ERF), the European Fund for the 
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Migration Forum, which was still in the start-up phase at the time of my research. The Center 
began by offering immigrants legal counseling and assistance in dealing with the government 
offices responsible for legalizing their stay in Warsaw.1078 In fact, of the national integration 
programs mentioned above, IIP is the only integration measure in the city which is almost 
fully financed by governmental monies from the governor, the organ responsible for the 
implementation of IIP in the Masovian Voivodeship. 
Most of the organizations where I interviewed staff members have thus far provided 
Polish language courses, legal counseling and general intercultural activities like “getting to 
know each other” with introduction courses to Polish culture, cuisine and traditions and that 
of the immigrants’, too.1079 Apart from individual job counseling run by one counselor at the 
PAH, no intensive job readiness courses for immigrants were available within the scope of 
the programs offered by the organizations I interviewed at the time of my research. 
Unfortunately but not surprisingly, then, no integration measures could be reported which 
specifically targeted immigrant youth. The work readiness programs available to youth in the 
city and sponsored by the governmental agency Youth Job Corps (Młodzieżowe Hufce 
Pracy) rarely reached immigrants. However, demand for such programs was generally 
acknowledged and a new project was already on the horizon.1080  
Because of financial constraints, the funding source started to determine the type of 
service. As my interviewee at the IOM explained that in light of the new possibilities of getting 
funds through EIF programs, those who began to regularly offer language courses for 
refugees with ERF funding came up with new projects for third country nationals.1081 These 
funds, however, require that the undocumented be excluded from these services. Few 
organizations which do not rely solely on EU money – like the PAH, the Migrant Center or the 
Raszyńska School – can provide services to all who come.1082 
Organizations apparently try to use the opportunity of obtaining funds through the 
new EU financial mechanisms in Poland in order to find ways of providing immigrants with 
various kinds of help. However, they sometimes launch programs without researching 
exactly which integration measures are needed and how they can best reach the target 
group. In fact, many of the projects should probably be considered experiments and testing 
grounds for potentially better programs in the future. As Dorota Przymies from Survival 
Foundation asserted, the best way to find out about immigrants’ needs is learning by doing. 
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Only after she had been employing immigrants in her own organizations could she finally 
fully understand the challenges immigrants face on the Polish labor market.1083  
 
5.2.4.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society 
 
Reaching out to immigrants is much easier when the organization employs 
immigrants as coworkers, as Survival Foundation does. The mutual trust between 
immigrants and the organization seems to be much stronger, so no official barrier exist 
between “us,” the competent native staff, and “you,” the poor immigrant seeking help. 
Nevertheless, since there are many organizations on the “immigrant integration market,” it 
seems that those organizations which initially provide assistance, like the individual job 
counseling offered by PAH, or the legal services of the Helsinki Foundation or SIP, tend to 
lack the resources – the staff, money, and time – to be in a position to encourage more 
immigrants to come to them. Moreover some “more well-established” 1084 immigrant service 
providers have also been directly contacted by the Office for Foreigners, which has recently 
become eager to cooperate with NGOs to tackle integration challenges in refugee centers. 
For new programs, finding target groups is more challenging. The organizations come 
up with more or less successful methods of learning the needs. Lingua Mundi’s online 
survey, which seeks to gather information about the need for language courses of possible 
applicants for their new EIF funded integration courses, is an interesting attempt to discover 
immigrants’ expectations. The organizers of the first planned youth job preparation courses 
were still in doubt about how to attract immigrant youth. Finally, as Gniadek ironically put it, 
some organizations trying to develop new ideas for EIF projects invite immigrants to 
meetings but they do not manage to bring them back again.1085 The most successful method 
of reaching out is literally going in to the communities where immigrants live. The Migrant 
Center, for example, leaves their offices and takes their Polish language services to remote 
locations on the outskirts of the city, to those who are not able to commute into the city 
center. Diversity Foundation, in turn, has come up with an innovative project, a so-called 
Mobile Immigrant Consultation Point at the Bazaar in the Warsaw Stadium area, the work 
site of many undocumented immigrants and thus a symbol of multicultural life in Warsaw.1086 
The Foundation’s workers used to mingle with the market sellers’ customers and in informal 
talks inquired about immigrants’ problems and offered legal counseling. 
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Along with an increase in the number of integration projects targeting immigrants, 
more campaigns and intercultural events were also organized in the city. The most famous of 
these events, the yearly celebration of World Refugee Day, coordinated by PAH, and World 
Migrant Day, organized by IOM, are now no longer the only campaigns which raise 
awareness of diversity in the city. At the same time smaller scale projects (like intercultural 
events for the community at the Raszyńska School, the library project Network for 
Knowledge on Migration,1087 or the City Council’s project Diverse Warsaw, aimed at fighting 
discrimination against people based on race or ethnic origin) are concrete signs that people 
have begun to talk about immigrants in the city. Still, as many organizations complained, this 
has not led to an increase in volunteers nor prompted the business sector to greater 
engagement in integration management. 
 
5.2.4.5 Network-Building  
 
The cooperation between integration stakeholders has started to develop only 
recently. The coordinator of the governmental program IIP, WCPR builds coalitions with 
language service providers, like Lingua Mundi, or runs consultation programs with Warsaw 
employment agencies. Less cooperation was reported among non-profits which have only 
begun to emerge in Warsaw. On the one hand, they still apparently want to work 
independently or they simply lack the capacity to run partnership projects, which are always 
time-consuming. On the other hand, some of the interviewees were working for organizations 
which were not well known enough to be considered reliable partners for others at the time of 
the interview. Katarzyna Kubin, working at the Forum for Social Diversity, the most recently 
founded organization of all those interviewed, noted a certain degree of discrimination 
against small organizations: 
 
From our side, we were very open to cooperation. It was necessary for us, because in order to 
be treated seriously we had to have a stable partner. We did not have anybody, none of the 
more established institutions wanted to cooperate with us. So we started building our 
organization on our own, from scratch… Only when we started passionately organizing our 
Mobile Immigrant Consultation Point did others get interested. Now we know that we started 
from the wrong point. First you have to develop your innovative ideas. Once you put them into 
practice and show that they work, you should then set up your organization and form 
partnerships.1088 
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 The project is coordinated by the Polish Migration Forum, which distributes books or raises funds 
for publications of migration research for the associated libraries in Warsaw and across Poland.     
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 Interview W/14. 
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However, since there are not many service-providers for immigrants, the 
organizations know each other quite well, and they quickly learn about new, emerging 
initiatives. Once they get to know each other better, they usually form coalitions in 
applications for EU funds to run future EIF projects together. The most important niche for 
consultations was legal counseling, but none of the organizations mentioned any kind of 
network-building for immigrant youth. 
Some of the bigger players started establishing working groups or consultations 
which sought to identify immigrants’ needs and potential integration partners to improve 
integration management in the city. The first of such initiatives formed in 2005, when the IOM 
invited both governmental and non-governmental organizations, among others a couple of 
existing migrant associations in Warsaw, for consultations. At the meetings they identified a 
need for changes and improvements in the situation of immigrants in the city, which were 
summarized in the IOM report Empowering Migrants.1089 Similar reports are usually follow-
ups of consultations or conferences on migration and integration which have recently started 
to take place with more frequency. For example, the newly-established (in 2008) Forum for 
Foreigners, by Masovian Voivode, invites all interested integration stakeholders from the city 
to join together to diagnose the current situation of immigrants and work to find solutions. 
One of the biggest challenges is to motivate employers and the business sector in general to 
take part, the coordinator of the Masovian Forum stated.1090 The central Polish government, 
though, has also engaged in networking with NGOs, at IOM’s National Platform of 
Cooperation for Migration Strategy in Poland, a majority of whose members come from 
Warsaw.1091 
The level of cooperation is slowly increasing among cities across Poland, spurred by 
the Warsaw-based organizations. Compared to other European countries, in turn, the city still 
lags behind other EU metropolises in participating in European networks for international 
cooperation on immigrant integration. A boom in international migration projects among 
Polish researchers is a notable exception.1092 
In sum, as many respondents agreed, most of the initiatives for network-building 
focus on identifying the problems, and holding discussions and consultations. Przymies 
argued: 
 
There is a good cooperation with governmental institutions like the Department for Migration 
Policy or the Office for Foreigners, but it involves only consultation. Somebody writes a good 
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report on that, adds it to the list of the organization’s activities and that’s it. In fact, immigrants, 
who should be the real beneficiaries, do not profit from this networking.1093  
 
Nevertheless, many respondents expressed great hope that the preliminary cooperation on 
programs connected with immigrant integration will bring about more concrete action in the 
near future. 
 
5.3 Summary: Comparing the Incomparable 
 
The above analysis of integration work in the city case studies reveals a wide 
spectrum of both similar and different approaches to this work not only on the part of 
organizations in different cities of two neighboring EU countries and two neighboring US 
states, but also among various interviewees inside the gates of the same city. Consequently, 
it is not possible to draw clear dividing lines between cases and generalize about a specific 
mode of integration in each city, which accordingly gives shape to the work of all 
organizations in each city. In fact, much as each individual immigrant experiences integration 
differently and finds his or her own way to integrate, in a similar way organizations pursue the 
goal of integration work in various ways, more or less efficiently and more or less 
innovatively. 
Whether the concept of integration is defined by the municipalities, or how they 
choose to define it, may be considered a deciding factor for an organization’s approach to 
immigrant integration, as can the status enjoyed by a particular organization. However, as 
the analysis thus far has shown, there is no single, deciding factor. Many other issues, set 
the conditions for immigrant integration management in a given organization. These 
conditions will be summarized in the conclusion in chapter 6. 
Nevertheless, my field work and the investigation of particular aspects involved in 
managing the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market, presented earlier in this 
chapter, provides a basis for arguing that in each case study a certain, unique atmosphere 
relating to the subject of immigrant integration exists. This context defines the presence of 
immigrants and their integration as an aspect of urban live that is either an ordinary feature of 
daily life (in San Diego), a controversial issue (in Phoenix), a trend (in Munich), or a novel 
development (in Warsaw). Interestingly enough, these different discourses on integration in 
the cities, reflected in the work of the organizations interviewed, correspond to Singers’ 
typologies of American immigration gateways, which I also ascribed to the EU case 
studies.1094  
 
                                                     
1093
 Interview W/1.  
1094
 See subchapter 3.2. 
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1) In the border city San Diego, an established, post-World War II gateway, the 
issues of immigrant youth are on the agenda of many youth programs, regardless 
of whether their target audience is native or foreign-born. Consequently, the 
immigrant youth who need integration assistance are lumped together with other 
disadvantaged young people in poor communities, which were also sometimes 
densely populated by segregated, ethnic population groups. Although the issue of 
the undocumented is by no means off the table, it is not as emotional or 
controversial, at least within the city,1095 as in the capitol of Arizona.  
 
2) In Phoenix, a rapidly-growing emerging gateway, integration management of 
immigrant youth is narrowed down to the controversies around the issue of 
providing help to the undocumented or deporting them. In such an atmosphere, 
avoiding the subject of immigrants might be the safest way for the organizations to 
continue providing services to immigrant youth. As a result, though, three distinct 
groups have emerged: strong advocates of undocumented youth, fierce 
opposition to the undocumented, and timid, integration service providers who 
want to help but are too wary to talk about their aspirations publicly and openly 
build networks. 
 
3) In Munich, which I consider a continuous gateway, the subject of immigrant 
integration and the concept of integration has become one of the city labels for the 
promotion of intercultural openness and tolerance in the conservative state of 
Bavaria. Consequently, the city boasts many integration programs directed at 
immigrant youth and fertile ground for network-building for many service providers 
in the city. Moreover, immigrant integration has turned into a trendy catchword 
used at many cultural and political events in the city, which can have two affects: it 
either encourages the involvement of Munich residents or overwhelms them 
somewhat with theorizing about integration processes. 
 
4) In Warsaw, which in the future I believe will become a pre-emerging gateway, 
integration stakeholders are still struggling to find a way to welcome new 
immigrants. Nevertheless, the boom in new ideas, plans, and enthusiasm is 
remarkable. The first integration networks are still in the process of learning about 
each other, discovering ways to reach out to immigrants, finding out how best to 
tap into the available EU resources for integration programs, and cooperating with 
international partners. It seems that in the city where the subject of integration is 
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 One should not forget about the dire situation of IB youth in the canyons or the undocumented 
crossing the mountains and deserts in the city surroundings. See subchapter 5.2.1.  
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still quite new, the establishment a common strategy is needed to develop 
“mature” integration management which also embraces immigrant youth.  
 
It is important to emphasize again that these unique circumstances for dealing with 
the issue of integrating immigrant youth to a large extent result from the top-down contexts of 
supranational, national, and state integration frameworks, presented in chapter 4, which 
therefore complicates a comparison of the city case studies. These top-down contexts are 
often overlooked in comparative studies of local integration practices, which try to evaluate 
best and worst practices across different cities without taking into consideration external, 
national conditions. In fact, an example of a best practice in Warsaw, the Mobile Immigrant 
Information Point, would not work very well in Phoenix, a city in which immigrants are quite 
wary of being stopped and questioned about their migration status by strangers and/or the 
police.  
The climate for integration management in each of immigration gateways presented 
here cannot reflect the wealth of new insights and information about methods of providing 
tools for immigrant integration on the part of the local society which are sometimes similar 
and sometimes different within and across case studies. Nevertheless, the incongruity of the 
transatlantic top-down and local contexts for integration brings into focus certain patterns, 
which will be presented in the concluding chapter. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
Bringing the research to an end evokes reflections about what has been done, what 
still needs to be done and the desired outcome of the study presented here, all of which is 
summarized in this chapter. I will first offer answers to the core research questions 
introduced at the beginning of the dissertation, then elaborate on the limitations of the 
research and prospects for further study, and finally suggest recommendations for integration 
work for immigrant youth in line with the Affirmative Integration Management (AIM) approach 
as proposed in this dissertation. 
 
6.1 Research Findings  
 
The research findings from the analysis of the influence of the top-down integration 
policies and the city contexts for integration management will be gathered into two sections. 
The first catalog will provide the answer to the first two research questions, presenting the 
factors which were found to influence the development of local initiatives aimed at integrating 
young immigrants into the labor market. The discussion following will explain how these 
factors determine the options for taking action by utilizing Affirmative Integration 
Management for immigrant youth. The implementation of Positive Youth Development 
strategies, which aim at developing the human capital of immigrant youth, is a prerequisite 
for implementing AIM. Consequently, the identification of factors which facilitate or hinder the 
realization of AIM at a given organization will provide the answer to the second research 
question: which factors enable the host society to tap into the potential of young immigrants? 
The second catalog will present the similarities and differences in the US and EU 
case studies, based on the research findings. In so doing, the study’s third research question 
will be answered: can the exchange of integration policy research and practical experience 
with integration management in the United States and the European Union be useful –are 
lessons learned from this exchange transferable? 
 
6.1.1 Affirmative Integration Management in Practice  
 
Based on an analysis of the transatlantic examples of local labor market integration 
initiatives for helping young immigrants gain access to the labor market, several important 
factors have been found in the US, Germany and Poland which influence the direction of the 
development of integration measures offered by the host society’s institutions.1096 The results 
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 The definition of the host society is narrowed down to the representatives of local government and 
important civil society institutions at the city level; these are the stakeholders in education and labor 
market systems and immigrant integration policies, as defined in subchapter 2.3.  
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suggest that the integration work of any given institution in each case study depends on the 
local, national, and sometimes even supranational context of immigrant integration policy-
making. At the same time many internal factors, at the local level of a given institution, which 
determine the character of the integration measures offered to immigrant youth, have been 
observed. Table 7 encapsulates the most important internal and external factors which 
determine the prospects for taking action after the institution of AIM, hereafter AIM factors: 
 
Table 7 External and Internal AIM Factors  
 
The catalog of the most important factors which determine the possibilities of taking action following 
the institution of Affirmative Integration Management for immigrant youth on the labor market  
 
  
External 
 
 
Internal 
 
 
1. Development of a city’s integration strategies 
and integration monitoring  
 
 
1. The institution’s understanding of its role in the 
immigrant integration process 
 
2. Available funds for the development of 
integration measures  
 
 
2. Target groups of integration measures  
 
3. Structures for network-building and 
cooperation with regard to the school-to-work 
transition of young immigrants 
 
 
3. The variety of direct and indirect integration 
measures 
 
4. The influence of top-down integration policies  
 
4. The willingness to cooperate with other 
organizations on the development of efficient 
immigrant integration programs  
 
 
5. Political and public discourse on the 
integration of immigrants 
 
 
5. The scope of information campaigns about 
integration services 
 
Table 7 clearly shows that to a large extent external factors restrict organizations in 
developing their integration work. At the same time, as the table illustrates, they depend 
considerably on their own internal organization and philosophy. Both internal and external 
variables will be briefly summarized here. 
The development of integration strategies and monitoring at the city government level 
is a factor encouraging local organizations to engage in integration work. Integration 
concepts and a city’s network of civil society actors demonstrate that immigration is not a 
taboo subject and that it deserves greater attention and commitment from city residents. 
Broad support for integration work on the part of the city government may open new 
possibilities for organizations to tap into a city’s resources, such as platforms for consultation 
and partnerships with governmental and non-governmental integration stakeholders. It is 
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even better if such platforms also focus particularly on strategies for the development of 
youth services in the city.  
Municipal, state, national, or, in Europe, EU funds are indispensable financial 
resources for the development of integration programs for immigrant youth, usually run by 
non-profit organizations. In addition, funds should also, ideally, be provided by the local 
business sector. The lack of financial stability of integration service providers often dooms 
their innovative initiatives to failure. Moreover, short-term grants are not the best solution to 
their financial constraints, as the amount of effort and engagement the organization puts into 
a single project is not proportional to the long term effect. In fact, integration stakeholders 
without stable financial incomes are under constant pressure to seek new funds before the 
current grant ends and cannot focus on improving their services. Additionally, grant makers’ 
restrictive regulations narrow the scope of integration work of organizations (e.g. the proviso 
that services for immigrant youth be limited to the documented).  
Stand-alone programs for immigrant youth from a single service provider are much 
more often affected by financial constraints than those run through partnerships. Moreover, 
single programs are sometimes less effective than those run in cooperation with 
stakeholders in various fields of integration work: workforce development or the educational 
system (e.g. employment agencies or educators). In fact, network-building is one of the best 
possible avenues to pulling together different resources, funds certainly, but even more 
important different areas of expertise which make it possible to organize more 
comprehensive youth programs targeting immigrants. Consequently, structures available for 
network-building may significantly improve integration services. 
National integration network-building and national integration funds are a necessary 
complement to local resources. However, it is questionable whether national regulation of 
integration policies always fosters the development of integration work for local 
organizations. For example, regulations on the provision of obligatory integration courses 
which are too strict reduce the maneuverability of local service providers and often impose 
unnecessary red tape. At the same time, top-down restrictions do not always respect a given 
organization’s expertise in integration work and sometimes fails to respond to the particular 
needs of some immigrant groups. 
Finally, as mentioned in subchapter 5.3, the local atmosphere for integration work 
with immigrant youth can range from enthusiasm and support to a lack of awareness to 
heated discussions about “illegals” and the fear of “foreign cultures.” Consequently, the local 
environment can either promote or impede the development of integration initiatives. Heated 
political and public debate on the subject of immigration may also hinder the involvement of 
volunteers and employers in programs for immigrant youth.  
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Despite a wide range of external AIM factors, the importance of the internal structure 
of organizations cannot be overlooked. In fact, the method of approaching immigrant youth is 
to a large extent dependent on the personal attitudes of the staff toward the subject of 
immigrant integration and youth development. Whether the staff understand the integration 
process as a shared responsibility or merely the task of the immigrant is essential. Different 
approaches were observed in the research, ranging from more demanding to more 
cooperative. The ideal situation would be to engage immigrant youth in the development of 
services for their peers, which would give them a chance to develop their organizational and 
entrepreneurial skills. Moreover, if an organization perceives the integration process as the 
fastest possible way to self-sufficiency, they may easily fail to notice the potential of certain 
immigrants and/or their aspirations to further education, while persuading them to take the 
first available jobs. 
If possible, organizations should not be exclusive and should be ready to offer their 
services to all immigrant youth in need. Unfortunately, the regulations of many grant makers 
restrict the target groups. Very often those without legal documents are out and cannot 
expect any positive reinforcement in their struggles to obtain an education and to integrate. 
However, many solutions can be found, like applying for additional grants or offering 
counseling to the excluded target groups outside the strict structure of the funded programs. 
Perseverance and belief in the mission of helping all young immigrants, regardless of their 
ethnic backgrounds or legal status, can work miracles.  
The range of integration measures an organization offers is another internal factor 
which supports practicing AIM. More comprehensive services, which offer not only language 
training but also remedial tutoring, courses in self-assessment, or the development of 
workforce skills, can better address the challenges faced in making the school-to-work 
transition. Moreover, indirect immigrant integration measures, which are offered to both 
native and immigrant youth, may foster even better integration processes. Since an 
organization’s capacities do not always allow providing “a full package” of labor market 
integration services, networking with others is indispensable.  
The willingness to take part in network-building is usually beneficial for both sides: the 
immigrants and the organizations. Integration projects in partnerships enhance the capacities 
of the partners. Consequently, potential competitors for the same funds become partners in 
one comprehensive project. However, selectiveness in networking is also important. 
Because of the boom in networking proposals, international conferences, meetings, and 
exchanges of best practices, the real goal of providing high-quality integration services to 
local immigrant youth may easily be forgotten. 
The organizations which seek to offer comprehensive immigrant youth programs 
make great effort at not only establishing constructive networks but also reaching out to 
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youth and the local population, if their services are still not widely known. Activism and 
information campaigns are an essential part of their work. On the other hand, like networking 
advertising should not overshadow the actual mission of the organization. Non-profits can 
easily turn into for-profits and project coordinators into people seeking celebrity and 
recognition. In fact, the immigrant youth who need help are often on the margins of the 
society, away from schools where integration services reach and beyond the reach of the 
employment agencies who can sometimes connect young job-seekers with school-to-work 
transition programs. Finding methods of reaching out to immigrant youth on the margins is a 
necessity for AIM practitioners.  
In conclusion, for immigrant youth service providers both internal and external factors 
determine whether the local society is able to evaluate and tap into potential of young 
immigrants. The interplay of all these factors reveals just how multidimensional the process 
of integration management is. The external factors were not found to fully support the 
integration work of the organizations interviewed in any of the case studies, as the analysis 
showed. Similarly, none of the organizations, governmental or non- governmental, were able 
to successfully cope with all the internal pitfalls hampering the implementation of AIM 
principles. Better practices and practices best avoided have been identified. However, I 
would be wary of labeling any service the best one and any case study the example for all 
others to follow. Achieving the status of the best immigrant youth service provider is only 
possible when no improvements are needed. But bringing resources together and 
exchanging information about what can be done better is the best way to achieve the target 
of employing Positive Youth Development strategies with immigrant youth. 
 
6.1.2 Exchange of Transatlantic Perspectives on Integration  
 
Research findings not only show points of difference but also many points of 
convergence among the factors influencing the management of immigrant integration and 
research on it in various local, state and national contexts in the United States, Germany, 
and Poland. Table 8 presents a catalog of these similarities and differences, which I 
recommend as a basis for further comparative research on immigrant integration in the EU 
countries and the US.1097  
Looking at the table, it seems that the list of differences is actually counterbalanced 
by points of overlap which support the exchange of integration policy research and practical 
experience of integration management in the US states and the EU countries. Six 
dimensions of comparative transatlantic research will be briefly summarized here. 
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 See implications for further study in subchapter 6.2.  
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Table 8 The Catalog of Similarities and Differences among the EU and US Case Studies for the 
comparative transatlantic research framework. 
 
Differences Convergences 
1. History of immigration 1. Immigration as “a structural necessity” 
2. Immigration scale:  
- immigration numbers  
- immigrant groups 
- availability of statistical data  
2. The importance of good practices exchanges: 
- integration of management solutions, independent of   
  statistics  
3. Public and political discourse on migration and 
integration: 
- the country’s self - image 
- the government’s and the society’s “body languages” 
  
3. Fortress America – Fortress Europe  
  
 
4. “National and local mode of integration”:  
- levels of governance and division of competencies 
  in immigration and integration policies  
- different terminology: immigrant, foreigner, 
  migration background, integration as “fluid concepts”  
 
4. Common issues within national modes: 
- local problems v. top-down national integration  
  measures 
- need for cooperation across sectors  
- language and integration courses, naturalization tests,  
  and indicators of immigrant integration  
- centralization of integration policies  
5. Legal status:  
- the path to citizenship: jus soli  v. jus sanguinis 
- the role of citizenship in gaining access to education  
  and the labor market 
5. Right to stay and integrate:  
- controversies about unauthorized immigration  
- rejection of integration measures for unauthorized  
  immigrant youth  
6. Education and vocational training systems and  
    characteristics of the local labor market 
6. Knowledge-driven economy:  
- need for cooperation between educators and  
  employers  
- need for recognizing immigrants’ potentials  
 
First, what lies behind the current situation regarding immigration and integration in a 
given place is, not surprisingly, dependent on its particular history with migrant movements, 
which have shaped the various attitudes towards immigration in the local communities in 
evidence today. Such an argument could rule out the possibility of comparing US and EU 
cases were it not for the fact that different histories do not always translate into different 
present and future developments. The United States, Germany and Poland are currently 
facing common challenges: immigrants are needed, therefore they should be accepted or 
perhaps even invited. As Dietrich Thränhardt and Robert Miles noted back in 1995, 
“immigration has become a structural necessity” for North America and wealthy capitalist 
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European countries.1098 Such a message is echoed in some of the demographic and 
economic projections being made today for the US and the EU, which warn of aging native 
populations and foresee positive contributions by immigration to the local economy on both 
sides of the Atlantic.1099  
Secondly, the volume of migration and the ethnic diversity of the incoming 
populations in a given location represent yet another factor influencing integration 
management. The intensity of integration measures is assumed to be proportional to the 
scale of migration. As Roger Waldinger points out:  
 
As long as immigrants are few and their resources limited, only close associates are able to 
access help. But the buildup of a population inevitably expands and diversifies the types of 
social networks that an immigrant community includes. Greater numbers then create the basis 
for institutions, both formal and informal that bring immigrants together in recurrent, 
systematic, and more durable ways.1100  
 
“Greater numbers” of immigrants at least make their presence visible and recognizable to 
those in the host society who are in a position to implement integration measures (like 
governmental and non-governmental organizations). In fact, it is necessary to have available 
data on migration so as to raise public awareness about the need for integration. The lack of 
statistical data on migration is challenging not only for comparative researchers but also for 
activists in organizations working toward immigrant integration who seek approval for the 
integration initiatives they have planned. As most of the integration and migration reports, 
press articles and interviews cited here point out, numbers do matter in public discourse if 
one wants to persuade or prove, accept or reject proposals, new ideas, or reforms.  
However, whether the size of the immigrant population enhances the quality of the 
available integration measures is debatable. Different migration numbers and the ethnic 
diversity of transatlantic case studies are no reason to abandon regional comparisons. In 
fact, good practices and innovative solutions do not necessarily depend solely on the scale of 
migration. As new international integration exchange platforms and reports verify, a wide 
spectrum of integration management solutions come from various localities in different 
countries with different immigrant groups across the US and the EU.  
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Thirdly, each case study in the transatlantic research framework is set in a given 
political context, which strongly influences public discourse and political decisions. Many 
differences exist in governmental “body language” and societal “body language” in California, 
Arizona, Germany, and Poland. However, their global settings vis-à-vis overall trends in US 
and EU immigration policies are similar. In fact, there are common tendencies to approve 
exclusive strategies to allow needed immigrants in and to prevent unwanted immigrants from 
entering and living in “Fortress America” and “Fortress Europe.” The concept of “Fortress 
Europe,” coined by critics of the exclusive EU immigration policy after the Schengen 
Agreement in 1985, is currently being used with reference to the US as “Fortress America.” 
This new usage derives from the constant failure of immigration reform and the literal 
fortification of the American borders.1101 A similar rhetoric of immigrant exclusion is 
widespread on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The fourth point of differences refers to various modes of integration analyzed in 
chapter 4. Integration management functions differently in the US and the EU member 
states, which are influenced by different immigration policies, different decision-making 
structures, and different divisions of competencies in the countries. Additionally, what forms 
the national mode of integration in a given country derives from the official and unofficial 
language used in reference to immigration and integration. The connotation of such fluid 
concepts as immigrants, foreigners, people with migration backgrounds still differs from 
country to country and shapes political and social attitudes differently.1102 On the other hand, 
the need for coordinating integration management across sectors, according to the AIM 
theory, can be seen in organizations at both national and grassroots levels, regardless of 
differences in the use of immigration and integration terminology. Similarly, some common 
trends appear in the debate on modes of integration in the EU and the US such as language 
and integration courses, naturalization tests, or indicators of immigrant integration. Moreover, 
centralization of integration measures is currently underway on both sides of the Atlantic: the 
integration policy is on the agenda for both the federal government of the US and the 
European Commission of the EU. 
The fifth point, which bears an enormous influence on models of integration 
management, concerns the immigrant’s path to citizenship and all the rights and benefits 
granted by citizenship. Access to citizenship varies from country to country and poses 
different challenges for those who are already “in the club” or those who are still standing on 
the outside wanting to come in.  
While the rules for obtaining citizenship may vary, the US and the EU countries have 
to confront the issue of what to do with “the unwanted” who have already entered the 
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country. The nature of the debate on undocumented immigrants already in the country 
depends on the size and scale of the “problem,” but the challenge to integration service 
providers remains the same: officially they are not allowed to help anyone, unless “loopholes” 
are found. This makes integration management for immigrant youth without legal status a 
taboo of sorts and thus a highly controversial issue. 
Finally, managing the school-to-work transition of immigrant youth is intimately 
connected with education and labor market policies, which are unique in each of the case 
studies. Education systems and the degree of access to education, vocational training, and 
labor markets for immigrant youth determine potential integration measures. However, on 
both sides of the Atlantic, similar challenges exist with reference to education and the 
economy. Education is considered a key labor market integration factor in the knowledge-
driven economies both in the US and the EU member states. Recognition of immigrant 
assets (as signified by bilingual education and/or recognition of foreign qualifications, for 
example) and cross-sector involvement in labor market integration management (also by 
such key stakeholders in labor markets as employers) are common problems in the case 
studies, independent of their labor market and education systems. The experiences of 
transition and the pathways of immigrant youth might be similar in the EU countries and the 
US where education is no longer a luxury but a necessity. 
In sum, despite different national and local contexts for immigrant integration in the 
US and the EU countries and their cities, the exchange of integration policy research and 
practical experience of integration management should be considered a valuable source of 
potential solutions to common challenges faced by policymakers and organizers of programs 
for immigrant youth on both sides of the Atlantic. Surprisingly, the incongruity in the case 
studies showed many common aspects of policymaking processes at national, state and 
local levels and practical integration work. Some good practices may turn out to be 
transferable, while others will remain in the realm of unachievable goals. Nevertheless, the 
transatlantic exchange among researchers and practitioners helps to raise awareness of 
those integration problems which have not yet been recognized at the local level by 
municipalities or integration service-providers or by national governments both in the US and 
in the EU.  
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6.2 Research Limitations  
 
The limitations of my transatlantic study on managing immigrant integration derive 
from the challenging nature of transatlantic comparative research, further complicated by 
disparities between the case studies; from restrictions imposed by the applied research 
methods; and from the amount of time available for the empirical work.  
Because of different levels of governance in the United States, Germany, and Poland, 
a clear, comprehensive, and structurally comparable presentation of all top-down integration 
contexts for the city case studies was simply not possible. The top-down context for the case 
studies has been narrowed down to focus on those elements which have the greatest impact 
on the development of the local management of immigrant integration: the European and 
national contexts for Munich and Warsaw and the national and state contexts for San Diego 
and Phoenix. However, other entities at the level of the federal German states, Polish 
voivodeships, and the US counties also have a strong influence, though probably not as 
much, on direct integration policies as well as on education, labor market systems, 
infrastructure, and available public and financial resources in the cities, which might hinder or 
facilitate integration measures for immigrant youth.  
As the findings showed, the incongruity of the US, German, and Polish national 
modes of integration, of other policies investigated relevant to the topic, as well as the 
incongruity of city case studies brought attention to new perspectives on managing immigrant 
integration and conducting transatlantic research on immigrant integration in the EU and US 
case studies. Nevertheless, as with every case study research project, the choice of cases 
definitely impacts the research results so no general conclusions can be drawn regarding 
integration management in German, Polish, or US cities. 
Additionally, the dissertation is a policy-oriented research project and cannot provide 
any in-depth and unbiased assessment of the success of the local integration measures 
examined. Much as it is important and intriguing to monitor opinions about service providers 
and to investigate their achievements, it was not possible to analyze policy outcomes. For 
such an undertaking, including the opinions of the receivers of immigrant youth services 
about the methods and shortcomings of the institutions interviewed would be crucial. 
Moreover, because some underprivileged ethnic groups were over-represented in the 
cities, the focus of discussions about the integration of immigrant youth was frequently on the 
unsuccessful youth. Obviously the picture of successful immigrant youth and some good 
experiences with young immigrants on the part of integration stakeholders might have been 
overshadowed by stories about the struggles of the underprivileged with integration 
challenges. Again, consulting immigrant youth would counterbalance the sometimes biased 
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opinions of the interviewees, overwhelmed by problems of the less privileged immigrants 
which they have to confront on a daily basis. 
Finally the time constraints of my empirical work in Poland and the US did not allow 
contacting and consulting all important integration stakeholders in the cities nor to consult 
representatives of the business sector. For the same reason, I was not able to track all 
changes and developments in integration services in each city following the conclusion of my 
field visits.  
 
6.3 Implications for Further Research 
 
It is hoped that the study can provide incentives for further transatlantic scientific 
inquiries addressing some of the important aspects, mentioned above, not covered in the 
dissertation. 
Consequently, it would be interesting to do follow-up research in other cities from the 
same US states and EU countries in order to examine how their local integration 
management functions under the influence of the same top-down integration contexts. At the 
same time it would be advisable to extend the scope of the transatlantic research to other US 
states and EU countries, using the proposed framework for transatlantic research on 
managing immigrant integration.  
Moreover, there is a strong need to investigate the involvement of business sectors in 
integration measures for immigrant youth and the potential of cooperating with civil society 
actors and local governments. As the research pointed out, so far little network-building 
exists in this sector and more research on potential areas for cooperation as well as the 
monitoring of recruitment procedures of young immigrants would be beneficial for both 
immigrant youth service providers and local governments. 
Another research gap in all countries investigated was found in the national 
frameworks for the recognition of foreign qualifications and their practical implementation at 
the local level. US, German, and Polish frameworks for this are still underdeveloped and a 
study of recent EU incentives might be a good point of reference for a transatlantic 
exchange. 
Next, the application of Positive Youth Development strategies in managing 
immigrant integration is strongly recommended for further study. The possibilities of 
practicing PYD strategies as a proper avenue for guiding immigrant youth into the labor 
market is universal, regardless of a country’s history, immigration flows, or the conditions of 
the local labor market. PYD is still in the developmental phase and it is to be hoped that 
testing the application of the proposed Affirmative Integration Management approach among 
various integration stakeholders will contribute to PYD research. Moreover, research on 
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success stories of immigrant youth might offer a needed boost of confidence, demonstrating 
to the host society that managing immigrant integration can yield positive results.  
Finally, as the dissertation showed, integration of undocumented immigrant youth is a 
common challenge for all case studies. More research is needed to break the silence and 
taboos around this challenge in other cities, both in the US and the EU. As the Munich 
example shows, one piece of research can work miracles and give rise to the unanticipated 
development of city models for welcoming undocumented youth. 
 
6.4 Looking Ahead 
 
It is believed that improving things in the world can be done most successfully by 
looking at what already exists and comparing different methods of organization. The 
exchange of various practices and policy solutions on how to better manage the integration 
of immigrant youth is intended to offer practical suggestions for both integration policy-
makers, at different levels of governance, and local practitioners. The research findings 
presented in the dissertation should stimulate such progress. The following final remarks and 
recommendations should encourage the development of better immigrant integration 
strategies at both the national and local levels.  
 
1) It seems that neither a highly structured and regularized immigrant integration 
policy, which narrows down the integration process to formalized contracts, nor a 
hand-off approach, on the part of the government, to the integration challenges of 
immigrant youth is a good solution for the development of local integration 
initiatives. Ideally resources and funds for network-building and integration 
programs should be provided by national frameworks, but still a certain amount of 
room to maneuver, with regard to their use, should be left to the discretion of 
“local moderators of integration.”1103 The development of EU integration tools for 
facilitating the establishment of integration programs in the EU member states 
may be worth emulating. 
 
2) National awareness-raising about the contributions and success stories of 
immigrants, regardless of their immigration status, is needed. The host society 
may then find it easier to welcome the newcomers and, at the same time, 
immigrants themselves may feel that their migration background is not an 
obstacle but an asset. 
 
                                                     
1103
 See Bommes, M. (2008), op. cit., p. 187.  
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3) The volume of immigration should not determine the degree of governmental 
engagement in awareness-raising campaigns about integration and integration 
management. In fact, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant vigilante actions may 
develop quickly and exert a strong impact on the local society’s attitudes towards 
young immigrants and hinder their personal development. 
 
4) Positive Youth Development strategies should be considered the key methods in 
education and vocational training programs for immigrant youth. Cooperation in 
the development of such strategies should involve different sectors: educators, 
administrators, and employers. 
 
5) Despite sometimes unfavorable circumstances, externally, for instituting the 
principles of Affirmative Integration Management, local youth service providers 
should not abandon their efforts to provide the best options for the development of 
each immigrant youth’s potential. In fact, much of the success depends not on 
national and local integration policies but on the commitment of youth service 
providers to their work. Joining resources with other local service providers may 
prove beneficial in overcoming organizational and financial challenges. 
 
Finally, when discussing strategies for managing immigrant integration, it is important 
to remember the abstract and subjective issues involved in moving to a new country. Each 
new immigrant experiences the new rules of the game in his or her own individual way, which 
cannot be anticipated by any integration program or business plan for integration 
management. In fact, we are still talking about services by and for people, and each person 
has his or her own personal history, character, and capabilities. No integration strategy can 
guarantee success. It can only invite both natives and immigrants to join together to 
cooperate with each other for social equality. The success of this endeavor depends on the 
individual work of both actors. 
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Appendix 1 
Interview questions  
 
 
1. To what extent does your organization deal with immigrants on a daily basis (both 
documented and undocumented) and what is their ethnic background? 
2. How does your organization understand/ define integration of immigrants in your city? 
3. What are the prerequisites for successful integration of young immigrants in general and 
specifically into the labor market? 
4. What has changed in the course of the last ten years in the situation of young immigrants in 
general and specifically on the labor market in Phoenix? 
5. What are the challenges which young immigrants face on the labor market in your city? How 
does this situation differ among ethnic groups and from the situation of the natives? 
6. What role does your organization play in the integration of young immigrants in general and 
specifically into the labor market? Do you organize any programs or courses to help young 
immigrants to receive better education and job market opportunities? Are they available for 
undocumented immigrants as well? 
7. How would you estimate the degree of discrimination based on immigration status at the 
workplace in your city? 
8. Does your organization cooperate with the business sector to foster the internalization and 
diversification of the workforce of your city, promoting an immigrant workforce? If so could you 
please provide some best practices or challenges for dealing with employers? 
9. How do you reach immigrants (programs, initiatives, counseling)? How do you reach those 
who have no interest in integrating? 
10. How do you network and cooperate with other organizations, local government, municipalities, 
and enterprises in the field of integration of young immigrants into the labor market in your 
city? 
11. How do you cooperate with citizens in this field (campaigns, mobilization, social projects)? 
12. How do you finance programs for immigrants within your organization? Do you receive any 
city, state or federal financial support? If so, please specify. 
13. Is there any degree of cooperation between the organizations in different cities and states and 
other countries (exchange of best practices) in the field of immigrant integration? 
14. How does the current political situation in your country affect the situation of young immigrants 
on the labor market in your city and the work of your organization? 
15. Do you have any statistical information concerning the sources and amount of funds your 
organization receives from the state and federal government to serve immigrants? Please 
name the programs if possible. 
16. What challenges will your organization face in the near future to work effectively toward the 
integration of young immigrants into the labor market in your city? 
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Appendix 2 
Interview tables 
 
The interviews from San Diego, Phoenix, and Munich are recorded on the CD attached to the back 
cover of the dissertation.   
Selected parts of the interviews with the organizations in Warsaw are in appendix 9. 
 
 
Table A1 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in San Diego. 
 
Code Organization Interviewee/Position 
(Position held at the time of the 
interview) 
Comments/Website  
SD/1 American Friends 
Service Committee 
(AFSC) San Diego 
Pedro Rios  
Program Director - San Diego 
Area  
Co-chair of the San Diego 
Immigrant Rights Consortium.  
http://afsc.org/office/san-diego-ca 
SD/2 Casa Familiar Andrea Skorepa 
CEO and President 
A community development agency 
in the community of San Ysidro.  
http://www.casafamiliar.org 
SD/3 Casa Familiar Olivia Ravillo 
Project Coordinator 
http://www.casafamiliar.org 
SD/4 International 
Rescue Committee, 
San Diego 
Christina Piranio 
Youth Program Manager  
One of the role models for IRC in 
Phoenix.  
http://www.rescue.org/us-
program/us-san-diego-ca 
SD/5 San Diego Asian 
Youth Organization 
(SDAYO) 
 
Somsack Thongchanh         
Police Service Officer  
 
four teenage members of 
SDAYO  
SDAYO was initiated by the San 
Diego Police Department, 
Community Relations Office. 
http://www.sandiego.gov/police 
SD/6 Ser Pacific Beach 
Employment Center 
Pacific Beach Office  
Waldo Lopez                       
Center Coordinator  
One of few agencies in San Diego 
which organize employment of day 
laborers and give them a “shelter.” 
SD/7 San Diego Job 
Corps Center  
Bobby Brown                      
Center Director 
A federal residential education and 
job training program for at-risk 
youth from low income families.  
http://www.sandiegojobcorps.org 
SD/8 
 
Career 
Development 
Services at San 
Diego Continuing 
Education 
Doug Elliot                            
Career Counselor 
http://cds.sdce.edu/ 
 
 
SD/9 Transfer Academy 
at San Diego 
Continuing 
Education   
Sheyla D. Castillo         
Counselor  
http://www.sdce.edu/ 
 
 
SD/10 Transfer Career 
Center at San 
Diego City College   
Marilyn Harley                     
Director  
http://www.sdcity.edu/transfer/ 
 
SD/11 Youth One Stop 
Career Center      
San Diego County 
Kurt Farrington 
Work Readiness Assistant II 
The Center serves students that 
are expelled, delinquent, foster, 
homeless, parenting, gang 
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Office of 
Education/Juvenile 
Court and 
Community Schools  
affiliated, or on probation, not 
necessarily immigrant youth.  
https://www.sdcoe.net/jccs2/?loc=
metro-wr&m=1 
SD/12 
 
Metro Region 
Career Centers 
Mark Nanzer 
Manager 
Located in the City Heights District, 
with high number of refugees.  
http://www.ccdsd.org 
SD/13 Catholic Charities 
Diocese of San 
Diego 
Michael McKay  
Department Director  
One of VOLAGs in San Diego. 
http://www.ccdsd.org 
SD/14 City Middle College 
(CMC) at San Diego 
City College  
Kimi Rodriguez Mc Swain 
Adjunct Counselor 
http://www.sdcity.edu/AcademicPro
grams/ProgramsofInstruction/CityM
iddleCollegeCMC 
SD/15 San Diego 
Workforce 
Partnership 
Mark Cafferty 
President and CEO 
Due to technical problems, the 
interview was not recorded.  
http://www.sandiegoatwork.com 
SD/16 CalWORKs, 
Continuing 
Education 
Juan Serrano, 
Intake Coordinator 
http://www.sdce.edu/services/calw
orks.htm 
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Table A2 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in Phoenix. 
 
Code Organization Interviewee/Position 
(Position held at the time of the 
interview) 
Comments/Website  
P/1 GateWay Early 
College High 
School 
Yvonne Watterson             
Principal  
Watterson’s work for 
undocumented students in 
Phoenix impacted the scope of 
this dissertation. Only after 
meeting with the principal did I 
realize that the issue of the 
undocumented should be also in 
focus of my field work.  
P/2 Golden Gate 
Community Center 
Daniel Zapata                       
Director of Family Education 
http://www.goldengatecenter.org 
P/3 Chicanos por la 
Causa 
Anthony J. Alberta                    
Vice President  
http://www.cplc.org 
P/4 Friendly House Luis Enriquez 
Coordinator of Adult 
Education/Workforce 
http://www.friendlyhouse.org 
 
P/5 Center for 
Community 
Development and 
Civil Rights  at 
Arizona State 
University (ASU) 
Raul Yzaguirre 
Executive Director  
A former President and CEO of 
the National Council of La Raza 
(NCLR)  
http://cdcr.asu.edu 
 
P/6 Florence Immigrant 
and Refugee 
Rights Project 
Jacquelyn Ehrenberg 
Funds Manager  
http://www.firrp.org 
 
P/7 Job Corps Sam Georgiou                    
Support Services Manager 
A federal residential education 
and job training program for at-
risk youth from low income 
families.  
http://phoenix.jobcorps.gov 
P/8 Phoenix College Trino Sandoval 
Interim Associate Dean of Custom 
Training and Education 
http://www.pc.maricopa.edu 
 
P/9 Phoenix Workforce 
Connection, City of 
Phoenix 
Cynthia M. Spell 
Deputy Community and Economic 
Development Director 
A person highly interested in 
networking for immigrant 
integration in Phoenix. 
http://phoenix.gov/econdev/phxw
c/index.html 
P/10 International 
Rescue Committee 
in Phoenix 
Jennifer Doran 
Family and Youth Services 
Program Manager 
http://www.rescue.org/us-
program/us-phoenix-az 
P/11 Crockett 
Elementary School  
Tammy Tusek                    
Principal  
 
http://www.balsz.k12.az.us/educ
ation/school/school.php?sectioni
d=8 
P/12 AZ Lost Boys 
Center 
Ralph J Serpico               
Executive Director 
 
Jany Deng 
Program Manager 
The Center hosts the Cow 
Project, an innovative 
entrepreneurship initiative: 
http://www.azlostboyscenter.org/
cow.html 
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P/13 Arizona 
Department of 
Economic Security 
Charles Shipman                    
State Refugee Coordinator 
Shipman coordinates the 
Refugee Resettlement Program 
for the whole State of Arizona.  
https://www.azdes.gov 
P/14 Arizona Call-A-
Teen Youth 
Resources, Inc. 
(ACYR) 
Sharler Barnett                   
Program Manager 
  
Tim Valenica                           
Youth Program Coordinator 
http://www.acyraz.org/ 
 
P/15 American Dream 
Academy (ADA),  
the Center for 
Community 
Development and 
Civil Rights at ASU  
Maria Luisa                           
Program Coordinator  
The interview covers a personal 
and emotional story of the 
interviewee who experienced 
lots of challenges herself after 
coming to the US as an 
undocumented student from 
Mexico. 
http://cdcr.asu.edu/Programs/am
erican-dream-academy-ada  
P/16 CADENA 
(Comité de Apoyo 
para el Desarrollo 
Estudiantil de la 
Nación Americana) 
Carmen Cornejo                           
Executive Director  
A strong advocate for 
undocumented students and the 
DREAM Act.  
http://www.dreamactaz.org/ 
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Table A3 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in Munich. 
 
Code Organization Interviewee/Position 
(Position held at the time of the 
interview) 
Comments/Website  
M/1 Hauptschule an 
der Führichstrasse, 
Ramersdorf  
Angela Illmberger              
Principal  
The school is located in one of 
the districts with the highest 
share of immigrants, mostly 
asylees and undocumented in 
the city. 80% of pupils are 
estimated to have a migration 
background.  
M/2 Ausländerbeirat  
(Foreigners’ 
Advisory Council) 
 
Cuman Naz                               
Head  
No special integration programs 
are administered by the 
Council. It is an important 
political representative of 
immigrants in Munich and 
focuses mostly on lobby work.  
http://www.auslaenderbeirat-
muenchen.de/ 
M/3 Stelle für 
Interkulturelle 
Arbeit   
(The Office for 
Intercultural 
Affairs) 
Margret Spohn                            
Office Manager 
The lead manager of the 
Intercultural Integration 
Concept of the City in Munich. 
The name “Frau Spohn” has 
risen to a key symbol of 
intercultural work of the City of 
Munich.  
M/4 Café 104   Birgit Poppert                        
Project Coordinator  
The organization, which started 
as a clandestine organization in 
1998, now has grown to the 
best known non-profit, which 
serves the undocumented in 
Munich.  
http://www.cafe104.de/  
M/5 Spanische 
Katholische 
Mission München 
(Spanish Catholic 
Mission)  
Alberto Martínez                   
Parish Priest  
A very unique interview which 
turned into a less formal 
conversation about working for 
the undocumented people in 
Munich.  
http://www.misioncatolica-
munich.de/ 
M/6 Sozialbürgerhaus 
Pasing  
Sabine Nowack                          
Office Manager 
One of 13 Sozialbürgerhäuser, 
led by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
für Beschäftigung München 
GmbH (ARGE). 
M/7 IG JMD 
Jugendmigrations-
dienst 
Barbara Bornemann 
Counselor   
 
At the seat of IG 
InitiativGruppe, one of JMDs in 
Munich. 
http://www.jmd-
verbund.de/home/index.html 
M/8 
 
IG InitiativGruppe 
(Interkulturelle 
Begegnung und 
Bildung e.V.) 
 
Manfred Bosl                       
Director   
This non-profit has the most 
impressive integration offer for 
immigrants of all ages among 
the organizations which I have 
encountered in Munich.  
http://home.initiativgruppe.de/ 
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M/9 Schlau School  
(Schulanaloger 
Unterricht für 
unbegleitete, 
minderjährige 
Flüchtlinge) 
 
 
Martina Unger                          
Social Worker 
Along with the school for 
asylees, Unger works for 
another initiative Heimaten e.V. 
– Netz für 
Chancengerechtigkeit, which 
aims at integration of both 
German and immigrant youth in 
the city. 
http://www.schlau-schule.de/ 
http://www.heimaten.de/ 
M/10 Flüchtlingsrat Monika Steinhauser       
Coordinator  
The interview concerns mostly 
the situation of asylum seekers 
in Germany and particularly in 
Munich. 
http://www.muenchner-
fluechtlingsrat.de 
M/11 
 
REGSAM  
(Regionalisierung 
sozialer Arbeit in 
München)  
  
Friederike Goschenhofer 
REGSAM Moderator  
The municipal network 
REGSAM is divided into 16 
districts which aim to 
coordinate local social work, 
including work with immigrants.  
http://www.regsam.net/de/00_st
artseite.php 
M/12 
 
MigraNet Amt für 
Wohnen und 
Migration 
(The Office of 
Housing and 
Migration) 
 
Regina Ober                        
MigraNet Coordinator  
One of the key coordinators of 
the EU and national projects for 
immigrants which are 
administered at the level of the 
City of Munich. 
http://www.muenchen.de/Ratha
us/soz/wohnenmigration/integra
tionshilfen/185129/migranet.ht
ml 
M/13 Referat für Arbeit 
und Wirtchaft  
(The Department 
for Labor and 
Economic Affairs)  
Ulrike Schulz                        
MOVA plus Coordinator 
   
Robert Hanslmaier                
Project Coordinator   
MOVA plus tries to mobilize  
apprenticeship 
training positions with non-
German entrepreneurs in 
Munich. 
http://www.movaplus.de/ 
http://www.muenchen.de/arbeit
undwirtschaft 
http://www.muenchen.de/mbq/ 
M/14 AWO 
(Arbeiterwohlfahrt 
München) 
 
Kerstin Schmitt                       
Social Worker  
 
Kristina Schmitt coordinates 
intercultural trainings INKOMM 
for both school staff and 
students. 
http://www.awo-muenchen-
migration.de/ 
 
M/15 Lotsenprojekt 
Pontis 
Stefan Dehne                       
Project Initiator  
At the time of the interviews the 
project was just about to start.  
http://www.diakonie-
hasenbergl.de 
M/16 Die Münchner 
Volkshochschule 
(MVHS) 
Ingrid Veicht                           
Manager of the Office: Deutsch, 
Migration und Integration 
Coordinator of the project 
FLÜB&S – Flüchtlinge in Beruf 
und Schule, one of few projects 
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supported by the City of Munich 
which offers language courses 
and education for asylees. 
http://www.mvhs.de/   
M/17* University of 
Applied Sciences 
in Regensburg 
Philip Anderson                
Professor for Migration and 
Intercultural Social Work at the 
Faculty of Social Sciences  
The author of the study on the 
undocumented in Munich. His 
recommendations resulted in 
creating by the City the Munich 
Model.   
http://www.philip-
anderson.de/english.htm 
M/18*  verdi  
 
Ulrich Gammel                 
Fachbereich 6, Ressort C 
Landesbezirk Bayern 
http://muenchen.verdi.de/ 
 
 
* Two additional interviews M/17 and M/18 could not be conducted face-to-face and are based on 
written responses to interview questions sent via email (see appendix 6 and appendix 7). 
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Table A4 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in Warsaw. 
 
Code Organization Interviewee/Position 
(Position held at the time of the 
interview) 
Comments/Website  
W/1 The ‘Ocalenie’ 
(Survival) 
Foundation 
Dorota Przymies                      
Deputy of the Board 
 
The only organization among 
those which I interviewed which 
employs immigrants.  
http://www.ocalenie.org.pl/ 
W/2 Polish 
Humanitarian 
Action (PAH),      
the Center for 
Refugees and 
Repatriates  
Teresa Stępniak                        
Job Counselor 
http://www.pah.org.pl/ 
W/3 Polish 
Humanitarian 
Action (PAH),      
the Center for 
Refugees and 
Repatriates 
Małgorzata Gebert                           
Head  
http://www.pah.org.pl/ 
W/4 Office for 
Foreigners 
Ewa Piechota                               
Public Relations Officer 
The office is a central authority 
of governmental administration 
responsible for matters with 
respect to entry of immigrants in 
the territory of Poland, their 
transit, granting refugee status, 
asylum, tolerated stay and 
temporary protection. 
http://www.udsc.gov.pl/ 
W/5 Foreign Language 
Teaching 
Foundation 
Lingua Mundi  
Adam Brańko                             
Head 
 
Małgorzata Sas                       
Polish Language Teacher  
Since 2005 the organization has 
been organizing language 
courses for refugees. 
http://www.linguaemundi.pl/ 
W/6 The Office of 
Mazowieckie 
Province Governor  
Andrzej Rybus-Tołłoczko       
Director of Cooperation with Social 
Self-Government. 
http://www.mazowieckie.pl/eng/p
rovince_governor.html 
W/7 Intercultural Center 
for Labor Market 
Adaptation (MCAZ) 
Marta Piekut                    
Intercultural Trainer  
The project has finished, and the 
website has closed. 
W/8 The Helsinki 
Foundation for 
Human Rights 
Agata Forys                           
Program Coordinator of Legal 
Assistance to Refugees and 
Migrants 
The interview concerns mostly 
the issue of legal status of 
immigrants in Poland. 
http://www.hfhr.org.pl/uchodzcy/ 
W/9 Polish Migration 
Forum 
Agnieszka Kosowicz         
President of the Board 
http://www.forummigracyjne.org/
en/ 
W/10 International 
Organization for 
Migration, Poland 
Janina Owczarek                  
Project Coordinator  
Poland belongs to the IOM since 
1992. The office is an active 
initiator of networking for 
immigrants among governmental 
organization and non-profits 
across Poland. 
http://www.iom.pl/ 
W/11 VIA Foundation  Elżbieta Staniszewska          The scope of the foundation is 
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Deputy of the Board labor market integration of all 
underprivileged groups in 
Poland.  
http://www.via.org.pl/ 
W/12 Warsaw Family 
Support Center 
(WCPR) 
Dorota Rosiecka                      
Social Counselor 
The governmental agency which 
implements Individual Integration 
Programs (IIP) in Warsaw. 
W/13 Association for 
Legal Intervention 
(SIP)  
Aleksandra Chrzanowska               
Coordinator of Section for 
Immigrants  
An interesting example of 
enthusiasm for new initiatives 
and integration work for 
immigrants among non-profits. 
http://www.interwencjaprawna.pl/ 
W/14 Foundation Forum 
for Social Diversity  
(FFRS) 
Katarzyna Kubin                       
Deputy of the Board            
Coordinator of the Welcome 
Center in Warsaw 
The Foundation was in the 
process of formation at the time 
of my interview.  
http://www.ffr.org.pl/ 
W/15 The Fu Shenfu 
Migrant Center 
Jacek Gniadek                 
Missioner  
http://www.migrant.pl/ 
W/16 Raszyńska School  Krystyna Starczewska        
Principal 
One of few lower secondary 
schools in Warsaw which is 
famous for education programs 
for refugee pupils.  
http://www.bednarska.edu.pl 
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Appendix 3 
San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium 
 
Table A5 Members of the San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium 
 
1 American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial Counties (ACLU) 
National legal organization advocating for individual rights on a broad array of issues affecting individual 
freedom in the United States.  
http://www.aclUSndiego.org/ 
2 American Friends Service Committee 
Quaker organization founded in 1917 that includes people of various faiths who are committed to social 
justice, peace, and humanitarian service. 
http://www.afsc.org/sandiego 
3 American Immigration Lawyers Association, San Diego (AILA) 
National legal association of immigration lawyers established to promote justice and advocate for fair 
and reasonable immigration law and policy. 
http://www.aila.org/ 
4 Angeles del Desierto 
Volunteer group that does search and rescue operations in the desert and mountainous regions of the 
border between the United States and Mexico. 
http://www.thedesertangels.org 
5 California Immigrant Policy Center 
The Policy Center seeks to inform public debate and policy decisions on issues affecting the state’s 
immigrants and their families in order to improve the quality of life for all Californians. 
http://www.caimmigrant.org 
6 Catholic Charities 
Faith-based community service ministry of the Catholic Diocese of San Diego that advocates for a just 
society on behalf of the poor and promotes self-determination for all. 
http://www.ccdsd.org/ 
7 Catholic Relief Services 
Faith-based  organization that assists the impoverished and disadvantaged worldwide. 
http://www.crs.org/ 
8 Center for Social Advocacy 
Community organization promoting positive attitudes and actions that ensure respect, acceptance and 
equal opportunity for all people. 
http://www.centerforsocialadvocacy.org 
9 City of San Diego Human Relations Commission 
City commission that conducts and promotes activities that foster mutual respect and understanding; 
and protects basic human and civil rights. 
http://www.sandiego.gov/human-relations 
10 Employee Rights Center 
Legal service organization that educates employees about their rights and advocates for them as 
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needed. 
http://www.weberc.net 
11 Equality Alliance 
An effort to build a network for working in coalition across ethnic, cultural, and geographic boundaries 
on issues of equality. 
http://www.equalitysandiego.org 
12 Escondido Human Rights Committee 
Grassroots human rights organizations that educates and advocates on behalf of immigrants and other 
community members in Escondido. 
13 Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice of San Diego County (ICWJ) 
Grass-roots, faith-based organization educating and mobilizing San Diego religious communities to 
support issues and campaigns that will sustain lives with dignity for workers and their families by such 
means as improving wages, benefits, and working conditions. 
http://www.ICWJ.org 
14 International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
One of the first to respond, one of the last to leave. For 75 years, the International Rescue Committee 
has been a leader in humanitarian relief. 
http://www.theirc.org 
15 Little Saigon Foundation 
We shall engage in the economic revitalization, enhancement of social justice, and promotion of cultural 
diversity of Vietnamese communities in San Diego. 
http://www.littlesaigonsandiego.org 
16 National Lawyers Guild, San Diego (NLG) 
Legal association dedicated to the advocacy of immigrants, criminal defendants and other clients. 
http://www.nlg.org 
17 No Border Wall 
No Border Wall is a grassroots coalition of groups and individuals united in our belief that a border wall 
will not stop illegal immigration or smuggling and will not make the United States any safer. 
http://www.noborderwall-take-action.blogspot.com/ 
18 Oceanside Human Rights Council 
Community college based human rights organizations that educates and advocates on behalf of 
immigrants and other community members in Oceanside. 
19 San Diego Foundation for Change 
To create a passionate community of support for progressive leaders and organizations in the San 
Diego/ Tijuana region. 
http://www.foundation4change.org 
20 South Bay Forum 
Non-partisan PAC committed to addressing the educational, socioeconomic, and political needs of the 
San Diego South Bay community while building coalitions with other communities. 
http://www.southbayforum.com/ 
21 Trans-Border Institute 
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The Trans-Border Institute (TBI) was created in 1994 with two main objectives: 1) to promote border-
related scholarship, activities and community at the University of San Diego, and 2) to promote an 
active role for the University in the cross-border community. 
http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/tbi/ 
22 UURISE 
Unitarian Universalists (UUs) are a justice seeking people with a rich history of effecting change by 
taking social action. 
http://uurise.org/ 
 
Source: San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium: http://immigrantsandiego.org/ 
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Appendix 4 
Eleven Principles of the Munich City Integration Policy 
 
 
1. Integration depends on the recognition of common, free and democratic standards. 
2. Integration concerns everybody and is a process of mutual understanding and negotiation in 
the case of conflicting interests. Integration strengthens the sense of solidarity in a community. 
3. Integration in a European city must be based on the promotion of non-isolation and socio-
geographical mix in all sections of the community. 
4. Integration key resources are language skills in both German and a person’s native language. 
5. Integration means recognizing and developing diversity, as well as enabling political 
participation and equal opportunity for involvement in urban society. 
6. Integration can only be achieved if institutions adopt a policy of intercultural orientation and 
intercultural mainstreaming. 
7. Integration means decisive action to combat discrimination and racism. 
8. Integration recognizes the existing potential of the people of Munich. 
9. Integration stands for equal access for all to information, education, culture and the arts, 
sports, job opportunities, housing, social services and healthcare regardless of age, gender, 
skin color, religion, social and cultural origins, disabilities, philosophy, sexual orientation. 
10. All integration measures and the entire municipal policy regarding people of immigrant 
background are checked as regards their impact on women and men, as well as on girls and 
boys. The impact of all measures on the acceptance of lesbians, gays and transgender also 
has to be examined. 
11. Integration must have something specific to offer to each target group. 
 
Source: Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München. (2009). Intercultural 
Integration Concept. Outline. München: Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt 
München. 
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Appendix 5 
IG JMD’s cooperation network for labor market integration of immigrant youth 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
IG – InitiativGruppe Interkulturelle Begegnung und Bildung e.V., Jugendmigrationsdienst 
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Appendix 6 
Interview M/17 with Philip Anderson, a migration expert on the situation of the undocumented 
in Germany.   
 
1) Gibt es Schätzungen, wie viele illegale Immigranten zur Zeit in München wohnen? 
 
Schätzungen sind immer auf diesem Gebiet schwierig. Man geht aber prinzipiell von einer 
Reduzierung der Zahl der Menschen in der Illegalität seit dem EU Beitritt der 
Erweiterungsländer im Mai 2004 aus. Nichtsdestotrotz würde ich nach wie vor von einigen 
Tausenden, womöglich zwischen 10 und 20,000 Personen in der Illegalität in München 
ausgehen. Die wichtige Unterscheidung zwischen „einfach“ („nur“ Schwarzarbeit) und „doppelt 
illegal“ (zusammen mit fehlendem Aufenthaltsstatus) ist auch zu treffen. 
 
2) Was verstehen Sie unter Integrationspolitik? Gibt es eine Integrationspolitik für illegale 
Immigranten in Deutschland, Bayern, München? 
 
An dieser Stelle verweise ich auf das Integrationskonzept der Stadt München (zu beziehen 
über die Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, Kontaktperson: Dr. Margret Spohn). Allerdings schließt 
dieses ansonsten solide und fundierte Konzept „Illegale“ nicht ausdrücklich mit ein – was ich 
sehr bedauerlich finde. 
 
3) Welche Voraussetzungen gibt es für eine erfolgreiche Integration der jungen Immigranten in 
die Aufnahmegesellschaft? 
 
Integration ist unter deutschen Bedingungen ohne Aufenthaltsstatus kaum möglich. Schon die 
jungen Menschen mit unsicherem Status (d.h. mit einer Duldung) haben enorme 
Schwierigkeiten, eine Bildung zu erhalten bzw. eine Ausbildung zu machen. 
Gleichberechtigter Zugang zu Bildung, Erlernen der deutschen Sprache (mit entsprechender 
Sprachförderung), die soziale Integration von Familien, Zugang zu den Errungenschaften des 
Sozialstaates – gerade für junge Menschen – sind alle notwendige Voraussetzungen für eine 
Integration. Allen voran wäre die Möglichkeit, eine Berufsausbildung zu machen, für solche 
Jugendlichen die essentielle Voraussetzung – ohne Aufenthaltstitel ist diese Option aber 
praktisch ausgeschlossen.  
 
4) Wie schätzen Sie die Situation der ausländischen Jugendlichen ohne Papiere in der Schule 
und auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in München? 
 
Die Situation ist sehr schlecht; aber in München immerhin besser als sonst wo, weil die LHS 
München zumindest versucht, den Schulbesuch von Kindern in der Illegalität – innerhalb des 
eng gesetzten rechtlichen  Rahmens – zu ermöglichen. Kinder sollen in der Schule durch 
mündliche Angaben von ihren Eltern mit Migrationshintergrund angemeldet werden können, 
d.h. keine Meldebescheinigung oder Pass oder ähnliches muss vorgelegt werden. Dadurch 
wird das Signal gesendet, dass die Kinder in die Schule kommen sollen – das Recht auf 
Bildung geht in den Augen des Münchner Stadtrats vor. Bis zum Übertritt in die weiterführende 
Schule kann ein punktueller Schulbesuch deshalb erfolgen, dann kommen aber offizielle 
Vorgänge nach außen (Ummeldungen, Übertritte, Prüfungen etc.) und die Kinder tauchen in 
die Illegalität wieder unsichtbar ab. 
 
Eine Ausnahme stellen, private bzw. kirchliche Schulen dar, die sich z. T. öffentlich dazu 
bekennen, Kinder in der Illegalität aufzunehmen (Beispiel: das Privatgymnasium der Jesuiten 
in München). Ihre Begründung: Das Recht auf Bildung ist ein international verbrieftes 
(Menschen-)Recht, das vor aufenthaltsrechtlichen Fragen den Vorrang haben muss. Zugang 
zum Beruf bzw. zu einer Berufsausbildung ist, wie oben ausgeführt, kaum möglich. Solche 
Jugendlichen versuchen schwarz zu jobben und irgendwie zu überleben. Sie sind dadurch 
naturgemäß ungeschützt und maximal ausbeutbar. 
 
5) Was kann man in diesem Zusammenhang noch verbessern? Gibt es irgendwelche pro-aktive 
Maßnahmen? Wo entstehen die Hürden? Wer kann Projekte für illegale Immigranten 
finanzieren? 
 
Es gibt die Schäuble Initiative vom Herbst 2008, den Schulbesuch von Kindern in der Illegalität 
zu ermöglichen. Innenminister Schäuble will anscheinend dieses Thema mit den zuständigen 
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Ministern auf Länderebene aufgreifen. Die Initiative ist zwar löblich, der Minister ist aber qua 
Funktion nicht zuständig, d.h. wird seine Initiative abgelehnt, kann er mit Fug und Recht 
behaupten, er habe sein Bestes getan, die zuständigen Kollegen (d.h. die Kultusminister) 
wollten aber leider nicht… 
 
Zugang zu Integrationskursen nicht vom Aufenthaltsstatus abhängig zu machen, wäre ein 
guter erster Schritt, um die Integration von jungen Menschen in der Illegalität zu ermöglichen. 
Der entscheidende Schritt ist aber – und hier ist der Gesetzgeber auf Bundesebene gefragt – 
der illegale Aufenthalt zu einer Ordnungswidrigkeit von einer Straftat abzustufen. Dies würde 
der gesamte Bereich der Arbeit mit dieser Zielgruppe entkriminalisieren – und die Arbeit vieler 
Professionen von Ärzten/innen zu Sozialpädagogen/innen erleichtern. Zu diesem mutigen 
Schritt ist aber der deutsche Staat m. E. in voraussehbarer Zeit nicht fähig oder willens. Aus 
diesem Grund gibt es  (Ihre letzte Teilfrage) keine offiziellen Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten für 
Projekte für Menschen in der Illegalität und die Förderung ihrer gesellschaftlichen Integration. 
Es gehen nur Projekte mit Verschleierungscharakter, d.h. mit angeblich anderer Zielgruppe.  
   
6) Was hat sich innerhalb der letzten Jahren geändert in der Situation der ausländischen 
Jugendlichen ohne Papiere in München (innerhalb der letzen 25 Jahren)? 
 
Es gibt mehr kommunale Aufmerksamkeit in den letzten Jahren für die Problematik der 
Menschen in der Illegalität insgesamt. Die Kommune München bietet ein Beispiel dafür, dass 
man innerhalb eines eng gestalteten rechtlichen Rahmens, einiges für die Menschen- und 
soziale Rechte dieser Zielgruppe tun kann. (Für den aktuellen Stand der Entwicklung 
kontaktieren Sie Dr. Margret Spohn der Stelle für interkulturellen Arbeit der LHS München). 
Darüber hinaus aber gab es wenig konkrete Änderungen (außer im Einzelfall durch 
gelegentliche Bleiberechtsregelungen oder ein großzügiges Auslegen der 
Ermessensspielräume durch manche Sachbearbeiter/in – gerade bei Jugendlichen). 
Ansonsten stehen Verbesserungen noch aus.  
 
7) Wie kommt man an die Immigranten heran, die an einer Integration bisher kaum Interesse 
zeigten? 
 
Sprachkurse und Beratungsangebote durch Basisinitiative, die Vertrauen in den Communities 
genießen und mit „Illegalen“ zusammenarbeiten, sind sicherlich wichtig. Insgesamt können 
„Outreach“ Projekte, welche die Selbstorganisationen der Migranten erreichen, gefordert. Aber 
dies ist insgesamt unter den herrschenden Bedingungen in Deutschland schwierig, denn 
„Integration“ von „Illegalen“ ist auch nicht von staatlicher Seite erwünscht! Man kann 
deswegen m. E. nicht von einer implizierten „Bringschuld“ diesbezüglich seitens der 
Menschen in der Illegalität (d.h. von einer fehlenden Integrationsbereitschaft) ausgehen. 
 
8) Gibt es und wenn ja, wie entsteht die Netzwerkbildung und Zusammenarbeit mit anderen 
Organisationen, lokalen Regierung, Unternehmen auf dem Gebiet Integration der 
ausländischen Jugendlichen ohne Papiere? 
 
Es gibt kaum eine Netzwerkbildung, so weit mir bekannt, lediglich kleine Netzwerke von 
engagierten Einzelpersonen und ganz wenigen Basisinitiativen, z.B. Cafe 104 oder die 
Anlaufstelle von Ärzte der Welt in München (jeweils medizinische Versorgung und 
Rechtsberatung). Netzwerke spezifisch für Jugendliche existieren, so weit ich weiß, nicht. Die 
meisten Menschen in der Illegalität leben in einer getrennten Lebenswelt. Ihr Hauptziel ist in 
der Regel „nicht auffallen“ und finanziell über die Runden kommen bzw. für das eigene 
(Migrations-) Projekt sparen. 
 
Es verhält sich allerdings anders bezüglich der Arbeitswelt. Menschen in der Illegalität müssen 
arbeiten und die (ethnischen und andere) Netzwerke helfen sich gegenseitig, v. a. wenn es 
um Gelegenheitsjobs geht: privates Baugewerbe, personenbezogene Dienstleistungen, 
Betreuungsaufgaben in Privathaushalten, Reinigungsbewerbe, kleine und mittlere 
Unternehmen mit flexiblem Arbeitsbedarf – diese sind alle Bereiche in denen auch 
Jugendliche in der Illegalität Arbeit finden können. Längerfristige Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten 
ergeben sich in der Regel nur dann, wenn man sich falsche Papiere von guter Qualität 
ergattern kann.      
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9) Wie arbeitet man mit den Einheimischen in München (Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung- 
Sensibilisierung für das Thema: illegale Immigranten)? 
 
Es gibt recht offene Journalisten/innen und Medienvertreter/innen, die vor allem Berichte über 
die soziale und menschenrechtliche Lage verfassen. Politische Aktivitäten der Basisinitiativen 
wie Ärzte der Welt (z.B. Ausstellung über die Lebenssituation und öffentliche 
Diskussionsveranstaltung beim Kulturfestival Tollwood im Dezember 2007, Ausstellung und 
Infoveranstaltungen zum Leben in der Illegalität im Kulturzentrum Gasteig im März 2008) 
zielen auf die Aufklärung der lokalen Bevölkerung ab, und sind wertvoll.  
 
Darüber hinaus hat ein Verein, bestehend aus Wohlfahrtsverbänden, Basisinitiativen und 
städtischen Vertretern im Laufe des Jahres 2008 einen Fonds für die medizinische 
Behandlung von Nichtversicherten ins Leben gerufen (vorrangig „Illegale“). Dieser Fond will 
Gelder für die medizinische Versorgung sammeln und auch öffentliche Aufklärungsaufgaben 
übernehmen. 
       
10) Lassen sich gemeinsame Ziele der lokalen und überregionalen Politik von Integration der 
Menschen ohne Papiere zusammenstellen? 
 
Vor allem sind die Kommunen auf diesem Gebiet aktiv, weil sie die sozialen, bildungs- und 
gesundheitlichen Probleme der Menschen in der Illegalität am Intensivsten mitbekommen. 
Das Thema Menschen- und Sozialrechte ist in das Gremium der Kommunen, den Deutschen 
Städtetag eingebracht worden. Es geht um die (über-) lebenswichtigen Themen wie 
Gesundheitsversorgung, Schulbesuch und Lohnverprellung. Wichtig ist ebenso die Arbeit des 
katholischen Forums (und des daraus hergeleiteten Manifests gleichen Namens) Leben in der 
Illegalität, um die Thematik überregional auf die politische Tagesordnung zu setzen. Bund und 
Länder stellen sich aber bisher quer. Es wird von politischer Seite konsequent verweigert, auf 
dieser Ebene einen Handlungsbedarf zu erkennen. Man könnte es so formulieren: In 
Deutschland wird die zivilgesellschaftliche „Basis“ in der Gesellschaft mit diesen Problemen 
allein gelassen, obwohl hunderttausende von Menschen in der Illegalität – und ihre 
Angehörige in diesem Lande betroffen sind. 
 
11) Wie berücksichtigt man die Anweisungen der EU-Behörden im Bereich Integrationspolitik? 
 
Die Vorgaben der EU-Integrationspolitik entwickeln sich konstant und bringen eine Menge 
Verbesserungen für Zugewanderte mit gesichertem Status (z.B. Impulse für flächendeckende 
Sprach- und Integrationskurse), aber: Menschen in der Illegalität profitieren davon nicht – weil 
rigoros (und auf Betreiben vor allem der Bundesregierung, bzw. des 
Bundesinnenministeriums) zwischen legalen und illegalen Zuwanderern unterschieden wird. 
Eine konsequente Abschottungs- und Ausweisungspolitik, welche zwecks Effizienz EU-weit 
harmonisiert werden soll, ist das Ergebnis. Mit anderen Worten: Menschen in der Illegalität soll 
laut EU Politik immer konsequenter von Strukturen und Leistungen der Integrationspolitik 
ausgeschlossen werden. Man unterscheidet hiermit nach den stereotypen Vorgaben einer 
ordnungspolitisch orientierten Sicht der Dinge zwischen guten/legalen/erwünschten auf der 
einen und schlechten/illegalen/unerwünschten Zuwanderern/innen auf der anderen Seite. 
 
12) Gibt es und wenn ja, wie funktioniert eine internationale Kooperation auf dem Gebiet  
Integration der Jugendlichen ohne Papiere? 
 
Ich kenne keine Kooperationsansätze, weder innereuropäisch oder transatlantisch, spezifisch 
für Jugendliche. Es gibt natürlich lose Vernetzungen auf diesem Gebiet zwischen 
Forschern/innen. Lediglich die Arbeit von PICUM (Platform for International Cooperation on 
Undocumented Migrants) als vernetzende Initiative in Brüssel weist allgemein auf die 
grenzüberschreitenden menschenrechtlichen Kooperationsmöglichkeiten durch Best Practice 
Beispiele (Gesundheit, Schule, Sozialberatung, Arbeit) auf diesem Feld in dieser Richtung. 
 
13) Welche Herausforderungen stehen vor München in Bezug auf die Integration der 
ausländischen Jugendlichen ohne Papiere? 
 
1. Mehr Wissen über die Situation von jungen Menschen in der Illegalität sicherstellen, 2. 
Mehr Bewusstsein darüber in der Bevölkerung erreichen. 3. Die Gesundheitsversorgung 
(Zugang zur Behandlung, Vernetzung, therapeutischer Bedarf, sexuelle Aufklärung, 
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Gesundheitsfond usw.) sicherstellen. 4. Das Thema Ermöglichung des Schulbesuchs als 
Menschenrecht auf Bildung öffentlich und politisch voranbringen. 5. Insgesamt die fehlenden 
Integrationsoptionen für Jugendliche publik machen und politisch offensiv zum Thema 
machen. 6. Zu diesen Themen kommunale, landes- und bundespolitische Partner und 
Verbündete suchen. Stichwort: die bisherige systematische und strukturimmanente Exklusion 
dieser Menschengruppe, vor allem aber der Kinder und  Jugendlichen beseitigen! 
 
 
München, Januar 2009 
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Appendix 7 
Interview M/18 with Ulrich Gammel, verdi 
 
1) Was versteht Ihre Institution/was verstehen Sie  unter Integrationspolitik? 
 
Verdi akzeptiert, dass Deutschland ein Einwanderungsland ist. Daher unterstützen wir 
geregelte Zuwanderung, sprich Migration. Migranten brauchen ausreichende und qualitativ 
hochwertige  Integrationsangebote.  Zugewanderte haben ein Recht auf Integration in die 
Gesellschaft, umgekehrt hat die Gesellschaft das Recht, dass Migranten die 
Integrationsangebote auch nutzen. Integrationsangebote müssen darauf abzielen, den 
Zugewanderten eine Teilhabe am öffentlichen Leben und im Arbeitsmarkt zu ermöglichen. 
 
2) Welche Voraussetzungen gibt es für eine erfolgreiche Integration der jungen Migranten in die 
Aufnahmegesellschaft, allgemein und spezifisch: in die Arbeitswelt?  
 
Sprachkenntnisse und das Angebot der Gesellschaft, sich diese sprachlichen Kenntnisse zu 
erwerben. Auch gehört die Interkulturelle Kompetenz zu diesen Voraussetzungen, denn ohne 
gegenseitige Kenntnisse über die Herkunftsländer ist ein verstehen wollen und ein verstanden 
werden kaum möglich. 
 
3) Wie schätzen Sie die Situation der Jugendlichen mit dem Migrationhintergrund auf dem 
Arbeitmarkt in München? 
 
Sie ist schlechter als die der deutschen Jugendlichen. Die Ausbildungsbeteiligungsquote sank 
in Bayern in den letzten 10 Jahren bei ausländischen Jugendlichen von 40 % auf 25%, bei 
deutschen Jugendlichen sank sie von 71 % auf 65%. 
 
4) In wieweit unterscheidet sie sich von der Situation der deutschen Jugendlichen? Spielt 
Geschlecht der jungen Migranten eine Rolle? 
 
Die Ausbildungsbeteiligungsquote sank in Bayern in den letzten 10 Jahren bei ausländischen 
Jugendlichen von 40 % auf 25%, bei deutschen Jugendlichen sank sie von 71% auf 65%. Ob 
das Geschlecht eine Rolle spiel kann vermutlich bejaht, aber nicht belegt werden. 
 
5) Ist Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung ein Problem in München?   
 
Unabhängig von der Staatsangehörigkeit findet bei Ausbildungsplätzen in den letzten Jahren 
ein „Verdrängungswettbewerb“ statt. Das kann – je nach Branche – auch sogenannte 
Regelarbeitsplätze betreffen. Hier spielen Defizite bei der Schul- und Berufsausbildung eine 
große Rolle. Ein höherer Anteil von ausländischen als deutschen  Schülern verlässt die 
Hauptschule ohne Abschluss, das sind in Bayern über 20%! Klar, dass dies zu faktischen 
Benachteiligungen im Berufsleben führt. 
 
6) Was kann man in diesem Zusammenhang noch verbessern? Gibt es irgendwelche pro-aktive 
Maßnahmen?  
 
Verschiedene Forderungen werden hier von uns aufgestellt: 
- Mehr Investitionen im Bildungsbereich 
- Flächendeckende, ganztägige interkulturelle und qualifizierte Vorschulangebote 
- Eine Schule für alle Kinder, keine Trennung nach Schultypen 
- Anerkennung der Herkunftskultur und –sprachen der Kinder sowie deren Förderung im 
Kindergarten und in der Schule 
- Überarbeitung der Lehrpläne  unter interkulturellen Gesichtspunkten 
 
7) Was hat sich innerhalb der letzten Jahren geändert in der Situation der ausländischen 
Jugendlichen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in München (innerhalb der letzen 25 Jahren)? 
 
In Bayern leben ca. 19% und in München ca. 24 % Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund. In 
Bayern nahm der Anteil der ausländischen Jugendlichen an der Gesamtzahl der 
Auszubildenden in den letzten 15 – 20 Jahren ab. 1994 lag die Zahl der ausländischen 
Jugendlichen noch bei 9,8%, heute liegt er unter 5%! 
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8) Welche Rolle spielt Ihre Institution für die soziale Integration der ausländischen Jugendlichen 
und ihre Integration auf dem Arbeitsmarkt?  
 
Migration braucht Partizipationsmöglichkeiten, Zuwanderung braucht Akzeptanz und Abbau 
von Vorurteilen! Wir fördern die Integration von Migrantinnen und Migranten bei den Wahlen 
zu Betriebs- und Personalräten, sowie zu Jugend- und Auszubildendenvertretungen. Verdi 
richtet auf Bundes-, Landes- und Bezirksebene Arbeitskreise für Migrationspolitik ein. 
 
9) Wie erreichen Sie Ihre Zielgruppen? Wie kommt  man an die Migranten heran, die an einer 
Integration bisher kaum Interesse zeigten (Programme, Projekte, Beratung, 
Förderungsangebote)? 
 
Wir laden Vertreter der Migranten in unserer Organisation zu Sitzungen, Veranstaltungen und 
Aktionen ein. Wir führen Seminare zu migrationspolitischen Themen durch, wie z.B. Gegen 
Rassismus und Rechtsradikalismus und für den Erwerb von mehr Multikultureller Kompetenz. 
Es gibt bei verdi eine „Richtlinie zur Migrationspolitik“ und eine „Programmatische Erklärung 
zur Migrationspolitik.“ 
 
10) Wie entsteht die Netzwerkbildung und Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Organisationen, lokalen 
Regierung, Unternehmen auf dem Gebiet Integration der ausländischen Jugendlichen im 
Bereich Arbeitsmarkt? 
 
In den betrieblichen Vertretungsorganen Betriebs- und Personalräte, gewerkschaftliche 
Vertrauensleute wird die Zusammenarbeit von deutschen und ausländischen Kollegen 
tagtäglich gelebt und geprobt. Zur Erkämpfung von migrationspolitischen Zielen, wie z.B. einer 
Wahlplattform zu Landtagswahlen, werden die in Frage kommenden Organisationen 
eingeladen, dies organisiert unser Dachverband DGB. 
 
11) Wie arbeitet man mit den Einheimischen (Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung- Sensibilisierung für 
das Thema: Integration der Jugendlichen mit Migrationhintergrund)? – (Programme, 
Projekte?) 
 
Es werden auf Sitzungen und Seminaren Workshops zum Thema Migration gebildet. Wir 
sehen gemeinsam Filme und Vorträge an und diskutieren diese kritisch. Die 
Zusammensetzung ist gemischt, deutsche und Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund. 
Bei fast jeder gesellschaftspolitischen Aktivität von verdi sind deutsch und ausländische 
Kollegen miteinander aktiv: Streik, Demonstrationen, Kundgebungen. 
 
12) Lassen sich gemeinsame Ziele der lokalen und überregionalen Politik von Integration 
zusammenstellen?  
 
Ja, dies haben wir jetzt vor den Landtagswahlen in Bayern gemacht. Es gibt ein mehrseitiges 
Programm „Integration durch Partizipation“ welches die Gewerkschaften (DGB, IGM, verdi 
u.a.) und die Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Ausländerbeiräte Bayerns erstellt haben und der Politik 
und den Wählern vortragen, veröffentlichen. 
 
13) Wie berücksichtigt man die Anweisungen der EU-Behörden im Bereich Integrationspolitik? Ist 
eine einheitliche EU-Integrationspolitik  in der Zukunft möglich (persönliche Meinung)?  
  
Antwort: Wenn alle demokratischen Kräfte an einem Strang ziehen ist es möglich. Durch EU-
Antidiskriminierungs-Richtlinien wurden die Grundlagen für das deutsch „Allgemeine 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz“ geschaffen und das ist gut so! 
 
14) Gibt es und wenn ja wie funktioniert eine internationale Kooperation auf dem Gebiet  
Integration der Jugendlichen im Bereich Arbeitsmarkt. Gibt es einen Informationsaustausch 
mit amerikanischen Städten (Transatlantischer Austausch)? 
 
Antwort: Es gibt solche Projekte, wobei der Befragter hier keine derzeitigen nennen kann. Als 
Schüler hat er selbst Brieffreundschaften nach US / Dayton gehabt, was für die internationale 
Verständigung und Völkerfreundschaft persönlichkeitsbildende Akzente setzte. 
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15) Welche Herausforderungen stehen vor Ihrer Institution in Bezug auf die Integration der 
ausländischen Jugendlichen? 
 
Antwort: die Gewerkschaften haben hier noch viel zu leisten und gehen es an. Die Integration 
innerhalb der Gewerkschaft und der deutschen Gesellschaft ist eine Querschnittsaufgabe für 
verdi, die „Migrantinnen und Migranten“ wurden auf unserem Bundeskongress 2007 
satzungsgemäß als „Gruppe“ innerhalb der Organisation aufgewertet. Die Schaffung von 
Akzeptanz für Zuwanderung ist eine zentrale Aufgabe der wir uns stellen. Mit Vereinbarungen 
gegen Diskriminierung und mit Initiativen in den Betrieben für Gleichbehandlung, Tolerenz und 
Akzeptanz wollen wir dies erreichen. 
Politische Forderungen dazu sind: 
- Gezielte Förderung Jugendlicher mit Migrationshintergrund im Übergang von Schule und 
Berufsleben 
- Mehr jugendliche Migranten müssen in den Öffentlichen Dienst eingestellt werden 
- Mehr Ausbilder mit Migrationshintergrund einstellen 
- Vermehrte Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsabschlüsse bei uns 
- Spezielle berufliche Weiterbildungsangebote für ausländische Kolleg/innen. 
- Regelmäßige Bayerische Berichte zum Ausbildungs- und Arbeitsmarkt unter dem Aspekt 
Migration. 
 
 
München, August 2008 
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Appendix 8 
Summary report of IOM consultations with public officials and NGOs in Warsaw in the years 
2005-2006  
 
 
 
“EMPOWERING MIGRANTS: INTEGRATION THROUGH INFORMATION AND TRAINING OF 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND NGOs” 
 
IOM Warsaw 
 
Final conclusions and recommendations 
 
The compiled conclusions and recommendations were formulated during the national meetings 
(debate and national workshops) that were organized in the frames of the project. 
 
1. INTEGRATION POLICY: 
 
1.1 Integration of immigrants is a multilateral process in which both immigrant communities 
and the host society are engaged. Integration requires activities from both sides. 
1.2 The creation of integration policy targeting immigrants, not only refugees, is required. 
1.3 Regarding regular and irregular migrants, the possibility of regularization of the 
residence/stay was identified as a factor that influences the process of integration.    
Specific problems of groups of irregular immigrants who live in Poland and who have 
already integrated into the Polish society were identified and presented by representatives 
of migrant communities. Those immigrants, mostly Vietnamese and Armenians, lack of 
possibility of regularization of their residence/stay, because of the following reasons: 
- lack of identification document from country of origin and fear of contacting the 
administration of that country 
- fear of contacting the Polish administration, fear of expulsion 
The creation of a possibility to regularize the stay and receive work permit for the mentioned 
groups of irregular migrants in Poland might bring economic benefits for the Polish state. The 
lack of possibility of getting the residence permit and work permit restrains the integration into 
the labor market and generates the growth of the black market.  
 
2. INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS – COOPERATION AMONG INSTIUTIONS AND EXCHANGE 
OF INFORMATION 
 
2.1 The cooperation and exchange of information among public administration, NGOs, and 
migrant communities on migrant integration issues are necessary elements of effective 
activities supporting the process of integration of immigrants. 
2.2 The access of immigrants and institutions from different sectors (public administration, 
NGOs, migrant community organizations) to information on migrant issues is a basic 
condition of successful integration. 
 
3. INTEGARATION OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE LABOR MARKET 
 
BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS 
 
3.1 The following barriers and problems of access of immigrants to the labor market were 
identified: 
- complicated, two stages (promise to receive work permit and work permit at the 
later stage) and time-consuming procedure to receive work permit which cost has 
to be covered by employers; moreover employers are obligated to deliver in 
persons all documents concerning the foreign employees to a labor office 
- lack of possibility to regularize the stay and receive work permit (see 1.3.) 
- lack of sufficient knowledge of the Polish language  
- lack of knowledge on legal rules in Poland 
- lack of proper qualifications (qualifications that are in demand) 
- possibility of illegal employment  
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- high costs of employment which employers have to cover 
- very low payments for the unqualified workers 
- very often fee-for-task agreements are offered by employers; the migrant workers 
who are employed under this agreement are lack of employee’s social benefits 
- negative stereotypes on foreigners 
 
3.2 The following solutions of identified problems were proposed: 
 
- simplification of procedure to receive residence permit; one stage procedure 
should exchange two stage procedure - residence permit and work permit should 
be contained in one legal document 
- creation of effective professional information system and legal advice service  
- increase the number of employees in public administration responsible for 
migration issues, including the access of immigrants to the labor market (in 
Masovian Voivodeship, average number of beneficiaries applying for work permit 
per year is 30.000, around 6.000 written answers are prepared and provided to 
beneficiaries per year; currently the administration staff responsible for issuing of 
work permit includes 13 people) 
- professional training for the public administration staff  responsible for migration 
issues, including those dealing with the access of immigrants to the labour 
market; the training should be carried out in order to increase the level of 
knowledge on the access of foreigners to the labour market and on general 
immigrants’ issues. 
- creation of possibility for immigrants to attend free language courses 
 
LABOR MARKET POLICY 
 
3.3 The economic indicators and economic benefits should determinate the access and flow 
of immigrants to the labor market. 
3.4 The need for the following activities in the field of labor market policy and immigration 
policy was identified: detailed analysis of the labor market in relation to the current 
demographic changes; identification of the economic sectors and professions in which 
there is a need for migrant workers. Access of migrant workers to these sectors and 
professions should be facilitated. 
 
BLACK MARKET 
 
3.5 The problem of the black market was identified. The government should counteract the 
black market because: 
- the black market negatively affected the State Treasury 
- in the black market, the workers rights are not respected 
3.6 In the current legal frames, employment on the black market is profitable for both foreign 
workers and employers. However, the punishment much more affects a foreign worker 
than an employer. 
 
4. ACCESS OF IMMIGRANTS TO THE HEALTH CARE 
 
4.1 The children of foreigners do not have access to the health care including vaccinations. 
This practice is a violation of the basic human rights. 
4.2 The foreigners very often are sent from one doctor to another, from one hospital to 
another. The reason behind the fact is the lack of information from which source the cost 
will be covered. The public heath care service in Poland does not possess sufficient 
knowledge on immigrants groups in Poland, on their situation and rights. Therefore, the 
information campaign and seminars on the access of foreigners to the health care system 
targeting people working in health care system is needed.  
4.3 The immigrants do not have sufficient information on access to the health care system 
and their rights. The information campaign on foreigners’ access to the health care system 
in Poland targeting third country nationals is needed.  
4.4 The lack of coordination with regards to the access of foreigners to the health care system 
was identified. 
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4.5 The administrative discrepancy that functions on the practical level was identified. A 
foreigner who wants to be insured in the National Health Fund is requested to provide the 
identification number PESEL that is given with the residence card. However, to get a 
residence card the insurance is needed.  
 
5. INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE CULTURAL FIELD 
 
5.1 Regarding the integration of immigrants in the cultural field, it was agreed that bicultural 
identity is a safe identity for both migrants and host society. The bicultural identity includes 
the elements of the culture of the country of origin and the culture of host society. The 
migrant communities should have the right and possibility to express there identity and 
culture of origin and participate in the culture of host country adding their own cultural 
background rooted in the country of origin. 
5.2 The need for information about possibilities of fundraising of organization of cultural 
events and for improvement of organizational skills (including preparing the project – 
financial and logistic part) of representatives of migrant community organizations was 
identified. 
 
 
Compiled by Janina Owczarek 
IOM Warsaw 
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Appendix 9 
Selected parts of the interviews with the organizations in Warsaw1104  
(translated from Polish)  
 
 
Interview W/1 
The ‘Ocalenie’ (Survival) Foundation - Dorota Przymies  
 
On integration measures:  
With illegal immigrants there is the problem that most of the NGOs in Poland are dependent on 
the EU Funds, which do not allow supporting illegal immigrants. So, the organizations have to help 
within their own capacities… You know, I cannot state it officially that we help illegal people. But 
we turned nobody down here. This is our rule. 
We do lots of things from our own pocket. We have started a so called “chip in” action: gathering 
people and funds for offering immediate service, if such is needed, to the immigrants without 
papers, like health care or legal counseling.  
 
On integration challenges:  
People are not aware of the integration challenges immigrant face here in Poland and in Warsaw. 
In fact, the best way to find out about them is learning by doing. Only after I  had started 
employing immigrants in our organization could I finally fully understand what you have to go 
through applying for a work permit, or what I have to explain to them as an employer, for example 
basic rules about signing work contracts. As far as I know we are the only NGO  that employs 
foreigners in Poland for its projects. 
 
On integration policy:  
There is a lack of NGOs and practitioners who are experienced in running integration programs, 
especially  preparation courses for labor market integration. There are no special programs for 
immigrant youth. In fact, many of refugee youth here belong to the lost generation. No transition 
programs exist for them: school-to-work. We need a synchronized campaign to change it. Only 
few legal service providers exist for immigrants, but it is not enough. We have to expand the offer.  
 
On network-building:  
With the City of Warsaw we have great connections. They understand us and appreciate what we 
do and the new City’ Strategy for the Development of Social Problems is promising. Neither can I 
complain about various forms of consultations. There is a good cooperation with governmental 
institutions like the Department for Migration Policy or the Office for Foreigners, but it involves only 
consultations. Somebody writes a good report on that, adds it to the list of the organization’s 
activities and that’s it. In fact, immigrants, who should be the real beneficiaries, do not profit from 
this networking.  
 
                                                     
1104
 The selected parts mostly refer to points pertaining to interview question groups, which have been 
discussed in the section on integration work in Warsaw, see subchapter 5.2.4.  
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Interview W/2  
Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) - Teresa Stępniak  
 
On integration challenges/undocumented:  
Everybody who comes here needs an individual modeling, “reshaping.” I usually say, “give me a 
man and I will find him or her a job.” But it is not so easy. First of all, they have to speak Polish. 
Then they have to be flexible enough to adapt to the needs of the Polish labor market. We need to 
make them realize that getting a job often requires giving up their ambitions. In fact, it is easier for 
highly skilled immigrants to accept a job below their qualifications than for those who only 
graduated from high schools. They say: I have Matura [high school certificate in Poland], so I will 
not clean!” Moreover, a lot of refugees have qualifications that do not match our needs here, like 
Chechens who have qualifications in the war industry. They ask me quite often: “Do you have 
some war-related work for me?”  
 
The undocumented are of course here among us. I am trying to help everybody who comes to us. 
We are quite successful in finding immigrants some very short term jobs, for example hand 
clappers for TV shows. As the TV moderators say, they are needed there, they are “colorful” and 
therefore attractive for the media. 
 
On cooperation and campaigns:  
Unfortunately, I do not know many organizations which provide job counseling for immigrants, I 
used to cooperate with the Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation. It was very rewarding 
for both sides. But they do not exist anymore.  
 
When it comes to international cooperation, there are many projects, but I do not take part in 
them. Please ask my younger coworker. I am trying not to develop and expand, but to be useful. I 
am 62, maybe I will still work two years. I have no capacities to organize campaigns, no time, no 
resources. I can really hardly “breathe” here. In fact, I was happy to be able to find some time for 
the interview with you.  
 
 
Interview W/3  
Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) - Małgorzata Gebert 
 
On integration measures: 
We are very happy to have some volunteers who provide free Polish language courses, so we do 
not need to check the legal status of those who come here. When the course is funded by the 
governmental or EU money, then problems arise, and many absurd and awkward situations occur. 
For example, during the course of the program, immigrant may lose their status when they receive 
a negative decision on their application for asylum. Consequently we would be supposed to throw 
them out…  
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On reaching out:  
We do not do run any large scale information campaigns; we do not have any funds for it. We did 
try and we will try gain releasing our regular refugee newspaper. We were successful doing this, 
but after 3 years our funding ended. Now we have gotten money so we plan to issue the paper in 
three languages. We have a good network of distributors: like employment agencies or family 
support centers, so we hope to succeed again. We do not reach out to the residents of the city 
with any campaigns, we do it once a year, organizing a Refugee Day. 
 
 
Interview W/4  
Office for Forigners - Ewa Piechota 
 
On integration challenges and integration measures: 
Learning Polish language is only a right not an obligation for those who are in refugee centers. In 
fact, few are interested in learning Polish, usually 4 to 10 refugees take part in the language 
courses in the centers. Usually 2-4 hours a week. Women and men take part in classes separately 
because of their cultural rules and beliefs. Quite often women do not attend courses at all. 
Foreigners very often skip courses and do not prepare for classes. Consequently they do not 
improve. Learning in the refugee centers can be regarded only as pre-learning, so that a foreigner 
can communicate with social workers and all necessary welfare institutions he or she has to get in 
touch with.  
 
Moreover, it is important to note that the Office for Foreigners is not supposed to provide any 
integration programs and courses, but is only responsible for issuing a positive or negative 
decisions regarding foreigner’s application for humanitarian protection in Poland.  
 
Since the beginning of its work, the Office has been trying to guarantee foreigners best possible 
measures for their pre-integration. Among others, it enables all possible NGOs and international 
organizations to work in the refugee centers. A number of new organizations with new services for 
immigrants has been rapidly increasing recently.  
 
 
Interview W/5  
Foreign Language Teaching Foundation Lingua Mundi - Małgorzata Sas 
 
On integration measures:  
We have been on the language education market for 13 years; however we started providing 
Polish language courses for refugees only in 2005.  
We realized that the language course is a bit too little, and the extension of language courses to 
workforce-readiness programs is needed. If we had more money we would organize job-
preparation courses. We would be more eager to cooperate with other organizations so that we 
would provide vocational language courses and they would organize trainings. 
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We used to have lecturers and workshops on job searching tools and about job agencies, but 
unfortunately the cooperation with employment agencies stopped, as the external financial aid to 
the program was canceled. Because the scale of immigration is not big enough, Polish 
government does not want to invest money in integration programs. However, the recent changes 
in the discourse on immigration seem to be promising.  
 
Now we are running two EU projects: one from the EU Refugee Fund for people with a 
humanitarian protection status and the other new one for third country nationals.  
Consequently, we cannot accept illegal immigrants for the EU-funded courses. We used to have a 
small course financed by our Foundation, which functioned quite well, but now our budget is 
reduced. But I have to admit there were no people this year with this sort of problem. Nobody with 
illegal status came to us this year. 
 
On reaching out to immigrants:  
Still we are looking for the ways to reach out with our courses to eligible immigrants.  
We set up an internet portal www.polskanadobre.eu [Poland for good]. Still we cannot tell you 
anything about the results. We want to invite immigrants to collaboration and exchange of ideas 
on how the integration services should be provided. We would like to find out who can be a 
beneficiary of our program.  
 
It is hard to estimate how many of our clients are young, as we do not have any statistics. Most of 
them are over 20 years old. We’re not planning to organize any courses for immigrant youth in this 
year. In fact, we used to have a language course for the youth but because Chechens were 
overrepresented there and they stirred up conflict with others, we gave the courses up. However, 
we do have individual consultation open for anybody from out clients, so everybody, including 
young immigrants can come to us and talk about their problems and get our advice.  
 
On integration challenges: 
Immigrant on the Polish labor market face lots of problems getting a job, but I would not call it 
discrimination. I would say it is natural and logical that an employer wants to employ somebody 
whose qualifications can be more applicable and can be recognized. But there are few exceptions. 
For example, we used to have an advertisement that read “I employ all: both black or yellow.” We 
knew this employer; he has a very good experience with refugees.  
 
I do not think that Poles are discriminatory, but it should be taken for granted that some time is 
needed to get used to immigrants. Many Polish citizens might not tolerate Muslim immigrants 
rolling out their carpets and starting pray on the floor during the school breaks, as they do in our 
school. 
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Interview W/6  
The Office of Masovian Province Governor - Andrzej Rybus-Tołłoczko 
 
On network-building: 
At the beginning of the year 2008 four NGOs, based in Warsaw initiated consultation rounds with 
us about the challenges of immigrant integration in the city. We started regular meetings and 
established The Forum for Foreigners. Now we intend to meet every three months with local 
NGOs and organizations engaged in working with immigrants in the voivodeship. We are actually 
open for everybody who wants to come. It is a sort of information bazaar for us: getting to know 
what is going on around the subject of immigrants. The meetings are also supposed to integrate 
clerks from our office and raise awareness of the importance of the issue in many sectors. 
However, it is very challenging to encourage business sector for any sort of sponsorship or 
involvement in our initiatives. In fact, many companies have recently given up financing some local 
NGOs here… 
 
We are about to start out new project Information Center for Foreigners in cooperation with the 
Polish Migration Forum, and the Association for Legal Intervention. It is difficult to say what will 
come next. As you probably know, there is no integration policy and there is no strategy for 
integration either nationally in Poland or locally in Warsaw. The Forum is one step towards its 
formation.  
 
 
Interview W/7 
Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation (MCAZ) - Marta Piekut 
 
On integration-measures: 
Currently many initiatives within the EU seek to find out the needs for integration work, and 
whether planned projects can be of any use. People exchange best practices, write 
recommendations, and organize conferences … I am not sure what is their outcome. Looking at 
our national policies nothing has changed. I can imagine that more time is needed to implement 
any recommendations on integration policies at the national level,  
 
More years are needed if not dozens of years to take any action, as long as we rely only on single 
short-term projects, we still cannot talk about any national migration or integration strategy. In fact 
all of these projects are treated here [in Poland] as experiments. No matter what comes out of 
them, the aim is to collect data, learn more about local situation etc. The fact that somebody can 
get a job through the program is only a positive side-affect. Because the most important thing is to 
experiment, to spread information, and to pass your recommendations to the higher level.  
 
Our projects had to end, a couple of publications were published, but the idea is not continued…  
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Interview W/8  
The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights - Agata Forys 
 
On integration measures: 
I am talking a lot about money, but unfortunately if you want to do something for immigrants you 
have to have the means to do it. So far there have been no resources from the State. The only 
existing Individual Integration Programs are illusionary. In fact, social workers have so many 
clients in the Family Support Centers that individual counseling is almost impossible. Providing for 
some basic needs, like finding accommodation for refugees in Warsaw, is already a big problem, 
let alone individual counseling. 
 
I think that for our private sector it is still a little bit too early to think about sponsoring any 
integration programs for immigrants. It is much easier to for businessmen to raise money for 
building a well in Sudan or building a school. Let’s put it bluntly, they are not as controversial as 
sponsoring for example Chechens in Poland. In fact, our service to immigrants may be disturbing 
for some people.  
 
We are planning to develop more projects for immigrants coming to Poland for reasons other than 
humanitarian. In general the number of refugees is decreasing, although you can never foresee 
what will happen in the near future. 
 
 
Interview W/9 
Polish Migration Forum - Agnieszka Kosowicz 
 
On reaching out: 
My ideal is to network with other organizations for the common goal: to raise awareness about 
immigrants in Poland and to get immigrants acquainted with Poles and Polish life.  
 
I think now that there is a lot more action in the field of immigrant integration. Because of the new 
EU funds and grants, the subject is “no longer so exotic.” Many interesting activities are on the 
rise. There is still chaos though, as there is no common understanding on what the integration is. 
People still do not realize that pre-integration measures are very important for those who are 
waiting to get their status legalized in the country.  
 
On integration measures:  
The library project Network for Knowledge on Migration which I currently run with over 10 libraries 
across Poland is one of the indirect measures for immigrant integration. In the project we try to 
distribute books and raise funds for publications on migration research, integration, and anti-
discrimination movements. 
 
We also run the Online Migration Info Service. First it was supposed to address Poles who would 
like to inquire about legal rights of foreigners, intercultural events etc. It turned out very quickly that 
more immigrants are approaching us than natives. They are looking for our assistance on various 
  
379 
issues ranging from legalization of the status to job market and education offers. The project 
operates thanks to the EU funds, but we do not differentiate between who is legal here who is not 
among the users of our service. In fact, they seek help anonymously. More or less we realize who 
uses this info-line…  
 
 
Interview W/10  
International Organization for Migration IOM - Janina Owczarek 
 
On integration concept: 
I need to refer you to our official IOM definition of integration, which we adopt as the principle of 
functioning of our organization. You can find it on our website. For us integration is a two way 
process, which relates to adaptation. Adaptation is adjustment and is not as strong as 
assimilation. By adapting you do not need to reject your cultural identity. Assimilation entails 
adjusting to only one of the sides, and usually ends up with the rejection of your own culture. 
 
On integration challenges: 
There is a very slow change in Poland in the Polish doctrine of labor market protectionism for 
Poles. Polish law still promotes Polish people on the labor market. The doctrine resulted from a 
bad economic situation after the Polish transition period. At that time, people believed that they 
have to secure their position against foreigners. We strongly believe it should be changed. Labor 
market should be open for immigrants to fulfill the current niches. Moreover, we shouldn’t expect 
that foreigners would come here only for a short period of time and leave soon.  
 
On network building: 
We started a good platform for networking, both nationally and internationally within the EU project 
Empowering Migrants: Integration through Information and Training of Public Officials and NGOs, 
which took place in Poland, Czech, Slovakia, and Hungary from May 2005 till April 2006. We were 
examining the situation on the Polish labor market for immigrants and their integration and 
compared it with the situations in the countries of our project partners. We conducted research 
among clerks and employers in Warsaw, focusing on four core aspects of integration: culture, 
labor market, access to health care, and too a lesser extent education. At the end of the project 
we invited NGOs, public officials, and migrant organizations in Poland to take part in a series of 
workshops and discussions on intercultural trainings and integration of immigrants in Poland. For 
many participants it was the first chance to meet the representatives of migrant organizations. We 
have published the results and recommendation in the report, which has been widely read.  
I can send you per email the summary of the recommendations. 
 
On integration measures: 
At the time of our running the project most of the Polish NGOs did not deal with any services 
aimed at economic migrants. They were restricted by the available EU funds only to the programs 
for refugees. Only recently with the new EU pool of money for third country nationals has it 
changed, so that many organizations started switching focus of their work to new target groups.  
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Having good experience with the project, now we have just stared building the Platform of 
Cooperation for Migration Strategy in Poland. By the same token, we try to promote the idea that 
migration can bring about good benefits if it is only governed in a good way.  
 
 
Interview W/11  
VIA Foundation - Elżbieta Staniszewska 
 
On integration measures: 
We are quite a new organization. Since our beginning we stared organizing psychological and 
legal counseling for refuges, and we have contracts with the Warsaw Family Support Center.  
We still do not have any programs for the youth, but we are planning on organizing one in the near 
future.  
 
We always start our courses with so called mobilization activities or integration activities, which 
allow each participant to learn about the diversity of cultures we have here: celebrating different 
holidays of the immigrants’ host countries, or cooking together.  
In fact, people best integrate when they are in touch with people of another culture. For example, I 
strongly oppose the trend to segregate Chechens into separate courses.  
We often organize some excursions together or so called immersion integration courses showing 
new immigrants how to find a doctor, a job advertisement, or even how to validate a bus ticket. 
Personally I think that a right integration takes place when they [immigrants] are led by the 
organization like ours. We try to disperse them and mingle them with us. So we do not do so much 
on job market integration but social integration. There are many social problems, society is not so 
open. For example, immigrants face many problems with renting a flat in Warsaw… 
 
 
Interview W/12  
Warsaw Family Support Center - Dorota Rosiecka 
 
On integration concept and integration measures:  
Implementing national Individual Integration Programs, we cannot rely our work here on any 
formal national definition of integration. It does not actually exist. Only the fields of work for 
immigrants integration are regulated by law: cash benefits for maintenance, coverage of cost of 
learning Polish, and contributions to health insurance and guidance services, like finding 
accommodation. 
When it comes to the question about national integration policy I would like to escape it and in a 
diplomatic way refer you to the ladies from the national Bureau for Social Policy, they are 
responsible for integration policy, I would not like to take a stance on that if I may.  
 
You can imagine, sometimes it is very difficult, we have to stick to the rules of law and we cannot 
provide help to those who are still waiting for the decision on their legal status. Sometimes it is 
really heart-breaking when we have to refuse assistance, but we are dealing with the 
governmental money here. It is not a matter of our good or bad intention.  
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In our work we can see many integration challenges for newcomers here, especially for those from 
some particular ethnic groups. Sometimes we think that immigrants would function better here if 
they quickly become self-sufficient and independent of their family members and break away from 
their ethnic groups.  
The fastest integration happens among people from Ukraine or Belarus. We do not like to talk 
about conflicts, but really some problems can be observed among Chechens. We heard rumors 
that when they are mixed with other they behave much better. On the other hand, getting 
feedback from our clients on their language courses we used to hear that they did not feel good 
there because there were to many Chechens. 
 
We do not have lots of teenagers as clients here. But soon we are starting a new project 
Integration towards Self-sufficiency for disadvantaged social groups, which is also supposed to 
target immigrant youth. We are still struggling to figure out how to reach immigrant youth for the 
program. 
 
 
Interview W/13  
Association for Legal Intervention (SIP) - Aleksandra Chrzanowska 
 
On network-building and integration measures: 
No coherent integration policy exists. Moreover, we can’t say that the institutions which deal with 
foreigners cooperate with each other. 
When the Office for Foreigners is responsible for dealing with candidates for refugee status, as 
they called them, they do not think about very crucial first experience of immigrants with the host 
society which is detrimental for their future integration. We were trying to make the Office realize 
that they should take care of the time period when asylum seekers are waiting for the decisions. If 
you want to talk about a reasonable integration process for immigrants you should think about 
their integration from the very moment they arrive in Poland, and not from the time when their 
status becomes legal. Legalization procedures sometimes last many months or years. Letting 
them just eat and drink in refugee centers but not thinking about their integration is not very smart. 
Learning self-sufficiency within a couple of days, which many would expect of immigrants once 
they have obtained legal status, is simply unrealistic. The Office did not take our arguments 
seriously. The officials there think that it is not worth investing in people if we still do not know if 
the people have to leave the country soon. Maybe now the situation is slowly changing and they 
start to cooperate with us. So far we have had two meetings with them.  
 
Few labor market integration programs exist. A very good project the Intercultural Center for Labor 
Market Adaptation functioned very well. Unfortunately its funding ended. Since one year it does 
not exist any more, and the foreigners keep coming to us and asking where they can sign up for 
similar courses. 
 
Neither do I know anything about services for immigrant youth. It is an enormous problem…  
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Interview W/14 
Foundation Forum for Social Diversity (FFRS) - Katarzyna Kubin  
 
On network-building:  
From our side, we were very open to cooperation. It was necessary for us, because in order to be 
treated seriously we had to have a stable partner. We did not have anybody, none of the more 
established institutions wanted to cooperate with us. So we started building our organization on 
our own, from scratch… Only when we started passionately organizing our Mobile Immigrant 
Consultation Point did others get interested. Now we know that we started from the wrong point. 
First you have to develop your innovative ideas. Once you put them into practice and show that 
they work, you should then set up your organization and form partnerships. 
 
Now we have won the EU grant for both mobile and permanent points. We are staring this month 
and we will have more to say in a few month. The composition of our team has changed and 
grown. For half a year we started gathering people knowledgeable about the procedures of 
legalization and integration into the Polish labor market system. In fact some of them, mostly from 
Ukraine and Belarus, had to go trough similar procedures of getting adjusted to the reality here.  
 
 
Interview W/15  
Fu Shenfu Migrant Center - Jacek Gniadek 
 
On integration concept and measures: 
We were established in 2005 by the Divine Word Missionaries. The idea was to provide legal 
counseling, language courses and socialization activities for all immigrants irrespective of their 
legal status. Most of those who come to the Center are Vietnamese, who have still an 
unauthorized stay in Poland and work illegally.  
 
Our stance on people without papers can be summarized by three claims of John Paul II in his 
Message for the World day of Migrants and Refugees in 1996: “no man is illegal,” “everybody has 
the right to emigrate,” and “everybody has the same rights as persons regardless of possessing 
citizenship.” The goal of the organization is to pave the way to the legalization of anybody who 
wants to stay in Poland.  
 
On reaching out: 
We want to reach out with our service to remote places on the outskirts of the city to those who 
are not able to commute to the Center. For example, now we go once a week to Vietnamese and 
Chinese communities in remote Wólka Kosowska.  
 
Now many organizations open their offices in Warsaw, they advertise their Polish language 
courses and are waiting for clients. I teach in a Vietnamese bar and commute on my own. I started 
a year ago, I did not know any Chinese person there. Through one contact I was able to get to 
know the community better. What will come out of this: I do not know, I do not care, the most 
important thing is that thanks to my presence there I show them that I am not afraid of talking to 
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foreigners. I also show it to other Poles: “look at me; there is nothing to be afraid of when living 
with immigrants.” 
 
On integration challenges: 
Integration problems stem from the fact that many of immigrants do not have a work permit or can 
use social benefits. The problem is for example with Africans or Chechens, they are used to social 
benefits here, they use it as long as they can. Asians, if I may generalize, want to work, they are 
real entrepreneurs. They want to have their own business, this is their dream: to be independent 
of the machinery: the state.  
 
If immigrants have a work permit they do not need any integration projects, like cooking courses 
for example: they will come for the first time, they will eat and then they would never come again. 
And then the organizers have problems how to find the target groups. In fact, first you have to test, 
examine the environment. Even if you have great ideas, they should meet real needs.  
 
 
Interview W/16 
Raszyńska School - Krystyna Starczewska 
 
On reaching out: 
In our school we have created the culture of acceptance and tolerance. We adopted special 
education program: “Diversity that enriches us”, and within the program we run several diversity 
projects. We experience lots of challenges in dealing with cultural differences in our school. We 
have to teach kids some basic rules, for example that girls are equal to boys. However, we also 
learn a lot working with many refugee kids. We try to melt with them and we do not have any 
cases of aggressions or larger conflicts. We also reach out to parents and school community 
through our intercultural festivals.   
 
Most of immigrant students come from refugee centers in Warsaw, the Office for Foreigners 
usually send them to us. We do not check papers; everybody can come here. They do not need to 
pay for the school. Thanks to our scholarship funds we are able to raise money for their education. 
Moreover, we also try to find volunteers for extra tutorials for many refugees kids we have here. 
  
We are quite unique as most of public schools do not want to take refugees students, who might 
lower their performance rankings. Moreover, it is also a big challenge to make parents accept the 
fact that refugee kids can have some privileges, like they do not need to pay tuition, as it is 
common in non-public schools like ours, and they can have extra tutorials.  
 
We still do not focus so much on the career development of our immigrant kids. We think that they 
first need to be immersed in education and develop their potential. Our task is to educate and 
integrate immigrant students.  
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